Of course I dc^gfe m^mtl^^^^^^laactipn1s thusjbe cornel, m^ftial actions, AS was said in §„§ 41 — 51, 62, 63, " no^effg^ en&jbles us to. assimilate ^MindLan^ Motion. I am merelj showing a p(]^csJleUsjai between a certain physical^evolutiox and the cofreEEive psychicaTevqi^tion.
§ 180." That mental phenomena constitute a series is a doctrine of old standing, and one the general truth of which none call in question. As we have seen, however, it is to be understood in a qualified sense. When the facts are c<Jhtemplated objectively, it becomes manifest that though the changes constituting intelligence. approach to a single succession, they do not absolutely form one — that there are constantly being performed actions of an intelligent kind which are not present to consciousness— and that, through the many gradations between completely-conscious actions and completely-unconscious ones, the psychical changes merge into those which we distinguish as physical. When we Consider the facts subjectively— when we interrogate consciousness/ we find that though the general seriality of the changes is obvious, there are many experiences which make us hesitate to assert complete seriality. Let us examine one.
The visual impressions we receive from moment to moment, though ordinarily regarded as single states, are in reality multiple ones; and it becomes a perplexing question how far each of these can be considered a member of a linear series of changes. Besides the particular thing to which the eyes are directed, many other things are partially seen; and no clear separation can be made among the degrees of definiteness with which they are presented to consciousness. Only one point of the object looked at is perceived with perfect distinctness. Yet it cannot be said that consciousness is entirely occupied with this one point; for the object as a whole may be identified by the single glance directed to this one point. Obviously our consciousness of things within the visible area, becomes smaller as they become more remote from the centre to which the axes of the eyes converge. Obviously there is nx> particular distance from this centre at which we can say that consciousness ceases. And thus there would seem to be a great number of nascent consciousnesses of different intensities existing at the same moment. Only by a certain license, then, can the internal change pro-, duced by a visual impression be called single. Strictly speaking, it is a multitude of simultaneous changes bound together. Still more conspicuous becomes the qualification with which we must accept the doctrine that psychical changes are distinguished by their seriality, when.
THE NATURE OP INTELLIGENCE. 405 from fclie state of consciousness produced "by a visual impression^ we go on to observe the state of consciousness known as the resulting perception. The various distances, solidities, structures, &c., which appear to be immediately given in the impression, being really known by inference, severally imply many changes; and these changes are practically synchronous with those constituting the impression itself, since the positions and natures of the objects are recognized in the instant of perception. So that beyond that complexity of a visual consciousness due to the many co-existing feelings and relations it includes, there is a further complexity caused by the many represented feel-' ings and relations, which are so closely united with the presented ones as seemingly to form with them one consciousness.
Nevertheless, the doctrine that psychical life is distinguished from physical life by consisting of successive changes only, instead of successive and simultaneous changes, may be shown from the very facts here cited. For though a visual impression makes us nascently conscious of many things, yet there is always some one thing of which we are more conscious than of the rest. And when we so look at this one thing as to perceive it in the true sense of the word — to know it as such or such, we are almost exclusively occupied with it. Though the images of other things are all the while being impressed on the retina, and are producing changes there, yet these are not appreciated internally — are scarcely more than physical changes — do not undergo that co-ordination with others which constitutes them psychical changes. And this fact, that in proportion as any object seen is distinctly thought of, the other objects withinr view cease to be thought of, shows clearly how consciousness becomes more definitely serial as it rises to a higher form. In brief, we may say that while the outer strands of changes which constitute the thread of consciousness are indefinite and loosely adherent, there is always an internal closely-twisted series of changes, forming what we may consider as consciousness proper.
proper.
Psychical changes therefore, if not absolutely distinguished from physical changes by their seriality, are relatively so distinguished; and in proportion as they assume that most developed form constituting rationality they cohere into a seemingly-single succession of states. Though these states are physiologically composite,, and were once psychologically composite, yet, to the extent that they have become consolidated elements of thought they may rightly be regarded as severally simple.
§ 181. Such, then, is the.outcome of our examination. Gradually differentiated from the lower order of changes constituting bodily life, this higher order of changes constituting mental life assumes -a decidedly-serial arrangement in proportion as intelligence advances. Though this serial arrangement never becomes complete, yet in the human consciousness it approaches completeness; and. the highest processes of this consciousness are possible only on condition that its successive states, compound as they may be in nature, shall comport themselves as practi-Jcally elementary. The fact that every proposition ex-;] presses a relation, an<3 that every relation.subsists between pwo terms, of itself proves that distmct tlxchught necessi-Jtates serial arrangement of its.components.
A succession of changes being thus tike subject-matter of Psychology, it is the business,of Psychology to determine the_h^^of^OT_successi<m. That they follow one another in a particular way, the existence of Intelligence itself testifies. The problem is to explain their order.
§ 182. All Life; whether physical or psychical, being the combination of changes in correspondence with external coexistences and sequences, it results that if the changes constituting psychical life occur in succession, the...law^ of their successipn^must^ be the law of their correspondence.
An adequate statement of this law is by no means easy to find. Did the phenomena in the environment form,, like the phenomena of consciousness, a succession, there would be no difficulty. The entire fact would be expressed by saying that the internal succession, parallels the external suc<y*saion. But the environment contains many successions of phenomena, going on simultaneously. Further, there are found in it a great variety of phenomena which are not successive at all, but co-existent. Again, it is unlimited, and the phenomena it includes are not only innumerable, but insensibly pass into a relative non-existence as the distance from the organism increases. Once more, the environment, relatively considered, is ever varying as the organism moves from place to place. Howjbhen can th^ucce^^ changes bejjnjwj^waj ^foratulated^? How is it possible to express the law of a single series of internal phenomenal terms of its correspondence with an infinity of external phenomena, both serial and non-serial, mixed in the most heterogeneous manner, and presented to the moving organism in fortuitous combinations never twice alike?
Were it not that the inner relations must correspond with, the outer ones; and that therefore the order of states of consciousness must be in some way expressible in terms of the external order; we might despair of finding any general law of psychical changes. Even as it is, we may be certain that no general law can apply to extended portions of the series of changes. Mainly dependent as these must be, on the assemblages of things by which the organism is environed, and on the new assemblages perpetually disclosed by its movements, they can be no more formulated than these assemblages can be formulated. Evidently, it is in the immediately-connected changes, and small groups of changes, rather than in the longer concatenations of changes, that a law is to be sought.
§ 183. A correspondence between the internal order and the external order, implies that the relation between any two states of consciousness corresponds with the relation between the two things producing them. How corresponds? The two states of consciousness occur in succession; and all successions are alike in so far as they are simply succes-^ sions. In what, then, can the correspondence consist? In this, that the persistence of the connexion between the states of consciousness is proportionate to the persistence of the connexion between the agencies to which they answer. The relations between external objects, attributes, acts, are of all grades, from the necessary to the fortuitous. The relations between the answering states of consciousness must similarly be of all grades, from the necessary to the fortuitous. When any state a occurs, the tendency of some other state d to follow it, must be strong or weak according to the degree of persistence with which A and D (the objects or attributes that produce a 'and d) occur together in the1 eiirironmeiit. If, in the environment, there is a more persistent occurrence of A with B than of A with D; then, tlie maintenance of the correspondence implies that when a arises in consciousness, & shall follow rather than d. These are manifest requisites. If the strengths of the connexion "between the internal states are not proportionate to the persistences of the relations between the answering external H agents, there will be a failure of the correspondence — the I inner order will disagree with the outer order.
I A due understanding of the matter may best be obtained f by examining the several objections to this general statement.
I § 184. The acts of animals exhibit countless failures of ] I the internal order to parallel the external order. In the i moth, which, flies at a candle-flame, there exists no relation I of psychical states answering to the relation between liglit jf and heat in the environment. The connexion between the ^ odour of a flower and the contained honey, is duly responded I • to by sequent actions in the moth; as is also the connexion i between a certain change in the field of view and the; approach of a living body. But there is no internal adjust-£ inent by which, after the visual impression produced by a flame, anything like the feeling of a burn is suggested; and ;. I hence the creature's death. Again, the birds which on uninhabited islands allow explorers to approach close to them, manifestly lack that co-ordination of psychical changes by which the birds of our woods and moors are led to fly the sportsman. Externally there co-exists with particular appearances, a destructive activity; but internally, the state of consciousness roused by these appearances is not followed by any state of consciousness representing a destructive activity: and a risk of being killed is the consequence. A child's percepjbion of some brightly-coloured berry does not excite an idea of pain, or of the word " poison/* but more probably some idea of a pleasant taste; and should injurious chemical properties co- exist with these attractive visible ones, the child's life may be endangered. But in all cases" of this kind what is the implication? Do we not speak of the injuries suffered as resulting from lack of sagacity? or.as evincing ignorance? And is it not a corollary that,, as non-conformity of the inner to the outer order is want of intelligence, conformity of the inner to the outer order is that in which intelligence consists?
A few instances in which the failure of the correspondence is not total but partial, will enforce th'is conclusion. The dog that comes on hearing his name called,, usually does so expecting to find his master or some member of the family; but if, as occasionally happens, his name is called by a stranger, the sequence in his states of consciousness is not adapted to the external facts: he makes a mistake. Among the Australian savages, who mostly meet with violent deaths, it. is the belief that any one who dies without apparent cause has been killed by an unseen foe; and a stranger who happens to be found near at hand is liable to be sacrificed as the supposed assassin. Here, though the mental connexion between death and enmity very generally agrees with the connexion in the environment, it by no means uniformly does so. The earlier chemists, by a large number of experiences respecting the combinations of acids and bases, were led to think of substances that neutralized bases as substances having sour tastes; but this relation of ideas, though very generally in harmony with external relations, is not always so.
What, now, do we say of cases like these, in which the inner order does not completely answer to the outer order? We say that they imply a low degree of intellect, or a limited experience, or a but partial enlightenment. And the disappearance of these discrepancies between thoughts and facts we speak of as an advance in intelligence.
$ 185. " But how does this conception include co-existences? " it may be asked. " In so far as the environment presents motions and changes, there is no difficulty in understanding the law of intelligence to be, that the THE LAW OF INTELLIGENCE. 4H strength of the tendency which the antecedent of any psychical change has to be followed by its consequent, is proportionate to the persistence of the union between the external things they symbolize. But when this union is noi} between successive things but between simultaneous things — not a union in Time but a union in Space., it is less easy to see how the parallelism between the inner and the outer order can result from fulfilment of this, law. The connexion between two states of consciousness occurring in succession, can very well represent the connexion between two external phenomena occurring in succession. But if it can do this, it cannot also represent the connexion between two external phenomena not oqcurring in succession."
The full reply to this objection will be contained by implication in a future chapter^ on " The Relations of Coexistence and Non-Coexistence." Here it must suffice to say that the relation of co-existence is distinguished from the relation o,f sequence by the readiness of its terms to follow one another through consciousness in either order, with equal facility and vividness; tjiat ^e consciousness of it arises when, in passing backwards and forwards from one term to the other, the sequences being similarly unresisting cancel one another; and that thus it consists of a duplication in consciousness, made up of -a sequence and its inversion. Such being the nature of the relation of co- existence, subjectively considered, the law of intelligence as above formulated applies to it no less than to the relation of sequence. If two phenomena, A and B, habitually coexist in the environment, then, when the phenomenon A is presented to the senses, the produced state of consciousness a/, is immediately succeeded by the state &, representing the phenomenon B. The process of thought does not end here, however: if it did, the external relation wouljl be known as a sequence. But the phenomenon B, in the environment, being as much the antecedent of A as A is of B (neither of them being antecedent or consequent, except in the order of our experience of them), it results that the state 6 having been induced, the law involves that it shall be followed by the state a. The state a again induces the state 6, and is itself once more re-induced; and so on as long- as the relation remains the object of thought. Let us take a case. If the outlines and colours of a body are presented, the resulting consciousness is instantly followed by the consciousness of something resistant; and conversely, if, in the dark, a body is touched, the resulting consciousness is instantly followed by the consciousness of something extended. But in neither case is this all. When, the idea of extension has been suggested that of resistance does not finally disappear; nor when the idea of resistance has been suggested does that of extension finally disappear. Both continue to be thought of, as it would seem, almost simultaneously. And since the two terms of the relation cannot be known in absolutely the same state of consciousness; since further, the persistent consciousness of them cannot be one state of consciousness, which is equivalent to no consciousness; it follows that the apparently-incessant presentation of both is really a rapid alternation — an alternation so rapid as to produce the effect of continuity 3 just as the alternating impressions to which the retina is subjected by the pictures on the opposite sides of a revolving thaumatrope, cause a consciousness of the two pictures t as fused into one. Indeed, as this illustration suggests, it is in virtue of the law of intelligence as above formulated, that the relation of co-existence becomes cognizable. For this rapidity with which two states of consciousness answering to two co-existent phenomena, continually reproduce each other, itself exemplifies thejextreme cohesion of those internal states wh]c}^ to extremely-coherent external phenomena. And it is in consequence of this extreme cohesion, with the quick alternation involved by it, that the two phenomena are presented apparently together, and the idea of co-existence generated.
Where, as in most cases, there are not two co-existent phenomena but a group, this same law implies cohesion of many different states of consciousness, which similarly produce and re-produce one another in all orders; and such an irregularly -varied presentation and re-presentation of combined properties is just what we know takes place. Even more apparent becomes the conformity of the facts to the law on remembering, that among the clustered states of consciousness those which answer to invariably-coexistent phenomena, as resistance and extension, continue reproducing each other during the whole perception, forming, as it were, the basis of it; whereas the several other states of consciousness answering to the special qualities of the object (qualities not invariably co-existing with resistance and extension) do not remain thus persistent, but appear^ and disappear, and reappear in consciousness, with, degrees of frequency varying according to the constancy of the answering qualities.
§ 186. A fact seemingly incongruous with the generaliza- ' tion is, that a great proportion of mental changes arise in a way which is in one sense fortuitous. Noises heard through the open window traverse consciousness in a totally-irregular manner. When walking along the streets, the passing people and vehicles produce internal changes of which the succession is indeterminate. External objects, attributes, acts, being infinitely varied in their combinations, every observer is subject to changing assemblages of impressions between which, no law of connexion can be traced. Hence, to a large part of the successive changes that con- } stitute intelligence, the formula above given must be in- f applicable.
This difficulty will disappear on consideration, Tb»e alleged law of intelligence is that the strength of the tendency which the antecedent of any psychical change has to call up its consequent, is proportionate to the persistence of the union between the external things they symbolize. Thus far., we have considered this law with reference to those connexions in consciousness which correspond to established or habitual connexions in the environment. Here the connexions in the environment to which the connexions in consciousness correspond, are accidental ones. A fortuitous relation in the environment is paralleled by a fortuitous relation in thought. Two adjacent mental impressions answer to two phenomena that are by chance adjacent in Space or Time. Thus far the law manifestly applies as before: the internal order conforms to the external order. But how, it may be asked, can the tendency of the antecedent state of consciousness to be followed by the consequent state, be described as proportionate to the persistence of the union between, the external things they symbolize? Very properly. Suppose the relation in the environment to be that between a certain person and some unusual place at which he is met. This -relation may either be considered generally, in connexion with our experiences at large; or specially, as a particular experience.
Generally considered, the relation is one whose terms have no persistence of union whatever: this person may never have been in that place before or since; and in conformity with this absence of persistence in. the external union, is the absence of any tendency for the idea of the person and the idea of the place to follow one another — at any rate before he was met there. Specially considered, the relation is one that actually occurred; when it occurred, the union between its terms was absolute; and in conformity with this temporarily-absolute union of its terms, was the temporarily-absolute tendency of the answering states of consciousness to follow one another. As, at the moment it was observed, the adjacent co-existence of the person and the place was as absolute as is the co-existence of extension and resistance in a solid mass; so, at the moment it. was observed, the two states of consciousness produced by the THE LAW 0¥ INTELLIGENCE. 413 person and the place cohered as absolutely as do the conceptions of extension and resistance.
Bightly interpreted then,, the law applies as fully to the fortuitous relations presented in any act of percept-ion, as ifc does to the more or less habitual relations which experience establishes among ideas.
§ 187. In the succession of psychical changes there " doubtless occur many combinations which are not easily explicable. Thus, on the case last instanced it may be remarked, that though before a certain person has been met in a certain place, there exists no tendency for the states of consciousness answering to the person and the place to occur together; yet afterwards, the tendency for one of the states to call up the other is often so decided that it shows itself repeatedly. Here then a more persistent relation seems to be established between the states of consciousness than exists between the corresponding phenomena. Sometimes, indeed, the exceptional character of the external relation becomes the very cause of tenacity in the internal relation. The more astonishing the 'event — the more utterly it is at variance with the ordinary course of things, the stronger becomes the cohesion between the answering states of consciousness. Whence it would appear that, occasionally, psychical changes conform to a law the reverse of that enunciated. Again, it may be asked how, if the law is as alleged, can consciousness ever escape out of certain indissolubly-related states when once it gets into them? If, for instance, the necessary co-existence of extension with a perceived resistance, is known through the rapid alternation of the states of consciousness answering to them; and if these states are as inseparable in the organism as the phenomena in the tenvironment; why should not the two go on reproducing each other for ever?
Fully to answer -these a-nd-^ll like* queries, would be to include in this chapter an entire system of psychology; for when all peculiarities in the succession of psychical changes are explained, everything is explained. Here, none but general replies can be given. Of these the first is, that, as already said, the law enunciated is the law of intelligence in the abstract; not the law of our intelligence, or of any intelligence with which we are acquainted. It is the law to which psychical changes conform more and more as intelligence becomes higher; but which can be perfectly conformed to only by perfect intelligence. And some of the anomalies pointed out imply nothing beyond imperfection in the conformity. Bat in the majority of cases it will be found that what seem to be non-conformities are really conformities of a complex kind. It must be remembered that the succession of any one state of consciousness after any other, is due, not to a single tendency, but to a combination of tendencies. As in the environment each phenomenon stands related to various surrounding phenomena; as the relations in which it stands to these are some of them necessary, some very general, some special, some purely fortuitous; it is a corollary from the alleged law of intelligence, that each state of consciousness has connexions, more or less close, with many other states — has a number of other states simultaneously tending, with various degrees of strength, to arise after it. Consequently, the change which actually takes place is the resultant of many tendencies acting together. The next state of consciousness is produced by composition of forces. The force with which this next state cohered to its immediate antecedent, is aided by the forces with which a group of adjacent states cohered to it; and by the union of many small forces, a compound tendency may be produced which overcomes some single tendency much stronger than any one or two of its components. A great physical law of the external world supplies us with an analogy. Simple as is the principle that every atom of matter gravitates towards every other with a force varying inversely as the square of the distance, yet we see in the still unsolved " problem of three bodies/' how complex becomes the effect when several forces conspire and conflict; and we see how, when a number of bodies are acting, the course that will be pursued by any one of them cannot be calculated. Similarly, though the law of attraction of mental states is simple; yet when the attractions of many mental states come into play — some uniting, some conflicting— it becomes next DO impossible to predict the result. And just as in the ascent of a balloon we may meet with a phenomenon seemingly quite at variance with the law of gravitation, though really quite in harmony with it; so there may occur mental changes which, while they appear to be directly opposed to the law of psychical succession, are nevertheless fulfilments of it.
Apparent anomalies are thus reconcilable with the conclusion, that the strength of the tendency which the antecedent of any psychical change has to be followed by its consequent, is proportionate to the persistence of the union between the external things they symbolize. Such is the a priori necessity; and such is the generalization reached a posteriori. Only in virtue of this law can there be that adjustment of internal relations to external relations which constitutes life, while it makes possible the continuance of life. And only by supposing such a law to exist can we explain the facts, that relations which are absolute in the environment are absolute in us, that relations which are probable in the environment are probable in us, that relations which are fortuitous in the environment are fortuitous in us.
j E E CHAPTEE III THE GROWTH OF INTELLIGENCE.
§ 188. The law enunciated in the foregoing chapter, "beino- the law of Intelligence in the abstract — the law which Intelligence fulfils more and more the further it advances, we have next to examine the modes in which better fulfilment of the law is exhibited; and to seek the general cause for this ever increasing fulfilment of it.
Three ways^in which progress shows itself may be disf'tmgu^EeSr There is, first — increase in the accuracy with ^ which the inner tendencies are proportioned to the outer persistences. There is, second — increase in the number of cases, unlike as to kind but like as to grade of complexity, in which there are inner tendencies answering to outer persistences. And there is, third — increase in the complexity * of the coherent states of consciousness, answering to coherent j complexities in the environment. The organism is placed "tamid innumerable relations of all orders. It begins by imperfectly adjusting its actions to a few of the simplest of these. To adjust its actions more exactly to these few simplest, is one form of advance. To adjust its actions to a greater variety of these simplest, is a further form of advance. To adjust its actions to successive grades of the more complicated, is yet another form of advance. And to whatever stage it reaches there are still the same three kinds of improvement open to it — a perfecting of the correspondences already achieved; an achievement of other correspondences THE GBOWTH OF INTELLIGENCE. 419 of the same order -} and an achievement of correspondences of a higher order: all of them implying greater fulfilment of the law of intelligence.
But now, what are the requisites to this progress? Is the genesis of Intelligence explicable on any one general principie"applying at once to all these modes of advance? Ifso, what is this general principle?
§ 189. In the environment there exist relations of all orders of persistence., from the absolute to the fortuitous. Consequently, in a creature displaying a developed correspondence, there must exist all grades ©f strength in the connexions between states of consciousness. As a high, intelligence is only thus possible, it is manifestly a condition to intelligence in general that the antecedents and consequents of psychical changes shall admit of all degrees of cohesion. And the question to be answered is: — How are their various degrees of cohesion adjusted?
Concerning their adjustments there are two possible hypotheses, of which all other hypotheses can be but modifications. On the one hand, it may be asserted that the strength of the tendency which each state of consciousness has to follow any other, is fixed beforehand by a Creator — / that there is a "pre-established harmony'' between the! inner and outer relations. On the other hand, it may be| as7ierted"that the strength of the tendency which each state of consciousness, has to follow any other, depends on the frequency with which the two have been connected in experience — that the harmony between the inner and outer relations arises from the fact..that the,putei:,relatign8s^p^)dupe the inner TeStions. Let us briefly examine these two For the first the reason given,, like the reason given* for \ the special-creation hypothesis at large, is that certain of; the phenomena cannot otherwise be explained. This^sjoger^ | natural genesis of the adjustment is alleged because no f natural genesis has been assigned. The hypothesis has not a single fact to rest on. The facts that may be cited in its support, such as those of reflex action, are simply facts which have not yet been explained; and this alleged explanation of them as due to a pre-established harmony, is simply a disguised mode of shelving them as inexplicable. A further criticism is, that those who espouse this theory dare not apply it beyond a narrow range of cases. It is only. where the connexions between psychical states are absolute — as in the so-called forms of thought and in the congenital instincts — that they fall back on ff pre-established harmony/' .But they should either go the entire length with Leibnitz, or not go with him at all. If they assume that the adjustment of inner relations to outer relations has been in some y cases fixed beforehand, they ought in consistency to assume that it has Feela Tnalljjases fixed beforehand. If, answering to eacf aBsoluteiy-pe?sistent connexion of phenomena in the environment, there has been provided some absolutely-persistent connexion between states of consciousness; why, where the outer connexion is almost absolutely persistent, and the inner connexion proportionately persistent, must we not suppose a special provision here also? why must we not suppose special provisions for all the infinitely-varied degrees -of persistence? The unqualified adoption of the tlE2i^sis is, however, declined, for obvious reasons. It ^I2]!^LHvo^ve the assertion of a rigorou|., necessity in all *noughtjand action — an assertion which,tEose who favour this hypothesis are, more than any others, disinclined to