with an arrow, becomes, by constant repetition, so organized as to be performed almost without thought of the processes of adjustment gone through — and if skill of this kind is so far transmissible that particular races of men become characterized by particular aptitudes, which are nothing else than partially-organized psychical connexions; then, if there exist certain external relations which are experienced by all organisms at all instants of their waking lives — relations which are absolutely constant, absolutely universal— there will be established answering internal relations that are absolutely constant, absolutely universal. Such relations we have in those of Space and Time. The organization of subjective relations adjusted to these objective relations has been cumulative, not in each race of creatures only, but throughout successive races of creatures; and such subjective relations have, therefore, become more consolidated than all others. Being experienced in every perception and every action of each creature, these connexions among outer existences must, for this reason too, be responded to by connexions among inner feelings, that are, above all others, indissoluble. As the substrata of all * other relations in the non-ego, they must be responded to by conceptions that are tho substrata of all other relations, in the ego. Being the constant and infinitely-repeated elements of thought, they, must become the automatic ele-1 merits of thought — the elements of thought which it is impossible to get rid of — the " forms of intuition/' Such, it seems to me, is the only possible reconciliation between the experience-hypothesis and the hypothesis of the transcendentalists; neither of which is tenable by itself. Insurmountable difficulties are presented by the Kantian doctrine (as we shall* hereafter see); an<l the anl%6nist doctrine, taken alone, presents difficulties that are equally insurmountable. Tqv jest with the ^ unqualified assertign antecedent to experience, the jnind is a blank, is to ignore the questions — whence,cornes the power of organizing expe.
rlf-nces? whence arise the different degrees of that power -.— 3 d by different races of organisms, and different 4!v;i*:iiuals of the same race? If^ at birth, there exists t\ L" but a passive receptivity of impressions,, why i- t^t'a horse as educable as a man? Should it be v i " 1 r Jot language makes the difference, then why do *' <• rh- cat aud the dog, reared in the same household,.rr-vo at equal degrees and kinds of intelligence? Undero, «1 in its current form, the experience-hypothesis implies •hit rli? presence of a definitely-organized nervous system i> a circumstance of no moment — a fact not needing to be ji^n into account I Yet it is the all-important fact — the ta.'t to which, in one sense, the criticisms of Leibnitz and others pointed — the fact without which an assimilation of experiences is inexplicable. Throughout the animal 1 kingdom in general, the actions are dependent on the | nervous structure. The^jghysiologist shows us that each it. Hex movement implies the agency of certain nerves and pmglia; that a development of complicated instincts is accompanied by complication of the nervous centres and their commissural connexions; that the same creature in different stages, as larva and imago for example, changes its instincts as its nervous structure changes; and that as we advance to creatures of high intelligence, a vast increase in the size and in the complexity of the nervous system takes place. Whatjis ^ the obvious inference? It is that the ability to co-ordinate impressions and to perform the appropriate actions, always implies the jpre-existence of certain serves arranged in a certain way. What is the meaning of * ihe human, brain? It is that the many established relations among*" its parts, stand for so many established relations among the psychical changes. Bach of the constant connexions among the fibres of the cerebral masses, answers to some constant connexion of phenomena in the experiences of the race. Just as the organized arrangement subsisting between the sensory nerves of the nostrils and the motor nerves of tlie respiratory muscles, not only makes possible a sneeze, but also, in the newly-born infant, implie? sneezings to be hereafter performed; so, all the organized * arrangements subsisting among the nerves of the infant's brain, not only make possible certain combinations of impressions, but also imply that such combinations will hereafter be made — imply that there are answering combinations in tho outer world — imply a preparedness to cognize these combinations — implj faculties of comprehending them. It is true that the resulting compound psychical changes, do not take place with the same readiness and automatic precision as the simple reflex action instanced — it is true that some individual experiences seem required to establish them. But while this is partly due to the fact that these combinations are highly involved, extremely varied in their modes of occurrence, made up therefore of psychical relations less completely coherent, and hence need further repeti tions to perfect them; it is in a much greater degree due to the fact that at birth the organization of the brain is incomplete, and does not cease its spontaneous progress for twenty or thirty years afterwards. Those who contend that knowledge results wholly from the experiences of the individual, ignoring as* they do the mental evolution which accompanies the autogenous development of the nervous system, fall into an error as great as if they were to ascribe all bodily growth and structure to exercise, forgetting the innate tendency to assume the adult form. Were the infant 'born with a full-sized and completely-1* constructed brain, their position would be less untenable, j But, as the case stands, the gradually-increasing intelli- / gence displayed throughout childhood and youth, is more i attributable to the completion of the cerebral organization, than to the individual experiences — a truth proved bj the j fact that in adult life there is sometimes displayed a high j endowment of some faculty which, during education, was / never brought into play. Doubtless, experiences received \ by the individual furnish the concrete materials for all thought. Doubtless, the organized and semi-organized arrangements existing among the cerebral nerves, can give no knowledge until there has been a presentation of the external relations to which they correspond. And doubtless,, the chiidjs daily observations and reasonings aid the formation of those involved nervous connexions that are iu process of spontaneous evolution; just as its daily gambols aid the development of its limbs. But saying this is quite a different thing from saying that its intelligence is wholly produced by its experiences. That is an utterly inadmissible doctrine — a doctrine which makes the presence of a * brain meaningless — a doctrine which makes idiotcy unaccountable.
In the sense, then, that there exist in the nervous system certain pre-established relations answering to relations in the environment, there is truth in the doctrine of ' ' forms of intuition" — not the truth which its defenders suppose, but a parallel truth. Corresponding to absolute external relations, there are established in the structure of the nervous system absolute internal relations — relations that are potentially present before birth in the shape of definite nervous connexions; that are antecedent to, and independent of, individual experiences; and that are automatically disclosed along with the first cognitions. And, as here understood, it is not only these fundamental relations which are thus pre- determined; but also hosts of other relations of a more or less constant kind, which are congenitally represented by more or less complete nervous connexions. But these pre-determined internal relations, } though independent of the experiences oF the individual, are not independent of experiences in general: they have; been determined by the experiences "of preceding organisms. The corollary here drawn from the general argument is, that the^human.brain is an organized register of infinitelynumerous experiences receive'S during jjh[g evolution of jjyjb, or rather, during the evolution of that series of organisms through which the human organism has been reached. The eifects~^Tthe most uniform and frequent of these experiences have been successively bequeathed, principal and interest; aud have slowly amounted to that high intelligence which lies latent in the brain of the infant — which the infant in after life exercises and perhaps strengthens or further complicates— and which, with minute additions,, it bequeaths to future generations. And thus it happens that the European inherits from twenty to thirty cubic inches more brain than the Papuan. Thus it happens that faculties, as of music, which scarcely exist in some inferior human races, become congenital in superior ones. Thus it happens that out of savages unable to count up to the number of their fingers, and speaking a language containing only nouns and verbs, arise at length our Newtons and Shakspeares.
CHAPTEE VIII.
CHAPTEE VIII.
§ 209. The assertion that those psychical states which we class as Feelings, are involved with, and inseparable from, those which we class as intellectual processes, seems a contradiction to direct internal perceptions. It will^jjadeed, be atjonce admitted that intellectual processes canno| be sepajrated from ejai-peripheral feelings, real or ideal • since, invariably, these are either the immediate terms, or the ultimate components of the terms, between which relations are established in every cognition. But while all will grant that the feelings initiated in us by the forces of the external world, are, in their presentative or representative forms, the indispensable materials of thought, and that therefore to this extent intellect and fe^Hng:mcannot be parted; manyf will demur to the proposition that feelings of the ento-! peripheral and central classes are not separable from Intel- j lectual processes. ^ Some approach towards a right comprehension of the matter, will be gained by recalling certain leading conclusions set down among the Inductions of Psychology. We saw thatJUind is ^composed of feelings and the relations between feelings. We saw that the^feeUngs are primarily divisible ^mto^the centrally-initiated"" ancf tEe peripherallvinitiated 7 which last are re-divisibte into those which are initiated at; the outer surface of the body and those which are initiated within the body. On comparing these three great orders of feelings, we found that whereas the epiperipheral are relational to a very great extent, the entoperipheral, and still more the central, have but small aptitudes for entering into relations. Hence, by implication, it was shown that the relational element of Mind is in no case absent. But the relational element of Mind is the intellec- 1 tual element. "Obviously, then, nqjdnd of feeling, sensa-I tional or emotional, can be wholly freed from the intellectual f element.
Further, this conclusion is implied by the argument elaborated in the foregoing chapters. If all mental phenomena are incidents of the correspondence between the organism and its environment; and if this correspondence passes insensibly from its lowest to its highest forms; then, we may be certain, a priori, thatjio orders of Feelings can be completdy disentangled from other phenomena of consciousness. We may infer that they must arise gradually out of the lower forms of psychical action, by steps such as lead to the higher forms of psychical action already traced out; and that they must constitute another aspect of these. This is just what we shall find.
§ 210. Before proceeding to the synthetic interpretation, it may be well to remark that even in our ordinary experi-4 ences, the impossibility of dissociating the psychical states! classed as intellectual from those seemingly most unlike! psychical states classed as emotional, may be discerned, J While we continue to compare such extreme forms of the two as an inference and a fit of anger, we may fancy that they are entirely distinct. Butjfjve. ^exjamin§,,,iiLterme- j diate jriodes of consciousness, we shall quickly ^ which avo Jbofcli co^nitiv0_a]KL^motivp. the state oFTnmd produced by seeingja..b.ga^ Primarily, this is a co-ordination o£ the visual impressions which the statue gives, resulting in a consciousness of what they mean; and this we call a purely intellectual act. But usually this act cannot be performed without some pleasurable feeling of the emotional order. Should it be said that this emotion arises from the many ideas associated with the human form, the rejoinder is,, that though these aid in its production,, it cannot be altogether so accounted for; seeing that we feel a kindred pleasure on contemplating a fine building. If it be urged that, even in this case, collateral states of consciousness are induced which suffice to explain the emotion, then, whence results the gratification given on looking at a simple curve — an ellipse or parabola? The manifest difficulty in disentangling the cognitive from the emotive in these cases, becomes, in other cases, an impossibility. Not only does the state of consciousness produced by a melody show us ££g£^^-2£^_ emotion ^ entangled, but the state of consciousness produced by a * singlebeautiful tone does so. Not only is a combination of colours, as in a landscape, productive of a pleasurable feeling beyond that due to mere sensations; but there is pleasure accompanying the perception of even one colour, when of great purity or brilliance. Nay, the touch of a perfectly smooth or soft surface causes an agreeable consciousness.
In all these cases the simple distinct feeling directly aroused by the outer agent, is joined with some compound vague feeling indirectly aroused. (See § 128.)
I Otherwise put, the matter stands thus. The materials I dealt with in every cognitive process are either sensations or I the representations of them. These sensations, and by implication the representations of them, are habitually in some ^degree agreeable or disagreeable. Hence, only in those rare jcases in which both its terms and its remote associations are \ absolutely indifferent, can an act of cognition be abso- Hutfily free from emotion. Conversely, as every emotion involves the presentation or representation of objects and ajctjon^; and as the perceptions, and by implication the /recollections, of objects and actions, all imply cognitions; it follows that no emotion can be absolutely free from cognition.
§ 211. The relation between intelligence and feeling will be most clearly understood on studying the relation between perception and sensation,, which are the simplest forms of the two.
Every sensation, to be known as one, must be perceived; and must so be in one respect a perception. Every perception must be made up of combined sensations; and must so be in one respect sensational. But though they haye the same essential elements, these elements are not similarly dominant in the two. In sensation,, consciousness is occupied with certain affections of the organism. In percep* tion, consciousness is occupied with the relations among those affections. Sensations are primary undecomposable states of consciousness; while perceptions are secondary decomposable states, consisting of changes from one primary state to another. Hence, as continuance of the primary states is inconsistent with the occurrence of changes, it follows that consciousness of the changes is in antagonism with consciousness of the states between which they occur. So that perception and sensation are, as it were, ever tending to exclude each other, but never succeeding. Indeed, consciousness continues only in virtue of this conflict. Without the primary affections of consciousness, there can be no changes from one primary affection to another; and without changes from one to another, there can be no primary affections, since in the absence of changes consciousness ceases. Neither consciousness of the changes, nor of the affections between which they occur, can exist by itself. Nevertheless, either may so predominate as greatly to subordinate the other. When the changes are so rapid that the states forming their antecedents and consequents do not last for appreciable times, consciousness is almost wholly occupied with changes — with the relations among sensations: sensations are present so far only as is needful for the establishment of relations among them; and we have that condition of consciousness called perception. On the other hand,, when the states forming the antecedents and consequents of the changes have considerable persistence, or rather when they are not permanently destroyed by the changes but continually return, and are thus broken by the changes only so far as is needful to maintain consciousness — when., therefore,, some one of them by its continuous recurrence, greatly predominates over others; then there results the condition of consciousness called sensation.
Xow this is just the relationship which exists throughout between knowing in general and feeling in general. Though differing from Sir William Hamilton respecting.the interpretation of the antagonism between perception and sensation, I agree with him in holding that the same antagonism holds between cognition and emotion. The differences are simply differences that arise from successive complications. As, out of those simple perceptions forming the lowest class of cognitions, the higher cognitions result by the compounding of perceptions; so, out of those simple sensations forming the lowest class of feelings, the higher feelings arise by the compounding of sensations. And as, when cognitions grow highly compound their elements become too numerous to be all present together, and so become partly representative, and afterwards sometimes wholly representative; so, when the feelings grow highly compound their elements become too numerous to be all present together, and so become partly representative, and afterwards sometimes wholly representative. These positions require elucidation.
It has been from time to time pointed out that, in the development of Mind, there is a progressive consolidation of states of consciousness. States of consciousness once separate become indissociable. Other states that were originally united with difficulty, grow so coherent as to follow one another without effort. And thus THE FEELIHGS. 477 THE FEELIHGS. 477 there arise large aggregations of states,, answering to complex external things — animals, men, buildings — which are so welded together as to be practically single states. But this integration, by uniting a large number of related sensations into one state, does not destroy them. Though subordinated as parts of a whole, they still exist. And being severally in their original forms, feelings, this state which is composed of them is a feeling — a feeling produced by the fusing of a number of minor feelings. Hence a certain pleasure accompanying all kinds of perceptions; as every child shows us. Not only, however, does this hold with the groups of simple sensations that are united to form perceptions; but it holds with groups of these groups. When the composite states of consciousness answering to single complex objects, become sufficiently consolidated; then, if the daily experiences present some constant assemblage of complex objects, such as those distinguishing a particular locality, there results a consolidation of these into a still larger aggregate of states: the feelings severally constituted by these composite states, are, in their turn, merged into a more composite feeling, which in its mixed and com* paratively massive character verges on the emotional. And then from the union of this composite feeling with other composite feelings, the elements of which are mainly repre-; sentative, such as those implied in the domestic relations,. I there is produced an extremely involved and massive j feeling of the emotional order, answering to the idea, r home. But now let it be remarked that as fast I as these compound states of consciousness in their ascend-; ing grades, severally become, by integration of their j elements, practically single; so fast do they begin to play j the same parts in the mental processes that single states j do. The continuance of a sensation being inconsistent with I the occurrence of a change, we saw that consciousness of!
changes, or relations among sensations, is ever at variance jwith consciousness of the sensations. Here we may f similarly see that in proportion as a composite feeling including" many sensations and their relations, becomes consolidated,, its continuance must be at variance with the occurrence of a change to some other composite feeling; that is — must be at variance with the establishnie-it of a relation between the thing causing such composite feeling, and any thingelse; that is — must be at variance with cognition. And hence arises the fact known to persons analytically inclined-, that when they think about any gratification they are receiving— speculate upon the cause of it, or criticise the object of it — the gratification is suspended.
These several expositions have, I think, made it clear that cognition and feeling, throughout all phases of their evolution, are at once antithetical and inseparable. The implication is that they are but different aspects of the same development, and may so be expected to arise from the same root by the same process. This being understood we may now go on to consider the feelings synthetically.
§ 212. "Where action is perfectly automatic, feeling does not exist. Of this we have several proofs. We have the proof that in creatures most markedly exhibiting them, automatic actions go on equally well when the chief nervous centre has been removed. We have the proof that our own automatic actions are unaccompanied by feelings: as wit-"ness those of the viscera in their normal states. And we have the further proof that actions which in ourselves are partly voluntary, partly reflex (as that by which the foot is withdrawn from scalding water), and which, so long as they are accompanied by feeling, are accompanied by will, become more energetically automatic if feeling is lost. When injury of the afferent nerves has destroyed sensibility in a limb, the slightest stimulus, as the touch of a feather, produces reflex movements that are stronger than those produced in a limb retaining its sensibility.
This antagonism, of automatic action and feeling will be better understood on observing that feeling involves a persistence which automatic action negatives. To have the state of consciousness recognizable as a particular feeling, implies some duration of that state; and in proportion as it fills a smaller interval in the chain of states, in the same proportion does it lapse out of consciousness — in the same proportion does it cease to be felt. The proposition is a truism. To say that a state of consciousness has considerable continuity, is to say that it is a distinct element of consciousness; which is the same thing as being known or felt. To say that it has scarcely any continuity, is to say that it forms a scarcely perceivable element in consciousness; which is the same thing as being scarcely at all known or felt. And to say that it is a state of consciousness having no appreciable length, is to say that it forms no element in consciousness; which is the same thing as being not known or felt. It follows, therefore, that when a set of psychical changes occurs instantaneously, the psychical states forming the antecedents and consequents of the changes are not felt; and the further the consolidation of • any set of psychical changes is carried, the more complete must be the absence of feeling. Now the completely-consolidated sets of changes are the automatic changes. The automatic changes are those of which the elements are practically fused into one change. Consequently, where all the psychical actions are perfectly automatic, there is no feeling.
"While an entire absence of Memory and Reason is accompanied by an entire absence of Peeling, the same progress which gives origin to Memory and Reason simultaneously gives origin to Peeling. For what did we find to be the circumstances under which Memory and Reason become nascent? We found that when the adjustments of the organism to its environment begin to take in involved and infrequent groups of outer relations — when, consequently, the answering groups of inner relations include many ele- 4SO SPECIAL SYNTHESIS.
inents, of which some are not often repeated in experience — when, that is, there are formed groups of inner relations whose components are imperfectly coherent — when, as a necessary result, there come to be hesitating automatic actions; then, Memory and Reason simultaneously become nascent. The ceasing to be automatic and the becoming rational, are, as we saw, the same thing. We have just seen, however, that when psychical changes are perfectly automatic, they are without feeling. The existence of feeling we have seen to imply psychical states having some persistence. But psychical states having some persistence are the states which result when automatic action fails. Thus then, as the psychical changes become too complicated to be perfectly automatic, they become incipiently sensational. Memory, Reason, and Feeling take their rise at the same time.
A confirmation of this view, parallel to confirmations given in the two preceding chapters, may be set down. Among our own mental processes, many which were once slow, and were then accompanied by feeling, are by the same repetition which renders them automatic, also rendered indifferent or feelingless. This is equally the case whether the accompanying feelings are painful or pleasurable. In spelling out its reading-lessons, the child experiences a disagreeable sense of effort; but in the adult, the identification of words is a totally unemotional process. The learning of a new language requires labour that is more or less unpleasant, and the first attempts to speak it soon produce weariness; but after due practice it is spoken with entire indifference. And not to multiply illustrations, I may quote the general remark that habit renders easy the actions that once were hard, as showing that this lawholds throughout; since by calling actions hard we mean to some extent painful, and becoming easy is ceasing to be painful. Equally general is the kindred truth. So long as the combinations of properties they present are new to it, the commonest objects give pleasure to tlie infant; but as fast as, by constant repetition, the compound impressions produced become consolidated into perfect cognitions of the objects, so fast do the objects become indifferent. Throughout childhood, youth, and manhood, the same fact is daily manifested. The often-repeated groups of psychical changes cease to be interesting; and there arises a demand for those that have not been experienced, or have been little experienced.
The parallel is complete. We found that not only do Memory and Reason begin where the psychical changes cease to be automatic; but that where they have existed they disappear when, by perpetual repetition, the psychical changes become automatic. And here we find both that Feeling arises under the same conditions, and that it ceases under the same conditions.
Let us now devote our attention to the genesis of Feelings of more complex kinds.
§ 213. When there come to be cases in which two very similar groups of external attributes and relations have been followed in experience by different motor changes; and when, consequently, the presentation of one of these groups partially excites two sets of motor changes, each of which is prevented by their mutual antagonism from at once taking place; then, while one of these sets of nascent motor changes and nascent impressions habitually accompanying it, constitutes a memory of such motor changes as before performed and impressions as before received, and while it also constitutes a prevision of the action appropriate to the new occasion, it further constitutes the desire to perform the action. For different as these three things eventually become, they are originally one. A further development of an illustration already used will make this manifest. Suppose the subject of the psychical phenomena we are considering, to have I I 482 SFSCIAL SYNTHESIS.
occasional experiences of two animals somewhat similar in colour, size, and general contour, one of which serves for prey and the other of which is a dangerous enemy. The complex impression produced by the enemy, has been followed in experience by injuries, by some defensive actions, j» by certain cries, and eventually by flight. The complex 1 impression produced by the prey has been followed in ex- I perience by motions of pursuit, by successful grappling and: biting, by processes of tearing to pieces and swallowing. But I as these two complex impressions have many elements in • common, each tends in so far as there is a confusion between them, to arouse either of these two sets of psychical changes; and when one of these similar- animals is seen, each set be-; comes nascent according as the impression produced varies. At one moment the defensive actions, the cries, and the movements of escape, which have followed some such impression as that received, tend to arise; and the next i moment a change in the position of the perceived animal so alters the impression, as partially to excite the psychical; states involved in pursuit, attack, destroying, and devouring.; But what is either of these partial excitations? It is nothing; else than an emotional impulse — a combination of representative feelings which forms the stimulus to action — a desire.
To have in a slight degree such psychical states as accompany the reception of wounds, and are experienced during I flight, is to be in a state of what we call fear. And to have.! in a slight degree such psychical states as the processes of:. catching, killing, and eating imply, is to have the desires to ' catch, kill, and eat. That the propensities to the | acts are nothing else than nascent excitations of the > psychical state involved in the acts, is proved by the natural language of the propensities. Fear, when strong, expresses [ itself in cries, in efforts to escape, in palpitations, in •< tremblings; and these are just the manifestations that go; along with an actual suffering of the evil feared. The de-? stmctive passion is shown in a general tension of the mus- i cular system, in gnashing of teeth and protrusion of the claws, in dilated eyes and nostrils, in growls; and these are weaker forms of the actions that accompany the killing of prey. To such objective evidences,, every one can add subjective evidences. Every one can testify that the psychical state called fear, consists of mental representations of certain painful results; and that the one called anger, consists of mental representations of the actions and impressions which would occur while inflicting some kind of pain.