On the other hand, it is time that a ferocious egoism, which remains unaffected by this irrational altruism, professed but not believed, should be practically modified by a rational al truism. This sacred duty of blood-revenge, insisted on by the still-vigorous religion of enmity, needs qualifying actually and not verbally. Instead of senselessly reiterating in cate chisms and church services the duty of doing good to those that hate us, while an undoubting belief in the duty of retalia tion is implied by our parliamentary debates, the articles in our journals, and the conversations over our tables, it would be wiser and more manly to consider how far the first should go in mitigation of the last. Is it stupidity or is it moral cowardice which leads men to continue professing a creed that makes self-sacrifice a cardinal principle, while they urge the sacrificing of others, even to the death, when they trespass against us? Is it blindness, or is it an insane inconsistency, which makes them regard as most admirable the bearing of evil for the benefit of others, while they lavish admiration on those who, out of revenge, inflict great evils in return for small ones suffered? Surely our barbarian code of right needs revision, and our barbarian standard of honour should be somewhat changed. Let us deliberately recognize what good they represent and what mixture of bad there is with it.
Courage is worthy of respect when displayed in the mainte nance of legitimate claims and in the repelling of aggressions, bodily or other. Courage is worthy of yet higher respect when danger is faced in defence of claims common to self and others, as in resistance to invasion. Courage is worthy of the highest respect when risk to life or linih is dared in de fence of others; and becomes grand when those others have 110 claims of relationship, and still more when they have no claims of race. But though a bravery which is altruistic in its motive is a trait we cannot too highly applaud, and though a bravery which is legitimately egoistic in its motive is praiseworthy, the bravery that is prompted by aggressive egoism is not praiseworthy. The admiration accorded to the " pluck v of one who fights in a base cause is a vicious ad miration, demoralizing to those who feel it. Like the physi cal powers, courage, which is a concomitant of these, is to be regarded as a servant of the higher emotions — very valuable, indispensable even, in its place; and to be honoured when dis charging its function in subordination to these higher emo tions. But otherwise not more to be honoured than the like attribute as seen in brutes.
Quite enough has been said to show that there must be a compromise between the opposite standards of conduct on which the religions of amity and enmity respectively insist, before there can be scientific conceptions of social phenomena. Even on passing affairs, such as the proceedings of philan thropic bodies and the dealings of nation with nation, there cannot be rational judgments without a balance between the self -asserting emotions and the emotions which put a limit to self-assertion, with an adjustment of the corresponding beliefs. Still less can there be rational judgments of past social evolu tion, or of social evolution in the future, if the opposing actions which these opposing creeds sanction, are not both continuously recognized as essential. No mere impulsive recognition, now of the purely-egoistic doctrine and now of the purely-altruistic one, will suffice. The curve described by a planet cannot be understood by thinking at one moment of the centripetal force and at another moment of the tangential force; but the two must be kept before consciousness as acting simultaneously. And similarly, to understand social progress in the vast sweep of its course, there must be ever present to the mind, the egoistic and the altruistic forces as co-operative factors equally indispensable, and neither of them to be ignored or repro bated.
The criticism likely to be passed on this chapter, that " The Educational Bias " is far too comprehensive a title for it, is quite justifiable. There are in truth few, if any, of the several kinds of bias, that are not largely, or in some meas ure, caused by education — using this word in an extended ssene. As, however, all of them could not be dealt with in one chapter, it seemed best to select these two opposite forms of bias which are directly traceable to teachings of opposite dogmas, and fosterings of opposite sentiments, during early life. Merely recognizing the fact that education has much to do with the other kinds of bias, we may now most con veniently deal with these each under its specific title.
CHAPTER IX.
" OUR country, right or wrong1," is a sentiment not unfrequently expressed on the other side of the Atlantic; and, if I remember rightly, an equivalent sentiment was some years ago uttered in our own House of Commons, by one who rejoices, or at least who once rejoiced, in the title of philo sophical Radical.
Whoever entertains such a sentiment has not that equi librium of feeling required for dealing scientifically with social phenomena. To see how things stand, apart from personal and national interests, is essential before there can be reached those balanced judgments respecting the course of human affairs in general, which constitute Sociology. To be convinced of this, it needs but to take a case remote from our own. Ask how the members of an aboriginal tribe re gard that tide of civilization which sweeps them away. Ask what the North-American Indians said about the spread of the white man over their territories, or what the ancient Britons thought of the invasions which dispossessed them of England; and it becomes clear that events which, looked at from an un-national point of view, were steps towards a higher life, seemed from a national point of view entirely evil. Admitting the truth so easily perceived in these cases, we must admit that only in proportion as we emancipate ourselves from the bias of patriotism, and consider our own society as one among many, having their histories and their futures, and some of them, perhaps, having better claims than we have to the inheritance of the Earth — only in proportion as we do this, shall we recognize those sociological truths which have nothing to do with particular nations or par ticular races.
So to emancipate ourselves is extremely difficult. It is with patriotism as we lately saw it to be with the sentiment causing political subordination: the very existence of a so ciety implies predominance of it. The two sentiments join in producing that social cohesion without which there cannot be co-operation and organization. A nationality is made possible only by the feeling which the units have for the whole they form. Indeed, we may say that the feeling has been gradually increased by the continual destroying of types of men whose attachments to their societies were relatively small; and who are therefore incapable of making adequate sacrifices on behalf of their societies. Here, again, we are reminded that the citizen, by his incorporation in a body politic, is in a great degree coerced into such sentiments and beliefs as further its preservation: unless this is the average result the body politic will not be preserved. Hence another obstacle in the way of Social Science. We have to allow for the aberrations of judgment caused by the sentiment of patriotism.
Patriotism is nationally that which egoism is individually —has, in fact, the same root; and along with kindred benefits brings kindred evils. Estimation of one's society is a reflex of self-estimation; and assertion of one's society's claims is an indirect assertion of one's own claims as a part of it. The pride a citizen feels in a national achievement, is the pride in belonging to a nation capable of that achievement: the be longing to such a nation having the tacit implication that in himself there exists the superiority of nature displayed. And the anger aroused in him by an aggression on his nation, is an anger against something which threatens to injure him also, by injuring his nation.
As, lately, we saw that a duly- ad justed egoism is essential; so now, we may see that a duly-adjusted patriotism is essen tial. Self-regard in excess produces twTo classes of evils: by prompting undue assertion of personal claims it breeds aggres sion and antagonism; and by creating undue estimation of personal powers it excites futile efforts that end in catastroplies. Deficient self-regard produces two opposite classes of evils: by not asserting personal claims, it invites aggression, so fostering selfishness in others; and by not adequately valuing personal powers it causes a falling short of attain able benefits. Similarly with patriotism. From too much, there result national aggressiveness and national vanity. Along with too little, there goes an insufficient tendency to maintain national claims, leading to trespasses by other nations; and there goes an undervaluing of national capa cities and institutions, which is discouraging to effort and progress.
The effects of patriotic feeling which here concern us, are those it works on belief rather than those it works on conduct. As disproportionate egoism, by distorting a man's conceptions of self and of others, vitiates his conclusions respecting hu man nature and human actions; so, disproportionate patriot ism, by distorting his conceptions of his own society and of other societies, vitiates his conclusions respecting the natures and actions of societies. And from the opposite extremes there result opposite distortions; which, however, are com paratively infrequent and much less detrimental.
Here we come upon one of the many ways in which the corporate conscience proves itself less developed than the individual conscience. For while excess of egoism is every where regarded as a fault, excess of patriotism is nowhere regarded as a fault. A man who recognizes his own errors of conduct and his own.deficiencies of faculty, shows a trait of character considered praiseworthy; but to admit that our doings toward other nations have been wrong is reprobated as unpatriotic. Defending the acts of another people with whom we have a difference seems to most citizens something like treason; and they use offensive comparisons concerning birds and their nests, by way of condemning those who as cribe misconduct to our own people rather than to the people with whom we are at variance. Not only do they exhibit the unchecked sway of this reflex egoism which constitutes patriotism — not only are they unconscious that there is any thing blameworthy in giving the rein to this feeling; but they think the blameworthiiiess is in those who restrain it, and try to see what may be said 011 both sides. Judge, then, how seriously the patriotic bias, thus perverting our judg ments about international actions, necessarily perverts our judgments about the characters of other societies, and so vitiates sociological conclusions.
We have to guard ourselves against this bias. To this end let us take some examples of the errors attributable to it.
What mistaken estimates of other races may result from over-estimation of one's own race, will be most vividly shown by a case in which we are ourselves valued at a very low rate by a race we hold to be far inferior. Here is such a case supplied by a tribe of negroes: — " They amused themselves by remarking on the sly, ' The white man is an old ape.' The African will say of the European, ' He looks like folks,' [men], and the answer will often be, ' No, he don't.'...Whilst the Caucasian doubts the humanity of the Ilamite, the latter repays the compliment in kind." ' Does anyone think this instance so far out of the ordinary track of error as to have 110 instruction for us? To see the contrary he has but to look at the caricatures of Frenchmen that were common a generation ago, or to remember the pop ular statement then current respecting the relative strengths of French and English. Such reminders will convince him that the reflex self-esteem we call patriotism, has had, among ourselves, perverting effects sufficiently striking. And even now there are kindred opinions which the facts, when exam ined, do not bear out: instance the opinion respecting personal beauty. That the bias thus causing misjudgments in cases where it is checked by direct perception, causes greater misjudgments where direct perception cannot check it, needs no proof. How great are the mistakes it generates, all histories of international struggles show us, both by the contradictory estimates the two sides form of their repective leaders and by the contradictory estimates the two sides form of their deeds. Take an example: — "Of the character in which Wallace first became formidable, the accounts of literature are distractingly conflicting. With the chroni clers of his own country, who write after the War of Independence, he is raised to the highest pinnacle of magnanimity and heroism. To the p]nglish contemporary chroniclers he is a pestilent ruffian; a disturber of the peace of society; an outrager of all laws and social duties; finally, a robber — the head of one of many bands of robbers and marauders then infesting Scotland." 2 That, along with such opposite distortions of belief about conspicuous persons, there go opposite distortions of belief 'about the conduct of the peoples they belong to, the accounts of every war demonstrate. Like the one-sidedness shown within our own society by the remembrance among' Protes tants of Roman Catholic cruelties only, and by the remem brance among1 Roman Catholics of Protestant cruelties only, is the one-sidedness shown in the traditions preserved by each nation concerning the barbarities of nations it has fought with. As in old times the Normans, vindictive themselves, were shocked at the vindictiveness of the English when driven to bay; so in recent times the French have enlarged on the atrocities committed by Spanish guerillas, and the Russians on the atrocities the Circassians perpetrated. In this conflict between the views of those who commit savage acts, and the views of those on whom they are committed, we clearly per ceive the bias of patriotism where both sides are aliens; but we fail to perceive it where we are ourselves concerned as actors. Every one old enough remembers the reprobation vented here when the French in Algiers dealt so cruelly with Arabs who refused to submit — lighting fires at the mouths of caves in which they had taken refuge; but we do not see a like barbarity in deeds of our own in India, such as the ex ecuting a group of rebel sepoys by fusillade, and then setting fire to the heap of them because they were not all dead,8 or in the wholesale shootings and burnings of houses, after the sup pression of the Jamaica insurrection. Listen to what is said about such deeds in our own colonies, and you find that habit ually they are held to have been justified by the necessities of the case. Listen to what is said about such deeds when other nations are guilty of them, and you find the same persons in dignantly declare that no alleged necessities could form a jus tification. Nay, the bias produces perversions of judgment even more extreme. Feelings and deeds we laud as virtuous when they are not in antagonism with our own interests and power, we think vicious feelings and deeds when our own in terests and power are endangered by them. Equally in the mythical story of Tell and in any account not mythical, we read with glowing1 admiration of the successful rising of an oppressed race; but admiration is changed into indignation if the race is one held down by ourselves. We can see nothing save crime in the endeavour of the Hindus to throw off our yoke; and we recognize no excuse for the efforts of the Irish • to establish their independent nationality. We entirely ig nore the fact that the motives are in all such cases the same, and are to be judged apart from results.
A bias which thus vitiates even the perceptions of physical appearances, which immensely distorts the beliefs about con spicuous antagonists and their deeds, which leads us to repro bate when others commit them, severities and cruelties we applaud when committed by our own agents, and which makes us regard acts of intrinsically the same kind as wrong or right according as they are or are not directed against our selves, is a bias which inevitably perverts our sociological ideas. The institutions of a despised people cannot be judged with fairness; and if, as often happens, the contempt is un warranted, or but partially warranted, such value as their institutions have will certainly be under-estimated. When antagonism has bred hatred towards another nation, and has consequently bred a desire to justify the hatred by ascribing hateful characters to members of that nation, it inevitably happens that the political arrangements under which they live, the religion they profess, and the habits peculiar to them, become associated in thought with these hateful char acters — become themselves hateful, and cannot therefore have their natures studied with the calmness required by science.
An example will make this clear. The reflex egoism we name patriotism, causing among other things a high valua tion of the religious creed nationally professed, makes us overrate the effects this creed has produced, and makes us underrate the effects produced by other creeds and by influ ences of other orders. The notions respecting savage and civilized races, in which we are brought up, show this.
The word savage, originally meaning wild or uncultivated, has come to mean cruel and blood-thirsty, because of the rep resentations habitually made that wild or uncultivated tribes of men are cruel and blood-thirsty. And ferocity being- now always thought of as a constant attribute of uncivilized races, which are also distinguished by not having our religion, it is tacitly assumed that the absence of our religion is the cause of this ferocity. But if, struggling successfully against the bias of patriotism, we correct the evidence w^hich that bias has garbled, we find ourselves obliged to modify this assump tion.
When, for instance, we read Cook's account of the Tahitians, as first visited by him, we are surprised to meet with some traits among them, higher than those of their civilized visitors. Though pilfering was committed by them, it was not so serious as that of which the sailors were guilty in steal ing the iron bolts out of their own ship to pay the native women. And when, after Cook had enacted a penalty for theft, the natives complained of one of his own crew — wrhen this sailor, convicted of the offence he w^as charged with, was condemned to be whipped, the natives tried to get him off, and failing to do this, shed tears on seeing preparations for the punishment. If, again, we compare critically the accounts of Cook's death, we see clearly that the Sandwich Islanders behaved amicably until they had been ill-used, and had rea son to fear further ill-usage. The experiences of many other travellers similarly show us that friendly conduct on the part of uncivilized races when first visited, is very general; and that their subsequent unfriendly conduct, when it occurs, is nothing but retaliation for injuries received from the civilized. Such a fact as that the natives of Queen Charlotte's Island did not attack Captain Carteret's party till after they had received just cause of offence,4 may be taken as typical of the histories of transactions between wild races and cultivated races.
When we inquire into the case of the missionary Williams, "the Martyr of Erromanga," we discover that his murder, di lated upon as proving the wickedness of unreclaimed natures, was a revenge for injuries previously suffered from wicked Europeans. Read a few testimonies about the relative be haviours of civilized and uncivilized:— "After we had killed a man at the Marquesas, grievously wounded one at Easter Island, hooked a third with a boat-hook at Tonga-tabu, wounded one at Namocka, another at Mallicollo, and killed another at Tanna; the several inhabitants behaved in a civil and harmless man ner to us, though they might have taken ample revenge by cutting off our straggling parties." 5 " Excepting at Cafta, where I was for a time supposed to come with hostile intent, I was treated inhospitably by no one during all my travels, excepting by Europeans, who had nothing against me but my apparent poverty." 6 " In February, 1812, the people of Winnebah [Gold Coast] seized their commandant, Mr. Meredith," and so maltreated him that he died. The town and fort were destroyed by the English. " For many years afterwards, English vessels passing Winnebah were in the habit of pouring a broadside into the town, to inspire the natives with an idea of the severe vengeance which would be exacted for the spilling of European blood." * Or, instead of these separate testimonies, take the opinion of one who collected many testimonies. Referring to the kind treatment experienced by Enciso from the natives of Car tagena (on the coast of New Granada), who a few years before had been cruelly treated by the Spaniards, Washington Irving says: — " When we recall the bloody and indiscriminate vengeance wreaked upon this people by Ojida and his followers for their justifiable resist ance of invasion, and compare it with their placable and considerate spirit when an opportunity for revenge presented itself, we confess we feel a momentary doubt whether the arbitrary appellation of savage is always applied to the right party." 8 The reasonableness of this doubt will scarcely be ques tioned, after reading of the diabolical cruelties committed by the invading Europeans in America; as, for Instance, in St. Domingo, where the French made the natives kneel in rows along the edge of a deep trench and shot them batch after batch, until the trench was full, or, as an easier method, tied numbers of them together, took them out to sea, and tumbled them overboard; and where the Spaniards treated so horribly the enslaved natives, that these killed themselves wholesale: the various modes of suicide being shown in Spanish draw ings.
Does the Englishman say that these, and hosts of like demoniacal misdeeds, are the misdeeds of other civilized races in other times; and that they are attributable to that corrupted religion which he repudiates? If so, he may be reminded that sundry of the above facts are facts against ourselves. He may be reminded, too, that the purer religion he professes has not prevented a kindred treatment of the North American In dians by our own race. And he may be put to the blush by accounts of barbarities going on in our own colonies at the present time. Without detailing these, however, it will suf fice to recall the most recent notorious case — that of the kid nappings and murders in the South Seas. Here we find re peated the typical transactions: — betrayals of many natives and merciless sacrifices of their lives; eventual retaliation by the natives to a small extent; a consequent charge against the natives of atrocious murder; and finally, a massacre of them, innocent and guilty together.
See, then, how the bias of patriotism indirectly produces erroneous views of the effects of an institution. Blinded by na tional self-love to the badness of our conduct towards inferior races, while remembering what there is of good in our con duct; forgetting how well these inferior races have usually behaved to us, and remembering only their misbehaviour, which we refrain from tracing to its cause in our own trans gressions; we over-value our own natures as compared with theirs. And then, looking at the two as respectively Christian and Heathen, we over-rate the good done by Christian institu tions (which has doubtless been great), and we under-rate the advance that has been made without them. We do this ha bitually in other cases. As, for instance, when we ignore evi dence furnished by the history of Buddhism; respecting the founder of which Canon Liddon lately told his hearers that " it might be impossible for honest Christians to think over the career of this heathen Prince without some keen feelings of humiliation and shame." 9 And ignoring all such evidence, we get one-sided impressions. Thus our sociological concep tions are distorted— do not correspond with the facts; that is, are unscientific.
To illustrate some among the many effects wrought by the bias of patriotism in other nations, and to show how mischiev ous are the beliefs it fosters, I may here cite evidence fur nished by France and by Germany.
Contemplate that undue self-estimation which the French have shown us. Observe what has resulted from that exceed ing faith in French power which the writings of M. Thiers did so much to maintain and increase. When we remember how, by causing under-valuation of other nations, it led to a disre gard of their ideas and an ignorance of their doings — when we remember how, in the late war, the French, confident of vic tory, had maps of G-erman territory but not of their own, and suffered catastrophes from this and other kinds of unpreparedness; we see what fatal evils this reflex self-esteem may pro duce when in excess. So, too, on studying the way in which it has influenced French thought in other directions. On reading the assertion, " La chimie est une science fran-$aise," with which Wurtz commences his Histoire des Doc trines Chimiques, one cannot but see that the feeling which prompted such an assertion must vitiate the comparisons made between things in France and things elsewhere. Looking at Crimean battle-pieces, in which French soldiers are shown to have achieved everything — looking at a picture like Ingres' " Crowning of Homer," and noting French poets conspicuous in the foreground, while the figure of Shakspeare in one corner is half in and half out of the picture — reading the names of great men of all nations inscribed on the string course running round the Palais de V Industrie, and finding many unfamiliar French names, while (strange oversight, as we must suppose) the name of Newton is conspicuous by its absence; we see exemplified a national sentiment which, gen erating the belief that things not French deserve little atten tion, acts injuriously on French thought and French progress. From Victor Hugo's magniloquent description of France as the " Saviour of Nations," down to the declamations of those who urged that were Paris destroyed the light of civilization w^ould be extinguished, we see throughout, the conviction that France is the teacher, and by implication needs not to be a learner. The diffusion of French ideas is an essential thing for other nations; while the absorption of ideas from other nations is not an essential thing for France: the truth being, rather, that French ideas, more than most other ideas, stand in need of foreign influence to qualify the undue definiteiiess and dogmatic character they habitually display. That such a tone of feeling, and the mode of thinking appropriate to it, should vitiate sociological speculation, is a matter of course. If there needs proof, we have a conspicuous one in the writing's of M. Conite; where excessive self -estimation under its direct form, and under that reilex form constituting patriot ism, has led to astounding sociological misconceptions. If we contemplate that scheme of Positivist reorganization and feder ation in which France was, of course, to be the leader — if we note the fact that M. Comte expected the transformation he so rigorously formulated to take place during the life of his own generation; and if, then, we remember what has since hap pened, and consider what are the probabilities of the future, we shall not fail to see that great perversions are produced by this bias in the conceptions of social phenomena.
How national self-esteem, exalted by success in war, warps opinions about public affairs, is again shown of late in Ger many. As a German professor writes to me: — " there is, alas, no want of signs " that the " happy contrast to French selfsufficiency " which Germany heretofore displayed, is disap pearing "since the glory of the late victories." The German liberals, he says, " overflow with talk of Germanism, German unity, the German nation, the German empire, the German army and the German navy, the German church, and German science They ridicule Frenchmen, and what animates them is, after all, the French spirit translated into Ger man." To illustrate the injurious reaction on German thought, and on the estimates of foreign nations and their do ings, he describes a discussion with an esteemed German profes sor of philosophy, against whom he was contending that the psychical and ethical sciences would gain in progress and influ ence by international communion, like that among the physicomathematical sciences. He " to my astonishment declared that even if such an union were possible, he did not think it desir able, as it would interfere too much with the peculiarity of Ger man thought Second to Germany," he said, " it was Italy, wrhich, in the immediate future, was most likely to promote philosophy It appeared that what made him prefer the Italians...was nothing else than his having observed that in Italy they were acquainted with every philosophical treatise published in Germany, however unimportant." And thus, adds my correspondent, "the finest German characteristics are disappearing- in an exaggerated Teutonomania." One more truth his comments on German feeling disclose. An in direct antagonism exists between the sentiment of nationality and the sentiment of individuality; the result of which is that exaltation of the one involves depression of the other, and a decreased regard for the institutions it originates. Speaking of the "so-called National Liberals," he says: — "A friend of mine was lately present at a discussion, in the course of which a professor of philosophy, of the University of, was very eloquently, and witli perfect seriousness, contending that only one thing is now wanted to complete our German institutions — a national costume. Other people, who, no doubt, are fully aware of the ridiculousness of such things, are nevertheless guilty of an equally absurd and even more-intolerable en croachment on individual liberty; since, by proposing to es tablish a national church, they aim at constraining the adher ents of the various religious bodies into a spiritual uniform. Indeed, I should hardly have thought it possible that a Ger man government could encourage such monstrous proposi tions, if they had not been expounded to me at the Ministry of Public Worship."