want you to insure me against aggression, by making the punishment of aggressors, civil as well as criminal, swift, cer tain, and not ruinous to complainants. Instead of doing this, you persist in doing other things. Instead of securing me the bread due to my efforts, you give me a stone — a sculptured block from Ephesus. I am quite content to enjoy only what I get by my own exertions, and to have only that information and those pleasures for which I pay. I am quite content to suffer the evils brought on me by my own defects — believing, indeed, that for me and for all there is no other wholesome discipline. But you fail to do what is needed. You are careless about guaranteeing me the unhindered enjoyment of the benefits my efforts have purchased; and you insist on giving me, at other people's expense, benefits my efforts have not purchased, and on saving me from penalties I de serve."
u You are unreasonable. We are doing our best with the enormous mass of business brought before us: sitting on com mittees, reading evidence and reports, debating till one or two in the morning. Session after session we work hard at all kinds of measures for the public welfare — devising plans for educating the people; enacting better arrangements for the health of towns; making inquiries into the impurity of rivers; deliberating on plans to diminish drunkenness; prescribing modes of building houses that they may not fall; deputing commissioners to facilitate emigration; and so on. You can go to no place that does not show signs of our activity. Here are public gardens formed by our local lieutenants, the mu nicipal bodies; here are lighthouses we have put up to prevent shipwrecks. Everywhere we have appointed inspectors to see that salubrity is maintained; everywhere there are vaccinators to see that due precautions against small-pox are observed; and if, happening to be in a district where our arrangements are in force, your desires are not well controlled, we do our best to insure you a healthy "- " Yes, I know what you would say. It is all of a piece with the rest of your policy. While you fail to protect me against others, you insist on protecting me against myself. And your failure to do the essential thing, results from the absorption of your time in doing non-essential things. Do 262 TEE STUDY OP SOCIOLOGY.
you think that your beneficences make up for the injustices you let me bear? I do not want these sops and gratuities; but I do want security against trespasses, direct and indirect — security that is real and not nominal. See the predica ment in which I am placed. You forbid me (quite rightly I admit) to administer justice on my own behalf; and you profess to administer it for me. I may not take summary measures to resist encroachment, to reclaim my own, or to seize that which I bargained to have for my services: you tell me that I must demand your aid to enforce my claim. But demanding your aid commonly brings such frightful evils that I prefer to bear the wrong done me. So that, practically, having forbidden me to defend myself, you fail to defend me. By this my life is vitiated, along with the lives of citizens in general. All transactions are impeded; time and labour are lost; the prices of commodities are raised. Honest men are defrauded, while rogues thrive. Debtors outwit their cred itors; bankrupts make purses by their failures and recom mence on larger scales; and financial frauds that ruin their thousands go unpunished."
Thus far our impatient friend. And now see how unten able is his position. He actually supposes that it is possible to get government conducted on rational principles! His tacit assumption is that out of a community morally imper fect and intellectually imperfect, there may in some wTay be had legislative regulation that is not proportionately imper fect! He is under a delusion. Not by any kind of govern ment, established after any method, can the thing be done. A good and wise autocrat cannot be chosen or otherwise ob tained by a people not good and wise. Goodness and wisdom will not characterize the successive families of an oligarchy, arising out of a bad and foolish people, any more than they will characterize a line of kings. Nor wTill any system of rep resentation, limited or universal, direct or indirect, do more than represent the average nature of citizens. To dissipate his notion that truly-rational government can be provided for themselves by a people not truly rational, he needs but to read election-speeches and observe how votes are gained by clap-trap appeals to senseless prejudices and by fostering hopes of impossible benefits, while votes are lost by candid statements of stern truths and endeavours to dissipate ground less expectations. Let him watch the process, and he will see that when the fermenting mass of political passions and beliefs is put into the electoral still, there distils over not the wisdom alone but the folly also — sometimes in the larger proportion. Nay, if he watches closely, he may suspect that not only is the corporate conscience lower than the average individual conscience, but the corporate intelligence too. The minority of the wise in a constituency is liable to be wholly submerged by the majority of the foolish: often foolishness alone gets represented. In the representative assembly, again, the many mediocrities practically rule the few superiorities: the superior are obliged to express those views only which the rest can understand, and must keep to themselves their best and farthest-reaching thoughts as thoughts that would have no weight. He needs but remember that abstract principles are pooh-poohed in the House of Commons, to see at once that while the unwisdom expresses itself abundantly, what of highest wisdom there may be has to keep silence. And if he asks an illustration of the way in which the intelligence of the body of members brings out a result lower than would the intelligence of the average member, he may see one in those muddlings of provisions and confusions of language in Acts of Parliament, which have lately been calling forth pro tests from the judges.
Thus the assumption that it is possible for a nation to get, in the shape of law, something like embodied reason, when it is not itself pervaded by a correlative reasonableness, is im probable a priori and disproved a posteriori. The belief that truly-good legislation and administration can go along with a humanity not truly good, is a chronic delusion. While our own form of government, giving means for expressing and enforcing claims, is the best form yet evolved for pre venting aggressions of class upon class, and of individuals on one another; yet it is hopeless to expect from it, any more than from other forms of government, a capacity and a recti tude greater than that of the society out of which it grows. And criticisms like the foregoing, which imply that its short comings can be set right by expostulating with existing gov erning agents or by appointing others, imply that subtlest kind of political bias which is apt to remain when the stronger kinds have been got rid of.
Second only to the class-bias, we may say that the political bias most seriously distorts sociological conceptions. That this is so with the bias of political party, everyone sees in some measure, though not in full measure. It is manifest to the Radical that the prejudice of the Tory blinds him to a present evil or to a future good. It is manifest to the Tory that the Radical does not see the benefit there is in that which he wishes to destroy, and fails to recognize the mischiefs likely to be done by the institution he would establish. But neither imagines that the other is no less needful than himself. The Radical, with his impracticable ideal, is unaware that his en thusiasm will serve only to advance things a little, but not at all as he expects; and he will not admit that the obstructiveiiess of the Tory is a wholesome check. The Tory, doggedly resisting, cannot perceive that the established order is but relatively good, and that his defence of it is simply a means of preventing premature change; while he fails to recognize in the bitter antagonism and sanguine hopes of the Radical, the agencies without which there could be no progress. Thus neither fully understands his own function or the function of his opponent; and by as much as he falls short of understand ing it, he is disabled from understanding social phenomena.
The more general kinds of political bias distort men's socio logical conceptions in other ways, but quite as seriously. There is this perennial delusion, common to Radical and Tory, that legislation is omnipotent, and that things will get done because laws are passed to do them; there is this confidence in one or other form of government, due to the belief that a government once established will retain its form and work as was intended; there is this hope that by some means the collective wisdom can be separated from the collective folly, and set over it in such way as to guide things aright; — all of them implying that general political bias which inevitably coexists with sub ordination to political agencies. The effect on sociological speculation is to maintain the conception of a society as some thing manufactured by statesmen, and to turn the mind from the phenomena of social evolution. While the regulating agency occupies the thoughts, scarcely any attention is given to those astounding processes and results due to the energies regulated. The genesis of the vast producing, exchanging, and distributing agencies, which has gone on spontaneously, often hindered, and at best only restrained, by governments, is passed over with unobservant eyes. And thus, by continu ally contemplating the power which keeps in order, and con templating rarely, if at all, the activities kept in order, there is produced an extremely one-sided theory of Society.
Clearly, it is with this kind of bias as it is with the kinds of bias previously considered — the degree of it bears a certain necessary relation to the temporary phase of progress. It can diminish only as fast as Society advances. A well-balanced social self-consciousness, like a well-balanced individual selfconsciousness, is the accompaniment of a high evolution.
CHAPTER XII.
" WHAT a log for hell-fire! " exclaimed a Wahhabee, on seeing a corpulent Hindu. This illustration, startling by its strength of expression, which Mr. Gifford Palgrave gives * of the belief possessing these Mahommedan fanatics, prepares us for their general mode of thinking about God and man. Here is a sample of it: — '" When 'Abd-el-Lateef, a Wahhabee, was preaching one day to the people of Iliad, he recounted the tradition according to which Mahomet declared that his followers should divide into seventy-three sects, and that seventy-two were destined to hell-fire, and one only to Paradise. ' And what, 0 messenger of God, are the signs of that happy sect to which is ensured the exclusive possession of Paradise? ' Whereto Ma homet had replied, ' It is those who shall be in all conformable to my self and to my companions.' ' And that,' added 'Abd-el-Lateef, low ering his voice to the deep tone of conviction, ' that, by the mercy of God, are we, the people of Riad.' " 2 For present purposes we are not so much concerned to ob serve the parallelism between this conception and the concep tions that have been, and are, current among sects of Chris tians, as to observe the effects produced by such conceptions on men's views of those who have alien beliefs, and on their views of alien societies. What extreme misinterpretations of social facts result from the theological bias, may be seen still better in a case even more remarkable.
By Turner, by Erskiiie, and by the members of the United States' Exploring Expedition, the characters of the Samoans are, as compared with the characters of the uncivilized gener ally, very favourably described. Though, in common with savages at large, they are said to be " indolent, covetous, fickle, and deceitful," yet they are also said to be " kind, good-hu moured,...desirous of pleasing1, and very hospitable. Both sexes show great regard and love for their children; " and age is much respected. " A man cannot bear to be called stingy or disobliging." The women "are remarkably domestic and virtuous." Infanticide after birth is unknown in Samoa. " The treatment of the sick was...invariably humane and all that could be expected." Observe, now, what is said of their cannibal neighbours, the Fijians. They are indiffer ent to human life; they live in perpetual dread of one an other; and, according to Jackson, treachery is considered by them an accomplishment. " Shedding of blood is to him [the Fijian] no crime but a glory." They kill the decrepit, maimed, and sick. While, on the one hand, infanticide covers nearer two-thirds than one-half of the births, 011 the other hand, " one of the first lessons taught the infant is to strike its mother: " anger and revenge are fostered. Inferiors are killed for neg lecting proper salutes; slaves are buried alive with the posts on which a king's house stands; arid ten or more men are slaughtered on the decks of a newly-launched canoe, to bap tize it with their blood. A chief's wives, courtiers, and aidesde-camp, are strangled at his death — being thereby honoured.
Cannibalism is so rampant that a chief, praising his deceased son, ended his eulogy by saying that he would " kill his own wives if they offended him, and eat them afterwards." Vic tims were sometimes roasted alive before being devoured; and Tanoa, one of their chiefs, cut off a cousin's arm, drank the blood, cooked the arm and ate it in presence of the owner, who was then cut to pieces. Their gods, described as having like characters, commit like acts. They live on the souls of those who are devoured by men, having first " roasted " them (the "souls" being simply material duplicates). They "are proud and revengeful, and make war, and kill and eat each other; " and among the names of honour given to them are " the adul terer," "the woman-stealer," "the brain-eater," "the mur derer." Such being the account of the Samoans, and such the account of the Fijians, let us ask what the Fijians think of the Samoans. " The Feegeeans looked upon the Samoans with horror, because they had no religion, no belief in any such deities [as the Feegeean], nor any of the sanguinary rites which prevailed in other islands; " — a statement quite in har mony with that made by Jackson, who, having- behaved dis respectfully to one of their gods, was angrily called by them " the white infidel."
Any one may read while running the lesson conveyed; and, without stopping to consider much, may see its applica tion to the beliefs and sentiments of civilized races. The fero cious Fijian doubtless thinks that to devour a human victim in the name of one of his cannibal gods, is a meritorious act; while he thinks that his Samoaii neighbour, who makes no sacrifice to these cannibal gods, but is just and kind to his fel lows, thereby shows that meanness goes along with his shock ing irreligioii. Construing the facts in this way, the Fijian can form no rational conception of Samoan society. With vices and virtues interchanged in conformity with his creed, the benefits of certain social arrangements, if he thinks about them at all, must seem evils and the evils benefits.
Speaking generally, then, each system of dogmatic the ology, with the sentiments that gather round it, becomes an impediment in the way of Social Science. The sympathies drawn out towards one creed and the correlative antipathies aroused by other creeds, distort the interpretations of all the associated facts. On these institutions and their results the eyes are turned with a readiness to observe everything that is good, and on those with a readiness to observe everything that is bad. Let us glance at some of the consequent perversions of opinion.
Already we have seen, by implication, that the theological element of a creed, subordinating the ethical element com pletely in early stages of civilization and very considerably in later stages, maintains a standard of right and wrong, rela tively good perhaps, but perhaps absolutely bad — good, that is, as measured by the requirements of the place and time, bad as measured by the requirements of an ideal society. And sanctifying, as an associated theology thus does, false concep tions of right and wrong, it falsifies the measures by which the effects of institutions are to be estimated. Obviously, the sociological conclusions must be vitiated if beneficial and det rimental effects are not respectively recognized as such. An illustration enforcing this is worth giving. Here is Mr. Palgrave's account of Wahhabee morality, as disclosed in answers to his questions: — " ' The first of the great sins is the giving divine honours to a creature.'
" ' Of course,' I replied, ' the enormity of such a sin is beyond all doubt. But if this be the first, there must be a second; what is it? ' " ' Drinking the shameful,' in English, ' smoking tobacco,' was the unhesitating answer.
" ' And murder, and adultery, and false witness?' I suggested.
"'God is merciful and forgiving,' rejoined my friend; 'that is, these are merely little sins.'
" ' Hence two sins alone are great, polytheism and smoking,' I con tinued, though hai'dly able to keep countenance any longer. And 'Abd-el-Kareem, with the. most serious asseveration, replied that such was really the case." 4 Clearly a creed which makes smoking one of the blackest crimes, and has only mild reprobation for the worst acts com mitted by man against man, negatives anything like Social Science. Deeds and habits and laws not being judged by the degrees in which they conduce to temporal welfare, the ideas of better and worse, as applying to social arrangements, cannot exist, and such notions as progress and retrogression are ex cluded. But that which holds so conspicuously in this case holds more or less in all cases. At the present time as in past times, and in our own society as in other societies, public acts are judged by two tests — the test of supposed divine appro bation, and the test of conduciveness to human happiness. Though, as civilization advances, there grows up the belief that the second test is equivalent to the first — though, conse quently, conduciveness to human happiness comes to be more directly considered; yet the test of supposed divine approba tion, as inferred from the particular creed held, continues to be very generally used. The wrongness of conduct is con ceived as consisting in the implied disobedience to the sup posed commands, and not as consisting in its intrinsic character as causing suffering to others or to self. Inevitably the effect on sociological thinking is, that institutions and actions are judged more by their apparent congruity or incongruity with the established cult, than by their tendencies to further or to hinder well-being.
270 TEE STUDY OF SOCIOLOGY.
This effect of the theological bias, manifest enough every where, lias been forced on my attention by one whose mental attitude often supplies me with matter for speculation — an old gentleman who unites the religion of amity and the religion of enmity in startling contrast. On the one hand, getting up early to his devotions, going to church even at great risk to his feeble health, always staying for the sacrament when there is one, he displays what is ordinarily regarded as an exem plary piety. On the other hand, his thoughts ever tend in the direction of warfare: fights on sea and land furnish topics of undying interest to him; he revels in narratives of destruc tion; his talk is of cannon. To say that he divides his reading between the Bible and Alison, or some kindred book, is an ex aggeration; but still it serves to convey an idea of his state of feeling. Now you may hear him waxing wroth over the dis establishment of the Irish Church, which he looks upon as an act of sacrilege; and now, when the conversation turns on works of art, he names as engravings which above all others he admires, Creur-de-Lion fighting Salndin, and Wellington at Waterloo. Or after manifesting some kindly feeling, which, to give him his clue, he frequently does, he will shortly pass to some bloody encounter, the narration of which makes his voice tremulous with delight. Marvelling though I did at first over these incongruities of sentiment and belief, the ex planation was reached on observing that the subordinationelement of his creed was far more dominant in his conscious ness than the moral element. Watching the movements of his mind made it clear that to his imagination, God was sym bolized as a kind of transcendently -powerful sea-captain, and made it clear that he went to church from a feeling akin to that with which, as a middy, he went to muster. On perceiv ing that this, which is the sentiment common to all religions, whatever be the name or ascribed nature of the deity wor shipped, was supreme in him, it ceased to be inexplicable that the sentiment to which the Christian religion specially ap peals should be so readily over-ridden. It became easier to understand how, when the Hyde-Park riots took place, he could wish that we had Louis Napoleon over here to shoot down the mob, and how he could recall, with more or less of chuckling, the deeds of press-gangs in his early days.
That the theological bias, thus producing conformity to moral principles from motives of obedience only, and not habitually insisting on such principles because of their in trinsic value, obscures sociological truths, will now not be difficult to see. The tendency is to substitute formal recog nitions of such principles for real recognitions. So long as they are not contravened directly enough to suggest dis obedience, they may readily be contravened indirectly; for the reason that there has not been cultivated the habit of contemplating consequences as they work out in remote ways. Hence it happens that social arrangements essen tially at variance with the ethics of the creed, give no offence to those who are profoundly offended by whatever seems at variance with its theology. Maintenance of the dogmas and forms of the religion becomes the primary, all-essential thing; and the secondary thing, often sacrificed, is the securing of those relations among men which the spirit of the religion re quires. How conceptions of good and bad in social affairs are thus warped, the pending controversy about the Athanasian creed shows us. Here we have theologians who believe that our national welfare will be endangered, if there is not in all churches an enforced repetition of the dogmas that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are each of them almighty; that yet there are not three Almighties, but one Almighty; that one of the Almighties suffered on the cross and descended into hell to pacify another of them; and that whoever does not believe this, " without doubt shall perish everlastingly." They say that if the State makes its priests threaten with eternal tor ments all who question these doctrines, things will go well; but if those priests who, in this threat, perceive the devilworship of the savage usurping the name of Christianity, are allowed to pass it by in silence, woe to the nation! Evidently the theological bias leading to such a conviction entirely ex cludes Sociology, considered as a science.
Under its special forms, as well as under its general form, the theological bias brings errors into the estimates men make of societies and institutions. Sectarian antipathies, growing out of differences of doctrine, disable the members of each religious community from fairly judging other religious communities. It is always difficult, and often impossible, for the zealot to conceive that his own religious system and his own zeal on its behalf may have but a relative truth and a relative value; or to conceive that there may be relative truths and relative values in alien beliefs and the fanaticisms which maintain them. Though the adherent of each creed daily has thrust on his attention the fact that adherents of other creeds are no less confident than he is — though he can scarcely fail sometimes to reflect that these adherents of other creeds have, in nearly all cases, simply accepted the dogmas current in the places and families they were born in, and that he has done the like; yet the special theological bias which his education and surroundings have given him, makes it almost beyond imagination that these other creeds may, some of them, have justifications as good as, if not better than, his own, and that the rest, along with certain amounts of absolute worth, may have their special fitnesses to the people holding them.
We cannot doubt, for instance, that the feeling with which Mr. Whalley or Mr. Newdegate regards Roman Catholicism, must cause extreme reluctance to admit the services which Roman Catholicism rendered to European civilization in the past; and must make almost impossible a patient hearing of anyone who thinks that it renders some services now. Whether great benefit did not arise in early times from the tendency towards unification produced within each congeries of small societies by a common creed authoritatively imposed? — whether papal power supposed to be divinely deputed, and therefore tending to subordinate the political authorities dur ing turbulent feudal ages, did not serve to curb warfare and further civilization? — whether the strong tendency shown by early Christianity to lapse into separate local paganisms, was not beneficially checked by an ecclesiastical system having a single head supposed to be infallible? — whether morals were not improved, manners softened, slavery ameliorated, and the condition of women raised, by the influence of the Church, notwithstanding all its superstitions and bigotries? — are questions to which Dr. Camming, or other vehement op ponent of popery, could not bring a mind open to con viction. Similarly, from the Roman Catholic the meaning and worth of Protestantism are hidden. To the Ultramontane, holding that the temporal welfare no less than the eternal salvation of men depends on submission to the Church, it is incredible that Church-authority has but a tran sitory value, and that the denials of authority which have come along with accumulation of knowledge and change of sentiment, mark steps from a lower social regime to a higher. Naturally, the sincere Papist thinks schism a crime; and books that throw doubt on the established beliefs seem to him ac cursed. Nor need we wonder when from such a one there comes a saying like that of the Mayor of Bordeaux, so much applauded by the Comte de Chambord, that " the Devil was the first Protestant; " or when, along with this, there goes a vilification of Protestants too repulsive to be repeated. Clear ly, with such a theological bias, fostering such ideas respect ing Protestant morality, there must be extremely-false esti" mates of Protestant institutions, and of all the institutions associated with them.
In less striking ways, but still in ways sufficiently marked, the special theological bias warps the judgments of Conform ists and Nonconformists among ourselves. A fair estimate of the advantages which our State-Church has yielded, is not to be expected from the zealous dissenter: he sees only the dis advantages. Whether voluntaryism could have done cen turies ago all that it can do now? — whether a State-sup ported Protestantism was not once the best thing practicable? —are questions which he is unlikely to discuss without preju dice. Contrariwise, the churchman is reluctant to be lieve that the union of Church and State is beneficial only during a certain phase of progress. He knows that within the Establishment divisions are daily increasing, while volun tary agency is doing daily a larger share of the work origi nally undertaken by the State; but he does not like to think that there is a kinship between such facts and the fact that outside the Establishment the power of Dissent is growing. That these changes are parts of a general change by which the political and religious agencies, which have been differ entiating from the beginning, are being separated and special ized, is not an acceptable idea. He is averse to the conception that just as Protestantism at large was a rebellion against an Ecclesiasticism which dominated over Europe, so Dissent among ourselves is a rebellion against an Ecclesiasticism which dominates over England; and that the two are but successive stages of the same beneficial development. That is to say, his bias prevents him from contemplating the facts in a way favourable to scientific interpretations of them.
Everywhere, indeed, the special theological bias accom panying a special set of doctrines, inevitably pre-judges many sociological questions. One who holds a creed as absolutely true, and who by implication holds the multitudinous other creeds to be absolutely false in so far as they differ from his own, cannot entertain the supposition that the value of a creed is relative. That a particular religious system is, in a general sense, a natural part of the particular society in which it is found, is an entirely-alien conception; and, indeed, a repug nant one. His system of dogmatic theology he thinks good for all places and all times. He does not doubt that when planted among a horde of savages, it will be duly understood by them, duly appreciated by them, and work on them results such as those he experiences from it. Thus prepossessed, he passes over the proofs found everywhere, that a people is no more capable of suddenly receiving a higher form of religion than it is capable of suddenly receiving a higher form of gov ernment; and that inevitably with such religion, as with such government, there will go on a degradation which presently reduces it to one differing but nominally from its predecessor. In other words, his special theological bias blinds him to an important class of sociological truths.
The effects of the theological bias need no further elucida tion. We will turn our attention to the distortions of judg ment caused by the anti-theological bias. Not only the actions of religious dogmas, but also the reactions against them, are disturbing influences we have to beware of. Let us glance first at an instance of that indignation against the established creed, which all display more or less when they emancipate themselves from it.
" A Nepaul king, Rum Bahadur, whose beautiful queen, finding that her lovely face had been disfigured by small-pox, poisoned her self, ' cursed his kingdom, her doctors, and the gods of Nepaul, vow ing vengeance on all.' Having ordered the doctors to be flogged, and the right ear and nose of each to be cut off, ' he then wreaked his vengeance on the gods of Nepaul, and after abusing them in the most gross way, he accused them of having obtained from him twelve thousand goats, some hundred-weights of sweetmeats, two thousand gallons of milk. &c., under false pretences.'...He then ordered all the artillery, varying from three to twelve-pounders, to be brought in front of the palace...All the guns were then loaded to the muzzle, and down he marched to the head-quarters of the Nepaul deities...All the guns were drawn up in front of the several deities, honouring the most sacred with the heaviest metal. When the order to fire was given, many of the chiefs and soldiers ran away panic-stricken, and others hesitated to obey the sacrilegious order; and not until several gunners had been cut down, were the guns opened. Down came the gods and goddesses from their hitherto sacred positions; and after six hours' heavy cannonading not a vestige of the deities remained." B This, which is one of the most remarkable pieces of iconoclasm on record, exhibits in an extreme form the reactive an tagonism usually accompanying abandonment of an old belief — an antagonism that is high in proportion as the pre vious submission has been profound. By stabling their horses in cathedrals and treating the sacred places and symbols with intentional insult, the Puritans displayed this feeling in a marked manner; as again did the French revolutionists by pulling down sacristies and altar-tables, tearing mass-books into cartridge-papers, drinking brandy out of chalices, eating mackerel off pateiias, making mock ecclesiastical processions, and holding drunken revels in churches. Though in our day the breaking of bonds less rigid effected by struggles less vio lent, is followed by a less excessive opposition and hatred; yet, habitually, the thro wing-off of the old form involves a replacing of the previous sympathy by more or less of antip athy: perversion of judgment caused by the antipathy taking the place of that caused by the sympathy. What before was reverenced as wholly true is now scorned as wholly false; and what was treasured as invaluable is now rejected as valueless.
In some, this state of sentiment and belief continues. In others, the reaction is in course of time followed by a re-action. To carry out the Carlylean figure, the old clothes which had been outgrown and were finally torn off and thrown aside