energies, as is the case with those powers that are drawn down through you [priests] by the necessities with which invocation is attended.
Or does the soul assert and imagine these things, and are they, as some think, the passions of the soul, excited from small incentives?
Or is a certain mixed form of subsistence produced from our soul, and divine inspiration externally derived?
Hence it must be said, that the soul generates the power which has an imaginative perception of futurity, through motions of this kind, or that the things which are adduced from matter constitute dsemons, through the powers that are inherent in them, and especially things adduced from the matter which is taken from animals.
For in sleep, when we are not employed about any thing, we sometimes obtain a knowledge of the future.
But that a passion of the soul is the cause of divination, is indicated by this, that the senses are occupied, that fumigations are introduced, and that invocations are employed; and likewise, that not all men, but those that are more simple and young, are more adapted to prediction.
The ecstasy, also, of the reasoning power is the cause of divination, as is likewise the mania which happens in diseases, or mental aberration, or a sober and vigilant condition, or suffusions of the body, or the imaginations excited by diseases, or an ambiguous state of mind, such as that which takes place between a sober condition and ecstasy, or the imaginations artificially procured by enchantment.
Nature, likewise, art, and the sympathy of things in the universe, as if they were the parts of one animal, contain premanifestations of certain things with reference to each other. And bodies are so prepared, that there is a presignification of some by others, which is clearly indicated by the works performed in predicting what is future. For those who invoke the divinities for this purpose, have about them stones and herbs, bind certain sacred bonds, which they also dissolve, open places that are shut, and change the deliberate intentions of the recipients, so as from being depraved to render them worthy, though they were before depraved. Nor are the artificers of efficacious images to be despised. For they observe the motion of the celestial bodies, and can tell from the concurrence of what star with a certain star or stars, predictions will be true or false; and also whether the things that are performed will be inanities, or significant and efficacious, though no divinity or daemon is drawn down by these images.
But there are some who suppose that there is a certain obedient genus of daemons, which is naturally fraudulent, omniform, and various, and which assumes the appearance of Gods and daemons, and the souls of the deceased; and that through these every thing which appears to he either good or evil is effected; for they are not able to contribute any thing to true goods, such as those of the soul, nor to have any knowledge of them, but they abuse, deride, and frequently impede those who are striving to be virtuous. They are likewise full of pride, and rejoice in vapours and sacrifices.
Jugglers likewise fraudulently attack us in many ways, through the ardour of the expectations which they raise.
It very much indeed perplexes me to understand how superior beings, when invoked, are commanded by those that invoke them, as if they were their inferiors; and they think it requisite that he who worships them should be just, but when they are called upon to act unjustly, they do not refuse so to act. Though the Gods, likewise, do not hear him who invokes them, if he is impure from venereal connexions, yet, at the same time, they do not refuse to lead any one to illegal venery.
[I am likewise dubious with respect to sacrifices, what utility or power they possess in the universe, and with the Gods, and on what account they are performed, appropriately indeed, to the powers who are honoured by them, but usefully to those by whom the gifts are olffered.*] Why also do the interpreters of prophecies and oracles think it requisite that they should abstain from animals, lest the Gods should be polluted by the vapours arising from them; and yet the Gods are especially allured by the vapours of animals?
Why is it requisite that the inspector [who presides over sacred rites] ought not to touch a dead body, though most sacred operations are performed through dead bodies? And why, which is much more absurd than this, are threats employed and false terrors, by any casual person, not to a dsemon, or some departed soul, but to the sovereign Sun himself, or to the Moon, or some one of the celestial Gods, in order to compel these divinities to speak the truth? For does not he who says that he will burst the heavens, or unfold the * The paragraph within the brackets is omitted in the original; but I have supplied it from the following answer of lamblichus to this Epistle. This omission is not noticed by Gale.
secrets of Isis, or point out the arcanum in the adytum, or stop Baris, or scatter the members of Osiris to Typhon, [or that he will do something else of the like kind *], does not he who says this, by thus threatening what he neither knows nor is able to effect, prove himself to be stupid in the extreme? And what abjectness does it not produce in those who, like very silly children, are possessed with such vain fear, and are terrified at such fictions? And yet Chaeremon, who was a sacred scribe, writes these things, as disseminated by the Egyptians. It is also said, that these, and things of the like kind, are of a most compulsive nature.
What also is the meaning of those mystic narrations which say that a certain divinity is unfolded into light from mire, that he is seated above the lotus, that he sails in a ship, and that he changes his forms every hour, according to the signs of the zodiac? For thus, they say, he presents himself to the view, and thus ignorantly adapt the peculiar passion of their owm imagination to the God himself. But if these things are asserted symbolically, being symbols of the powers of this divinity, I request an interpretation of these symbols. For * Here likewise the words within the brackets, which are omitted in the original, are added from lamblichus; but the omission is not noticed by Gale.
it is evident, that if these are similar to passions of the Sun, when he is eclipsed, they would be seen by all men who intently survey the God.
What also is the design of names that are without signification? and why, of such, are those that are barbaric preferred to our own? For if he who hears them looks to their signification, it is sufilcient that the conception remains the same, whatever the words may be that are used. For he who is invoked is not of the Egyptian race; nor, if he was an Egyptian, does he use the Egyptian, or, in short, any human language. For either all these are the artificial contrivances of enchanters, and veils originating from our passions, which rumour ascribes to a divine nature; or we ignorantly frame conceptions of divinity, contrary to its real mode of subsistence.
I likewise wish you to unfold to me, what the Egyptians conceive the fii'st cause to be; whether intellect, or above intellect? whether alone, or subsisting with some other or others? whether incorporeal, or corporeal; and whether it is the same with the Demiurgus, or prior to the Demiurgus? Likewise, whether all things are from one principle, or from many principles? whether the Egyptians have a knowledge of matter, or of primary corporeal qualities; and whether they admit matter to be imbegotten, or to be generated? For Chseremon, indeed, and others, do not think there is any thing else prior to the visible worlds; but in the beginning of their writings on this subject, admit the existence of the Gods of the Egyptians, but of no others, except what are called the planets, the Gods that give completion to the zodiac, and such as rise together with these; and likewise, the sections into decans, and the horoscopes. They also admit the existence of what are called the powerful leaders, whose names are to be found in the calendars, together with their ministrant offices, their risings and settings, and their significations of future events. For Chseremon saw that what those who say that the sun is the Deminrgus, and likewise what is asserted concerning Osiris and Isis, and all the sacred fables, may be resolved into the stars and the phases, occultations and risings of these, or into the increments or decrements of the moon, or into the course of the sun, or the nocturnal and diurnal hemisphere, or into the river [Nile]. And, in short, the Egyptians resolve all things into physical, and nothing into incorporeal and living essences. Most of them likewise suspend that which is in our power from the motion of the. stars; and bind all things, though I know not how, with the indissoluble bonds of necessity, which they call fate. They also connect fate with the Gods; whom, nevertheless, they worship in temples and statues, and other things, as the only dissolvers of fate.
Concerning the peculiar deemon, it must be inquired how he is imparted by the lord of the geniture, and according to what hind of efflux, or life, or power, he descends from him to us? And also, whether he exists, or does not exist? And whether the invention of the lord of the geniture is impossible, or possible? For if it is possible he is happy, who having learned the scheme of his nativity, and knowing his proper daemon, becomes liberated from fate.
The canons, also, of genethliology [or prediction from the natal day] are innumerable and incomprehensible. And the knowledge of this mathematical science cannot be obtained; for there is much dissonance concerning it, and Chseremon and many others have written against it. But the discovery of the lord, or lords, of the geniture, if there are more than one in a nativity, is nearly granted by astrologers themselves to he unattainable, and yet they say that on this the knowledge of the proper dsemon depends.
Farther still, I wish to know whether the peculiar dsemon rules over some one of the parts in us? For it appears to certain persons.
that daemons preside over the parts of our body, so that one is the guardian of health, another of the form of the body, and another of the corporeal habits, and that there is one daemon who presides in common over all these. And again, that one daemon presides over the body, another over the soul, and another over the intellect; and that some of them are good, but others bad.
I am also dubious whether this daemon is not a certain part of the soul, [such, foi; instance, as the intellectual part;] and if so, he will be happy who has a wise intellect.
I see likewise, that there is a twofold worship of the peculiar daemon; the one being the worship as of two, hut the other as of three. By all men, however, the daemon is called upon by a common invocation.
I farther ask, whether there is a certain other latent way to felicity, separate from the Gods? And I am dubious whether it is requisite to look to human opinions in divine divination and theurgy? And whether the soul does not devise great things from casual circumstances? Moreover, there are certain other methods which are conversant with the prediction of future events. And, perhaps, those who possess divine divination, foresee indeed what will happen, yet are not on this account happy; for they foresee future events, but do not know how to use this knowledge properly. I wish, therefore, that you would point out to me the path to felicity, and show me in what the essence of it consists. For with us [Greeks] there is much verbal contention about it, because we form a conjecture of good from human reasonings. But by those who have devised the means of associating with beings more excellent than man, if the investigation of this subject is omitted, wisdom will be professed by them in vain; as they will only disturb a divine - intellect about the discovery of a fugitive slave, or the purchase of land, or, if it should so happen, about marriage, or merchandize. And if they do not omit this subject, but assert what is most true about other things, yet say nothing that is stable and worthy of belief about felicity, in consequence of employing themselves about things that are difficult, but useless to mankind; in this case, they will not be conversant either with Gods or good daemons, but with that daemon who is called fraudulent; or, if this is not admitted, the whole will be the invention of men, and the fiction of a mortal nature.
SambUcIjus* on tlje jffilsstctics, ^c.
THE ANSWER OF THE PRECEPTOR ABAMMON TO THE EPISTLE OF PORPHYRY TO ANEBO, AND A SOLUTION OF THE DOUBTS CONTAINED IN IT.
SECTION I.
Hermes, the God who presides over language, was formerly very properly considered as common to all priests; and the power who presides over the true science concerning the Gods * The following testimony of an anonymous Greek writer, prefixed to the manuscript of this treatise, which Gale published, proves that this work was written by lamblichus: IcTTCov OTt o <^tAocro(^os Hpo/cAos VTro^vrjixari^iov ras rov fieyoXov IIAojTtvou evveaSas, Aeyei on o avnypa^wi/ €ts ttjv C is one and the same in the whole of things. Hence our ancestors dedicated the inventions of their wisdom to this deity, inscribing all their own writings with the name of Hermes. If, therefore, we participate of a portion of this God, adapted and commensurate to our powers, you do well to propose your theological doubts to the priests, as friends, and to make these doubts known to them. I also very properly conceiving that the epistle sent to my disciple Anebo was written to me, shall give you a true answer to your inquiries. For it would not be becoming, that Pythagoras and Plato, Democritus and Eudoxus, and many other of TrpoKciixevrjv rov UopcfivpLov eTri’^oX'qv, o decnrecTLOS e«3’tv la/il3Xi)(^os’ Kai 8ta TO T7]s v7To0e(re(ji^ olkslov Kat aKoXovOov^ vTroKpiverai TTpoccoTrov Kiyvimov tivos AjSapuDvos' aXXa Kai to ttjs Ae^ews KO/i/xaTtKov Kat a<f>opL'^iKov, Kat to to)v evvouov irpaypuariKov, Kai yXacfivpov, Kai evOovv, p^aprypei tov JlpoKXov KaAws Kai Kpivavra, Kai i^oprjcravra, i. e. “ It is requisite to know that the philosopher Proclus,inhisCommentar3. on the Enneads of the great Plotinus, says that it is the divine lamblichus who answers the prefixed Epistle of Porphyry, and who assumes the person of a certain Egyptian of the name of Abammon, through the affinity and congruity of the hypothesis. And, indeed, the conciseness and definiteness of the diction, and the efficacious, elegant, and divine nature of the conceptions, testify that the decision of Proclus is just.” That this, indeed, was the opinion of Proclus, is evident from a passage in his Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato, which has escaped the notice of Gale, and which the reader will find in a note on the fourth chapter of the eighth section of the following translation.
the ancient Greeks, should have obtained appropriate instruction from the sacred scribes of their time, but that you who are our contemporary, and think conformably to those ancients, should be frustrated of your wish by those who are now living, and who are called common preceptors. I, therefore, thus betake myself to the present discussion; and do you, if you please, conceive that the same person to whom you sent the letter returns you an answer. Or, if it should seem fit to you, admit it to be me who discourses with you in writing, or some other prophet of the Egyptians, for this is of no consequence. Or, which I think is still better, dismiss the consideration whether the speaker is an inferior or a superior character, but direct yoiir attention to what is said, so as readily to excite your mind to survey whether what is. asserted is true or false.
In the first place, therefore, we shall divide the genera of the proposed problems, in order that we may know the quantity and quality of them. And, in the next place, we shall show from what theologies the doubts are assumed, and according to what sciences they are investigated. For some things that are badly confused, require a certain distinction; others are conversant with the cause through which they subsist, and are apprehended; others, which we propose according to a certain contrariety, draw our decision on both sides; and some things require from us the whole development of mystic doctrines. Such, therefore, being the nature of the subjects of discussion, they are assumed from many places, and from different sciences. For some things introduce animadversions from what the wise men of the Chaldeans have delivered; others produce objections from what the prophets of the Egyptians teach; and there are some that, adhering to the theory of philosophers, make inquiries conformably to them. There are now likewise some, that from other opinions, which do not deserve to be mentioned, elicite a certain dubitation; and others originate from the common conceptions of mankind. These things, therefore, are of themselves variously disposed, and are multiformly connected with each other. Hence, through all these causes, a certain discussion is requisite for the management of them in a becoming manner.
We shall, therefore, deliver to you the peculiar dogmas of the Assyrians; and also clearly develop to you our own opinions; collecting some things from the infinite writings of the ancients, but others from those particulars which were comprehended by the ancients in one treatise, and pertain to the whole knowledge of divine natures. If also you should propose any philosophic inquiry, we shall discuss it for you, according to the ancient pillars of Hermes, which Plato and Pythagoras knew before, and from thence constituted their philosophy. But such things as exhibit foreign inquiries, or which are contradictory and contentious, we shall assist mildly and aptly, or we shall demonstrate their absurdity. Such, likewise, as proceed conformably to common conceptions, we shall endeavour to discuss in a way perfectly known and clear. And things, indeed, which require the experience of divine operations to an accurate knowledge of them, we shall explain, as far as this is possible to be effected by words alone; but such as are * In the original Kara ras Kotvas cvvotas, which Gale erroneously translates contra communes opiniones.
full of intellectual theory, we shall develop with a view to the purification of the soul. But indications of this theory worthy of notice may be mentioned, by which it is possible for you, and those who resemble you, to be conducted by intellect to the essence of [real] beings. And with respect to such things as become known by a reasoning process, we shall leave no one of these without a perfect demonstration. But in all things we shall give to each that which is appropriate. And such questions, indeed, as are theological, we shall answer theologically; such as are theurgic, theurgically; but such as are philosophical, we shall, in conjunction with you, philosophically explore. Of these, also, such as extend to first causes, we shall unfold into light, by following them conformably to first principles. But such as pertain to morals, or to ends, we shall fitly discuss, according to the ethical mode. And, in a similar manner, we shall examine other things methodically and appropriately. Let us, therefore, now betake ourselves to your inquiries.
/ I / I In the first place, therefore, you say, “ it must he granted that there are Gods.” Thus to speak, however, is not right on this subject. For an innate knowledge of the Gods is coexistent with our very essence; and this knowledge is superior to all judgment and deliberate choice, and subsists prior to reason and demonstration. It is also counited from the beginning with its proper cause, and is consubsistent with the essential tendency of the soul to the good. If, indeed, it be requisite to speak the truth, the contact with divinity is not knowledge. For knowledge is in a certain respect separated [from its object] by otherness.^' But prior to the knowledge, which as one thing knows another, is the uniform connexion with divinity, and which is suspended from the Gods, is spontaneous and inseparable from them. Hence, it is not proper to grant this, as * Damascius apywv says, "that difference not existing, there will not be knowledge.” And, " that the contact as of one with one is above knowledge.” Likewise, " that the intellectual perception of the first intelligible is without any difference or distinction. ere/ooTr^ros fir] ova-rjSy fi-qSe yvuKTts Et crvva<^rj cos cvos tt/dos ev, virep yvcocrcv.
Alibi, aSia/cpiTos rj tov tt/jcotou votjtov votjctcs.
if it might not be granted, nor to admit it as ambiguous (for it is always unically established in energy); nor are we worthy thus to explore it, as if we had sufficient authority to approve or reject it. For we are comprehended in it, or rather we are filled by it, and we possess that very thing which we are, [or by which our essence is characterized] in knowing the Gods.
I shall likewise say the same thing to you, concerning the more excellent genera that follow the Gods, I mean dsemons, heroes, and undefiled souls.* For it is necessary to understand respecting these, that there is always in them one definite reason of essence, and to remove from them the indefiniteness and instability of the human condition. It is likewise requisite to separate from them that in- * Between souls that always abide on high ^vith purity, such as the souls of essential heroes, and those that descend into the regions of mortality, and are defiled Avuth vice, such as the souls of the greater part of mankind, the class of middled souls subsists. These descend into the realms of generation, partly from that necessity by which all human souls are, at times, drawn down to the earth, and partly for the benevolent pui-pose of benefiting those of an inferior class. But they descend without being defiled with vice. They are also called heroes, Kara crx^o-iv, i. e. according to habitude, in order to distinguish them from essential heroes. And, in the Pythagoric Golden Verses, they are denominated the terrestrial heroes.
I t clination to one side of an argument rather than another, arising from the equilibrium of a reasoning process. For a thing of this kind is foreign from the principles of reason and life, I and rather tends to secondary natures, and to such things as pertain to the power and contrariety of generation. But it is necessary that the more excellent genera should be apprehended uniformly.
The connascent perception, therefore, of the perpetual attendance of the Gods, will be assimilated to them. Hence, as they have an existence which is always invariably the same, thus also the human soul is conjoined to them by knowledge, according to a sameness of subsistence; by no means pursuing through conjecture, or opinion, or a syllogistic process, all which originate in time, an essence which is above all these, but through the pure and blameless intellections which the soul received from eternity from the Gods, becoming united to them. You, however, seem to think, that there is the same knowledge of divine natures as of any thing else, and that one thing, rather than another, may be granted from opposites, in the same manner as it is usual to do in dialectic discussions. There is, however, no similitude whatever between the two kinds of knowledge. For the knowledge of divine natures is different from that of other tilings, and is separated from all opposition. It likewise neither subsists in being now granted, or in becoming to be, but was from eternity, uniformly consubsistent with the soul. And thus much I say to you concerning the first principle in us, from which it is necessary those should begin who speak or hear any thing about the natures that are superior to us.
With respect to your inquiry, “ what the 'peculiarities are in each of the tnore excellent genera, hy ivhich they are separated from each other f if you understand by peculiarities the specific differences under the same genus, which are distinguished by opposite qualities, as the rational and irrational under animal; we by no means admit peculiarities of this kind, in things which neither have one common essence, nor an equal contradistinction, nor receive a composition from something common, which is indefinite, and defines the peculiarity. But if you apprehend the peculiarity to be, as in prior and secondary natures, differing in their whole essence and whole genus, a certain simple condition of being, definite in itself; in this case.
your conception of peculiarities will be reasonable. For these peculiarities of things, which have an eternal subsistence, are simple, and entirely exempt. The inquiry, however, proceeds imperfectly. For it was necessary, in the first place, to inquire what the peculiarities are of the more excellent genera, according to essence; in the next place, what they are according to power; and thus afterwards, what they are according to energy. But, as your question now stands, with respect to the peculiarities by which these genera are separated, you alone speak of the peculiarities of energies. Hence you inquire concerning the dilference in the last things pertaining to them; but you leave uninvestigated such things as are first, and most honourable in them, and which are the elements of their difference. In the same place, also, something is added concerning “ efficacious and passive motions,'’ which is a division by no means adapted to the difference of the more excellent genera. For the contrariety of action and passion is not inherent in any one of them; but their energies are unrestrained, immutable, and without habitude to their opposites. Hence, neither must we admit in them motions of such a kind as arise from action and passion. For neither do we admit in the soul a self-motion, which consists of the mover and that which is moved; but we conceive that it is a certain simple essential motion, subsisting from itself,* and not possessing a habitude to another thing, and exempt from acting on, and suffering from, itself. Who, therefore, can endure that the peculiarities of the genera superior to the soul, should be distinguished according to active or passive motions?
That also which is added by you, “ or of accidents” is foreign from these genera. Tor in composites, and things which exist together with, or in others, or are comprehended by others, some things are conceived to be precedaneous, but others consequent; and some as essences, but others, as afterwards acceding to essences. For there is a certain coarrangement of them, and incongruity and interval intervenes. But, in the more excellent genera, all things must be conceived in rw eLvm, i. e. in merely existing; and wholes have a precedaneous subsistence, are separate by themselves, and have not their hypostasis from, or in others; so that there is not any thing in them which is accidental. Hence the peculiarity of them is not characterized from accidents.
At the end, likewise, of your inquiry, you * For avrrjv eavroi? ovcrav in this place, it is necessarj’^ to read avrrjv eavTijs ovcrav.
introduce a distinction according to nature. For your question asks, “ How essences are hnoivn hy energies, hy gyliysical motions, and hy accidents?'^ The very contrary, however, to all this takes place. For if energies and motions were constitutive of essences, they would be the lords of the difference which is between them. But if essences generate energies, the former being separate prior to the latter, will impart to motions, energies, and accidents, that by which they differ from each other. This, therefore, subsists contrarily to what you suppose, for the purpose of discovering the peculiarity which you now investigate.
In short, whether you think that there is one genus of the Gods, one of daemons, and in a similar manner of heroes, and souls essentially incorporeal; or whether you admit that these are severally many, you inquire what the difference of them is according to peculiarities. For if you apprehend that each of these is one [and the same genus] the whole arrangement of scientific theology is confounded. But if, as truth requires, you admit that they are generically distinguished, and that there is not in them one common essential definition, but that those of them which are prior, are exempt from those that are inferior, it is not possible to discover their common boundaries. And even if this were possible, this very thing would destroy their peculiarities. In this way, therefore, the object of investigation cannot be found. He, however, he who directs his attention to the analogous sameness which exists in superior natures, as, for instance, in the many genera of the Gods, and again in daemons and heroes, and, in the last place, in souls, will be able to define their peculiarities. Hence through this, it is demonstrated by us what the rectitude is of the present inquiry, and what its [accurate] distinction, and also in what manner it is impossible, and in what manner it is possible, for it to subsist.
In the next place, let us direct our attention to the solution of your inquiries. There is, therefore, the good itself which is beyond essence, and there is that good which subsists according to essence; I mean the essence which is most ancient and most honourable, and by itself incorporeal. And this is the illustrious peculiarity of the Gods, which exists in all the genera that subsist about them, preserving their appropriate distribution and order, and not being divulsed from it, and at the same time being inherent with invariable sameness in all the Gods, and their perpetual attendants.
In souls, however, which rule over bodies, and precedaneously pay attention to them, and which, prior to generation, have by themselves a perpetual arrangement, essential good is not present, nor the cause of good, which is prior to essence; but to these a certain participation * and habit, proceeding from essential good, accedes; just as we see that the participation of beauty and virtue is very different [in these souls] from that which we behold in men. For the latter is ambiguous, and accedes to composite natures as something adventitious. But the former has an immutable and never failing establishment in souls, and neither itself ever departs from itself, nor can be taken away by any thing else. Such, therefore, being the beginning and end in the divine genera, conceive two media between these extreme boundaries, viz. the order of heroes, which has an arrangement more elevated than that of souls, in power and virtue, in beauty and magnitude, and in all the goods which subsist about souls, and which, though it entirely transcends the psychical order, yet, at the same time, is proximately conjoined to it, through the alliance of a similar formed life. But the other medium, which is suspended from the Gods, though it is far inferior to them, is that of dmmons, which is not of a primarily operative nature, but is subservient to, and follows the beneficent will of the Gods. It likewise unfolds into energy the invisible good of the Gods, being itself assimilated to it, and gives completion to its fabrications conformably to it. For it renders that which is ineffable in the good of the Gods effable, illuminates that which is formless in forms, and produces into visible reasons [or productive forms] that which in divine good is above all reason. Receiving also a connascent participation of things beautiful, it imparts and transfers it, in unenvying abundance, to the genera posterior to itself. These middle genera, therefore, give completion' to the common bond of the Gods and souls, and cause the connexion of them to be indissoluble. They also bind together the one continuity of things from on high as far as to the end; make the communion of wholes to be inseparable; cause all things to have the best, and a commensurate mixture; in a certain respect, equally transmit the progression from more excellent to inferior natures, and the elevation from things posterior to such as are prior; insert in more imperfect beings order and measures of the communication which descends from more excellent natures, and of that by which it is received; and make all things to be familiar and coadapted to all, supernally receiving the causes of all these from the Gods.
You must not, therefore, think that this division is the peculiarity of powers or energies, or of essence; nor assuming it separately, must you survey it in one of these. But by extending it in common through all the genera, you will give perfection to the answer concerning the peculiarities of Gods, dsemons, and heroes, and also of those in souls which are now the subjects of your inquiry.
Again, however, according to another mode of considering the subject, it is necessary to ascribe to the Gods the whole of that which is united, of whatever kind it may be; that which is firmly established in itself, and which is the cause of impartible essences; the immoveable, which also is to be considered as the cause of all motion, and which transcends the whole of things, and has nothing in common with them; and the unmingled and the separate, understood in common in essence, power and energy, and every thing else of this kind. But that which D D is now separated into multitude, and is able to impart itself to other things, and which receives from others bound in itself, and is sufficient in the distributions of partible natures, so as to give completion to them; which also participates of the primarily operative and vivific, having communion with all real and generated beings; receives a commixture from all things, imparts a contemperation to all things from itself, and extends these peculiarities through all the powers, essences, and energies, in itself; all this we shall truly ascribe to souls, by asserting that it is naturally implanted in them.
What, therefore, shall we say concerning the media? I think, indeed, that from what has been before said, they will be manifest to every one; for these give completion to the indivisible connexion of the extremes. Nevertheless, it is necessary to be more explicit. I consider, therefore, the dsemoniacal tribe to be multiplied, but, unitedly, to be comingled, but in an unmingled manner, and to comprehend all other I I things of a subordinate nature, according to the idea of that which is more excellent. But again, the tribe of heroes supernally presides over a more obvious division and multitude, and likewise over motion, commixture, and things allied to these. It also receives gifts of a more excellent nature, concealed as it were inwardly; I mean union, purity, a firm establishment, impartible sameness, and a transcendency above other things. For one of these middle genera is proximate to the first, but the other to the last, of the extremes. But it reasonably follows, according to continuity of alliance, that the medium which begins from the most excellent natures, should proceed to such as are less excellent; but that the medium which primarily produces a contact with the last of things, should also in a certain respect communicate with the natures that transcend it. From these media, also, the completion may be seen of the first and last genera, and this entirely connascent, in a similar manner, in existence, in power, and in energy. As we have, therefore, in these two ways, perfectly completed the division of the four genera, we shall deem it sufficient in the others, to exhibit the extreme peculiarities alone, for the sake of conciseness, and because what remains, i. e. the comprehension of the media, is in a certain