* 1 ing XXXV.
$ Uſe that may be made of It.
PE re ing for. If I can find nothing poſitive to accede to, no more can I to contradiq, Of this latter kind of work, indeed, there 1s the leſs to do for any one elſe, our Ay.
thor himſelf having executed it, as we have ſeen, ſo. amply.
The whole of it 1s, I muſt confeſs, to me a riddle: more acute, by far, than J am, muſt be the Oedipus that can ſolve it. Happily it is not neceſſary, on account of any thing that follows, that it ſhould be ſolved. Nothing is concluded from it. For aught I can find, it has in itſelf no, uſe, and none is made of it. There it is, and as well might it be any where elſe, or no where.
. Were it then poſſible, there would be no uſe in its being ſolved: but being, as I take it, really unde ie, it were of uſe it ſhould be ſeen to be ſo. Peace may, by this means, be reſtored to the breaſt of many a deſponding ſtudent, who, now prepoſſeſſed with the hopes of a rich harveſt of inſtruction, makes a crime to him- {elf FoRMATION of GovERNMRENT.
ſelf of his inability to. reap what, in truth, his Author has not ſown. ; XXXVI.
As to the Original Contract, by turns embraced and ridiculed by our Author, a few pages, perhaps, may not be ill be- ſtowed in endeavouring to come to a preciſe notion about its reality and uſe. The ſtreſs laid on it formerly, and ſtill, perhaps, by ſome, is ſuch as renders it an objet not undeſerving of attention. I was in hopes, however, till I obſerved the notice taken of it by our Author, that this chimera had been effectually demoliſhed by Mr. Hu. [45] I think we hear not ſo [5] 1. In the third Volume of his Ta AT ISE on HUMan NATURE, | Our Author, one would think, had never fo much as opened that celebrated book: of which the criminality in the eyes of ſome, and the merits in the eyes of others, have ſince been almoſt effaced by the ſplendor of more recent productions of the fame pen. The magnanimity of our Author ſcorned, perhaps, or his cireumſpection ſeared, to derive inſtruction from an enemy: or, what is ſtill more probable, he knew not that the ſubject had been ſo much as touched upon by that penetrating and acute metaphyſician, whoſe works lie ſo much out of the — a. n XXXVI. Original Con- Lact, a fic tion, 1. Notion of the Original Contract overthrown by Mr. Hums., — # — CLAY — - Co 5 ay Bs x” 2 Gern — — Py —— r + CraP.
x f ( 4 TSR EN — ſo much of it now as formerly. The indeſtructible prerogatives of mankind have no need to be ſupported upon the ſandy foundation of a fiction. With the beaten track of Academic reading. But hete, as it happens, there is no matter for ſuch fears. Thoſe men, who are moſt alarmed at the dangers of a free enquiry; thoſe who are moſt intimately convinced that the ſureſt way to truth is by hearing nothing but on one fide, will, I dare anſwer almoſt, find nothing of that which they deem poiſon in this third volume. I would not wiſh to ſend the reader to any other than this, which, if I recolle& aright, ſtands clear of the objections that have of late been urged, with ſo much vehemence, againſt the work in general*. As to the two firſt, the Author himſelf, I am inclined to think, is not 111-diſpoſed, at Preſent, to join with thoſe who are of opinion, that they might, without any great loſs to the ſcience of Human Nature, be diſpenſed with. The like might be ſaid, perhaps, of a conſiderable part, even of this. But, after all 2. Hiſtory. of a mind perplexed by Fifing | retrenchments, there will ſtill remain enough to have laid mankind under indelible obligations. That the foundations of all virtue are laid in utility, is there demon-ſtrated, after a few exceptions made, with the ſtrongeſt force of evidence: but I ſee not, any more than Helvetius ſaw, what need there was for the exceptions.
2. For my own part, I well remember, no ſooner had I read that part of the work which touches on this ſubject, than I felt as if ſcales had fallen from my eyes.
* By Dr. BrATTIEJ in his Eay on the Immutability of Truth. | I then, — FoRMATION of GovERNMENT. | 47 XXXVII. CHAP.
With reſpect to this, and other fic- E tions, there was once a time, perhaps, xxxvl. when they had their uſe. With inſtru- lan general miſof this temper, I will not deny chievous in m—_ B Y the preſent but that ſome political work may have fate of been things.
then, for the firſt time, learnt to call the cauſe of the People the cauſe of Virtue. | Perhaps a ſhort ſketch of the wanderings of a raw but well-intentioned mind, in its reſearches after moral truth, may, on this occaſion, be not unuſeful: for the hiſtory of one mind is the hiſtory of many. The writings of the honeſt, but prejudiced, Earl of Clarendon, to -whoſe integrity nothing was wanting, and to whoſe wiſ- 3 dom little, but the fortune of living ſomething later; and the contagion of a monkiſh atmoſphere; theſe, and other concurrent cauſes, had liſted my infant affections on the ide of deſpotiſm. The Genius of the place T dwelt in, the at authority oFThe ſtate, the voice of the Church in her ſolemn offices; all theſe taught me to call Charles a Martyr, and his opponents rebels. I ſaw innovation, where indeed innovation, but a glorious innovation, was, in their efforts to withſtand him. I ſaw falſehood, where indeed falſehood was, in their diſavowals of innovation. [ ſaw ſelfiſhneſs, and an obedience to the call of paſſion, in the efforts of the oppreſſed to reſcue themſelves from oppreſſion. I ſaw ſtrong countenance lent in the ſacred writings to monarchic government: and none to any other, I ſaw paſſive obedience deep ſtamped with the ſcal of the Chriſtian Virtues of. and ſelf-denial.
Converſing [4 CO wa, FED — < been done, and that uſeful work, which, under the then circumſtances of things, could hardly have been done with any other. But the ſeaſon of Fiction is now „„ over: inſomuch, that what formerly might es bs Lawyers, I found them full of the virtues of their Original Contract, as a recipe of ſovereign efficacy for reconciling the accidental neceſſity of reſiſtance with the general duty of ſubmiſſion, This drug of theirs they adminiftered to me to calm my ſcruples. But my unpractiſed ſtomach revolted againſt their opiate. I bid them open to me that page of hiſtory in which the ſolemnization of this important contract was recorded. They ſhrunk from this challenge; nor could they, when thus preſſed, do otherwiſe than our Author has done, confeſs the whole to be a fiction. This, methought, looked ill. It ſeemed to me the acknowledgement of a bad cauſe, the bringing a fiftion to ſupport it. To prove fiftion, indeed,” ſaid I, * there is need of fiction; but it is the characteriſtic of truth © to need no proof but truth. Have you then really & any ſuch privilege as that of coining of? You « are ſpending argument to no purpoſe. Mdulge yourcc ſelves in the licence of ſuppoſing that to be true which 4% is not, and as well may you ſuppoſe that propoſition & jitſelf to be true, which you wiſh to prove, as that & © other whereby you hope to prove it.” Thus continued I unſatisfying, and unſatisfied, till I learnt to fee that utility was the teſt and meaſure of all virtue; of loyalty as much as any: and that the obligation to miniſter to .
, t might have been tolerated and counte- Cnae. nanced under that name, would, if now | attempted to be ſet on foot, be cenſured and ſtigmatized under the harſher appellations of zncroachment or impoſture. To attempt to introduce any ne one, would be now a crime: for which reaſon there is much danger, without any uſe, in vaunting and propagating ſuch as have been introduced already. In point of political " diſcernment, the univerſal ſpread of learning has raiſed mankind in a manner to a level with each other, in compariſon of what they have been in any former time: nor is any man now ſo far elevated above his fellows, as that he ſhould be indulged in the dangerous licence of cheating them for their good.
AXAV HE XXXVIIL. As tg the fiction now before us, in the This had a momentary character of an argumentum ad hominem, uſe.
to general happineſs, was an obligation paramount tof and incluſive of every other. Having thus got the in- ſtruction I ſtood in need of, I ſat down to make my profit of it. I bid adieu to the original contract: and I left it to thoſe to amuſe themſelves with this rattle, who could think they needed it.
A ewe, or centred, This propoſition, then, ** that men are were propoſitions which no man had any coming when it did, and managed as it was, it ſucceeded to admiration.
That compacts, by whomſoever entered into, ought to be kept; — that men are bound by compacts, are propoſitions which men, without knowing or enquiring why, were diſpoſed univerſally to accede to. The obſervance of promiſes they had been accuſtomed to ſee pretty conſtantly enforced. They had been accuſtomed to ſee Kings, as well as others, behave themſelves as if bound by them, “ bound by compacts; and this other, te that, if one party performs not his part, *© the other is releaſed from his,” being propoſitions which no man diſputed, call to prove. In theory they were al- ſumed for axioms: and in practice they were obſerved as rules. [?] If, on any [i] A compact or contract (for the two words on this occaſion, at leaſt, are uſed in the ſame ſenſe) may, think, be defined, a pair of promiſes, by two perſons teciprocally given, the one promiſe in conſideration of the other, Q occaſion, occaſion, it was thought Proper to make a ſhew of proving them, it was rather for _ form's fake than for any thing elſe: and that, rather in the way of memento or inſtruction to acquieſcing auditors, than in the way of proof againſt opponents. On ſuch an occaſion the common place retinue of phraſes was at hand; Juſtice, Right Reaſon required it, the Law of Nature commanded it, and ſo forth; all which are but ſo many ways of intimating that a man is firmly perſuaded of the truth of this or that moral propoſition, though he either thinks he reed not, or finds he can t, tell why. Men were too obviouſly and too generally intereſted in the obſervance of theſe rules to entertain doubts concerning the force of any arguments | they law employed in their ſupport.—lt is an old obſervation how Intereſt ſmooths the road to Faith. XXXIX.
A compact, then, it was ſaid, was made by the King and People: the terms of it were to this effect. The People, E2 on XXXIE Terms of the ſuppoſed contract ſtated.
bog ap 2 e BE ne. SOR That p CAP. on their part, promiſed to the King a I. general obedience. The King, on his part, promiſed to govern the people in ſuch a particular manner always, as ſhould be _ fubſervient to their happineſs. I inſiſt not on the words: I undertake only for the ſenſe; as far as an imaginary engagement, ſo looſely and ſo variouſly worded by thoſe who have imagined it, is capable of any decided ſignification. Aſſuming then, as a general rule, that promiſes, when made, ought to be obſerved; and, as a point of fact, that a promiſe to this effect in particular had been made by the party in queſtion, men were more ready to deem themſelves qualified to judge when it was ſuch a promiſe was broken, than to decide directly and avowedly on the delicate queſtion, when it was that a King acted ſo far in oppoſition to the happineſs of his people, that it were better no longer to obey him.
XL Stated thus It is manifeſt, on a very little conally, i: Lould nee fideration, that nothing was gained by this * this manceuvre after all: no difficulty removed by it. It was ſtill neceſſary, and that as much as ever, that the queſtion diſpenſe men men ſtudied to avoid ſhould be determined, in order to determine the queſtion I.
— from entering into the queſtion of utility, as was they thought to ſubſtitute in its room. intended.
It was ſtill neceſſary to determine, whether the King in queſtion had, or had not acted ſo far in oppoſition to the happineſs of his people, that it were better no longer to obey him; in order to determine, whether the promiſe he was ſuppoſed to have made, had or had not been broken, For what was the ſuppoſed purport of this promiſe? It was no other than what has juſt been mentioned, XLI. Let it be ſaid, that part at leaſt of this Law: that hereby a more preciſe rule XLI.
Nor, if ſtated 3 - - more particu=- ' promiſe was to govern in ſubſervience t0 leely; cect it anſwer what was defigned was laid down for his conduct, by means by it.
of this ſuppoſal of a promiſe, than that other looſe and general rule to govern in ſubſervience to the happineſs of his peoble: and that, by this means, it is the E 3 letter + I x 4: * # } p 4, N ws F.
op 7 th N ic * .
that can he ſafely taken for the entire _ purport of the promiſe here in queſtion: A FRAGMENT o GOVERNMENT, letter of the Law that forms the tenor of the rule.
Now true it 1s, that the governing in oppoſition to Law, 1s one way of governing in oppoſition to the happineſs of the people: the natural effect of ſuch a contempt of the Law being, if not aQually to deſtroy, at leaſt to threaten with deſtruction, all thoſe rights and privileges that are founded on it: rights and privileges on the enjoyment of which that happineſs depends. But till it is not this and that for ſeveral reaſons. Firſt, Becauſe the moſt miſchievous, and under certain conſtitutions the moſt feaſible, method of governing in oppotition to the happineſs of the people, is, by ſetting the Law itſelf in oppoſition to their happineſs. Secondly, Becauſe it is a cak very conceivable, that a King may, to 1 great degree, impair the happineſs of his people without violating the letter of any ſingle Law. T. bird} » Becauſe extract dinaty dinary occaſions may now and then occur, in which the happineſs of the people may be better promoted by acting, for the moment, in oppgizzon to the Law, than in ſubſervience to it. Fourthly, Becauſe it is not any ſingle violation of the Law, as ſuch, that can properly be taken for a breach of his part of the contract, ſo as to be underſtood to have releaſed the people from the obligation of performing theirs. For, to quit the fiction, and reſume the language of plain truth, it is ſcarce ever any ſingle violation of the Law that, by being ſabmitted to, can produce fo much miſchief as ſhall ſurpaſs the probable miſchief of re//tmmg it. If every ſingle inſtance whatever of ſuch a violation were to be deemed an entire diſſolution of the contract, a man who reflects at all would ſcarce find any-where, I believe, under the ſun, that Government which he could allow to ſubſiſt for twenty years together. It is plain, therefore, that to paſs any found deciſion upon the queſtion which the inventors of this fiction ſubſtituted E 4 inſtead * * = — os — oa ww, wm UV - P « Ly *.
Nor is it an original independent principle.
inſtead of the true one, the latter was ill neceſſary to be decided. All they gained by their contrivance was, the convenience of deciding it obliquely, as it were, and by a fide wind—that is, in a crude and haſty way, without any direct and ſteady examination.
XLII.
But, after all, for what reaſon is it, that men ought to keep their promiſes? The moment any intelligible reaſon is given, it is this: that it is for the advantage of ſociety they ſhould keep them; and if they do not, that, as far as puniſhment will go, they ſhould be made to keep them. It is for the advantage of the whole number that the promiſes of each individual ſhould be kept: and, rather than they ſhould not be kept, that ſuch individuals as fail to keep them ſhould be puniſhed. If it be aſked, how this appears? the anſwer is at hand:—Such is the benefit to gain, and miſchief to avoid, by keeping them, as much more than compenſates the miſchief of ſo much 7 pun iſhmen „ reer a= .
Fox MAT ION of GOVERNMENT. 57 puniſhment as is requiſite to oblige men Char. to it. Whether the dependence of benefit E; and miſchief (that is, of pleaſure and pain) upon men's conduct in this behalf, be as here ſtated, is a queſtion of a, to be decided, in the ſame manner that all other queſtions of fact are to be decided, by teſtimony, obſervation, and experience [4].
_ — — n — We * . * This then, and no other, being the Nor can it ſerve toprove reaſon why men ſhould be made to keep any thing, 7! 5 but wh their promiſes, viz. that it is for the pe 8 nnge proved without it.
{4] The importance which the obſervance of promiſes is of to the happineſs of ſociety, is placed in a very ſtriking and ſatisfactory point of view, in a little apologue of MonTEesqQuiev, intitled, The Hiſtory of the Troglodytes *, The Troglodytes are a people who pay no regard to promiſes. By the natural conſequences of this diſpoſition, they fall from one ſcene of miſery into another; and are at laſt exterminated, The ſame Philoſopher, in his Spirit of Laws, copying and refining upon the current jargon, feigns a Law for this and other purpoſes, after defining a Law to be a relation, How much more inſtructive on this head „ —— che fable of the Troglodytes than the pſeudo-metaphyical ſophiſtry of the E/prit des Lojx / Ste the Collection of his Works. advantage 58 MA FRAGMENT on GOVERNMENT.
Cray, advantage of ſociety that they ſhould, is YM" a reafon that may as well be given at once, why Kings, on the one hand, in governing, ſhould in general keep within eſtabliſhed Laws, and (to ſpeak univerfally) abſtain from all ſuch meatures as tend to the unhappineſs of their ſubjects: and, on the other hand, why /udjetts ſhould obey Kings as long as they fo conduct themſelves, and no longer; why they ſhould obey in ſhort / long as the probable miſchiefs of obedience are leſs than the probable miſchiefs of refitance: why, in a word, taking the whole body together, it is their duty to obey, juit fo long as it is their intereſt, and no longer. This being the caſe, what need of ſaying of the one, that He PROMISED ſo to govern; of the other, that they PROMISED ſo to obey, when the fact is otherwiſe?
XLIV. XLIV.
The Corena- True it is, that, in this country, accortion-Oath:: does not Qing to ancient forms, ſome ſort of vague the notion of Promiſe of good government is made by it, Kings at the ceremony of their coronation; nation: and let the acclamations, perhaps given, perhaps not given, by chance perſons out of the ſurrounding multitude, be conftrued into a promiſe of obedience on the part of the 20h multitude: that whole multitude itſelf, a ſmall drop collected together by chance out of the ocean of the ſtate: and let the two promiſes thus made be deemed to have formed a perfect compact. — not that either of them is declared to be the conſideration of the other *. „ Make the moſt of this conceſſion, one experiment there is, by which every reflecting man may ſatisfy himſelf, I think, beyond a doubt, that it is the conſideration of utility, and no other, that, ſecretly but unavoidably, has governed his judgment upon all theſe matters. The experiment is eaſy and deciſive. It is but to reverſe, in ſuppoſition, in the firſt place 2 1 V. ſupra par. 38. note. [i]. = miſes point of utility of the obſervance of pro Cnar. = XLV. The obligation OT à promile will no ſtand againſt that r uulity: Wnile HERE. that of utiliwill againſt that of a promiſe, ” ne...if Lc.
A fallacy obviated.
miſes in general.—Suppoſe the King to promiſe that he would govern his ſubjects not according to Law; not in the view to promote their happineſs: — would this be binding upon im? Suppoſe the people to promiſe they would obey him az all events, let him govern as he will; let him govern to their deſtruction. Would this be binding upon them? Suppoſe the conſtant and univerſal effect of an obſervance of promiſes were to produce miſchief, would it then be men's duty to obſerve them? Would it then be right to make Laws, and apply puniſhment to oblige men to obſerve them? XLVI.
% No;” (it may perhaps be replied) « but for this reaſon; among promiſes, «© ſome there are that, as every one al- &« Jows, are void: now theſe you have « been ſuppoſing, are unqueſtionably of « the number. A promiſe that is in itſelf « void, cannot, it is true, create any ob- &« ligation: But allow the promiſe to * be valid, and it is the promiſe itſelf « that — nh, YI EE I bet Erb A SING 3 1 1 r a V7 EE LL OE Ee Cot fc nA PS 1 AI gw « that creates the obligation, and no- « thing elſe.” The fallacy of this argument it is eaſy to perceive. For what 1s it then that the promiſe depends on for its validity? what is it that being preſent makes it valid? what is it that being wanting makes it void? To acknowledge that any one promiſe may be void, is to acknowledge that if any other is binding, it is not merely becauſe it is a promiſe. That circumſtance then, whatever it be, on which the validity of a promiſe depends, that circumſtance, I ſay, and not the promile itſelf muſt, it is plain, be the cauſe of the obligation which a promiſe is apt in general to carry with it. XLVII.
But farther. Allow, for argument's ſake, what we have diſproved: allow that the obligation of a promiſe is independent of every other: allow that a promiſe is binding propria vi Binding then on whom? On him certainly who makes it. Admit this: For what reaſon is the ſame individual I.
XLVII.
The obligation of a promiſe, were it even independent, would not be extenfive enough for the purpoſe, Cruay. individual promiſe to be binding on I. thoſe who never made it? The King, fifty years ago, promiſed my Great-Grandfather to govern him according to Law: my Great-Grandfather, iy years ago, promiſed the King to obey him according to Law. The King, juſt now, promiſed my neighbour to govern him according to Law: my neighbour, uſt now, promiſed the King to obey him according to Law, »—Be it ſo—What are theſe promiſes, all or any of them, to we? To make anſwer to this queſtion, ſome other principle, it is manifeſt, muſt be reſorted to, than that of the intrinſic obligation of promiſes upon thoſe who make them. XVIII. XLVIII.: But the _ Now this other principle that ſtill reciple of vu- __ is curs upon us, what other can it be than all- ſuficient. the principle of UTILITY? The principle which furniſhes us with that reaſon, which alone depends not upon any higher reaſon, but which is itſelf the ſole and all- ſufficient reaſon for every point of practice whatſoever.
Forms of Government?
CHAT: FoRMs of GOVERNMENT.
J. HE contents of the whole digreſ- ſion we are examining, were diſtributed, we may remember, at the out-ſet of this eſſay, into five diviſions. The firſt, relative to the manner in which Government in general was formed, has already been examined in the preceding chapter. The next, relative to the different pecies or forms it may aſſume, comes now to be conſidered. II.
The firſt object that ſtrikes us in this diviſion of our ſubject is the theological flouriſh it ſets out with. In God may be faid, though in a peculiar ſenſe, to be our Author's ſtrength. In theology he has found a not unfrequent ſource, of ornament to divert us, of authority to overawe CHAßp. II.
I. Subject of the preſent chapter.
II.
Theological flouriſh of our Author, 22 rer — - v — — eln 7 f PT n P Tot e P n CHAP, awe us, from ſounding into the ſhallow. II. neſs of his doctrines [a]. Governor That governors, of ſome ſort or other, celeſtial en- 7 5 dowments we muſt have, is what he has been ſhew- — * ing in the manner we have ſeen in the laſt chapter. Now for endowments to qualify them for the exerciſe of their function. Theſe endowments then, as if it were to make them ſhew the brighter, and to keep them, as much as poſſible, from being ſoiled by the rough hands of iA impertinent ſpeculators, he has choſen 70 ſhould be of ethereal texture, and has 1 fetched them from the clouds.
{i «© All mankind * he fays, © wil 1 agree that government ſhould be repoſed in ſuch perſons in whom thoſe qualities are moſt likely to be found, e the perfection of which are among the < attributes of Him who is emphatically [a] This is what there would be occaſion to ſhew at large, were what he ſays of Law in general, and of the al Laws of Nature and Revelation in particular, to be. examined.
9 op „ eo TE os WL SENS. 2 - * Forms of GovERNMENT., | 65 &« ſtyled the Supreme Being: the three CauaP. « oreat requiſites, I mean, or wiſdom, of II.
« goodneſs, and of power.“ But let us ſee the whole paſſage as it ſtands Iv. IV. « But as all the members of Society,” The paſſage 8. recited, (meaning natural Society) © are naturally to political power, of which none of them as yet have any) © it may be aſked,” (continues he) * in wheſe hands are the reins * of government to be intruſted? To this the general anſwer is eaſy; but the application of it to particular caſes, * has occaſioned one half of thoſe miſe chiefs which are apt to proceed from * miſguided political zeal. In general, | © all mankind will agree that govern-| © ment ſhould be repoſed in ſuch perſons © in whom thoſe qualities are moſt likely © to be found; the perfection of which “ are among the attributes of Him who is — — caphitivatiy ſtyled the Supreme Being; © the three grand requiſites, I mean, of | F „% wildom, Sy x” V. Theology on ſuch an occaſion as this impertinent.
A FRAGMENT o GOVERNMENT.
© wiſdom, goodneſs, and of power: wiſ- * dom, to diſcern the real intereſt of the *© community; goodneſs, to endeavour „always to purſue that real intereſt; « and ſtrength or power, to carry this „knowledge and intention into action. 4 Theſe are the natural foundations of « ſovereignty, and theſe are the requi- « ſites that ought to be found in every * well conſtituted frame of governent, Every thing in its place. Theology in a ſermon, or a catechiſm. But in this place, the flouriſh we have ſeen, might, for every purpoſe of inſtruction, have much better, it ſhould ſeem, been ſpared. What purpoſe the idea of that tremendous and incomprehenſible Being thus unneceſſarily introduced can anſwer, I cannot ſee, unleſs it were to bewilder and entrance the reader; as it ſeems to have bewildered and entranced the writer.
Beginning thus, is beginning at the wrong end: it is explaining ignotum per gnotius. It Fox MS of GovRRNMENr.
It is not from the attributes of the Deity, that an idea is to be had of any qualities in men: on the contrary, it is from what we ſee of the qualities of men, that we obtain the feeble idea we can frame to ourſelves, of the attributes of the Deity. | VI.
We ſhall ſoon ſee whether it be light or darkneſs our Author has brought back from this excurſion to the clouds. The qualifications he has pitched upon for thoſe in whoſe hands Government 1s to be repoſed, we ſee are three: wiſdom, goodneſs, and power. Now of theſe three, one there is which, I doubt, will give him ſome trouble to know what to do with. I mean, that of Power: which, looking upon it as a. jewel, it ſhould ſeem, that would give a luſtre to the royal diadem, he was for importing from the celeſtial regions. In heaven, indeed, we ſhall not diſpute its being to be found; and that at all junctures alike. But the parallel, I doubt, already fails. 5 In Difficulty it leads in tO.
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D. % .. SO YER, = VII. Power, either natural or political.
In neicher In the earthly governors in queſtion, or, to ſpeak more properly, candidates for government, by the very ſuppoſition there can not, at the juncture he ſuppoſes, be any ſuch thing. Power is that very quality which, in conſideration of theſe other qualities, which, it is ſuppoſed, are poſſeſſed by them already, my are now waiting to receive. VII.