power [2]; and, in general, that power CRHAP. which, extending as well over the public III. money as over every other article of public property, may be ſtyled the dyſpenſatorial[b]. Doth it include the power of granting patents for inventions, and [a] By f/eal power I mean that which in this country is exerciſed by what 1s called the Board of Trea-{ury. LL | | [3] By di/pen/atorial power J mean as well that which is exerciſed by the Board of Treaſury, as thoſe others which are executed in the ſeveral offices ſtyled with us tae War Office, Admiralty Board, Navy Board, Board of Ordnance, and Board of Works: excepting from the buſineſs of all theſe offices, the power of appointing perſons to fill other ſubordinate offices: a power which ſeems to be of a diſtinct nature from that of making diſpoſition of any article of public property.
Power, political power, is either over perſent or over things, The powers, then, that have been mentioned above, in as far as they concern rhings, are powers over ſuch things as are the property of the public: powers which differ in this from thoſe which conſtitute private ownerſhip, i in that the former are, in the main, not &ereficial (that is, to the poſſeſſors themſelves) and indi/-criminate; but fiduciary, and limited in their exerciſe to ſuch ad, as are conducive to the ſpecial purpoſes of pubs lic benefit and ſecurity, H 2 charters eee NEE 0 So n AE I - p Cat TOE Cup. charters of incorporation? Doth it in- III. clude the right of making bye-laws in corporations? And is the right of making bye-laws in corporations the ſuperior right to that of conferring the power to make them, or is it that there is an executive power that is ſuperior to a legiſlative? This executive again, doth it include the right of ſubſtituting the laws of war to the laws of peace; and, vice verſa, the laws of peace to the laws of war? Doth it include the right of re- ſtraining the trade of ſubjects by treaties with foreign powers? Doth it include the right of delivering over, by virtue of the like treaties, large bodies of ſubjects to foreign laws? — He that would under- ſtand what power is executive and not legiſlative, and what legiſlative and not executive, he that would mark out and delineate the different ſpecies of conſtitutional powers, he that would deſcribe either what 7s, or what ought to be the conſtitution of a country, and particularly larly of this country, let him theſe things. VI.
In the next place we are told in a parentheſis (it being a matter ſo plain as to be taken for granted) that “ each of « theſe branches of the Legiſlature 1s independent, —yes, © entirely independ-« ent,” of the two others. — Is this then really the caſe? Thoſe who confider the influence which the King and ſo many of the Lords have in the election of members of the Houſe of Commons; the power which the King has, at a minute's warning, of putting an end to the exiſtence of any Houſe of Commons; thoſe who conſider the influence which the King has over both Houſes, by offices of dignity and profit given and taken away again at pleaſure; thoſe who conſider that the King, on the other hand, depends for his daily bread on both Houſes, but more particularly on the Houſe of Commons; not to mention a 3 variety think of CHAP.
= VT. Independence inaccurately attributed to the three branches of the Government.
VII. A happy diſcovery—merit inſeparable fro high ſtation.
2 STAND Cos £1 c En En Tag on A FRAGMENT ox GOVERNMENT, variety of other circumſtances that might be noticed in the ſame view, will Judge what degree of preciſion there was in our Author's meaning, when he fo roundly alerted the affirmative. VII.
One parentheſis more: for this ſentence teems with parentheſis within parentheſis. To this we are indebted for a very intereſting piece of intelligence: nothing leſs than a full and true account of the perſonal merits of the members of | the Houſe of Lords for the time being. This he is enabled to do, by means of a contrivance of his own, no leſs ſimple than it is ingenious; to wit, that of looking at their titles. It is by looking at men's titles that he perceives, not merely that they ng to poſſeſs certain merits, not that there is reaſon to wh they may poſſeſs them, but that they do atually poſſeſs them, and that it is by poſſeſſing thoſe merits that they came to poſſeſs theſe titles. Seeing that ſome are biſhops, he knows that they are pious: | ſeeing BRITISH CoNs TITUTIoN.
ſeeing that ſome are peers, he knows that they are wile, rich, valiant [e].
VI. The [c] *© The Lords ſpiritual and temporal, [p. 50.] © which,” ſays our Author, 7s an ariſtocratical « aſſembly of perſons ſelected for their piety, their « birth, their wiſdom, their valour, or their property“ - I have diſtributed, I think, theſe endowments, as our Author could not but intend they ſhould be diſtributed. Birth, to ſuch of the members of that aſſembly as have their ſeat in it by 4eſcent: and, as to thoſe who may chance from time to time to fit there by creation, wildom, valour, and property in common among the temporal peers; and piety, ſingly but entirely, among my Lords the Biſhops. As to the other three endow. ments, if there were any of them to which theſe right reverend perſons could lay any decent claim, it would be wiſdom: but fince worldly wiſdom is what it would be an ill compliment to attribute to them, and the wiſdom which is from above is fairly included under piety, I conclude that, when ſecured in the excluſive poſſeſſion of this grand virtue, they have all that was intended them. There 1s a remarkable period in our hiſtory, at which, meaſuring by our Author's ſcale, theſe three virtues ſeem to have been at the boiling point, It was in Queen Ann's reign, not long after the time of the hard froſt. I mean in the year 1711. In that auſpicious year, theſe three virtues iſſued forth, it ſeems, with ſuch exuberance, as to furniſk merit enough to flock no fewer than a dozen reſpectable per- H 4 ſons, A VIII.
III. ” VIII, The more we conſider the application Suppoſed he makes of the common-place notions qualities of. x the three pre- COncerning the three forms of Governtended forms ment to our own, the more we ſhall ſee of Govern» | | ment not ap- the wide difference there is between licabie t.: dur un. keading and reflecting. Our own he finds to be a combination of theſe three. It has a Monarchical branch, an Ariftoſons, who, upon the ſtrength of it, were all made Barons in a day. Unhappily indeed, ſo little read was a right reverend and cotemporary hiſtorian “, in our _ * Author's method of “ diſcerning of ſpirits,” as to fancy, it was neither more nor leſs than the neceſſity of making a majority that introduced ſo large a body of new members thus ſuddenly into the houſe. But I leave it to thoſe who are read in the hiſtory of that time, to judge of the ground there can be for ſo romantic an imagination, As to piety, the peculiar endowment of the mitre, the ſtock there is of that virtue, ſhould, to judge by the like ſtandard, be, at all times, pretty much upon a level: at all times, without queſtion, at a max: mum. This is what we can make the leſs doubt of, ſince, with regard to eccleſiaſtical matters, in general, our Author, as in another place he aſſures us, has had the happineſs to find, that every thing is as it ſhould be +.”
See Biſhop Burnet's Hiſtory of his own Times, Vol. 2.
cratical, cratical, and a Democratical. The Ariſtocratical is the Houſe of Lords; the Democratical is the Houſe of Commons. Much had our Author read, at ſchool, doubtleſs, and at college, of the wiſdom and gravity of the Spartan ſenate: ſomething, probably, in Monteſquieu, and elſewhere, about the Venetian. He had read of the turbulence and extravagance of the Athenian mob. Full of theſe ideas, the Houſe of Lords were to be our Spartans or Venetians; the Houſe of Commons, our Athenians. With re— ſpect then to the point of wiſdom, (for that of honeſty we will paſs by) the con- ſequence is obvious. The Houſe of Commons, however excellent in point of honeſty, 1s an aſſembly of leſs vum than that of the Houſe of Lords. This is what our Author makes no ſcruple of aſſuring us. A Duke's ſon gets a ſeat in the Houſe of Commons. There needs no more to make him the very model of an Athenian cobler.
IX. Let III.
Cu Ar. III.
IX. Wiſdom, why likely to be wanting in the members of a Democracy _ * e IX.
Let us find out, if we can, whence this notion of the want of wiſdom in the members of a Democracy, and of the abundance of it in thoſe of an Ariſtocracy, could have had its riſe. We ſhall then ſee with what degree of propriety ſuch a notion can be transferred to our Houſes of Lords and Commons.
In the members of a Democracy in particular, there is likely to be a want of wiſdom —Why? The greater part being poor, are, when they begin to take upon them the management of affairs, uneducated: being uneducated, they are illiterate: being illiterate, they are ignorant. Ignorant, therefore, and unis, if that be what is meant by ignorant, they begin. Depending for their daily bread on the profits of ſome petty traffic, or the labour of ſome manual occupation, they are nailed to the work-board, or the counter. In the buſineſs of Government, it is only by fits and farts that they have leiſure ſo much as to a: 5 they they have no leiſure to rect. Ignorant therefore they continue. — But in what degree is this the caſe with the members of our Houſe of Commons: On the other hand, the members of an Ariſtocracy, being few, are rich: either they are members of the Ariſtocracy, becauſe they are rich; or they are rich, becauſe they are members of the Ariſtocracy. Being rich, they are educated: being educated, they are lear rned: being learned, they are knowing. They are at leiſure to reflect, as well as act. They may therefore naturally be expected to become more knowing, that is more wiſe, as they perſevere. In what degree is this the cafe with the members of the Houſe of Lords more than with thoſe of the Houſe of Commons? The fact is, as every body ſees, that either the members of the Houſe of Commons are as much at leiſure as thoſe of the Houſe of Lords; or, if occupied, occupicd in ſuch a way as tends to give them a more than ordinary inſight into ſome Particular department X. —and preſent in thoſe of an Ariſtocracy.
XI. Why, according to our Author.
2 / i Yo IEEE Wo: A IIS EIS; CO. Eo _ NICE RI 83 n. as ER os 5 E 1 * 1 Sr FADES OR PE EE 1 7 2 4 T DOSS * N Tak ment of Government. In whom ſhall we expect to find ſo much knowledge of Law as in a profeſſed Lawyer? of Trade, as in a Merchant?
XI. | But hold Our Author, when he attributes to the members of an Ariſto— cracy more wiſdom than to thoſe of a Democracy, has a reaſon of his own. Let us endeavour to underſtand it, and then apply it, as we have applied the others. In Ariſtocratical bodies, we are to underſtand there is more experience: at leaſt it 1s intended by ſome body or other there ſhould be: which, it ſeems, anſwers the ſame purpoſe as if there was, In Ariſtocracies, ſays. our Author, c there is more wiſdom to be found, & than in the other frames of Govern- « ment; being compoſed,” continues he, * or intended to be compoſed, of the «© moſt experienced citizens *. On this ground then it is, that we are to take for granted, that the members of the Houſe of Lords have more wiſdom . among TEL * e BRITISH Cos T ITU TION.
among them, than thoſe of the Houſe of Commons. It is this article of experience that, being a qualification poſſeſſed by the members of an Ariſtocratical body, as ſuch, in a ſuperior degree to that in which it can be poſſeſſed by a democratical body, is to afford us a particular ground for attributing a greater ſhare of wiſdom to the members of the upper houſe, than to thoſe of the lower. * How eit is that a member of an ariſtocracy, as ſuch, is, of all things, to have attained more experience than the member of a democracy, our Author has not told us; nor what it is this experience is to conſiſt of. Is it experience of things Preparatory to, but different from, the buſineſs of governing? This ſhould rather go by the name of #nowledge. Is it experience of the buſineſs itſelf of governing? Let us fee. For the member of the one body, as of the other, there muſt be a time when he firſt enters upon this buſineſs, They both enter upon it, 5 ſuppoſe XII. Superiority of “experi- * ence *” how far a proof of ſuperiority of wiſdom, 3 III.
how far attributable to ariſtccracies in general.
XIV.
ho far to Lords in particular.
our Houſe of ſuppoſe on the ſame day. Now then is it on that ſame day that one is more experienced in it than the other? or is it on that day ten years?
Nt; | Thoſe indeed who recolle& what we obſerved but now *, may anſwer without heſitation, —on that day ten years. The reaſon was there given. It is neither more nor leſs, than that want of leiſure which the bulk of the numerous members of a Democracy muſt neceflarily labour under, more than thoſe of an Ariſtocracy. But of this, what intimation is there to be collected, from any thing that has been ſuggeſted by our Author? XIV. | So much with reſpect to Ariſtocracies in general. It happens alſo by accident, that that particular branch of our own government to which he has given the name of the Ariſtocratical, the Houſe of Lords,—has actually greater opportunities of acquiring the qualification of ex- V. ſupra, par. 9.; perience, BRI TIs E ConsTITUTION: verience, than that other branch, the Houſe of Commons, to which he has _ given the name of the democratical. But to what is this owing? not to any thing in the characteriſtic natures of thoſe two bodies, not to the one's being Ariſtocratical, and the other Democratical; but to a circumſtance, entirely foreign and accidental, which we ſhall ſee preſently.
But let us obſerve his reaſoning. The Houſe of Lords, he ſays, is an aſſembly that behoves to have more wiſdom in it, than the Houſe of Commons. This is the propoſition. Now for the proof. The firſt is an Ariſtocratical aſſembly; the ſecond a Democratical. An Ariſtocratical afſembly has more experience than a Democratical; and on that account more wiſdom. Therefore the Houſe of Lords, as was to be proved, has more wiſdom than the Houſe of Commons. Now, what the whole of the argument reſts upon, we may obſerve, is this fact, that an Ariſtocratical aſſembly, as ſuch, has more experience than a Democratical III.
XV.
What is to be underſtood by the word © experience.”?
XVI.
Opportunity of experience not the ſole cauſe of wiſdom, Democratical one; but this, with Ariſtocratical aſſemblies in general, we ſee, is not, for any reaſon that our Author has given us, the caſe. At the fame time with reſpect to our Houſe of Lords in particular, in compariſon with the Houſe of Commons, it does happen to be the caſe, owing to this ſimple circumſtance: the members of the Houſe of Lords, when once they begin to fit, fit on for life: thoſe of the Houſe of Commons only from ſeven years to ſeven years, or it may happen, leſs.
XV.
In ſpeaking, however, in this place, of experience, I would rather be under- ſtood to mean opportunity of acquiring experience, than experience itfelf. For actual experience depends upon other concurrent cauſes.
XVI. It is, however, from ſuperiority of experience alone, that our Author derives ſuperiority of wiſdom. He has, indecd, the proverb in his favour: Experience, it r BRITISH Cors rTrurfox. it has been ſaid of old, „is the Mother « of Wiſdom:” be it fo; — but then Intereſt is the Father. There is even an Intereſt that is the Father of Experience. Among the members of the Houſe of Commons, though none ſo poot as to be illiterate, are many whoſe fortunes, according to the common phraſe, are yet to make. The fortunes of thoſe of the Houſe of Lords (I ſpeak in general) are made already. The members of the Houſe of Commons may hope to be members of the Houſe of Lords. The members of the Houſe of Lords have no higher Houſe of Lords to riſe to. Is it natural for thoſe to be moſt active who have the Jeg, or thoſe who have the 220% intereſt to be ſo? Are the experienced thoſe who are the leaſt, or thoſe who are the moſt active? Does experience come to men when aſleep, or when awake? Is it the members of the Houſe of Lords that are the moſt active, or of the Houſe of Commons? To ſpeak plain, is it in the Houſe of Lords that there is moſt bu- Wt . ö : 0 Fa, e FAT : TH) oy f — 3s FF i WIE. * a by * «LY 1 Tn by * KT. ann - q n U — IN I A ST 5 ö 8 J ii n an thy 1 * p FT 7 } 4 lis! * E * — i ee — ML - A — Daw os * — — 44 ah .
, We 1 n L e r "rb wh $1 n fineſs done, or in the Houſe of Commons? Was it after the ſiſb was caught that the ſucceſſor of St. Peter uſed the net, or was it before [i]? In a word, is there moſt wiſdom ordinarily where there is leaſt, or where there is moſt to gain by being wiſe [E]?
[ Every body has heard the ſtofy of him who, from a fiſherman, was made Archbiſhop, and then Pope, While Archbiſhop, it was his cuſtom every day, after dinner, to have a fiſhing net ſpread upon his table, by way of a memento, as he uſed to fay, of the meanneſs of his original. This farcical oſtentation of humility was what, in thoſe days, contributed not a little to the encreaſe of his reputation. Soon after his exaltation to St. Peter's chair, one of his intimates was taking notice to him, one day, when dinner was over, of the table's not being decked as uſual, Peace,“ anſwered the Holy Father, when the fi & is caught, there is no occaſion for the net.“ [4] In the Houſe of Commons itſelf, is it by the oputent and independent Country gentlemen that the chief buſineſs of the Houſe is tranſacted, or by aſpiring, and perhaps needy Courtiers? The man who would perſevere in the toil of Government, without any other reward than the favour of the people, is certainly the man fur the people to make choice of, But ſuch men are at beſt but rare. Were it not for thoſe children of Corruption we have been ſpeaking of, the buſineſs of the ſtate, 3 doubt, would ſtagnate.
XVII. A word = SOIT * 8 Wis S ET TENG IS 8 1 JC LY BRITITIsH ConsTITUTION, | | 115 XVII. CHAP.
A word or two more with reſpect to 1 the characteriſtic qualifications, as our XVII. Author ſtates them, of the higher aſſem- — bly of our legiſlature. Experience is, in the peculiar virtue of their being an ariſtocratical aſ- I ſembly, to afford them wiſdom: thus far we were arrived before. But he now puſhes the deduction a ſtep farther.— Wiſdom is to afford them“ circumſpection and mediatory caution:“ qualifications which it ſeems as if we ſhould ſee nothing of, were it not for them. Let us now put a caſe. The buſineſs, indeed, that originates in the Houſe of Lords is, as things ſtand, ſo little, that our Author ſeems to forget that there is any. However, ſome there is. A bill then origi-. nates with the Lords, and is ſent down to the Commons, —As to © circumſpeCtion” I fay nothing: Hat, let us hope, is not wanting to either Houſe. But whoſe province 1s © mediatory caution,” now?
The Democratical branch of our Legiſlature, upon our Author's principles, not diſtinguiſhable from the Ariſtocratical.
Thus much concerning theſe two branches of our legiſlature, fo long as they continue what, according to our Author's principles, they are at preſent: the Houſe of Lords the Ariſtocratical branch: the Houſe of Commons the Democratical. A little while and we ſhall ſee them ſo; but again a little while, perhaps, and we ſhall not fee them ſo. By what characteriſtic does our Author dit. tinguiſh an Ariſtocratical legiflative body from a Democratical one? By that of number: by the number of the perſons that compoſe them: by that, and that alone: for no other has he given. Now, therefore, to judge by that, the Houſe of Lords, at preſent, indeed, zs the Ariſtocratical branch: the Houſe of Commons in compariſon at leaſt with the other, the Democratical. 'Thus far is well. But ſhould the lift of nobility ſwell at the rate we have ſometimes ſeen it, there is an aſſignable period, and that, perhaps, at no very very enormous diſtance, at which the aſ- ſembly of the Lords will be more numerous than that of the Commons. Which will Ven be the Ariſtocratical branch of our Legiſlature? Upon our Author's principles, the Houſe of Commons. Which the Democratical? The Houſe of Lords. XIX.
The final cauſe we are to obſerve, and finiſhing exploit, the ©* portus & ſabba- % tum,” as Lord Bacon might perhaps haye called it [Z], of this ſublime and edifying diſſertation, is this demonſtration, he has -been giving us, of the perfection of the Britiſh Form of Government. This demonſtration (for by no Teſs a title ought it to be called) is founded, we may have obſerved, altogether upon the properties of numbers properties, newly diſcovered indeed, and of an [7] It is what he ſays of Theology with reſpe& to the pciences,—V, Augm. Scient. L. VIII. c. III. p. 97.
XIX. All. perfection of the Britiſh Con- ſtitution mathematically demon- ſtrated.
* extraordinary rr gy Bee yy en . 1 ee eee eat een 5 — — — „ r bas 13 Kn 1 "pb * +4 . OVER iq bu. = Char. extraordinary complection, moral proper.
HI. ties; but properties, however, ſo it ED ſeems, of numbers*. Tis in the nature then of numbers we ſhall find theſe characteriſtic properties of the three Forms of Government, if any where, Now the properties of numbers are univerſally allowed to be the proper ſubject of that mode of demonſtration which is called mathematical, The proof our Author has given has therefore already in .
; it the efence of ſuch a demonſtration, N nothing but the orm. This deficiency is no other than what an under-rate workman might eaſily ſupply, A mere technical operation does the buſineſs. That humble taſk it ſhall be my endeavour to perform. The ſubſtantial honour I a- ſcribe wholly to our Author, to whom only it 1s moſt due.
2: "SR GAL, OSD 83. ran 3 4 1 LE ho woe — or V. ſupra.
XX. PROPOSITION.
m IS e d A lege i oe er eee.
nn - FM. * r BRITISH Cors T ITU rio.
XX.
PROPOSITION. THEOREM. The Britiſh Government 1s all-perfect, DEMONSTRATION.
By definition, | 1 | The Britith Government — Monarchy + Ariſtocracy + Democracy.
Again, by de- 2 [Monarchy = the Gofinition, | vernment of 1.
Alſo, | 3 Democracy = the Government of all. Allo, 4. \Ariſtocracy = the Government of ſome num- ber between 1 and a//.. Put alſo 6 The numberof governors | in an Ariftocracy = Alſo, 2 11,000 has + wiſdom ſtrength—honeſty.
Alſo, 9 i, ooo, ooo has + honeſty XX: The demontration drawn up in form.
* I * 4: i : — III _ DIST ED — 2 S. cyt og Was mas mn — — —— — . — PE DEI CC TS Thee, LS. oh Og Ml T Xa a III.
The denionſtration drawn up in form.
A FR AGENT on GOVERNMENT.
Rejecting — wiſdom — honeſty [u Alſo rejecting — ſtrength — honeſty Alſo rejecting Se ſtrength — wiſdom Putting together the expreſſions.
But by the definitions [4], and the ſuppoſitions 1 has + ſtrength, 1,000 has + wiſdom.
neſty.
has ſtrength + wii dom + honeſty.: The Britiſh Government 1, ooo Þ 1, OOo, ooo.
L* Which is done without any ſort of ceremony, the quantities marked in this ſtep with the negative figi, being as ſo many fluents, which are at a naximum, or 4 minimum, Ju as happens to be moſt convenient.
Therefore, BRITISH ConsTITUTION. © 121 Therefore, by 15 The Britiſh Government CHAP.
[13] has + ſtrength + wiſ- III.. dom + honeſty. The dns Changing the|16|The Britiſh Government 2 up in expreſſion, is all- powerful ＋ allwiſe + all-honeſt.
But by defi-[17|All - powerful + allnition wile + all- honeſt = all- perfect.
Therefore, by 18 The Britiſh Government .
7 SCHOLIUM. After the ſame manner it may be proved to be a/l-weak, allfooliſh, and all-knaviſh, oe Thus much for the Britiſh Conſtitu- 1 Concluſion tion; and for the grounds of that pre- I Chapeminence which it boaſts, I truſt, indeed, not without reaſon, above all others that are known: Such is the idea our Author gives us of thoſe grounds. © You are not ſatisfied with it then, lays ſome one. Not perfectly.“ What : _ n — ts] r rr r r Rn I—_- .”
d A j + [ fl h .
* N oP IE In _— FEE...wb 0 PCC III.
Concluſion of the Chapter, — js then your own?'—]Jn truth this is more than I have yet quite ſettled, ] may have ſettled it with myſelf, and not think it worth the giving: but if ever [ do think it worth the giving, it wil! hardly be in the form of a comment on a digreſſion ſtuffed into the belly of a definition. At any rate it is not likely to be much wiſhed for, by thoſe, who hu read what has been given us on this ſubject by an ingenious foreigner: ſince it is to a foreigner we were deſtined to owe the beſt idea that has yet been given of a ſubject fo much our own. Our Author has copied: but Mr. de L'oLME has thought, The topic which our dur Author has thus brought upon the carpet (let any one judge with what neceſſity) is in reſpect to ſome parts of it that we have ſeen, rather of an invidious nature. Since, however, it {as been brought upon the carpet, I have treated it with that plainneſs with which an Engliſhman of all others 1s bound to treat it, becauſe an Engliſhman may thus treat it and be ſafe. I have ſaid 10 what 3 KATA Eo ang OR BEL WEI TM Es On Sets ͤ V Be. 1 7 1 by —— Va TD Gs 0 3 <= ODT TITS c ws OR AS r BRITISH CoxsTITuriox. 123 what the ſubject ſeemed to demand, Cyap. without any fear indeed, but without any III. with, to give offence; reſolving not to Concluſion | , |, of the Chap» permit myſelf to conſider how this or ter. 9 that man might chance to take it. I have ſpoken without ſycophantical reſpects indeed, yet J hope not without decency: certainly without any party ſpleen. I choſe rather to leave it to our Author to compliment men in the lump: and to ſtand aghaſt with admiration at the virtues of men unknown *. Our Author will do as ſhall ſeem meet to him. For my part, if ever I ſtand forth and ſing the ſong of eulogy to great men, it ſhall be not becauſe they occupy their 2 but becauſe they deſerve it.
V. ſupra, par. 7.
CHAP: N OY F r ern CHAT IF RIGHT of the SUPREME POWER to make LAws.
I.
* W now come to the third topic touched upon in the digreſſion; 1 80 or namely, the right, as our Author phraſes the para- it, which the Supreme Power has of graph in que- {on as ſtated Making laws. And this topic occupies by our Au- one pretty long paragraph. The title * here given to it is the ſame which in the next ſucceeding paragraph he has found for it himſelf. This is fortunate: for, to have been obliged to find a title for it myſelf, is what would have been to the laſt degree diſtreſſing. To intitle a diſcourſe, is to repreſent the drift of it. But, to repreſent the drift of this, is a taſk which, ſo long at leaſt as I confine my conſideration to the paragraph itſelf, bids defiance to my utmoſt efforts. II. Tis r n rn RESI TIN = c RIGHT of the SUPREME POWER % make Laws. II.
'Tis to another paſſage or two, a paſ- ſage or two that we have already ſeen ſtarting up in diſtant parts of this digreſſion, that I am indebted for ſuch conjectures as I have been able to make up.
Theſe conjectures, however, I could not have ventured ſo far to rely on, as on the ſtrength of them to have furniſhed the paragraph with a title of my own framing. The danger of miſrepre-ſentation was too great; a kind of danger which a man cannot but lie imminently expoſed to, who ventures to put a preciſe meaning upon a diſcourſe which in itſelf has none. That I may juſt mention, however, in this place, the reſult of them; what he is really aiming at, I take it, is, to inculcate a perſuaſion that in every ſtate there muſt ſubſiſt, in ſome hands or other, a power that is abſolute. mention it thus prematurely, that the reader may have ſome clue to guide him in CH Ar. IV.
— II. Drift of it, as conjectured.
— aging r .. "RENO. © 2 ie we RR INS Is A in his progreſs through the paragraph; which it is now time J ſhould recite, Aa £ cc «cc £6 cc cc CC cc cc cc cc ce cc C6 CC cc cc cc cc cs IIT. « Having,” ſays our Author, © thus curſorily conſidered the three uſual ſpecies of government, and our own ſingular conſtitution, ſelected and compounded from them all, I proceed to obſerve, that, as the power of making laws conſtitutes the ſupreme authority, ſo where-ever the ſupreme authority in any ſtate refides, it is the right of that authority to make laws; that is, in the words of our definition, to preſcribe the rule of civil action. And this may be diſcovered from the very end and inſtitution of civil ſtates, For a ſtate is a collective body, compoſed of a multitude of individuals united for their ſafety and convenience, and intending to act together as one man. If it therefore is to act as one man, it ought to act by one uniform will.
But in as much as political communi— & tles RIOHT of the SUPREME POWER to make LAWS.
« ties are made up of many natural per- « ſons, each of whom has his particular « will and inclination, theſe ſeveral wills «© cannot by any natural union be joined * together, or tempered and diſpoſed «© into a laſting harmony, ſo as to conſtie tute and produce that one uniform « will of the whole. It can therefore be no otherwiſe produced than by a % political union; by the conſent of all % perſons to ſubmit their own private ec Wills to the will of one man, or of © one, or more aſſemblies of men, to % whom the ſupreme authority is en- « truſted: and this will of that one man, or aſſemblage of men is, in dif- « ferent ſtates, according to their differ- © ent conſtitutions, underſtood to be IV. The other paſſages which ſuggeſted to me the conſtruction I have ventured to put upon this, ſhall be mentioned by and by. Firſt, let us try what is to be made 3 of it by itſelf, | V. The IV.
The ſenſe of it conſidered in itſelf.
8 e. 3. AT Ae anion ond er ni ab oe be, ee Eons.» *: + — IM Wong > | DE 5 Pt: * SY —. om a ed ed 5 rn ei: vi. no DANS "7 CR = Von wllh a ab ˙⅛ — e men F — oe IL IEIW The leading argument in it nugatory.
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