I FRAGMENT on GOVERNMENT, nor, perhaps, does every one mean the fame. Some who ſpeak of a law as being void (for to this expreſſion, not to travel through the whole liſt, I ſhall confine myſelf) would perſuade us to look upon the authors of it as having thereby forfeited, as the phraſe is, their whole power: as well that of giving force to the particular law in queſtion, as to any other. Theſe are they who, had they arrived at the ſame practical concluſion through the principle of utility, would have ſpoken of the law as being to ſuch a degree pernicious, as that, were the bulk of the community to ſee it in its true light, e probable miſchief of refiſting it would be leſs than the probable miſchief of ſubmitting Zo it, Theſe point, in the firſt inſtance, at þ2/{i/e oppoſition. XXX.
Thoſe who ſay nothing about forfeiture are commonly leſs violent in their views. Theſe are they who, were they to ground themſelves on the principle of utility, and, to uſe our language, would have ſpoken of the law as being miſ⸗ chievous indeed, but without ſpeaking of RIGHT of the SUPREME Pow ER fo make Laws.
it as being miſchievous to the degree that has been juſt mentioned. The mode of oppoſition which they point to is one which paſſes under the appellation of a /ega/ one. | XXXE.
Admit then the law to be void in their ſenſe, and mark the conſequences. The idea annexed to the epithet void is obtained from thoſe inſtances in which we ſee it applied to a private inſtrument. The conſequence of a private inſtrument's being void is, that all perſons concerned are to act as if no ſuch inſtrument had exiſted. The conſequence, accordingly, of a /aw's being void muſt be, that people ſhall act as if there were no ſuch law about the matter: and therefore that if any perſon in virtue of the mandate of the law ſhould do any thing in coercion of another perſon, which without ſuch law he would be puniſhable for doing, he would till be puniſhable; to wit, by appointment of the | judicial power. Let the law, for inſtance, be a = law Which tends to give It a controul over the legiſlative.
—A remedy worſe than the diſeaſe.
wer r 4 FRAGMENT on GOVERNMENT: law impoſing a tax: a man who ſhould go about to levy the tax by force would be puniſhable as a treſpaſſer: ſhould he chance to be killed in the attempt, the perſon killing him would zof be puniſhable as for murder: ſhould he kill, he himſelf would, perhaps, be puniſhable as for murder. To whoſe office does it appertain to do thoſe acts in virtue of which ſuch puniſhment would be inflicted? To that of the Judges. Applied to practice then, the effect of this language is, by an appeal made to the Judges, to confer on thoſe magiſtrates a controlling power over the acts of the legiſlature.
By this management a particular purpoſe might, perhaps, by chance be anſwered: and let this be ſuppoſed a good one. Still what benefit would, from the general tendency of ſuch a doctrine, and ſuch a practice in conformity to it, accrue to the body of the people is more than 1 can conceive, A Parliament, let it be ſuppoſed, is too much under the influence RICH of the SUPREME PowER to mate Laws.
ence of the Crown: pays too little regard to the ſentiments and the intereſts of the people. Be it ſo. The people at any rate, if not ſo great a ſhare as they might and ought to have, have had, at leaſt, ſome ſhare in chuſing it. Give to the Judges a power of annulling its acts; and you transfer a portion of the ſupreme power from an aſſembly which the people have had ſome ſhare, at leaſt, in chuſing, to a ſet of men in the choice of whom they have not the leaſt imaginable ſhare; to a ſet of men appointed ſolely by the Crown: appointed /s/ely, and avowedly and conſtantly, by that very magi-ſtrate whoſe partial and occaſional influence is the very grievance you ſeek to _ remedy, In the heat of debate, ſome, perhaps, would be for ſaying of this management that it was transferring at once the ſupreme authority from the legiſlative power to the judicial. But this would NI 18 de going too far on the other ſide. There But not ſo bad as ſome might 1epre- ſent it.
rr ns me — {on Tan ne xs as P po OY?
by r COT ONT gr ae — « +3 N pet — rn by Ws — oy P N nd 2 The ſupreme power limitable by convention.
A FRAGMENT ox GOVERNMENT.
is a wide difference between a pg/itive and a negative part in legiſlation, There is a wide difference again between a negative upon reaſons given, and a negative without any. The power of repealing a law even for. reaſons given 1s a great power: too great indeed for Judges: but {till very diſtinguithable from, and much inferior to that of making one IG]. .
Let us now go back a little. In denying the exiſtence of any affignable [5] Notwithſtanding what has been ſaid, it would be in vain to diſſemble, but that, upon occaſion, an appeal of this ſort may very well anſwer, and has, indeed, in general, a tendency to anſwer, in ſome ſort, the purpoſes of thoſe who eſpouſe, or profeſs to eſpouſe, the intereſts of the people, A public and authorized debate on the propriety of the law is by this means brought on. The artillery of the tongue is played of againſt the law, under cover of the law itſelf. An op— portunity is gained of impreſſing ſentiments unfavourable to it, upon a numerous and attentive audience. As to any other effects from ſach an appeal, let us believe that in the inflances in which we have ſecn it made, it is the certainty of miſcarriage that has been the encouragement to the attempt, bounds RIH of the SUPREME POWER to male LA ws.
bounds to the ſupreme power, I added *, © unleſs where limited by expreſs con- « vention:“ for this exception I could not but ſubjoin. Our Author indeed, in that paſſage in which, ſhort as it is, he is the moſt explicit, leaves, we may ob- ſerve, no room for it. However they „began, ſays he (ſpeaking of the ſeveral forms of government) * however they began, and by what right ſoever « they ſubſiſt, there 1s and muſt be in * ALL of them an authority that is ab-« ſolute...” To ſay this, however, of a// governments without exception to ſay that zo aſſemblage of men can ſubfiſt in a ſtate of government, without being ſubject to ſome ne body whoſe authority ſtands unlimited ſo much as by convention; to ſay, in ſhort, that not even by convention can any limitation be made to the power of that body in a ſtate which in other reſpects is ſupreme, would be taying, I take it, rather too much: it IV.
The ſupreme power himitable by convention.
— — NCR DT RE ing "IOC; bc A" .
* o as the terms of it be explicit.
13 US ro n would be ſaying that there is no ſuch thing as government in the German Empire; nor in the Dutch Provinces; nor in the Swiſs Cantons: nor was of old in the Achzan league.
In this mode of limitation I ſce not what there is that need ſurprize us. By what is it that any degree of power (meaning political power } is eſtabliſned? It is neither more nor leſs, as we have already had occaſion to obſerve*, than a habit of, acts; diſpaſition, with reſpect to Juture. This diſpoſition it is as eaſy, or I am much miſtaken, to conceive as being abſent with regard to one ſort of acts; as preſent, with regard to another. For a body then, which is in other reſpects ſupreme, to be conceived as being with reſpect to a certain fort of acts limited, all that is neceſſary is, that this ſort of 10 acts TT. Ce eee War eta 52, CCC SIT Fre and diſpoſition to obedience: habit, ſpeaking with reſpect to pul RIGHT of the SUPREME POWER to make Laws. 165 acts be in its deſcription diſtinguiſhable Cuae. from every other, 19 _ XXXVI. XXXVI.
By means of a convention then we Which farare furniſhed with that common fignal my which, in other caſes, we deſpaired of ae 888 on finding*. A certain act is in the inſtru- reſiſtance, ment of convention ſpecified,. with re-ſpect to which the government 1s therein precluded from iſſuing a law to a certain effect: whether to the effect of commanding the act, of permitting it, or of forbidding it. A law is iſſued to that effect notwithſtanding. The iſſuing then of ſuch a law (the ſenſe of it, and likewiſe the ſenſe of that part of the convention which provides againſt it being ſuppoſed clear) is a fact notorious and viſible to all: in the iſſuing then of ſuch a law we have a faq which is capable of being taken for that common fignal we have been ſpeaking of.
Theſe bounds the ſupreme body in queſtion has marked out to its authority: of ſuch a demarcation then what is the ef- M 3 fect?
a WEIS ASIF Sv » CHAP. fect? either none at all, or this: that the IV. diſpoſition to obedience confines itſelf within theſe bounds. Beyond them the diſpoſition is ſtopped from extending: beyond them the ſubject is no more prepared to obey the governing body of his own ſtate, than that of any other. What difficulty, I fay, there ſhould: be in conceiving a ſtate of things to ſubſiſt in which the ſupreme authority is thus limited, — what greater difficulty in conceiving it with this limitation, than without any, I cannot ſec. The two ſtates are, I muſt confeſs, to me alike conceivable: whether alike expedient, —alike conducive to the happineſs of the people, is another queltion. | XXXVII. XXXVIT. A Jatve for God forbid, that from any thing here ſaid renvrmati®® it ſhould be concluded that in any ſociety any convention is or can be made, which ſhall have the.cftect of ſetting up an in- ſuperable bar to that which the parties atfeed ſhall deem a reformation:— God ſorbid that any diſeaſe in the conſtitution of .
D » .
by „ _ aA KA. a> TIT 8 ALES [9,9 ao ACTA SN 8 ee n Fn 0 8 1 9 * LETS Oro — L % 7 Jour A n. 3 KY r DIAL = or OA OT CES SCE FS bo COTE REM 55 CI" NIELS EL OD f 2, Do RU ERIE RicnT of the SUPREME POWER to make Laws.
of a ſtate ſhould be without its remedy.
Such might by ſome be thought to be the caſe, where that ſupreme body which in ſuch a convention, was one of the contracting parties, having incorporated itſelf _ that which was the other, no longer ſubſiſts to give any new modification to the engagement. Many ways might however be found to make the requiſite alteration, without any departure from the ſpirit of the engagement. Although that body itſelf which contracted the engagement be no more, a /arger body from whence the firſt is underſtood to have derived its title, may ſtill ſubſiſt. Let this larger body be conſulted. Various are the ways that might be conceived of doing this, and that without any diſparagement to the dignity of the ſubſiſting legiſlature: of doing it, I mean to ſuch effect, as that, ſhould the ſenſe of ſuch larger body be fayourable to the alteration, it may be made by a law, which, in this caſe, neither ought to be, nor probably would be, M 4 regarded Ive e 1.68 A FRAGMENT on GOVERNMENT, . Cnay. regarded by the body of the people as IV. a breach of the convention [i]. | LD xxxvur. XXXVIII.
Notion of a To return for a moment to the lan- 3 4 guage uſed by thoſe who ſpeak of the 1 ſupreme power as being limited in its L] In Great Britain, for inſtance, ſuppoſe it were 1 deemed neceſſary to make an alteration in the act of Union, If in an article ſtipulated in favour of England, Þ there need be no difficulty; fo that there were a mail jority for the alteration among the Engliſh members, 4 without reckoning the Scotch. The only difficulty 3 would be with reſpect to an article ſtipulated in favour. of Scotland; on account, to wit, of the ſmall number of 1 the Scotch members, in compariſon with the Engliſh. {4 In ſuch a caſe, it would be highly expedient, to ſay no 1 more, for the ſake of preſerving the public faith, and 1 to avoid irritating the body of the nation, to take ſome 4 method for making the eitabliſhment of the new law, i depend upon their ſentiments, One ſuch method might be as follows. Let the new law in queſtion be enacted in the common form. But let its commencement be deferred to a diſtant period, ſuppoſe a year or two: let it then, at the end of that period be in force, unleſs petitioned againit, by perions of ſuch a deſcription, and in ſuch number as might be ſuppoſed fairly to repreſent the ſentiments of the people in general, per-ſons, for inſtance, of the deſcription of thoſe who at the time of the Union, conſtituted the body of electore. To be RE —— AAA PIR -; n —— r ON ESR * > * is I N Rokr of the Sur REME PowER to mate Laws.
own nature. One thing I would wiſh to have remembered. What is here ſaid of the impropriety, and evil influence of that kind of diſcourſe, is not intended to convey the ſmalleſt cenſure on thoſe who ule it, as if intentionally acceſſary to the ill effects it has a tendency to produce. It is rather a misfortune in the language, than a fault of any perſon in particular. The original of it is loſt in the darkneſs of antiquity. We inherited it from our fathers, and, maugre all its inconveniences, are likely, I doubt, to tranſmit it to our children.
To put the validity of the law out of diſpute, it would be neceſſary the fact upon which it was made ultimately to depend, ſhould be in its nature too notorious to be controverted. To determine therefore, Whether the conditions vpon which the invalidation of it was made to depend, had been complied with, is what muſt be left to the ſimple declaration of ſome perſon or perſons; for inſtance the King. I offer this only as a general idea: and as one amongſt many that perhaps might be offered in the ſame view. It will not be expected that I ſhould here anſwer objections, or enter into details, | XXXIX, =. preme power, dificult to eradicate, —— rr n LEE SHEET / / ö ET T6 EPO ofa ee Re i Er * vignette we 2: — * C HAP.
XXXIX. This not a XXXIX. | I cannot look upon this as a mere diſpute of words. I cannot help permere affair of ſuading myſelf, that the diſputes bewords.
tween contending parties - between the defenders of a law and the oppoſers of it, would ſtand a much better chance of being adjuſted than at preſent, were they but explicitly and conſtantly referred at once to the principle of UTILITY. The footing on which this principle reſts every diſpute, is that of matter of fat; that is, future fact — the probability of certain future contingencies. Were the debate then conducted under the auſpices of this principle, one of two things would happen: either men would come to an agreement concerning that probability, or they would ſee at length, after due diſcuſſion of the real grounds of the diſpute, that no agreement was to be hoped for. They would at any rate ſee clearly and explicitly, the point on which the ⁴greement turned, The diſcontented party would RICH of the SUPREME PCW ER to make Laws. I7T would then take their reſolution. to re- Cy ap. ſiſt or to ſubmit, upon juſt grounds, ac= IV. cording as it ſhould appear to them worth their while—according to what ſhould appear to them, the importance of the matter in diſpute—according to what ſhould appear to them the probability or; improbability of ſucceſs according, in ſhort, as the miſchiefs of ſubmiſſion ſhould appear to bear a leſs, or a greater ratio to the miſchiefs of reſiſtance. But the door to reconcilement would be much more open, when they ſaw that it might be not a mere affair of paſſion, but a difference of judgment, and that, for any thing they could know to the contrary, a ſincere one, that was the ground of quarrel.
XL. XL. All elſe is but womaniſh ſcolding and The above notion perchildiſh altercation, which is ſure to irri- petuates tate, and which never can perſuade.—* 7 "A. “ fay, the legiſlature cannot do this—T «« lay, that it can. I fay, that to do this, * exceeds the bounds of its authority — J ſay, 'T by i by 10 HAP ” FN —— B . *# "© FI oy - it. * # =.
* ® fu i A „ [4 I.
The principle of uT1- LITY puts an end to it.
J fay, it does not.,”— Tt is evident, that a pair of diſputants ſetting out in this manner, may go on irritating and perplexing one another for everlaſting, without the ſmalleſt chance of ever coming to an agreement. It is no more than announcing, and that in an obſcure and at the ſame time, a peremptory and captious manner, their oppoſite perſuaſions, or rather affections, on a queſtion of which neither of them ſets himſelf to diſcuſs the grounds. The queſtion of utility, all this while, moſt probably, is never fo much as at all brought upon the carpet: if it be, the language in which it is diſcuſſed is ſure to be warped and clouded to make it match with the obſcure and entangled pattern we have ſeen, XII. On the other hand, had the debate been originally and avowedly inſtituted on the footing of utility, the parties might at length have come to an agreement; or at leaſt to a viſible and explicit RIGHT of the SUPREME POWER to make Laws.
iſſue.— I ſay, that the miſchiefs of Cnar.
* the meaſure in queſtion are to /uch an _* amount.—-7 ſay, not ſo, but to a J,.
« —[ ſay, the benefits of it are only to % fach an amount. I ſay, not ſo, but „ to a greater. —This, we ſee, is a ground of controverſy very different from the former. The queſtion is now mani- ſeſtly a queſtion of conjecture concerning ſo many future contingent matters of fat: to ſolve it, both parties then are naturally directed to ſupport their reſpective perſuaſions by the only evidence the nature of the caſe admits of;—the evidence of ſuch paſt matters of fact as appear to be analogous to thoſe contingent future ones. Now theſe paſt facts are almoſt always numerous: ſo numercus, that till brought into view for the purpoſe of the debate, a great proportion of them are what may very fairly have efcaped the obſervation of one of the parties: and it is owing, perhaps, to this and nothing elſe, that that party is of the perſuaſion which ſets it at variance with the IV.
The principle of uvri- LIT puts an end to it.
- + it i . "1 „ i; it: J UNE {ts 1 it — — S Coe eo >> rats rp 41 oe * — ala ng „ eee rere r Tt Tt I F of N n es EE CW ng Rs Ty 174 | A FRAGMENT on GOVERNMENT, Cup. the other. Here, then, we have a plain IV. and open road, perhaps, to preſent recon- The princi- Cilement: at the worſt to an intelligible kee ur and explicit ifſue, —that is to ſuch a end to t. ground of difference as may, when thoroughly trodden and explored, be found to lead on to reconcilement at the laſt. Men, let them but once clearly under- ſtand one another, will not be long ere they agree. It is the perplexity of ambiguous and ſophiſtical diſcourſe that, while it diſtracts and eludes the apprehenſion, ſtimulates and enflames the paſ-ſions. | | | But it is now high time we ſhould return to our Author, from whoſe text we have been inſenſibly led aſtray, by the nicety and intricacy of the queſtion it ſeemed to offer to our view.
DuTy of the SurREME POWER fe make LAWS: DuTY of the SUPREME PowWER f make \ Laws.
E now come to the laſt topic touched upon in this digreſſion: a certain © duty,” which, according to our Author's account, the ſupreme power lies under:—the duty of making laws.
cc cc cc cc cc cc cc ce cc II.
Thus far, ſays he, © as to the right of the ſupreme power to make laws; but farther, it is its duty likewile. For ſince the reſpective members are bound to conform themſelves to the will of the ſtate, it is expedient that they receive directions from the. ſtate declaratory of that its will. But ſince it is impoſſible, in ſo great a multitude to give injunctions to every particular man, relative to each particular action, © therefore rag apts as xv * 2 WT" r — — K rr CHA r. , Subject of the paragraph examined in the preſent chapter.
II. The paragraph recited.
III.
The firſt ſentence examined. The moſt obvious ſenſe of it nugatory.
ot a4 LE SS therefore the ſtate eſtabliſhes general rules for the perpetual information and direction of all perſons, in all points, whether of poſitive or negative duty. And this, in order that every man may know what to look upon as his own, what as another's; what abſolute and what relative duties are required at his hands; what is to be eſteemed honeſt, diſhoneſt, or indifferent; what degree every man retains of his natural liberty; what he has given up as the price of the benefits of ſociety; and after what manner each perſon is to moderate the uſe and exerciſe of thoſe rights which the ſtate aſſigns him, in order to promote and ſecure the public tranquillity.” III.
Still as obſcure, ſtill as ambiguous as ever. The © ſupreme power we may remember, according to the definition ſo lately given of it by our Author, and fo often ſpoken of, is neither more nor lels than the power te make laws. Of this power Fan, =_ CY > SEE. o N, ih» Ty. 8 AE LIT Ser Mt n 9 _ bt IRR r. IE 1 CIT oo ow Ve Eres wor nt Lg; rn RE Tad nx = YER r Dory of the SUPREME PowER to make Laws, power we are now told that it is its e duty” to make laws. Hence we learn— what?—that it is its duty” to do what it does; to be, in ſhort, what it is. This then is what the paragraph now before us, with its apparatus of ars and « buts,” and ©*/inces,” is deſigned to prove to us. Of this ſtamp is that meaning, at leaſt, of the initial ſentence, which is apparent upon the face of it.
IV.
Compleat the ſenſe of the phraſe, “ 70 * make laws; add to it, in this place, what it wants 1n order to be an adequate expreſſion of the import which the preceding paragraph ſeemed to annex to it; you have now, for what is mentioned as the object of the © duty, another ſenſe indeed, but a ſenſe ſtill more untenable than the foregoing. *© Thus far,” ſays our Author (recapitulating what he had been ſaying before) © as to the right of the ſu-* preme power to make laws. — By this eight“ we ſaw, in the preceding chapter, was meant, a right to make laws 22 N all TV. The next moſt obvious extravagant.
V. A third ſenſe propoſed.
all caſes whatſoever. But further,” he now adds, © it is its duty likewiſe.” Its duty then to do—what? to do the ſame thing that it was before aſſerted to be its right to do—to make laws in all caſes whatſoever: or (to uſe another word, and that our Author's own, and that applied to the ſame purpoſe) that it is its duty to be 7e zbſolute*.” A ſort of duty this which will probably be thought rather a ſingular one, Mean time the obſervation which, if I conjecture right, he really had in view to make, is one which ſeems very juſt indeed, and of no mean importance, but which is very obſcurely expreſſed, and not very obviouſly connected with the purpoſe of what goes before. The duty he here means is a duty, which reſpects, I take it, not ſo much the actual making of laws, as the taking of proper meaſures to ſpread abroad the knowledge of whatever laws happen to have been made: a duty which (to adopt ſome of our Author's own words) T7 rg Ts DurTy of the SurREME Pow ER to mate Laws. 179 words) is converſant, not ſo much about Crap. iſſuing directions, as about providing Va that ſuch as are iſſued ſhall be © received.”
ee. % VI. vr. Mean time to ſpeak of the duties of a Objection to the uſe of the ſupreme power;—of a legiſlature, mean- word. duty ing a ſupreme legiſlature;—of a ſet of an 0ceamen acknowledged to be abſolute;—is what, I muſt own, I am not very fond of. Not that I would with the ſubordinate part of the community to be awhit leſs watchful over their governors, or more diſpoſed to unlimited ſubmiſſion in point of conduct, than if I were to talk with ever ſo much peremptorineſs of the © Cities of theſe latter, and of the rights which the former have againſt them [a]: what I am afraid of is, running into ſolœciſm and confuſion in d:/cour/ſe.
VII. I underſe] With this note let no man trouble himſelf who 5 is not uſed, or does not intend to uſe himſelf, to what! are called metaphy/ical ſpeculations: in whoſe eſtimation 1 the benefit of underſtanding clearly what he is ſpeaking of, 15 not worth the labour, F 2. That may be faid to. be my duty to do (underſtand Duty (political), } N 2 political — .
i A ee .
The proper {ſenſe of it.
— * I underſtand, I think, pretty well, what is meant by the word duty (political duty) when applied to myſelf; and I could political duty) which you (or ſome other perſon or per-ſons) have a right to have me made to do. I have then a DUTY foauards you: you have a RIGHT as again/?
2. Right (political).
3. Puniſhment a fundamental idea.
4. To define or expdund, To Words not to be expounded but by parapbraſiz.
6. Parapbraſis what.
me. 2. What you have a right to have me made to do (underſtand a political right) is that which I am liable, according to law, upon a requiſition made on your behalf, to be puniſbed for not doing.
3. I ſay puniſhed: for without the notion of puniſhment (that is of pain annexed to an act, and accruing on a certain account, and from a certain /ource) no notion can we have of either right or duty.
4. Now the idea belonging to the word pain is a ſimple one. To eue or rather (to ſpeak more generally) to expound a word, is to reſolve, or to make a progreſs towards reſolving, the idea belonging to it into {imple ones.
5. For expounding the words duty, right, power, title, and thoſe other terms of the ſame ſtamp that abound lo much in ethics and juriſprudence, either I am much deceived, or the only method by which any inſtruction can be conveyed, 1s that which is here exemplified, An expoſition framed after this method I would term paraphrafis. | | 6. A word may be ſaid to be expounded by paraphrafis, when not that wwerd alone is tranſlated into | other Dvury the SUPREME Po WER to make Laws.
could not perſuade myſelf, I think, to apply it in the ſame ſenſe in a regular didactic diſcourſe to thoſe whom I am ſpeaking other words, but ſome whole /entence of which it forms a part is tranſlated into another /entence; the words of which latter are expreſſive of ſuch ideas as are /imple, or are more immediately reſolvable into ſimple ones than thoſe of the former. Such are thoſe expreſſive of abftances and fi mple modes, in reſpe&t of ſuch alſtract V.
The proper ſenſe of it.
terms as are expreſſive of what Locket has called mixed modes, This, in ſhort, is the only method in which any abſtract terms can, at the long run, be expounded to any inſtructive purpoſe: that is in terms calculated to raiſe mages either of /ub/tances perceived, or of emotions; —ſources, one or other of which every idea mutt be drawn from, to be a clear one.
7. The common method of defining—the method per genus & differentiam, as logicians call it, will, in many caſes, not at all anſwer the purpoſe. Among abſtract terms we ſoon come to ſuch as have no /uperior genus. A definition, per genus & differentiam, when applied to theſe, it is manifeſt, can make no advance: it muſt either ſtop ſhort, or turn back, as Ae, upon itſelf, in a circulate or a repetend. 15 8. Fortitude is a virtue: Very well: — but what 1s a virtue? *© A virtue is a diſpoſition:“ - Good again: but what is a di/po/ition? *©* A diſpoſition 18 a - ==; and there we ſtop. The fact is, a di/po/itron has no ſuperior genus: A diſpoſition is not a, any thing:;— this is not the way to give us any notion of what is meant by it. A poaver,” again, is a right: and 7. Definition per genus & di ifferentiamy not univerſally applicable, N 3 | what EF 0» RESI” OG Ida rr * .
— rr r * . r CAP. .
The preper ſenſe of it.
An imperfection frequent in our Author's method.
1. Duties, three ſorts.
2. Political duty.
ſpeaking of as my ſupreme governors, That is my duty to do, which I am liable to be puniſhed, according to law, if I do not do: this is the original, ordinary, and 3 ſenſe of the word duty[5].
Have what is a right? It is a power.,—An Hate is an intereſi, ſays our Author ſomewhere; where he begins defining an eſtate:—as well might he have ſaid an zztere/t was an eftate. As well, in ſhort, were it to define in this manner, a conjunction or a prepoſition. As well were it to ſay of the prepoſition 7hrough, or of the conjunction 4e. cauſe; a through is a -, or a becauſe is a, and ſo go on defining them.
9. Of this ſtamp, by the bye, are ſome of his moſt fundamental deſinitions: of conſequence they muſt leave the reader where they found him. But of this, per— haps, more fully and methodically on ſome future occa— fion. In the mean time I have thrown out theſe looſe hints for the conſideration of the curious.
[5] 1. One may conceive three ſorts of duties; political, moral, religidhs; correſpondent to the three ſorts of auction they are enforced: or the ſame point of conduct may be a man's düty on theſe three ſeveral accounts. After ſpeaking of the one of theſe to put the change upon the reader, and without warning begin ſpeaking of another, or not to let it be ſeen from the firſt which of them one is ſpeaking of, cannot but be productive of confuſion.
2. Political duty is created by puniſhment; or at leaf by DvuTy of the SUPREME PowWER to make Laws.
Have theſe ſupreme governors any ſuch duty? No: for if they are at all liable to puniſhment by the will of perſons who have puniſhment in their hands; perſons ſtated and certain, — political ſuWriors.
3. Religious duty is alſo created by puniſhment: by puniſhment expected at the hands of a perſon certain,— the Supreme Being.
4. Moral duty 1s created by a kind of motive, which from the uncertainty of the perſons to apply it, and of the ſpecies and degree in which it will be applied, has hardly yet got the name of puniſhment: by. various mortifications reſulting from the ill-will of perſons àn— certain and variable, - the community in general: that is, ſuch individuals of that community as he, whoſe duty is in queſtion, ſhall happen to be connected with.
5. When in any of theſe three ſenſes a man aſſerts a point of conduct to be a duty, what he aſſerts is the exiſtence, actual or probable, of an external event: viz. of a puniſhment iſſuing from one or other of theſe ſources in conſequence of a contravention of the duty; an event extrinſic to, and diſtin from, as well the conduct of the party ſpoken of, as the ſentiment of him who ſpeaks. If he perſiſts in aſſerting it to be a duty, but without meaning it ſhould be underſtood that it is on any one of theſe three accounts that he looks upon it as ſuch; all he then aſſerts is his own internal entiment: all he means then is, that he feels himſelf z/ca/ed or di/pieaſed at the thoughts of the point of conduct in queſtion, but without being able to tell 2 In this caſe he ſhould e'en ſay ſo: and not ſeek to give an un- N 4 | due Ve The proper ſenſe of it.
3. Religious duty.
4. Maral duty.
Dien between theſe ſen- ſes and a fourth which is figurative and impreper.
> oh r —— * rr V.
The proper ſenſe of it.
6. Duty not applicable here in any Proper ſenſe, puniſhment according to law, whether it be for not doing any thing, or for doing, then due influence to his own ſingle ſuffrage, by delivering it in tgrms that purport to declare the voice either of God, offof the law, or of the people.
6. Now which of all theſe ſenſes of the word our Author had in mind; in which of them all he meant to aſſert that it was the duty of ſupreme governors to make laws, I know not. Political duty is what they cannot be ſubject to“: and to ſay that à duty even of the moral or religious kind to this effect is incumbent on them, ſeems rather a precipitate aſſertion, In truth what he meant was neither more nor leſs, I ſuppoſe, than that he ſhould be glad to ſee them do what he is ſpeaking of; to wit, make laws: that is, as he explains himſelf, ſpread abroad the knowledge of them. — Would he ſo? So indeed ſhould I; and if aſked why, what anſwer our Author would give I know not; but I, for my part, have no difficulty. I anſwer,—becauſe I am perſuaded that it 1s for the benefit of the community that they (its governors) ſhould do ſo. This would be enough to warrant mein my own opinion for ſaying that they ought to do it. For all this, I ſhould not, at any rate, ſay that it was their duty in a political ſenſe. No more ſhould I venture to ſay it was in a moral or religious ſenſe, till I were ſatisfied whether they themſelves 7hought the meaſures uſeful and feaſible, and whether they were generally /uppo/ed to think ſo. Were I ſatsified that they r7hem/elves thought ſo, God * See the note fojlowing.
then, ' "Nat, ATE 1 Dury of the SUrREME PowER to make Laws.
then are they not, what they are ſuppoſed to be, ſupreme governors [e]: thoſe then, I might ſay, knows they do. God, we are to ſuppoſe, will puniſh them if they negle@ purſuing it. It is then their religious duty. Were I ſatisfied that the people ſuppoſed they thought ſo: the people, I might ſay, in caſe of ſuch negleQ,—the people, by various ' manifeſtations of its ill-will, will alſo puniſh them. It is then their moral duty. 8 | In any of theſe ſenſes it muſt be obſerved, there can be no more propriety in averring it to be the duty of the ſupreme power to purſue the meaſure in queſtion, than in averring it to be their duty to purſue any other ſuppoſable meaſure equally beneficial to the community. To uſher in the propoſal of a meaſure in this peremptory and aſſuming guiſe, may be pardonable in a looſe rhetorical harangue, but can never be juſtifiable in an exact didactic compoſition. Modes of private moral conduct there are indeed many, the tendency whereof is ſo well known and ſo generally acknowledged, that the obſervance of them may well be ſtiled a duty. But to apply the ſame term to the particular details of g tive conduct, eſpecially newly propoſed ones, is going, I think, too far, and tends only to confuſion.