condition, compounded of that of a guardian, and Chap. that of a master. To the parent then, in quality ' — v — ' of guardian, results a set of duties, involving, as necessary to the discharge of them, certain powers: to the child, in the character of a ward, a set of rights corresponding to the parent's duties, and a set of duties corresponding to his powers. To the parent again, in quality of master, a set of beneficiary powers, without any other necessary limitation (so long as they last) than what is annexed to them by the duties incumbent on him in quality of a guardian: to the child, in the character of a servant, a set of duties corresponding to the parent's beneficiary powers, and without any other necessary limitation (so long as they last) than what is annexed to them by the rights which belong to the child in his capacity of ward. The condition of a parent will therefore be exposed to all the offences to which either that of a guardian or that of a master are exposed: and, as each of the parents will partake, more or less, of both those characters, the offences to which the two conditions are exposed may be nominally, as they will be substantially, the same. Taking them then all together, the offences to which the condition of a parent is exposed will stand as follows: 1. Wrongful non-investment of parentality *. 2. Wrongful interception of parentality.
* At first view it may seem a solecism to speak of the condition of parentality as one which a man can have need to VOL. II. N 3. Wrongful divestment of parentality. 4. Usurpation of parentality. 5. Wrongful investment of parentality. 6. Wrongful abdication of parentality. 7- Wrongful detrectation of parentality. 8. Wrongful imposition of parentality. 9- Mismanagement of parental guardianship. 10. Desertion of parental guardianship. ] 1. Dissipation in prejudice of filial wardship. ] 2. Peculation in prejudice of filial wardship. 13. Abuse of parental powers. 14. Disturbance of parental guardianship. 15. Breach of duty to parents. l6. Elopement from parents. 17. Child-stealing. 18. Bribery in prejudice of filial wardship.
L.
Offences Ncxt with regard to the offences to which the toucliing the filial condition.
be invested with. The reason is, that it is not common for any ceremony to be required as necessary to a man's being deemed in law the father of such or such a child. But the institution of such a ceremony, whether advisable or not, is at least perfectly conceivable. Nor are there wanting cases in which it has actually been exemplified. By an article in the Roman law, adopted by many modern nations, an illegitimate child is rendered legilimate by the subsequent marriage of his parents. If then a priest, or other person whose office it was, were to refuse to join a man and woman in matrimony, such refusal, besides beitig a wrongful non-investment with respect to the two matrimonial conditions, would be a wrongful non-investment of parentality and filiation, to the prejudice of any children who should have been legitimated.
Jilial condition *, the condition of a son or daughter stands exposed. The principles to be pursued in the investigation of offences of this description, have already been sufficiently developed. It will be sufficient, therefore, to enumerate them without further discussion. The only peculiarities by which offences relative to the condition in question stand distinguished from the offences relative to all the preceding conditions, depend upon this one circumstance; viz. that it is certain every one must have had a father and a mother: at the same time that it is not certain that every one must have had a master, a servant, a guardian, or a ward. It will be observed all along, that where a person, from whom, if alive, the benefit would be taken, or on whom the burthen would be imposed, be dead, so much of the mischief is extinct along with the object of the offence. There still, how- * In English we have no word that will serve to express with propriety the person who bears the relation opposed to that of parent. The word child is ambiguous, being employed in another sense, perhaps more frequently than in this: more frequently in opposition to a person of full age, an adult, than in correlation to a parent. For the condition itself we have no other word than Jiliation: an ill-contrived term, not analogous to paternity and maternity: the proper term would have been Jiliality: the word filiation is as frequently, perhaps, and more consistently, put for the act of establishing a person in the possession of the condition of filiality.
Chi p. ever, remains so much of the mischief as depends — ■^ — ' upon the advantage or disadvantage which might accrue to persons related, or supposed to be related, in the several remoter degrees, to him in question. The catalogue then of these offences stand as follows: ]. Wrongful non-investment of filiation. This, if it be the offence of him or her who should have been recognized as the parent, coincides with wrongful detrectation of parentality: if it be the offence of a third person, it involves in it non-investment of parentality, which, provided the parentality is, in the eyes of him or her who should have been recognized as the parent, a desirable thing, is wrongful. 2. Wrongful interception of filiation. This, if it be the offence of him or her who should have been recognized as the parent, coincides with wrongful detrectation of parentality: if it be the offence of a third person, it involves in it interception of parentality, which, provided the parentality is, in the eyes of him or her who should have been recognized as parent, a desirable thing, is wrongful. 3. Wrongful divestment of filiation. This, if it be the offence of him or her who should be recognized as parent, coincides with wrongful abdication of parentality: if it be the offence of a third person, it involves in it divestment of parentality: to wit, of paternity, or of maternity, or of both: which, if the parentality is, in the eyes of him or her who should be recognised as parent, a desirable thing.
are respectively wrongful. 4. Usurpation of filiation. This coincides with wrongful imposition of parentality; to wit, either of paternity, or of maternity, or of both: and necessarily involves in it divestment of parentality, which, if the parentality thus divested were, in the eyes of him or her who are thus divested of it, a desirable thing, is wrongful. 5. Wrongful investment of filiation: (the filiation being considered as a beneficial thing.) This coincides with imposition of parentality, which, if in the eyes of the pretended father or mother the parentality should be an undesirable thing, will be wrongful. 6. Wrongful abdication of filiation. This necessarily coincides with wrongful divestment of parentality; it also is apt to involve in it wrongful imposition of parentality; though not necessarily either to the advantage or to the prejudice of any certain person. For if a man, supposed at first to be your son, appears afterwards not to be your's, it is certain indeed that he is the son of some other man, but it may not appear who that other man is. 7- Wrongful detrectation of filiation. This coincides with wrongful non-investment or wrongful interception of parentality. 8. Wrongful imposition of filiation. This, if it be the offence of the pretended parent, coincides necessarily with usurpation of parentality: if it be the offence of a third person, it necessarily involves imposition of parentality; as also divestment of parentality: either or both of which, according to the circumstance abovementioned, may or may not be wrongful. 9- Mismanagement of parental guardianship. 10. Desertion of parental guardianship. 1 1. Dissipation in prejudice of filial wardship. 12. Peculation in prejudice of filial wardship. 1 3. Abuse of parental power. 14. Disturbance of parental guardianship. 15. Breach of duty to parents. 16' Elopement from parents. 17. Child-stealing. 18. Bribery in prejudice of parental guardianship.
LI.
Condition of We shall now be able to apply ourselves with a husband.
— Poweis. some advantage to the examination of the several rights, that ofFeuces to which the marital condition, or connexed to it. ditiou of a husbaud, stands exposed. A husband is a man, between whom and a certain woman, who in this case is called his wife, there subsists a legal obligation for the purpose of their living together, and in particular for the purpose of a sexual intercourse to be carried on between them. This obligation will naturally be considered in four points of view: 1. In respect of its commencement. 2. In respect of the placing it. 3. In respect of the nature of it. 4. In respect of its duration. First then, it is evident, that in point of possibility, one method of commencement is as conceivable as another: the time of its commencement might have been marked by one sort of event (by one sort of signal, as it may here be called) as well as by another. But in practice the signal has usually been, as in point ^^^'t^-of utility it ought constantly to be, a contract ' — ^ — entered into by the parties: that is, a set of signs, pitched upon by the law, as expressive of their viutual consent, to take upon them this condition. Second, and third, with regard to the placing of the obligations which are the result of the contract, it is evident that they must rest solely on one side, or mutually on both. On the first supposition, the condition is not to be distinguished from pure slavery. In this case, either the wife must be the slave of the husband, or the husband of the wife. The first of these suppositions has perhaps never been exemplified; the opposing influence of physical causes being too universal to have ever been surmounted: the latter seems to have been exemplified but too often; perhaps among the first Romans; at any rate, in many barbarous nations. Thirdly, With regard to the nature of the obligations. If they are not suffered to rest all on one side, certain rights are thereby given to the other. There must, therefore, be rights on both sides. Now, where there are mutual rights possessed by two persons, as against each other, either there are powers annexed to those rights, or not. But the persons in question are, by the supposition, to live together: in which case we have shewn *, that it is not only expedient, but in a manner necessary, that on * Supra.
* Supra.
Chap, one slde there should be powers. Now it is only ^ — V — ' on one side that powers can be: for suppose them on both sides, and they destroy one another. The question is then, In which of the parties these powers shall be lodged? we have shewn, that on the principle of utility they ought to be lodged in the husband. The powers then which subsist being lodged in the husband, the next question is. Shall the interest of one party only, or of both, be consulted in the exercise of them? it is evident, that on the principle of utility the interests of both ought alike to be consulted: since in two persons, taken together, more happiness is producible than in one. This being the case, it is manifest, that the legal relation which the husband will bear to the wife will be a complex one: compounded of that of master and that of guardian.
LIT.
Offences The offcuccs thcu to which the condition of a touching the condition of husband will be exposed, will be the sum of those to which the two conditions oi master and guardian are exposed. Thus far the condition of a husband, with respect to the general outlines of it, stands upon the same footing as that of a parent. But there are certain reciprocal services, which being the main subject of the matrimonial contract, constitute the essence of the two matrimonial relations, and which neither a master nor guardian, as such, nor a parent, at any rate, have XVI.
XVI.
usually been permitted to receive. These must Chai of course have been distinguished from the indiscriminate train of services at large which the husband in his character of master is impowered to exact, and of those which in his character of guardian he is bound to render. Being thus distinguished, the offences relative to the two conditions have, in many instances, in as far as they have reference to these peculiar services, acquired particular denominations. In the first place, with regard to the contract, from the celebration of which the legal condition dates its existence. It is obvious that in point of possibility, this contract might, on the part of either sex, subsist with respect to several persons of the other sex at the same time: the husband might have any number of wives: the wife might have any number of husbands: the husband might enter into the contract with a number of wives at the same time: or, if with only one at a time, he might reserve to himself a right of engaging in a similar contract with any number, or with only such or such a number of other women afterwards, during the continuance of each former contract. This latter accordingly is the footing upon which, as is well known, marriage is and has been established in many extensive countries: particularly in all those which profess the Mahometan religion. In point of possibihty, it is evident that the like liberty might be reserved on Cr-^i"- the part of the wife: though in point of practice ' — ^/ — ' no examples of such an arrangement seem ever to have occurred. Which of all these arrangements is, in point of utility, the most expedient, is a question v^^hich would require too much discussion to answer in the course of an analytical process like the present, and which belongs indeed to the civil branch of legislation, rather than to the penal*. In Christian countries, the solemnization of any such contract is made to exclude the solemnization of any subsequent one during the continuance of a former: and the solemnization of any such subsequent contract is accordingly treated as an offence, under the name of Polygamy. Polygamy then is at any rate, on the part of the man, a particular modification of that offence which may be stiled usurpation of the condition of a husband. As to its other effects, they will be different, according as it was the man only, or the woman only, or both, that were in a state of matrimony at the time of the commission of the offence. If the man only, then his offence involves in it pro tanto that of wrongful divestment of the condition of a wife, in prejudice of his prior wifef. If the woman only, then it involves * See ch. xvii. [Limits] § iv.
t In this case also, if the woman knew not of the prior marriage, it is besides a species of seduction; and, in as far as it affects her, belongs to another division of the offences of this class. Vide supra, xxxvi.
in it pro tanto that of wrongful divestment of the ^hap. condition of a husband, in prejudice of her prior ' — v — ' husband. If both were ah"eady married, it of course involves both the wrongful divestments which have just been mentioned. And on the other hand also, the converse of all this may be observed with regard to polygamy on the part of the woman. Second, As the engaging not to enter into any subsequent engagement of the like kind during the continuance of the first, is one of the conditions on which the law lends its sanction to the first; so another is, the inserting as one of the articles of this engagement, an undertaking not to render to, or accept from, any other person the services which form the characteristic object of it: the rendering or acceptance of any such services is accordingly treated as an offence, under the name of adultery: under which name is also comprised the offence of the stranger, who, in the commission of the above offence, is the necessary accomplice. Third, Disturbing either of the parties to this engagement, in the possession of these characteristic services, may, in like manner, be distinguished fi'om the offence of disturbing them in the enjoyment of the miscellaneous advantages derivable from the same condition; and on whichever side the blame rests, whether that of the party, or that of a third person, may be termed wrongful withholding of connubial ser^vices. And thus we have one-and-twenty sorts of of- Chap, fenccs to whicli, as the law stands at present in ' — V — ' Christian countries, the condition of a hnsband stands exposed: viz. 1. Wrongful non-investment of the condition of a husband. 2. Wrongful interception of the condition of a husband. 3. Wrongful divestment of the condition of a husband. 4. Usurpation of the condition of a husband. 5. Polygamy. 6. Wrongful investment of the condition of a husband. 7- Wrongful abdication of the condition of a husband. 8. Wrongful detrectation of the condition of a husband. 9. Wrongful imposition of the condition of a husband. 10. Mismanagement of marital guardianship. 1 1. Desertion of marital guardianship. 12. Dissipation in prejudice of matrimonial wardship. 13. Peculation in prejudice of matrimonial wardship. 14. Abuse of marital power. 1 5. Disturbance of marital guardianship. l6. Wrongful withholding of connubial services. 17. Adultery. 18. Breach of duty to husbands. 19- Elopement from husbands. 20. Wife-stealing. 21. Bribery in prejudice of marital guardianship *.
* I. Semi-public offences. — Falsehoods contesting, or offences against justice destroying, the validity of the marriages of people of certain descriptions: such as Jews, Quakers, Hugonots, &c. &c.
II. Self-regarding oft'ences. — Improvident marriage on the part of minors.
LIII. Chap.
XVI.
Next with regard to the offences to which the >--v — ' *-' Uiiences condition of a wife stands exposed. From the touching the -"• condition of patterns that have been exhibited already, the a ^'fe, coincidences and associations that take place between the offences that concern the existence of this condition and those which concern the existence of the condition of a husband, may easily enough be apprehended without farther repetitions. The catalogue of those now under consideration will be precisely the same in every article as the catalogue last exhibited.
LIV.
Thus much for the several sorts of offences relative to the several sorts of domestic conditions: those which are constituted by such natural relations as are contiguous being included. There remain those which are uncontiguous: of which, after so much as has been said of the others, it will naturally be expected that some notice should be taken. These, however, do not afford any of that matter which is necessary to constitute a condition. In point of fact, no power seems ever to be annexed to any of them. A grandfather, perhaps, may be called by the law to take upon him the guardianship of his orphan grandson: but then the power he has belongs to him not as grandfather, but as guardian. In point of possibility, indeed, power might be annexed to these relations, just as it might to any other.
Chap. But still HO ncw sort of domestic condition would ^^ — N/ — ' result from it: since it has been shewn that there can be no others, that, being constituted by power, shall be distinct from those which have been already mentioned. Such as they are, however, they have this in common with the beforementioned relations, that they are capable of importing either benefit or burthen: they therefore stand exposed to the several ofiFences whereby those or any other relations are liable to be affected in point of existence. It might be expected, therefore, that in virtue of these offences, they should be added to the list of the relations which are liable to be objects of delinquency. But the fact is, that they already stand included in it: and although not expressly named, yet as effectually as if they were. On the one hand, it is only by affecting such or such a contiguous relation that any offence, affecting uncontiguous relations can take place. On the other hand, neither can any offence, affecting the existence of the contiguous relations, be committed, without affecting the existence of an indefinite multitude of such as are uncontiguous. A false witness comes, and causes it to be believed that you are the son of a woman, who, in truth, is not your mother. What follows? An endless tribe of other false persuasions— that you are the grandson of the father and of the mother of this supposed mother: that you are the son of some husband of her's, or, at least, of some man with whom she has cohabited: Chap. the grandson of his father and his mother; and "■ — v — ' so on: the brother of their other children, if they have any: the brother-in-law of the husbands and wives of those children, if married: the uncle of the children of those children: and so on. — On the other hand, that you are not the son of your real mother, nor of your real father: that you are not the grandson of either of your real grandfathers or grandmothers; and so on without end: all which persuasions result from, and are included in, the one original false persuasion of your being the son of this your pretended mother.
It should seem, therefore, at first sight, that none of the offences against these uncontiguous relations could ever come expressly into question: for by the same rule that one ought, so it might seem ought a thousand others: the offences against the uncontiguous being merged as it were in those which affect the contiguous gelations. So far, however, is this from being the case, that in speaking of an offence of this stamp, it is not uncommon to hear a great deal said of this or that uncontiguous relationship which it affects, at the same time that no notice at all shall be taken of any of those which are contiguous. How happens this? Because, to the uncontiguous relation are annexed perhaps certain remarkable advantages or disadvantages, while to all the intermediate relations none shall be annexed which are Chap, in comparison worth noticing. Suppose Antony ^ — V — ' or Lepidus to have contested the relationship of Octavius (afterwards Augustus) to Caius Juhus Caesar. How could it have been done? It could only have been by contesting, either Octavius's being the son of Atia, or Atia's being the daughter of Julia, or Julia's being the daughter of Lucius Julius Caesar, or Lucius Julius Csesar's being the father of Caius. But to have been the son of Atia, or the grandson of Julia, or the great grandson of Lucius Julius Caesar, was, in comparison, of small importance. Those intervening relationships were, comparatively speaking, of no other use to him than in virtue of their being so many necessary links in the genealogical chain which connected him with the sovereign of the empire.
As to the advantages and disadvantages which may happen to be annexed to any of those uncontiguous relationships, we have seen already that no powers over the correlative person, nor any corresponding obligations, are of the number. Of what nature then can they be? They are, in truth, no other than what are the result either of local and accidental institutions, or of some spontaneous bias that has been taken by the moral sanction. It would, therefore, be to little purpose to attempt tracing them out a priori by any exhaustive process: all that can be done is, to pick up and lay together some of the principal articles in each catalogue by way of specimen. The ad- ^"*'* vantages which a given relationship is apt to ^ — v — impart, seem to be referable chiefly to the following heads: J. Chance of succession to the property, or a part of the property, of the correlative person. 2. Chance of pecuniary support, to be yielded by the correlative person, either by appointment of law, or by spontaneous donation. 3. Accession of legal rank; including any legal privileges which may happen to be annexed to it: such as capacity of holding such and such beneficial offices; exemption from such and such burthensome obligations; for instance, paying taxes, serving burthensome offices, &c. &c. 4. Accession of rank by courtesy; including the sort of reputation which is customarily and spontaneously annexed to distinguished birth and family alliance: whereon may depend the chance of advancement in the way of marriage, or in a thousand other ways less obvious. The disadvantages which a given relation is liable to impart, seem to be referable chiefly to the following heads: 1. Chance of being obliged, either by law, or by force of the moral sanction, to yield pecuniary support to the correlative party. 2. Loss of legal rank: including the legal disabiUties, as well as the burthensome obligations, which the law is apt to annex, sometimes with injustice enough, to the lower stations. 3. Loss of rank by courtesy: VOL. II. o VOL. II. o including the loss of the advantages annexed by custom to such rank. 4. Incapacity of contracting matrimony with the correlative person, where the supposed consanguinity or affinity lies within the prohibited degrees*.
* In pursuance of the plan adopted with relation to semipublic and self-regarding offences, it may here be proper to exhibit such a catalogue as the nature of the design will admit, of the several genera or inferior divisions of public offences.
I, Offences against the external security of the state. 1, Treason (in favour of foreign enemies.) It may be positive or negative (negative consisting, for example, in the not opposing the commission of positive.) 2, Espionage (in favour of foreign rivals not yet enemies.) 3. Injuries to foreigners at large (including piracy.) 4. Injuries to privileged foreigners such as ambassadors.)
II. Offences against justice. 1. Offences against judicial trust: viz. Wrongful non-investment of judicial trust, wrongful interception of judicial trust, wrongful divestment of judicial trust, usurpation of judicial trust, wrongful investment of judicial trust, wrongful abdication of judicial trust, wrongful detrectation of judicial trust, wrongful imposition of judicial trust, breach of judicial trust, abuse of judicial trust, disturbance of judicial trust, and bribery in prejudice of judicial trust.
Breach and abuse of judicial trust may be either intentional or unintentional. Intentional is culpable at any rate. Unintentional will proceed either from inadvertence, or from mis-supposal: if the inadvertence be coupled with heedlessness, or the missupposal with rashness, it is culpable: if not, blameless. For the particular acts by which the exercise of judicial trust may be disturbed see B. i. tit. [offences LV.
We come now to civil conditions: these, it may „.., -,.
•' Liv:l condiwell be imagined, may be infinitely various: as *'°"*- against justice.] They are too multifarious, and too ill provided with names, to be examined here.
If a man fails in fulfilling the duties of this trust, and thereby comes either to break or to abuse it, it must be through some deficiency in the three requisite and only requisite endowments, of knowledge, inclination, and power. [See supra, xxvii,] A deficiency in any of those points, if any person be in fault, may proceed either from his own fault, or from the fault of those who should act with or under him. If persons who are in fault are persons invested with judical trust, the oflfence comes under the head of breach or abuse of trust: if other persons, under that of disturbance of trust.
The ill effects of any breach, abuse, or disturbance of judicial trust, will consist in the production of some article or articles in the list of the mischiefs which it ought to be the original purpose of judicial procedure to remedy or avert, and of those which it ought to be the incidental purpose of it to avoid producing. These are either primary (that is immediate) or remote: remote are of the 2d, 3d, or 4th order, and so on. The primary are those which import actual pain to persons assignable, and are therefore mischievous in themselves: the secondary are mischievous on account of the tendency they have to produce some article or articles in the catalogue of those of the first order; and are therefore mischievous in their effects. Those of the 3d order are mischievous only on account of the connection they have in the way of productive tendency, as before, with those of the 2d order: and so on.
Primary inconveniences, which it ought to be the object of procedure to provide against, are, 1, The continuance of Chap, various as the acts which a man may be either com- — V — ' manded or allowed, whether for his own benefit, or the individual offence itself, and thereby the encrease as well as continuance of the mischief of it. 2. The continuance of the whole mischief of the individual offence. 3. The continuance of a part of the mischief of the individual offence. 4. Total want of amends on the part of persons injured by the offence. 5. Partial want of amends on the part of persons injured by the offence. 6. Superfluous punishment of delinquents. 7- Unjust punishment of persons accused. 8. Unnecessary labour, expence, or other suffering or danger, on the part of superior judicial officers. 9. Unnecessary labour, espence, or other suffering or danger, on the part of ministerial or other subordinate judicial officers. 10. Unnecessary labour, expence, or other suffering or danger, on the part of persons whose co-operation is requisite pro re natd, in order to make up the necessary complement of knowledge and power on the part of judicial officers, who are such by profession. 11. Unnecessary labour, expence, or other suffering or danger, on the part of persons at large, coming under the sphere of the operations of the persons above-mentioned.
Secondary inconveniences are, in the counsultative preinterpretative (or purely civil) branch of procedure. 1. Misinterpretation or adjudication. In the executive (including the penal) branch. 2. Total impunity of delinquents: (as favouring the production of other offences of the like nature.) S. Partial impunity of delinquents. 4. Application of punishment improper in specie, though perhaps not in degree (this lessening the beneficial efficacy of the quantity employed.) 5. Unoeconomical application of punishment, though proper, perhaps, as well in specie as in degree. 6. Unnecessary pecuniary expence on the part of the state.
that of others, to abstain from or to perform. As many different denominations as there are of per- Inconveniences of the 3d order are, 1. Unnecessary delay.
2. Unnecessary intricacy. Inconveniences of the 4th order are, 1. Breach, 2. Abuse, 3. Disturbance, of judicial trust, as above: viz. in as far as these offences are preliminary to and distinct from those of the 2d and 3d orders.
Inconveniences of the 5th order are, Breach of the several regulations of procedure, or other regulations, made in the view of obviating the inconveniences above enumerated: viz. if preliminary and distinct as before.
III. Offences against the preventive branch of the POLICE. 1. Offences against phthano-paranomic trust: ((pdavu, to prevent; itapayoixia, an offence.) 2. Offences against phthano-symphoric trust: a-v/Mpopa, a calamity. The two trusts may be termed by the common appellation of prophylactic: (■npo, before-hand, and (pvXarru, to guard against.)
IV. Offences against the public force. 1. Offences against military trust, corresponding to those against judicial trust. Military desertion is a breach of military duty, or of military trust. Favouring desertion is a disturbance of it. 2, Offences against that branch of public trust which consists in the management of the several sorts of things appropriated to the purposes of war: such as arsenals, fortifications, dock-yards, ships of war, artillery, ammunition, military magazines, and so forth. It might be termed polemotamientic: from iroXe/Ao?, war; and ra/xievi;, a steward *.
• A number of different branches of public trust, none of which have yet been provided with appellatives, have here been brought to view: which then were best? to coin new names for them out of the Greek, or, instead of a word, to make use of a whole sentence? In English, and in French, there is no other alternative; no more than in any of the other southern languages. It rests with the reader to determine.
^98 DIVISION OF OFFENCES.
Chap, soiis distinguished with a view to such commands ' — V — ' and allowances (those denominations only except- V. Offences against the positive encrease of the NATIONAL FELICITY. 1. OfFences against episturo-threptic trust: {eitKrrfifA.ri, knowledge; and r/je^w, to nourish or promote.) 2. OfFences against eupcedagogue trust: fu, well; and Tia.t^iz'Y'jr/eu, to educate. 3. Offences against noso-comial trust: vo(7o?, a disease; and v.ojji.i%!c, to take care of. 4. Offences against moro-comial trust: {jMpoi, an insane person.)
5. OfFences against ptocho-comial trust: (ttt&'xo'j the poor.)
6. OfFences against aniemfcZeiic trust: (avre/x^aXXw, to bestow in reparation of a loss.) 7- OfFences against hedonarchic trust: {vj^ovai, pleasures; and apxo[Acx,i, to preside over.) The above are examples of the principal establishments which should or might be set on foot for the purpose of making, in so many different ways, a positive addition to the stock of national felicity. To exhibit an exhaustive analysis of the possible total of these establishments would not be a very easy task: nor on the present occasion is it a necessary one; for be they of what nature and in what number they may, the offences to which they stand exposed will, in as far as they are offences against trust, be in point of denomination the same: and as to what turns upon the particular nature of each trust, they will be of too local a nature to come within the present plan.
All these trusts might be comprized under some such general name as that of agatho-poieutic trust: (aya^o-srotecc, to do good to any one.)
VI. Offences against the public wealth. 1. Nonpayment of forfeitures. 2. Non-payment of taxes, including smuggling. 3. Breach of the several regulations made to prevent the evasion of taxes. 4. Offences against fiscal trust: the same as offences against judicial and military ed which relate to the conditions above spoken of under the name of domestic ones) so many civil trusts. Offences against the original revenue, not accruing either from taxes or forfeitures, such as that arising from the public demesnes, stand upon the same footing as offences against private property. 5. Offences against demosio-tamientic trust: (Svj/*oo-ja, things belonging to the public: and raii.iev<;, a steward) viz. against that trust, of which the object is to apply to their several destinations such articles of the public wealth as are provided for the indiscriminate accommodation of individuals: such as public roads and waters, public harbours, post-offices, and packet boats, and the stock belonging to them; market-places, and other such public buildings; race-grounds, public walks, and so forth. Offences of this description will be apt to coincide with offences against agatho-poieutictxn^t as above, or with offences against ethno-plutistic trust hereafter mentioned, according as the benefit in question is considered in itself, or as resulting from the application of such or such a branch or portion of the public wealth.
VII. Offences against population. 1. Emigration. 2. Suicide. 3. Procurement of impotence or barrenness. 4. Abortion- 5. Unprolific coition. 6. Celibacy, VIII. Offences against the national avealth. I. Idleness. 2. Breach of the regulations made in the view of preventing the application of industry to purposes less profitable, in prejudice of purposes more profitable. 3. Offences against ethno-plutistic trust; (Xao?, the nation at large; icXovrti^u, to enrich.
IX. Offences against the sovereignty. 1. Offences against sovereign trust: corresponding to those against judicial, prophylactic, military, and fiscal trusts. Offensive rebellion includes wrongful interception, wrongful divestment, Chap, XVI.
^00 DIVISION OF OFFENCES.
conditions one might enumerate. Means however, more or less explicit, may be found out of circumscribing their infinitude.