of Mr. William Pitt, (then Minister) took me aside, and told me that they had read my Pamphlet on Law Taxes; that the reasons against them were unanswerable, and it was determined there should be no more of them.
Anno, 1804, July 10, 12, 14, 18.— This being in the number of Mr. Addington'a Taxes, Mr. Pitt, upon returning to office, took up all those Taxes in the lump. On the above days, this Tax was opposed in the House of Commons: and Mr. Wyndham, according to the report in the Time*, on one of those days, spoke of this Pamphlet as containing complete information on the subject; observing at the same time, that it was out of print. On behalf of administration, nothing like an answer to any of the objections was attempted: only the Attorney-General (Perchral) said, that the the addition proposed to those Taxes, was no more than equal to the depreciation of money.
Mr. Addington, before this, had recourse to the Tax on Medicine here spoken of, (p. 22.) So that, in the course of his short administration, if the representation here given be correct, he had had the misfortune to find out and impose the two worst species of taxation possible. Compare this with Denmark, and its courts of Natural Procedure, called Reconciliation Courts.
26th February,1816. — Unalleviated by any adequate hope of use, too painful would be the task, of hunting out, and holding up to view, the subsequent additions, which this worst of oppressions has, in this interval of twenty years, been receiving.
Money, it is said, must be had, and no other taxes can be found. The justification being conclusive, the tax receives its increase: next year, from the same hand, flow others in abundance.
Grievous enough is the Income Tax, called, lest it should be thought to be what it is, the Property Tax. — Grievous that tax is, whatever be its name; yet, sum for sum, compared with this tax, it is a blessing. Instead of 10 per cent, suppose it 80 per cent. Less bad would it be to add yet another 10 per cent, than a tax to an equal amount upon justice.
Grievous Grievous Grievous have been the additions, so lately and repeatedly made, to the taxes on Conreyancct and Agreements. Extensive the prohibitory part of the effect, though the pressure, — confined as usual to the poor, i. e. the great majority of the community, who have none to speak for them,— is scarcely complained of by the rich. Yet, were all law-taxes taken off*, and the amount thrown upon Conveyances and Agreements, iui»— even tins — would in reality be an indulgence.
Whether the oppression be more or less grievous, is never worth a thought Will it be submilled to? — This is the only question. Charity is kicked out of doors. Hope is fled. Faith and Piety remain, and atone for every thing.
For a list of about twenty-eight other sources of factitious delay, vexation, and expense, and thence of denial of justice, produced by the judges of former times, for the augmentation of lawyers' profit, their own included, — together with a list and summary account of the devices by which these burthens have been imposed, and by which Technical stands distinguished from Natural Procedure,— see by the same author, Scotch Reform, &c. printed for Ridgway, Piccadilly.
ADDITION BY A LEARNED FRIEND.
IN the court of Chancery, two cases have recently occurred, which may serve as an illustration of the extent in which the taxes upon law proceedings may operate as a denial of justice. In one case — Roe v. Gudgeon — the Defendant, in his answer to the Plaintiff's bill, submitted that he ought not to be compelled to set out certain accounts which had been required by the bill, as the expense of taking what is called an office copy of them, — a necessary preliminary to any further proceeding on the part of the Plaintiff in the cause, — would amount to the sum of 29,000/.: an expense almost wholly arising from the Stamps on the Paper, on which the office copy of the answer is compulsorily made. In this case the court determined, that it was not necessary these accounts should be set out: but in coming to this conclusion, how far the court was determined by the nature of the particular case, or by the magnitude tude of the expense that would thus be occasioned;— or whether if, without any such objection, the Defendant had actually set out these account*, the Plaintiff could have been relieved from pursuing the regular mode of procuring a copy of them, and thus incurring the above expense;— or whether, if the expense had been instead of 29,000/. only 28 or 27 thousand pounds, such an objection would have hppn listened to; — it is extremely difficult to say.
The other case alluded to, is one in which from peculiar circumstances, it is not thought proper to mention the names of the parties. It is optional with a man to be a Plaintiff in a cause, it is not altogether so optional with him to be a Defendant The preceding case shews that it is not always safe for a man to become a Plaintiff, without 28,0001. at least in his pocket, to begin with, over and above what is necessary for his maintenance. — The following ease shews that a man may not be always able to resist a demand, however unjust it may be, without being able to support an outlay of at least SOO/. In the case in question, the writer of this has been assured,— and from authority, which be has peculiar reason for relying upon, — that the expense of merely putting in an answer by cue of the Defendants to a bill in Equity, amounted to the above above sum of 800J.: what part of this expense was occasioned by the tax on law proceedings cannot be accurately ascertained, but it assuredly constituted a very considerable proportion of that sum.
FINIS.
John M'Creery, Printer, Black-Horse-Court, London.
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