they may be, you will want either the discernment necessary to enable you to see them in their true light, or the resolution to enable you to put a negative upon measures, of the mischief of which you are fully convinced." The imbecility of the persons thus addressed in the character of legislators and judges, their consequent unfitness for the situation, — such, it is manifest, is the basis of this fallacy. On the part of these legislators themselves, the forbearance manifested under such treatment, — on the part of the orator, the confidence entertained of his experiencing such forbearance, — aftbrd no inconsiderable presumption of the reality of the character so imputed to them.
Sect. 2. Imputation of had character.
The inference meant to be drawn from an imputation of bad character is, either to cause the person in question to be considered as entertaining bad design, i. e. about to be concerned in bringing forward future contingent and pernicious measures, or simply to destroy any persuasive force, with which, in the character of authority, his opinion is likely to be attended.
In this last case, it is a fallacy opposed to a fallacy of the same complexion, played off on the other side: to employ it, is to combat the antagonist with his own weapons. In the former case, it is another modification oi the fallacy of distrust, of which, hereafter.
In proportion to the degree of efficiency with which a man suffers these instruments of deception to operate upon his mind, he enables bad men to exercise over Sect. 3.] FALLACIES OF DANGER. J 33 him a sort of power, the thought of which ought to cover him with shame. Allow this argument the effect of a conclusive one, you put it into the power of any man to draw you at pleasure from the support of every measure, which in your own eyes is good, to force you to give your support to any and every measure which in your own eyes is bad. Is it good? — the bad man embraces it, and, by the supposition, you reject it. Is it bad? — he vituperates it, and that suffices for driving you into its embrace. You split upon the rocks, because he has avoided them; you miss the harbour, because he has steered into it.
Give yourself up to any such blind antipathy, you are no less in the power of your adversaries than by a correspondently irrational sympathy and obsequiousness you put yourself into the power of your friends.
Sect. 3. Imputation of bad motive.
The proposer of the measure, it is asserted, is actuated by bad motives, from whence it is inferred that he entertains some bad design. This, again, is no more than a moditication of the fallacy of distrust; but one of the very weakest; 1. because motives are hidden in the human breast; 2. because, if the measure is beneficial, it would be absurd to reject it on account of the motives of its author. But what is peculiar to this particular fallacy, is the falsity of the supposition on which it is grounded: viz. the existence of a class or species of motives, to which any such epithet as bad can, with propriety, be applied. What constitutes a 134 FALLACIES OF DANGER. \Ch. 1.
motive, is the eventual expectation, either of some pleasure, or exemption from pain; but forasmuch as in itself there is nothing good but pleasure, or exemption from pain, it follows that no motive is bad in itself, though every kind of motive may, according to circumstances, occasion good or bad actions *; and motives of the dissocial cast may aggravate the mischief of a pernicious act. But if the act itself to vi^hich the motive gives birth, — if, in the proposed measure in question, there be nothing pernicious, — it is not in the motive's being of the dissocial class, — it is not in its being of the self-regarding class, — that there is any reason for calling it a bad one. Upon the influence and prevalence of motives of the selfregarding class, depends the preservation, not only of the species, but of each individual belonging to it. When, from the introduction of a measure, a man beholds the prospect of personal advantage in any shape whatever to himself, — say, for example, a pecuniary advantage, as being the most ordinary and palpable, or, dyslogistically speaking, the most gross, - — it is certain that the contemplation of this advantage must have had some share in causing the conduct he pursues — it may have been the only cause. The measure itself being by the supposition not pernicious, is it the worse for this advantage? On the contrary, it is so much the better. For of what stuff is public advantage composed, but of private and personal advantage?
* See Dumont Traites de Legislation, torn. ii. c. 8. ed. 2; Bentham, Theory of Morals and Legislation.
Sect. 4. Imputation of inconsistency.
Admitting the fact of the inconsistency, the utmost it can amount to in the character of an argument against the proposed measure, is, the affording a presumption of bad design in a certain way, or of bad character in a certain way and to a certain degree, on the part of the proposer or supporter of the measure. Of the futility of that argument, a view has been already given; and this, again, is a modification of the fallacy of distrust.
That inconsistency, when pushed to a certain degree, may afford but too conclusive evidence of a sort of relatively bad character, is not to be denied: if, for example, on a former occasion, personal interest inclining him one way (say against the measure), arguments have been urged by the person in question against the measure, while on the present occasion personal interest inclining him the opposite way, arguments are urged by him in favour of the measure, — or if a matter of fact, which on a former occasion was denied, be now asserted, or *vice versa, — and in each case if no notice of the inconsistency is taken by the person himself, — the operation of it to his prejudice will naturally be stronger than if an account more or less satisfactory is given by him of the circumstances and causes of the variance.
But be the evidence with regard to the cause of the change what it may, no inference can be drawn from it against the measure unless it be that such inconsistency, if established, may weaken the persuasive force of the opinion of the person in question in the character of authority: and in what respect and degree an argument of this complexion is irrelevant, has been already brought to view.
Sect. 5. Imputatioji of suspicious connexions.
Noscitur ex sociis.
The alleged badness of character, on the part of the alleged associate, being admitted, the argument now in question will stand upon the same footing as the four preceding; the weakness of which has been already exposed, and will constitute only another branch of the fallacy of distrust. But before it can stand on a par even with those weak ones, two ulterior points remain to be established.
1. One, is the badness of character on the part of the alleged associate.
2. Another, is the existence of a social connexion between the person in question and his supposed associate, 3. A third, is, that the influence exercised on the mind of the person in question is such, thai in consequence of the connexion he will be induced to introduce and support measures (and those mischievous ones), which otherwise he would not have introduced or supported.
As to the two first of these three supposed facts, their respective degrees of probability will depend on the circums^tances of each case. Of the third, the Sect, 6.] TALLACIKS OF DANGER. 13.7 weakness may be exposed by considerations of a general nature. In private life, the force of the presumption in question is established by daily experience: but in the case of a political connexion, such as that which is created by an opposition to one and the same political measure or set of measures, the presumption loses a great part, sometimes the whole, of its force. Few are the political measures, on the occasion of which men of all characters, men of all degrees, in the scale of probity and improbity, may not be seen on both sides.
The mere need of information respecting matters of fact, is a cause capable of bringing together, in a state of apparent connexion, some of the most opposite characters.
Sect. 6. Imputationjoimded on identity of denomination.
Noscitur ex cognominibus.
The circumstances by which this fallacy is distinguished from the last preceding, is, that in this case between the person in question and the obnoxious persons by whose opinions and conduct he is supposed to be determined or influenced, neither personal intercourse nor possibility of personal intercourse can exist. In the last case, his measures were to be opposed because he was connected with persons of bad character; in the present, because he bears the same denomination as persons now no more, but who, in their own time, were the authors of pernicious measures. In so far as a community of interest exists between the persons thus connected by community of denomination, the allegation of a certain community of designs is not altogether destitute of weight. Community of denomination, however, is but the sign, not the efficient cause, of community of interest. What have the Romans of the present day in common with the Romans of early times? Do they aspire to recover the empire of the world?
But when evil designs are imputed to men of the present day, on the ground that evil designs were entertained and prosecuted by their namesakes in time past, whatsoever may be the community of interest, one circumstance ought never to be out of mind: — this is, the gradual melioration of character from the most remote and barbarous, down to the present lime; the consequence of which is, that in many particulars the same ends which were formerly pursued by persons of the same denomination are not now pursued; and if in many others the same ends are pursued, they are not pursued by the same bad means. If this observation pass unheeded, the consequences may be no less mischievous than absurd: that which has been, is unalterable. If, then, this fallacy be suffered to influence the mind and determine human conduct, whatsoever degree of depravity be imputed to preceding generations of the obnoxious denomination,— whatsoever opposition may have been manifested towards them or their successors, — must continue without abatement to the end of time. " Be my friendship immortal, my enmity mortal," is the senti- Sect. 6.] TALLACIES OF DANGER. 139 ment that has been so warmly and so justly applauded in the mouth of a sage of antiquity: but the fallacy here in question proposes to maintain its baneful influence for ever.
It is in matters touching religious persuasion, and to the prejudice of certain sects, that this fallacy has been played off with the greatest and most pernicious effect. In England, particularly against measures for the relief of the Catholics, " those of our ancestors, who, professing the same branch of the Christian religion as that which you now profess, were thence distinguished by the same name, entertained pernicious designs, that for some time showed themselves in pernicious measures; therefore you, entertaining the same pernicious designs, would now, had you but power enough, carry into effect the same pernicious measures: — they, having the power, destroyed by fire and faggot those who, in respect of religious opinions and ceremonies, differed from them; therefore, had you but power enough, so would you." Upon this ground, in one of the three kingdoms, a system of government continues, which does not so much as profess to have in view the welfare of the majority of the inhabitants, — a system of government in which the interest of the many is avowedly, so long as the government lasts, intended to be kept in a state of perpetual sacrifice to the interest of the few. In vain is it urged, these inferences, drawn from times and measures long since past, are completely belied by the universal experience of all present time. In the Saxon kingdom, in the 140 lALLACIES OF DANGER. [67/. 1.
Austrian empire, in the vast and ever-flourishing empire of France, though the sovereign is Catholic, whatsoever degree of security the Government allows of is possessed alike by Catholics and Protestants. In vain is it observed (not that to this purpose this or any other part of the history of the 17th century is worth observing), in vain is it observed, and truly observed, the church of England continued her fires after the church of Rome had discontinued hers"^; It is only in the absence of interest that experience can hope to be regarded, or reason heard. In the character of sinecurists and over-paid placemen, it is the interest of the members of the English Government to treat the majority of the people of Ireland on the double footing of enemies and subjects; and such is the treatment which is in store for them to the extent of their endurance.
Sect. 7. Cause of the prevalence of' the fallacies helonging to this class.
Whatsoever be the nature of the several instruments of deception by which the mind is liable to be operated upon and deceived, — the degree of prevalence they experience, — the degree of success they enjoy, — depends ultimately upon one common cause: viz. the ignorance and mental imbecility of those on whom they operate. In the present instance, » Under James I., when, for being Anabaptists or Arians, two men nere burnt in Smithfield.
besides this ultimate cause or root, they find in another fallacy, and the corresponding propensity of the human mind, a sort of intermediate cause. This is the fallacy of authority: the corresponding propensity is the propensity to save exertion by resting satisfied with authority. Derived from, and proportioned to, the ignorance and weakness of the minds to which political arguments are addressed, is the propensity to judge of the propriety or impropriety of a measure from the supposed character or disposition of its supporters or opposers, in preference to, or even in exclusion of, its own intrinsic character and tendency. Proportioned to the degree of importance attached to the character and disposition of the author or supporter of the measure, is the degree of persuasive force with which the fallacies belonging to this class will naturally act.
Besides, nothing but laborious application, and a clear and comprehensive intellect, can enable a man on any given subject to employ successfully relevant arguments drawn from the subject itself. To employ personalities, neither labour nor intellect is required: in this sort of contest, the most idle and the most ignorant are quite on a par with, if not superior to, the most industrious and the most highly-gifted individuals. Nothing can be more convenient for those who would speak without the trouble of thinking; the same ideas are brought forward over and over again, and all that is required is to vary the turn of expression. Close and relevant arguments have very little hold on the 142 FALLACIES OF DANGER. [C/l. 1.
passions, and serve rather to quell than to inflame them; while in personalities, there is always something stimulant, whether on the part of him who praises or him who blames. Praise forms a kind of connexion between the party praising and the party praised, and vituperation gives an air of courage and independence to the party who blames.
Ignorance and indolence, friendship and enmity, concurring and conflicting interest, servility and independence, all conspire to give personalities the ascendancy they so unhappily maintain. The more we lie under the influence of our own passions, the more we rely on others being affected in a similar degree. A man who can repel these injuries with dignity may often convert them into triumph: " Strike me, but hear," says he; and the fury of his antagonist redounds to his own discomfiture.
Ch. 2.] FALLACIES OF DANGER. 143 CHAPTER IT.
The Hobgoblin Argument, or^ No Innovation!
Ad metum.
Exposition.
The hobgoblin, the eventual appearance of which is denounced by this argument, is Anarchy; which tremendous spectre has for its forerunner the monster Innovation* The forms in which this monster may be denounced are as numerous and various as the sentences in which the word innovation can be placed.
" Here it comes! " exclaims the barbarous or unthinking servant in the hearing of the affrighted child, when, to rid herself of the burthen of attendance, such servant scruples not to employ an instrument of terror, the effects of which may continue during life. " Here it comes! " is the cry; and the hobgoblin is rendered but the more terrific by the suppression of its name.
Of a similar nature, and productive of similar effects, is the political device here exposed to view. As an instrument of deception, the device is generally accompanied by personalities of the vituperative kind. Imputation of bad motives, bad designs, bad conduct and character, &c. are ordinarily cast on the authors and advocates of the obnoxious measure; whilst the term employed is such as to beg the question in dispute. Thus, in the present instance, i7ino- 144 FALLACIES OF DANGER. [C/t. 2.
vation means a bad change, presenting to the mind, besides the idea of a change, the proposition, either that change in general is a bad thing, or at least tliat the sort of change in question is a bad change.
Exposure.
All-comprehensiveness of the condemnation passed by this fallacy.
This is one of the many cases in which it is difficult to render the absurdity of the argument more glaring than it is upon the face of the argument itself.
Whatever reason it affords for looking upon the proposed measure, be it what it may, as about to be mischievous, it affords the same reason for entertaining the same opinion of every thing that exists at present. To say all new things are bad, is as much as to say all things are bad, or, at any event, at their commencement: for of all the old things ever seen or heard of, there is not one that was not once new. Whatever is now establishment was once innovation.
He who on this ground condemns a proposed measure, condemns, in the same breath, whatsoever he would be most averse to be thought to disapprove. — He condemns the Revolution, the Reformation, the assumption made by the House of Commons of a part in the penning of the laws in the reign of Henry VI., the institution of the House of Commons itself in the reign of Henry HI., — all these he bids us regard as sure forerunners of the monster Anarchy, but particularly the birth and first efiicient agency of the House of Commons; an innovation, in comparison of which all Others, past or future, are for efficiency, ami consequently iiiischievousness, but as grains of dust in the balance.
Sect. 2. AppreJicnaion of mischief from cJiangc, what jouniJation it has in trulJi.
A circumstance that gives a sort of colour to tlie use of this fallacy is, that it can scarcely ever be found without a certain degree of truth adhering to it. Supposing the change to be one uhicl) cannot be effected without the interposition of the legislature, even this circumstance is sufficient to attach to it a certain quantity of mischief. The words necessary to commit the change even to writing cannot be put into that form without labour, importing a proportional quantity of vexation to the head employed in it; wliich labour and vexation, if paid for, is compensated by and productive of expense. When disseminated by the operation of the press, as it always must be, before it can be productive of whatever effect is aimed at, it becomes productive of ulterior vexation and expense. Here, then, is so much unavoidable mischief, of which the most salutary and indispensable change cannot fail to be productive: to this natural and unavoidable portion of mischief, the additions that have been made in the shape of factitious and avoidable mischief of the same kind are such as have sufficient claim to notice, but to a notice not proper for this place.
Here, then, we have the minimum of mischief^ L \46 PALLACIES OF DANGER. [Ck. 2.
which accompanies every change; and in tliis minimum of miscliief we have the minimum of truth with which this fallacy is accompanied, and which is sufficient to protect it against exposure, from a flat and undiscriminating denial.
It is seldom, however, that the whole of the mischief, with the corresponding portion of truth, is confined within such narrow bounds.
Wheresoever any portion, however great or small, of the aggregate mass of the objects of desire in any shape, — matter of wealth, power, dignity, or even reputation; — ^and whether in possession or only in prospect, and that ever so remote and contingent, must, in consequence of the change, pass out of any hand or hands that are not willing to part with it, — viz. either without compensation, or with no other than what, in their estimation, is insufficient, — here we have, in some shape or other, a quantity of vexation uncompensated: so much vexation, so much mischief beyond dispute.
But in one way or other, whether from the total omission of this or that item, or from the supposed inadequacy of the compensation given for it, or from its incapacity of being included in any estimate, as in case of remote and but weakly probable as well as contingent profits, it will not unfrequently happen that the compensation allotted in this case shall be inadequate, not only to the desires, but to the imagined rights of the party from whom the sacrifice is exacted.
In so far as such insutiicicncy appears to himself to exist, he will feel himself urged by a motive, the force of which will be in proportion to the amount of such deficiency, to oppose the measure: and in so far as in his eyes such motive is fit to be displayed, it vvill constitute what in his language will be reason., and what will be received in that character by all other persons in whose estimate any such deficiency shall appear to exist. So far as any such deficiency is specifically alleged in the character of u reason, it forms a relevant and si)ecific argument; and belongs not to the account of fallacies; and, if well founded, constitutes a just reason — if not for quashing the measure, at any rate for adding to the compensation thus shown to be deficient. xA.nd in this shape, viz. in that of a specific argument, will a man of course present his motive to view, if it be susceptible of it. But when the alleged damage and eventual injury will not, even in his own view of it, bear the test of inquiry, then, this specific argument failing him, he will betake himself to the general fallacy in lieu of it. He will set up the cry of Innovation! Innovation I hoping by this watchword to bring to his aid all whose sinister interest is connected with his own; and to engajje them to say, and the unreflecting multitude to believe, that the change in question is of the number of those in which the mischief attached to it is not accompanied by a preponderant mass of advantage.
148 FALLACIKS OV DANGER. [67/. 'J.
Incy.
Among the stories current in tlie profession of the law, is that of an attorney, who, when his client applied to him for relief against a forged bond, advised him, as the shortest and surest course, to forge a release.
Thus, as a shorter and surer course than that of attempting to make men sensible of the imposture, this fallacy has been every now and then met by what may be termed its counter-fallacy. — Time itself is the arch-innovator. The inference is, the proposed change, branded as it has thus been by the odious appellative of innovation, is in fact no change; its sole effect being either to prevent a change, or to bring the matter back to the good state in which it formerly was. This counter-fallacy, if such it may be termed, has not, however, any such pernicious properties or consequences attached to it as may be seen to be indicated by that name. Two circumstances, however, concur in giving it a just title to the appellation of a fallacy: one is, that it has no specific application to the particular measure in hand, and on that score may be set down as irrelevant; the other, that by a sort of implied concession and virtual admission, it gives colour and countenance to the fallacy to which it is opposed: admitting by implication, that if the appellation of a change belonged with propriety to the proposed measure, it might on that single account with propriety be opposed.
A few words, then, are now sufficient to strip the mask from this fallacy. No specific mischief, as likely to result from the specific measure, is alleged: if it were, the argument would not belong to this head. Wiiat is alleged is nothing more than that mischief, without regard to the amount, would be among the results of this measure. But this is no more than can be said of every legislative measure that ever did pass or ever can pass. If, then, it be to be ranked with arguments, it is an argument that involves in one common condemnation all political measures whatsoever, past, present, and to come; it passes ccftidemnation on whatsoever, in this way, ever has been or ever can be done, in all places as well as in all times. Delivered iVom an humble station, from the mouth of an old woman beguiling by her gossip the labours of the spinning-wheel in her cottage, it might pass for simple and ordinary ignorance: — delivered from any such exalted station as that of a legislative house or judicial bench, from such a quarter, if it can be regarded as sincere, it is a mark of drivelling rather than is^norance.
But it may be said, " My meaning is not to condemn all change, not to condemn all new institutions, all new laws, all new measures, — only violent and dangerous ones, such as that is which is now proposed." The answer is: Neither drawing or attempting to draw any line, you do by this indiscriminating appellative pai-s condemnation on all change; on every thing to ii'hicli any such epithet as 7iezv can with propriety be applied. Draw any such line, and the reproach of insincerity or imbecility shall be withholden: draw your line; but remember that whenever you do draw it, or so much as begin to draw it, you give up this your argument.
Alive to possible-imaginable evils, dead to actual ones, — eagle-eyed to future contingent evils, blind and insensible to all existing ones, — such is the character of the mind, to which a fallacy such as this can really have presented itself in the character of an argument possessing any the smallest claim to notice. To such a mind, that, by denial and sale of justice, anarchy, in so far as concerns nine-tenths of the people, is actually by force of law established, and that it is only by the force of morality, — of such morality as all the punishments denounced against sincerity, and all the reward applied for the encouragement of insincerity, have not been able to banish, that society is kept together; — that to draw into question the fitness of great characters for their high situations, is in one man a crime, while to question their fitness so that their motives remain unquestioned is lawful to another; — that the crime called libel remains undefined and undistinguishable, and the liberty of the press is defined to be the absence of that security which would be afforded to writers by the establishment of a licenser; — that under a show of limitation, a government shall be in fact an absolute one, while pretended guardians are real accomplices, and at the nod of a king or a minister by a regular trained body of votes black shall be declared wliite; miscarriage, success; mortality, health; disgrace, honour; and notorious experienced imbecility, consummate skill; — to such a mind, these, with other evils boundless in extent and number, are either not seen to be in existence, or not felt to be such. In such a mind, the horror of innovation is as really a disease as any to which the body in which it is seated is exposed. And in proportion as a man is afflicted with it, he is the enemy of all good, which, how urgent soever n]ay be the demand for it, remains as yet to be done; nor can he be said to be completely cured of it, till he shall have learnt to take on each occasion, and without repugnance, general utility for the general end, and, to judge of whatever is proposed, in the character of a means conducive to that end.
Sect. 4. Sinister interests in which this fallacy has its source.
Could the wand of that magician be borrowed at whose potent touch the emissaries of his wicked antagonist threw off their several disguises, and made instant confession of their real character and designs; -—could a few of those ravens by whom the word innovation is uttered with a scream of horror, and the approach of the monster Anarchy denounced, — be touched with it, we should then learn their real character, and have the true import of these screams translated into intelligible language.
1. I am a lawyer (would one of them be heard to sa^), a fee-fed judge, who, considering that the money I lay up, the power I exercise, and the respect and reputation I enjoy, depend on the undiminished continuance of the abuses of the law, the factitious delay, vexation and expense with which the few who liave money enough to pay for a chance of justice are loaded, and by which the many who have not, are cut oft" from that chance, — take this method of deterring men from attempting to alleviate those torments in which my comforts have their source.
2. I am a sinecurist (cries another), who, being in the receipt of 38,000/. a year, public money, for doing nothing, and having no more wit tiian honesty, have never been able to open my mouth and pronounce any articulate sound for any other purpose, — vet, hearing a cry of " No sinecures!" am come to join in the shout of *' No innovation! down with the innovators!" in hopes of drowning, by these defensive sounds, the offensive ones which chill my blood and make me tremble.
3. I am a contractor (cries a third), who, Iiaving bought my seat that I may sell my votes; and in return for them, being in the habit of obtaining with the most convenient regularity a succession of good jobs, foresee, in the prevalence of innovation, the destruction and the ruin of this established branch of trade.
4. I am a country gentleman (cries^a fourth), who, observing that from having a seat in a certain assembly a man enjoys more respect than he did before, on Sect. [.] FA I, LAC IKS OF DANGt^lJ. 133 the turf, ill the dog-kennel, and in the stable, and having tenants and other dependents enough to seat me against their wills for a place in which I am detested, and hearing it said that if innovation were suffered to run on unopposed, elections would come in time to be as free in reality as they are in appearance and pretence, — have left for a day or two tiie cry of " Tally-ho!" and '* Hark forward I" to join in tiie cry of " No Anarchy! " " No innovation! " 5. I am a priest (says a tifth), who, having proved the Pope to be Antichrist to the satisfaction of all Orthodox divines whose piety prays for the cure of souls, or whose health has need of exoneration from the burthen of residence; and having read, in my edition of the Gospel, that the apostles lived in palaces, whicli innovation and anarchy would cut down to parsonage-houses, though grown hoarse by screaming out, " No reading!" " No writing!" " No Lancaster!" and "No popery!" — for fear of coming change, am here to add what remains of my voice to the full chorus of "No Anarchy'" "No Innovation! " 154 FALLACllib or DANGEK. [Ch, 3.
Fallacy of Distrust, o)\ JVhafs at the bottom?
Ad nietum.
E.vposition, Tins argument may be considered as a particular modification of the No-Innovatioti argument. An arrangement or set of arrangements has been proposed, so plainly beneficial, and at the same time so manifestly innoxious, that no prospect presents itself of bringing to bear upon them with any effect the cry of No innovation. Is the anti-innovationist mute? no: he has this resource: — In what you see as yet (says he) there may perhaps be no great m.ischief; but depend upon it, in the quarter from whence these proposed innoxious arrangements come, there are more behind that are of a very different complexion; if these innoxious ones are suffered to be carried, others of a noxious character will succeed without end, and will be carried likewise.
Ea:posure.
The absurdity of this argument is too glaring to be susceptible of any considerable illustration from any thing that can be said of it.
1. In the first place, it begins with a virtual admission of the propriety of the measure considered in itself; and thus, containing within itself a demonstra- Ch. 3.] FALLACIIS Ol" 1)ANGF^I{. \55 don of its own futility, it cuts up from under it the very ground which it is endeavouring to make: yet, from its very weakness, it is apt to derive for the moment a certain degree of force. By the monstrosity of its weakness, a feeling of surprise, and thereupon of perplexity, is apt to he produced: and so long as this feeling continues, a ditiiculty of finding an appropriate answer continues with it. For that which is itself nothing, what answer (says a man) can I find?
2. If two measures, G and B, were both brought forward at the same time, G being good and B bad, rejecting G because B is bad would be quite absurd enough; and at first view a man n)ight be apt to suppose that the force of absurdity could go no further.
But the present fallacy does in etfect go much further: — two measures, both of them brought upon the carpet together, both of them unobjectionable, are to be rejected, not for any thing that is amiss in either of them, but for something that by possibility may be found amiss in some other or others, that nobody knows of, and the future existence of which, without the slightest ground, is to be assumed and taken for granted.