Under the English constitution, at any rate, the most strenuous defenders of the existing set of managing hands, as well as of the existing system of management, are not backward in representing an opposition as being no less necessary a power among the springs of Government than the regulator in a watch*. But in what way is it that opposition, be it what it may, ever acts or ever can act but by endeavouring to lower either the managing hands, or, in this or that part of it, the system of management, in the estimation of the people? and from a watchmaker's putting a regulating spring into the watch he is making, it would be just as reasonable and fair to infer that his meaning is to destroy the watch, as from the circumstance of a man's seeking, in this or that instance, to lower in the estimation of the people the managing hands, or this or that part of the system of management, to infer a desire on his part to destroy the Government.
N Under the English constitution at least, not only in point of fact is the disposition to pay that obedience by which the power of Government is constituted, and on which the existence of it depends, independent of all esteem for the hands by which this power is exercised, unaffected by any disesteem for this or that part of the system of management according to which it is executed, — but under such a constitution at least, the more complete this independence, the better for the stability and prosperity of the state. Being as it is, it suffices for carrying on at all times the business of Government, — viz. upon that footing in point of skill and prosperity which is consistent with the aptitude, probity and intelligence of the managing hands, and the goodness of the system of management under which they act: but if on each occasion it depended on the degree of estimation in which the conduct and character of the managing hands and the structure of the system of management under which they act happened at that time to be held by the majority of the people, this power would be seen strong, and perhaps too strong, at one time, — weak to any degree of weakness, — insufficient to any degree of insufficiency, — at another.
Among the peculiar excellencies of the English constitution, one is, that the existence of the Government, and even the good conduct of it, depends in a less degree than under any other monarchy upon the personal qualifications of the chief ruler, and upon the place he occupies in the estimation of the people. Conceive the character of the chief ruler perfect to a certain degree of perfection, all checks upon his power would be a nuisance. On the other hand, under a constitution of government into which checks upon that power are admitted, the stronger and more efficient those checks, the worse the personal character of the chief ruler may be, and the business of government still go on without any fatal disturbance.
On recent occasions, as if the endeavour had been new and altogether anomalous to the constitution, great were the outcries against the audacity of those parliamentary electors and other members of the community who, in the character of petitioners, were using their endeavours to lower the House of Commons in the estimation of the people, or, in stronger terms, to bring it and its authority into contempt. That by the individuals in question an endeavour of this nature should be regarded as a cause of personal inconvenience, and as such be resisted, is natural enough; but as to its being, on the part of the authors of those exertions, blameable, — or, on the part of the constitution, dangerous, — surely no further observation need here be added.
But what was complained of as an abuse, was the existence of that state of things, of that system of management, under which, in a number sufficient on ordinary occasions to constitute or secure a majority, the members of that governing body have a sinister interest separate from and opposite to that of the people for whom they profess to serve: that being independent as towards those to whom they ought to be dependent, — as to those whom it is their duty to control, and towards whom they ought to be independent,— they are dependent; and that, by means, by which, though altogether out of the reach of punishment, the dependence is rendered beyond comparison more constant and effectual than it would be by acts of punishable bribery.
In this state of things, if any alteration in it be desirable, it is impossible that such alteration should be brought about by other means than lowering in the estimation of the people not only the system itself, but all those who act willingly under it, and use their endeavours to uphold it.
Without this means, and by any other means, how is it that by possibility any such change should be produced? Supposing them assured of possessing, in the event of a refusal of all such change, as high a place in the estimation of the people as they hold at present, any thing done by them in furtherance of such a change would be an effect without a cause. In their personal capacities, they have all, or most of them, little to gain, while they have much to lose, by any proposed change.
True, it may be said, to be remedied, an imperfection, be it what it may, must be pointed out. But what we complain of as dangerous to Government, is, not the indication of such imperfections with their supposed remedies, but the mode in which they are apt to be pointed out; — the heat, the violence, with w hicli uch indication is accompanied. This we object to, n ot merely as dishonesty but as unwise, — as tending to irritate the very persons at whose hands the remedy thus pleaded for is sought.
To this, the answer is as follows: — 1. Whatsoever may be the terms most decorous, and, upon the supposition, the best adapted to the obtaining of the relief desired, it is not possible to comprise them in any such scheme of description as will enable a man to satisfy himself before-hand what terms will be considered exposed to, what exempt from, censure.
2. The cause of irritation is not so properly in the terms of the application, as in the substance and nature of the application itself: so that the greatest irritation would be produced by that mode of application, whichever it were, that appeared most likely to produce the effect in question; — ^the effect, the production of which is on the one part an object of desire, on the other of aversion: the least irritation by that which, in whatever terms couched, afforded the fairest pretence for non-compliance.
3. The imperfection in question being, by the supposition, one of a public nature, the advantages of which are enjoyed by a few, while the interest which the many, each taken individually, have in the removal of the imperfection is commonly comparatively small and remote, no little difficulty is commonly experienced by any one whose endeavour it should be to persuade the many to collect amongst them a de- 182 FALLACIKS OF DANGER. [67/. 4.
gree of impressive force sufficient to operate upon the ruling powers with effect. On the part of the many, the natural interest being in each case commonly but weak, it requires to bring it into effective action whatsoever aids can be afforded it. Strong arguments, how strong soever, will of themselves be scarcely sufficient; for at the utmost they can amount to no more than the indication of that interest which, in the case of the greater part of the many whose force it is necessary to bring to bear upon the point in question, is by the supposition but weak. In aid of the utmost strength of which the argument is susceptible, strength of expression will therefore be necessary, or at least naturally and generally regarded as necessary, and as such employed. But in proportion as this strength of expression is employed, the mode of application stands exposed to the imputation of that heat, and violence, and acrimony, the use of which it is the object of the alleged fallacy to prevent.
4. It is only on the supposition of its being in effect, and being felt to be, conducive, or at least not repugnant, to the interest of the ruling powers addressed, that the simple statement of the considerations which, in the character of reasons, prove the existence of the supposed imperfection, and, if a remedy be proposed, the aptitude of the proposed remedy, can with reason be expected to operate on them with effect. But the fact is, that on the part of those ruling powers, this sort of repugnance, in a degree more or less considerable, is no other than what on every such occasion ought in reason to be expected. If the imperfection in question be of the nature of those to which the term abuse is wont to be applied, these ruling powers have some or all of them, by the supposition, a special profit arising out of that abuse, a special interest consequently in the preservation and defence of it. Even if there be no such special interest, there exists in that quarter at all times, and in more shapes than one, a general and constant interest by which they are rendered mutually averse to applications of that nature. In the first place, in addition to their ordinary labours, they find themselves called upon to undertake a course of extraordinary labour, which it was not their design to undertake, and for which it may happen to some or all of them to feel themselves but indifferently prepared and qualified; and thus the application itself finds itself opposed by the interest of their ease. In the next place, to the extent of the task thus imposed upon them, they find the business of Government taken out of their hands. To that same extent their conduct is determined by a will, which originated not among themselves; and if, the measure being carried into effect, the promoters of it would obtain reputation, respect and affection, of those rewards a share more or less considerable falls into other hands: and thus the application in question finds an opponent in the interest of their pride.
Accusation-scarers Device.
Ad metiiin. " Infamy must attach somewhere."
Ed'posieioji.
This fallacy consists in representing the imputation of purposed calumny as necessarily and justly attaching upon him vvho, having made a charge of misconduct against any person or persons possessed of political power or influence, fails of producing evidence sufficient for conviction.
Its manifest object, accordingly, is, as far as possible, to secure impunity to crimes and transgressions in every shape, on the part of persons so situated: — namely, by throwing impediments in the way of accusation, and in particular, by holding out to the eyes of those persons who have in view the undertaking the functions of accusers, in case of failure, in addition to disappointment, the prospect of disgrace.
E.rposure.
*' Infamy must attach somewherer To this eflect was a dictum ascribed in the debates to the Right Honourable George Canning, on the occasion of the inquiry into the conduct of the Duke of York in his office of Commander in Chief.
Ch. 5.] FALLACIES OF DANGER. 185 In principle, insinuation to this effect has an unlimited application, — it applies, not only to all charges against persons possessed of political power, but, with more or less force, to all criminal charges in form of law against any persons whatsoever: and not only to all charges in a prosecution of the criminal cast, but to the litigants on both sides of the cause, in a case of a purely non-penal, or, as it is called, a civil nature.
If taken as a general proposition, applying to all public accusations, nothing can be more mischievous as well as fallacious. Supposing the charge unfounded, the delivery of it may have been accompanied with mala Jides (consciousness of its injustice), temer'itij only, or it may have been perfectly blameless. It is in the first case alone that infamy can with propriety attach upon him who brings it forward. A charge really groundless may have been honestly believed to be well-founded, i. e. believed with a sort of provisional credence, sufficient for the purpose of engaging a man to do his part towards the bringing about an investigation, but without sufficient reasons. But a charge may be perfectly groundless without attaching the smallest particle of blame upon him who brings it forward. Suppose him to have heard from one or more, presenting themselves to him in the character of percipient witnesses, a story, which, either in toto, or perhaps only in circumstances, though in circumstances of the most material importance, should prove false and mendacious, — how is the person who hears this, and acts accordingly, to blame? What sagacity can enable a man previously to legal investigation, a man who has no power that can enable him to ensure correctness or completeness on the part of this extra-judicial testimony, to guard against deception in such a case? Mrs. C. states to the accuser, that the Duke of York knew of the business; stating a conversation as having passed between him and herself on the occasion. All this (suppose) is perfectly false: but the falsity of it, how was it possible for one in the accuser's situation to be apprized of?
The tendency of this fallacy is, by intimidation, to prevent all true charges whatever from being made, — to secure impunity to delinquency in every shape.
But the conclusion, that because the discourse of a witness is false in one particular, or one occasion, it must therefore be false in toto, — in particular, that because it is false in respect of some fact or circumstance spoken to on some extra-judicial occasion, it is therefore not credible on the occasion of a judicial examination,— is a conclusion quite unwarranted.
If this argument were consistently and uniformly applied, no evidence at all ought ever to be received, or at least to be credited: for where was ever the human being, of full age, by whom the exact line of truth had never been in any instance departed from in the whole course of his life?
The fallacy consists, not in the bringing to view, as Ch. 5.] FALLACll'S OF DANGER. 187 lessening the credit due to the testimony of the witness, this or that instance of falsehood, as indicated by inconsistency or counter-evidence, but in speaking of them as conclusive, and as warranting the turning a deaf ear to every thing else the witness has said, or, if suffered, might have said. Under the pressure of some strong and manifest falsehood-exciting interest, suppose falsehood has been uttered by the witness: be it so; does it follow that falsehood will on every occasion— will in the particular occasion in question — be uttered by him without any such excitement?
Under the pressure of terror, the Apostle Peter, when questioned whether he were one of the adherents of Jesus, who at that time was in the situation of a prisoner just arrested on a capital charge, — denied his being so; and in so doing, uttered a wilful falsehood; and this falsehood thrice repeated within a short time: - — does it follow that the testimony of the Apostle ought not on any occasion to have been considered as capable of being true?
If any such rule were consistently pursued, what judge, who had ever acted in the profession of an advocate, could with propriety be received in the character of a witness?
Again, with respect to the object of the charge, so far from receiving less countenance where the object is a public than where he is a private man, accusation, whether it be at the bar of an official judicatory or at the bar of the public at large, ought to receive, beyond comparison, more countenance. In case of the truth 188 FALLACIES OF DANGER. \Ch. 5.
of the accusation, the mischief is greater, the demand for appropriate censure, as a check to it, correspondently greater. On the other hand, in case of non-delinquency, the mischief to the groundlessly-accused individual is less. Power, in whatever hands lodged, is almost sure to be more or less abused; the check, in all its shapes, so as it does not defeat the good purposes for vi'hich the power has been given or suffered to be exercised, can never be too strong. That against a man who, by the supposition, has done nothing wrong, it is not desirable, whether his situation be public or private, that accusation should have been preferred, — that he should have been subjected to the danger, and alarm, and evil in other shapes attached to it, is almost too plainly true to be worth saying.
But in the case of a public accusation, tiiough, by the supposition, it turns out to be groundless, it is not altogether without its use; — the evil produced is not altogether without compensation: for by the alarm it keeps up, in the breasts in which a disposition to delinquency has place, such accusation acts as a check upon it, and contributes to the prevention or repression of it. On the other hand, in the situation of the public man, the mischief, in the case of his having been the object of an unfounded accusation, is less, as we have shown in the preceding chapter, than in the case of a private man. In the advantages that are attached to his situation, he possesses a fund of compensation, which, by the supposition, has no place in the other case: and apprized as he Ch..5.] FALLACIES OF DANGER. 189 ought to be, and, but for his own fault, is, of the enmity and envy to which, according to the nature of it, his situation exposes him, and not the private man, he ought to be, and, but for his own fault will be, proportionably prepared to expect it, and less sensibly affected by it when it comes.
PART THE THIRD.
FALLACIES OF DELAY, The subject-matter of which is Delay i?t various shapes; and the object, to postpone discussion, with a view of eluding it.
The Quiet ist, or, " No Complaint.''
Ad quietem.
E.vposition. A NEW law or measure being proposed in the character of a remedy for some incontestable abuse or evil, an objection is frequently started to the following effect: — " The measure is unnecessary; nobody complains of disorder in that shape, in which it is the aim of your measure to propose a remedy to it; even when no cause of complaint has been found to exist, expecially under Governments which admit of complaints, men have in general not been slow to complain; much less where any just cause of complaint has existed." The argument amounts to this: — Nobody complains, therefore nobody suffers. It amounts to a veto on all measures of precaution or Ch. 1.] FALLACIES OF DELAY. ]91 prevention, and goes to establish a maxim in legislation, directly opposed to the most ordinary prudence of common life; — it enjoins us to build no parapets to a bridge till the number of accidents has raised an universal clamour.
Exposure* The argument would have more plausibility than it has, if there were any chance of complaints being attended to; — if the silence of those who suffer did not arise from despair, occasioned by seeing the fruitlessness of former complaints. The expense and vexation of collecting and addressing complaints to Parliament being great and certain, complaint will not commonly be made without adequate expectation of relief. But how can any such expectation be entertained by any one who is in the slightest degree acquainted with the present constitution of Parliament? Members who are independent of and irresponsible to the people, can have very few and very slight motives for attending to complaints, the redress of which would affect their own sinister interests. Again, how many complaints are repressed by the fear of attacking powerful individuals, and incurring resentments which may prove fatal to the complainant!
The most galling and the most oppressive of all grievances is that complicated mass of evil which is composed of the uncertainty, delay, expense and vexation in the administration of justice: of this, all but a comparatively minute proportion is clearly factitious % — factitious, as being the work originally and in its foundation of the man of law; latterly, and in respect of a part of its superstructure, of the man of finance. In extent, it is such, that of the whole population, there exists not an individual who is not every moment of his life exposed to suffer under it: and few advanced in life, who, in some shape or other, have not actually been sufferers from it. By the price that has been put upon justice, or what goes by the name of justice, a vast majority of the people, to some such amount as -^^ths or -i-fths, are bereft altogether of the ability of putting in for a chance for it; and to those to whom, instead of being utterly denied this sort of chance, it is sold, it is sold at such a price as to the poorest of such as have it still in their power to pay, the price is utter ruin, and even to the richest, matter of serious and sensible inconvenience.
In comparison of this one scourge, all other political scourges put together are feathers: and in so far as it has the operations of the man of finance for its cause, if, instead of one- tenth upon income, a property tax amounted to nine-tenths, still an addition to the property tax would, in comparison of the affliction produced by the sum assessed on law proceedings, be a relief: for the income tax falls upon none but the comparatively prosperous, and increases in proportion to the prosperity, in proportion to the ability to sustain it; whereas the tax upon law proceedings falls * See Scotch Reform, Ch, 1.] FALLACIES OF DELAY. 193 exclusively upon those whom it finds labouring under affliction, — under that sort of affliction which, so long as it lasts, operates as a perpetual blister on the mind. Here, then, is matter of complaint for every British subject that breathes: — here, injustice, oppression and distress are all extreme: complaint there is none; why r — because by unity of sinister interest, and consequent confederacy between lawyer and financier, relief is rendered hopeless.
o 194 FALLACIES OF DELAY. [Ch. Q.
CHAPTER II.
Fallacy of False-consolation.
Ad quieteni.
E.vposition.
A MEASURE, having for its object the removal of some abuse, i. e. of some practice the result of which is, on the part of the many, a mass of suffering more than equivalent to the harvest of enjoyment reaped from it by the few, being proposed, — this argument consists in pointing to the general condition of the people in this or that other country, under the notion, that in that other country, either in the particular respect in question or upon the whole, the condition of the people is not so felicitous as, notwithstanding the abuse, it is in the country in and for which the measure of reform is proposed.
" What is the matter with you?" " What would you have?" Look at the people there, and there: think how much better o^ you are than they are. Your prosperity and liberty are objects of envy to them; — your institutions are the models which they endeavour to imitate.
Assuredly, it is not to the disposition to keep an eye of preference turned to the bright side of things, where no prospect of special good suggests the opposite course, — it is not to such a disposition or such a Ch. 2.] FALLACIES OF DELAY. 195 habit that by the woxd fallacy it is proposed to affix a mark of disapprobation.
\yhen a particular suffering, produced as it appears by an assignable and assigned cause, has been pointed out as existing, a man, instead of attending to it himself, or inviting to it the attention of others, employs his exertions in the endeavour to engage other eyes to turn themselves to any other quarter in preference (he being of the number of those whose acknowledged duty it is to contribute their best endeavours to the affording to every afiiiction within their view whal soever relief may be capable of being afforded to it without preponderant inconvenience), — then, and then only, is it that the endeavour becomes a just ground for censure, and the means thus employed present a title to be received upon the list of fallacies.
E.vposure.
The pravity as well as fallaciousness of this argument can scarcely be exhibited in a stronger or truer light than by the appellation here employed to characterize it.
1. Like all other fallacies upon this list, it is nothing to the purpose.
2. In his own case, no individual in his senses would accept it. Take any one of the orators by whom this argument is tendered, or of the sages on whom it passes for sterling: with an observation of the general wealth and prosperity of the country in his ]96 FALLACIES OF DELAY. [C/l. 2.
mouth instead of a half-year's rent in his hand, let any one of his tenants propose to pay him thus in his own coin, — will he accept it?
3. In a court of justice, in an action for damages, to learned ingenuity, did ever any such device occur as that of pleading assets in the hand of a third person, or in the hands of the whole country, in bar to the demand? What the largest wholesale trade is to the smallest retail, such and more in point of magnitude is the relief commonly sought for at the hands of the legislator, to the relief commonly sought for at the hands of the judge. — What the largest wholesale trade is to the smallest retail trade, such in point of magnitude, yea and more, is the injustice endeavoured at by this argument when employed in the seat of legislative power, in comparison of the injustice that would be committed by deciding in conformity to it in a court of justice.
No country so wretched, so poor in every element of prosperity, in which matter for this argument might not be found.
Were the prosperity of the country never so much greater than at present, — take for the country any country whatsoever, and for present time any time whatsoever,— neither the injustice of the argument, nor the absurdity of it, would in any the smallest degree be diminished.
Seriously and pointedly in the character of a bar, to any measure of relief, no, nor to the most trivial improvement, can it ever be employed, Suppose a bill Ch. 2.] FALLACIES OF DELAY. 19/ brought in for converting an impassable road any where into a passable one, would any man stand up to oppose it who could find nothing better to urge against it than the multitude and goodness of the roads we have already r No: when in the character of a serious bar to the measure in hand, be that measure what it may, an argument so palpably inapplicable is employed, it can only be for the purpose of creating a diversion;— of turning aside the minds of men from the subject really in hand to a picture which by its beauty, it is hoped, may engross the attention of the assembly, and make them forget for the moment for what purpose they came there.
Procrastinators Argument.
Ad socordiam. " Wait a little, this is not the time."
Exposition.
To the instrument of deception here brought to view, the expressions that may be given are various to an indefinite degree; but in its nature and conception nothing can be more simple.
To this head belongs every form of words by which, speaking of a proposed measure of relief, an intimation is given, that the time, whatever it be, at which the proposal is made, is too early for the purpose; and given, without any proof being offered of the truth of such intimation; such as, for instance, the want of requisite information, or the convenience of some preparatory measure.
E.vposure.
This is the sort of argument or observation which we so often see employed by those who, being in wish and endeavour hostile to a measure, are afraid or ashamed of being seen to be so. They pretend, perhaps, to approve of the measure; they only differ as to the proper time of bringing it forward; but it may be matter of question whether, in any one instance, this observation was applied to a measure by a man Ch. 3.] FALLACIES OF DELAY. \^^ whose wish it was not, that it should remain excluded for ever.
It is in legislation the same sort of quirk which in judicial procedure is called a plea in abatement. It has the same object, being never employed but on the side of a dishonest defendant, whose hope it is to obtain ultimate impunity and triuniph by overwhelming his injured adversary with despair, impoverishment and lassitude.
A serious refutation would be ill bestowed upon so frivolous a pretence. The objection exists in the will, not in the judgment, of the objector. " Is it lawful to do good on the sabbath day?" was the question put by Jesus to the official hypocrites. Which is the properest day to do good? Which is the properest day to remove a nuisance? Answer, The very first day that a man can be found to propose the removal of it: and whosoever opposes the removal of it on that day, will, if he dare, oppose the removal on every other.
The doubts and fears of the parliamentary procrastinator are the conscientious scruples of his prototype the Pharisee, and neither the answer nor the example of Jesus has succeeded in renmving these scruples. To him, whatsoever is too soon to-day, be assured that to-morrow, if not too soon, it will be too late.
True it is, that, the measure being a measure of reform or improvement, an observation to this effect may be brought forward by a friend to the measure; and in this case, it is not an instrument of deception, but an expedient of unhappily necessary prudence.
Whatsoever it may be some centuries hence, hitherto the fault of the people has been, not groundless clamour against imaginary grievances, but insensibility to real ones; — insensibility, not to the effect, the evil itself, for that, if it were possible, far from being a fault, would be a happiness, — but to the cause, to the system or course of misrule which is the cause of it.
What, therefore, may but too easily be — what hitherto ever has been — the fact, and that, throughout a vast proportion of the field of legislation, is, that in regard to the grievances complained of, the time for bringing forward a measure of effectual relief is not yet come: why? because, though groaning under the effect, the people, by the artifice and hypocrisy of their oppressors, having been prevented from entertaining any tolerably adequate conception of the cause, would at that time regard either with indifference or with suspicion the healing hand that should come forward with the only true and effectual remedy. Thus it is, for example, with that Pandora's box of grievances and misery, the contents of which are composed of the evils opposite to the ends of justice.
Ch, 4.] FALLACIES OF DELAY. 201 Snairs-pace Argument.
Ad socordiam. " One thing at a time! Not too fast! Slow and sure!"
E.vposit'wn.
The proposed measure being a measure of reform, requiring that for the completion of the beneficial work in question a number of operations be performed, capable, all or some of them, of being carried on at the same time, or successively without intervals, or at short intervals, the instrument of deception here in question consists in holding up to view the idea of graduality or slowness, as characteristic of the course which wisdom would dictate on the occasion in question. For more effectual recommendation of this course, to the epithet gradual are commonly added some such eulogistic epithets as moderate and temperate; whereby it is implied, that in proportion as the pace recommended by the word gradual is quickened, such increased pace will justly incur the censure expressed by the opposite epithets, — immoderate, violent, precipitate, extravagant, intemperate.
E.vposure.
This is neither more nor less than a contrivance for making out of a mere word an excuse for leaving undone an indefinite multitude of things which, the arguer is convinced, and cannot forbear acknowledginjT, ought to be done.
Suppose half a dozen abuses which equally and with equal promptitude stand in need of reform; this fallacy requires, that without any reason that can be assigned, other than what is contained in the pronouncing or writing of the word gradual, all but one or two of them shall remain untouched.
Or, what is better, suppose that, to the effectual correction of some one of these abuses, six operations require to be performed — six operations, all which must be done ere the correction can be effected, — to save the reform from the reproach of being violent and intemperate, to secure to it the praise of graduality, moderation and temperance, you insist, that of these half-a-dozen necessary operations, some one or some two only shall be talked of, and proposed to be done; — one, by one bill to be introduced this session if it be not too late (which you contrive it shall be); another, the next session; which time being come, nothing more is to be said about the matter, and there it ends.