purpose is Culture, and in order to maintain the position | to which a State has already attained, and to advance still further, it requires at all times the exertion of every available power;—for only through the united power of AlJ has it attained this position. Should it not take the whole into account, it must recede instead of advancing, aud lose its position in the ranks of Culture: and what would further arise out of this we shall see at another time. Secondly, I ask,—What would the Citizens do with the remaining power which should in that case be left for their free use?—Shall they remain idle and leave this power unemployed? This is contrary to every form of Culture and is in itself Barbarism; the cultivated man cannot be inactive or unemployed beyond the necessary period of rest required by his sensuous nature, and this period of rest the State in any case would have left to him. Or shall they apply this power for the advancement of their individual purposes? In a Perfect State no just individual purpose can exist which is not included in the purposes of the Community, and for the attainment of which the Community does not provide. Should it finally be said,—This power may be applied by the Individual for the purpose of his own private and undisturbed Culture;—then my answer would be,—There is no kind of Culture which does not proceed from society, that is from the State, in the strictest sense of the word; and none on which it is not incumbent to strive to return to the State again: this Culture is therefore itself a purpose of the State, and its advancement in each Individual according to his degree must have already been taken into account in the Perfect State. We shall afterwards take care that this shall not be misunderstood in its application to the Actual State: here we speak only of the Perfect State, and to it the THE ABSOLUTE FORM OF THE STATE, 165 principle which we have laid down is applicable without any limitation.
To raise themselves with freedom to this Absolute State, as one of the conditions imposed by Reason on the Human Race, is the vocation of Mankind. This gradual elevation could take place neither in the state of Innocence among the Normal People, nor in the state of original Barbarism among the Savages.
Not among the former:—there men found themselves in the most perfect social relations, without need of any restraint or superintendence: every one acted justly and for the common advantage, spontaneously and without reflection on his own part, or on the part of any one else for him; and without this condition being first brought about either by his own skill or by any process of nature:—we have here no trace of a new genesis. Neither could this occur among the latter:—there each individual cared only for himself; and indeed only for his lower, merely animal, wants; and no one rose to the conception of any higher enjoyment. Consequently it was only in the commingling of the two original tribes of our Race, as the Actual Human Race of History, that the development of the - State could begin and be carried out.
The first condition of a State, and the first essential characteristic of our idea of it, as stated above, is this: That Freemen must at first become subject to the will and superintendence of other Freemen. Freemen, I say, in opposition to Slaves: and by Freemen I mean those to whose own skill and judgment it is left to provide the means of subsistence for themselves and their families; who are accordingly sovereign heads of families, and even continue to be so after their submission to a foreign will which bas other purposes in view. A Slave, on the contrary, is he to whom there is not left even the care for his own subsistence, but who is maintained by another, and in return becomes subject with his whole powers to the arbitrary will of his master; who therefore cannot be the head of a family, but is a member of a foreign family, and a bondsman for life; his master having no other reason for maintaining him but that his maintenance is more profitable than his destruction. Fvreemen, I said, as such, and on the supposition that they still remain free, must subject themselves to a foreign will; —and I said so for this reason:—It belongs to the Idea of a State, that the subjected may at least themselves become a purpose; and this can only occur when in their subjection they still remain free within a certain sphere, and this sphere of their liberty afterwards comes within the purpose of the State when the State advances to higher Culture;—but the Slave as such, and in the case of his never attaining freedom, cannot himself become a purpose; he is at best, like every other animal, a mere instrument of his master’s purpose; but by no means a purpose himself. In this subjection of Freemen to the oversight and rule of other Freemen, there are then two, or, if we reckon otherwise, tbree cases possible: and,—as this subjection is the origin of the State,— there are just as many possible fundamental forms of the State, through which it must pass towards its accomplishment; and J entreat you to observe well, and even to commit to memory, these fundamental forms, as the foundation upon which we intend to rest all our subsequent disquisitions upon this subject.
Namely,—by: this subjection the general mass of individuals who have thereby come into combination, considered:as a completed Whole, are either All without exception subjected to the Whole, that is, to the common purpose of All,—as it should be in the Perfect State; or they are not All subjected to the Whole. The latter case, where All are not subjected to the Whole, can only be “supposed possible in this way,—as the subjected at least are All subjected,—that the subjectors have not, on THE ABSOLUTE FORM OF THE STATE. 167 their part, subjected themselves reciprocally to the others and to the necessary purposes which are common to the others and to themselves. The subjectors have consequently subjected the others to their own particular purpose; which,—as it cannot be, or at least cannot be wholly, one of sensuous enjoyment—for in that case they would at once have reduced the subjected to slavery and destroyed their freedom altogether—must necessarily be the purpose of ruling for the sake of ruling. This would be our first case, as it is the first form which the State assumes in Time;—namely, the absolute inequality of the members of the State, who are divided into the classes of Rulers and Ruled, which can never exchange their relative positions so long as this arrangement endures. It is evident here, in passing, that such a State cannot subdue its vassals with all their powers to its purpose, as the State can certainly do when it has a better purpose in view:—for, in so doing, it would make them perfect Slaves, and would thereby cease to deserve the name eveu of a nascent State. Our other case was.this:—That all the individual members of the State, without exception, are subjected to the purpose of the Whole. This, again, is possible in two ways:—First, all the individual members may be only negatively subjected to the Whole; that is, a purpose may be secured to every one without exception, in the prosecution of which no one else dares to hinder him. Such a purpose, secured by the constitution against interference on the part of any one else, is called a Right: in such a constitution, therefore, every one has a Right to which all other men without exception are subjected. Equality of Right for all men as Right; but by no means identical Rights;—for the purposes secured to different individuals may be very different in extent, and the existing state of such relations was generally taken for the measure of Right when the dominion of Laws began, It is evident that the State which occupies-this position, since it confers Rights upon some of its Citizens which exceed the Rights of others who are nevertheless able to keep their ground, is far from subjecting all the powers of these favourites to its purpose: nay, since by these Privileges of its favourites it binders the others in the free use of their powers, that it even wastes these powers for the purposes of Individuals; and therefore, with all its Equality of Right, is far removed from the Absolute form of the State. The case we have now described would be the second fundamental form of the State, and the second stage upon which our Race would find itself in its progress towards the perfect form of the State. Lastly,—that all the individual members of the State are subjected to the purpose of the Whole, may also mean, that they are not merely subjected negatively thereto, but also positively; so that absolutely no Individual can propose any purpose to himself, and devote himself to its furtherance, which is his own merely and not at the same time the purpose of the whole Community. It is obvious that in such a constitution all the powers of all men are taken into account for the common purpose,—this common purpose being no other than the purpose of all men without exception considered as a Race; and that therefore this constitution manifests the Absolute form of the State, and a true equality of Rights and Powers begins. This equality does not by any means exclude the distinction of Classes in society; that is, the different modes in which human power may be applied, which are left to the exclusive cultivation of Individuals, who again leave the other modes of this application of power to the exclusive cultivation of other men. But no Class, and no exclusive application of power, must be permitted, which is not dedicated to the purpose of the Whole, and which is not absolutely necessary for the Whole;—the produce of which is not actually partaken of by all other classes, and by all the Individuals who compose these classes, according THE ABSULUTE FORM OF THE STATE. 169 to their ability to enjoy it. This would be the third stage of the development of the State;—in which it would be perfected, at least according to its Form, It will be found, and perhaps it may be understood at once by the more attentive and prepared auditor, that by means of this perfection of its Form, the State for the first time obtains possession of its true Afaterial,—that is, the genuine purpose of the Human Race which has associated itself within it; and that it has still to go through many stages of its progress before its end shall be attained. We speak here in the meantime only of the Form of the State.
I have undertaken these preliminary inquiries in order that we may be enabled to show what point of its development the State has attained in our own Age,—in those countries, of course, where it is farthest advanced. In the meantime I may declare, that in my opinion the State, still occupied with the completion of its Form, has now firmly established itself on what we have described as the second stage, and endeavours to attain the third;— which latter it has even attained in part, and in part has not yet attained. Hence, that in our own Age more than at any previous time, every Citizen, with all his powers, is subjected to the purpose of the State, is thoroughly penetrated by it, and so has become its instrument; and that the State endeavours to make this subjection universal and complete:—this constitutes, in our opinion, the fundamental character of the Age in its Civil Relations. What we precisely mean by this assertion, and that it is actually the case, will be most easily shown by depicting Times when it was not so; and by setting forth historically how, and by what course, it has gradually become as it now is. We reserve this inquiry, as well as some other investigations, which must precede it, for the following lectures.
Let us, however, discuss one not unimportant point of this Afaterzal to-day:—that of Political Freedom. Even in W the first form of the State the Subject remained personally free: he did not become a Slave. Had all been made Slaves, then the nature of the whole institution would have been lost. In this condition, however, not even the personal freedom of the Subject was guaranteed: he might be reduced to slavery by one of the Rulers; he had therefore no Civil Freedom,—that is, as we have explained it above, he had no Eight secured to him by the constitution: he was in fact not a Citizen but only a Subject; a Subject, however, only to a certain extent,not being a Slave; and beyond the limits of his subjection he was free,—-not through Law, but through Nature and Accident. In the second form of the State, each Individual, without exception, received back through the constitution a portion of freedom,—not exactly of arbitrary power, but of independence,— by which he compelled all other men to respect a certain purpose or Right which belonged peculiarly to him;—and every one had thus his own degree, not of mere personal liberty, but of secured and therefore Civil Freedom; while beyond this he was a Subject; and if the Privileges of others, by which he was restrained, were more extensive than his own, —he was more a Subject than a Citizen. In the Absolute form of the State, where all the powers of all men are called into activity for the necessary purpose of the whole community, each Individual binds all others just in so far as he is bound by them: all have equal Civil Rights or Civil Freedom; and each Individual is thus at once a complete Citizen and a complete Subject;—and, for the same reason, all are Citizens and Subjects in like manner. If we call that the Sovereign power which in reality gives its purpose to the State, then, in this last-mentioned form of the State, every Citizen will be-a part of the Sovereign power in the same manner and in the same degree;—and if in this respect we bestow the title Sovereign upon Individuals, then the principle just laid down may also be expressed thus:—Each Individual is THE ABSOLUTE FORM OF THE STATE. 171 entirely a Sovereign in respect of his necessary purpose as a member of the Race, and entirely a Subject in respect of the application of his individual powers:—and all are therefore both Sovereign and Subject in the same manner, Such is the case in reference to the State, when taken in its strictest sense, as we have described it above,—z.e. as an Idea. It isa wholly different question, possessing nothing in common with the former one,-—Who then shall understand and measure this purpose of the State given to it in reality, although not openly, by the Community as a whole, and, by means of this estimate, guide the power of the Citizens, and compel such as may oppose themselves thereto?—in one word, Who shall govern? Since it is impossible that any higher estimate of the purpose which has been given to the State by the Community as a whole can find a place in the State itself— all other powers and capacities in the State being subjected to this supreme estimate and guided thereby;— it follows that this estimate is associated with external independence and freedom; and indeed with Political Freedom, if the Greek word from which this expression ts derived may be applied to the active and efficient administration of a State. The former question would regard the Constitution of the State, which is and ought to be absolutely determined by Reason alone: the question now raised is directed to the Form of Government.
It is evident, that with respect to the latter, only two cases are possible: either all individuals without exception take part by right, and in a perfectly equal degree, in this estimate, and, by means of it, in the direction of all the powers of the State; and then All are partakers of Political Freedom, and are so in an equal degree:—or this estimate, and the direction consequent upon it, is given over exclusively to a certain number of individuals:—which latter case, according to our previous investigations, amounts to nothing more than this,—that a particular Class in society is established by Art, or is met with in Nature and History, to which is committed, as its exclusive branch of the general application of power, the estimate of the purpose of the State, and the task of governing according to this estimate; while the other Classes direct their powers to something else; and all of them, in their common character as the governed, stand opposed to the Rulers. Here Political Freedom is possessed only by the Rulers; the governed are altogether without it, and, in reference to the Government, they are merely Subjects.
In the first place, the Constitution of the State, as it should be according to Reason, is not necessarily altered or abridged in any respect by such a form of Government as we have now described. ‘The governing Class remains subject to the common purpose of the State, which is determined by the general wants of the Community; and it must apply all its powers, without exception or reserve, directly to the attainment of this purpose; just as the other Classes have to dedicate their labour indtrectly to the attainment of the same purpose: hence, in regard to this purpose, it is as much subjected as the others. This Class itself, as a constituent element of the Race, isa part of the purpose of the State; and the attainment of its wants, as an element of the Race, but not as a governing Class, must likewise be secured; and the Ruler is therefore a Citizen, just as much as all the others but in no higher degree.
It is thus only the form of the State which is determined, and its realization absolutely required, by Reason; but by no means the form of Government. If the purpose of the State be understood, as clearly as is possible at the time, and all existing power be directed towards the realization of this highest conception, then is the Government right and good, whether it be in the hands of All, or in the hands of a few Individuals, or finally in those of a THE ABSOLUTE FORM OF TUE STATE. 173 single Individual:—it being understood, in this last case, that this single Individual chooses his assistants according to his own judgment, who remain subject and responsible to him. Civil Freedom, and that to an equal degree, is absolutely required for all men; but Political Freedom is, at most, only necessary for one. All the inquiries which have ever been set on foot concerning the best Government, particularly in later times, have had finally in view to find a means of restraining the all-restraining power of Government:—first of all, in order that, as an absolutely correct insight cannot be obtained by force, there may at least be the best possible insight actually applied to the Government; and, in that case, that this best possible insight shall be actually realized. How useful soever this inquiry may be in itself, and however possible the theoretical solution of the problem, which indeed may actually have been solved somewhere; yet thousands of years may pass over our Race before this solution can belong to a philosophical characterization of any Present Age. It is a fortunate and satisfactory thing for us, that in the actual position of all cultivated States, and in the whole present Stage of Culture, there are numerous urgent and constraining reasons for every Government striving to attain the clearest possible insight into the true purpose of the State, and acting at all times with all its powers, according to the best insight which it has attained.
In the pursuance of our inquiries, we shall have opportunities to refer to these reasons. Could such indications on our part, and the whole range of inquiries which we have begun to-day, contribute anything especially towards making the particular Constitution under which we live more intelligible, and thereby dearer and more valuable, to us, then would one end be attained which belongs to the purpose of these lectures, (175 ) FARTHER DEFINITION OF THE IDEA OF THE STATE, To determine at what stage of its development the State has arrived in the Present Age, is the problem with which we are now occupied, and to solve which we have undeitaken the immediately preceding inquiries and investigations. We had first of all to declare the mere Form of the State; that is, what is implied in the mere general assertion of the existence of the State;—and this we have done in our last lecture. Should this investigation have appeared to some to be too speculative,—so that, on this account, it has either never been entirely clear to them, or is not now any longer wholly present to their memory, —this can only arise, in my opinion, from this,—that in their attempt to comprehend the form of the State their attention has been distributed over too large a number of Individuals, wholly different from each other in respect of their outward qualities; while at the same time it is requisite that this multitude of Individuals should be regarded as an indivisible organic Whole. For the Understanding, this business of comprehension is not rendered more difficult by the multitude and variety of these elements; but the Imagination, and still more the common power of observation which is accustomed to take cognizance only of the peculiarities of Individuals and of Classes, is easily tired, unless it has had a certain amount of practice beforehand. Thus, in order to make our ideas perfectly clear to those who perchance have not altogether understood our former lecture; and to bring the whole once more at one view before those to whom it may no longer be thoroughly present in memory; let us to-day illustrate our views by the example of a smaller Community, to which, although not itself a State, we may give the form of the State,—that being all with which we are concerned at present. j Let us suppose a union, perhaps by mutual agreement, of several natural families into one, which would thenceforward be an artificial family. The purpose of such a union could be nothing more than to acquire and preserve, as far as possible, by their common labour, the means of physical existence; and hence this union would not constitute a State-—the State not being an economical society, and having a purpose very different from the mere physical maintenance of individual life. But let us give to this family-union the general form of the State. This is only possible in the three following ways:—Hither all the members of the community are bound to apply their whole time and ability to labour for the whole number of families composing it, so that they cannot occupy themselves with aught else; while, on the other hand, all without exception have an equal interest in the property and.enjoyments of the whole;—there being nothing whatever belonging to the household which is not the property of all, and which would not; were the occasion to arise, actually be expended for any one. That each should apply his whole ability for all the families, I said;—- meaning thereby, in so far as he possesses such ability. It is not allowable that any one sbould say,—‘I am stronger than all the others; I do more for the common good, and therefore I must have something more than others in the division of enjoyments;’—for the union and combination of all into one Society is altogether unconditional; — that this one is the strongest is quite accidental; were he the weakest he would not be less cared for on that account; and were he accidentally to become weak or sick, so that he could no longer do anything for the common good, he would still be cared for in the same way. Were our supposed family-union organized in this way, it would then bear the Absolute form of the State, as zt ought to be according to Reason,—consisting in Equal Rights for All. Or:—the constitution of our supposed society might be thus arranged:— that perhaps, — for we may leave this point undetermined, —that perhaps all, without exception, are bound to apply all their powers for the purposes of the community; and also that there is no one to whom the participation in some portion of what has been acquired by the common labour is not secured; but that, nevertheless, only a few are admitted to partake of whatever is most precious and valuable in the produce of the common power, while the others are excluded from this enjoyment. In this case it would follow, that those who are thus excluded have laboured only in part for the whole community, and in part not for the whole (to which nevertheless they themselves belong), but only for the few favoured individuals; and hence that they have been, not indeed wholly, but yet in this latter respect, only means for the attainment of the purpose of these others. This arrangement would represent the second possible form of the State: Equality of Right for all, but not Equal Rights.
Finally, we may conceive of this union of families in the following way:-—that the greater number of its members labour with all their powers to acquire a permanent and fixed estate, while some neither put their own hand to the work, nor direct the labour of others, nor trouble themselves in any way whatever about the matter; but only come from time to time, and snatch from the property accumulated by the labour of the others, whatever is most accessible and pleasing to themselves; at most taking care that the working part of the community be not wholly ruined;—but even this only by their own arbitrary choice, since no one can bind them to this foresight. This condition of the society would bear the first form of the State:—the absolute subjugation of the many to the selfish purposes of the few, and absolute extinction of Rights among all.—This would be a picture of the three possible fundamental forms of the State which we have already enumerated.
From this constitution of the State and the Personal and Civil Freedom which are its necessary elements, we carefully distinguished the form of Government and the Political Freedom which belongs to it. That which we have adduced on this latter subject may likewise be illustrated by our imaginary community. In the supposed family-union, all the powers therein united ought to be directed to the attainment of the common purpose. This can be secured only by one single Will assuming the guidance of the whole application of power,—determining at all times what ought to be done immediately for the purpose of the community, and what may be deferred; what must be infallibly accomplished, and what may be relinquished should sufficient time and ability be wanting for its attainment;—a Will which appoints each one his place, so that his exertions may not interrupt, but assist and cooperate with, the labours of others;—a Will, in fine, to which each individual unconditionally submits his own will in respect to the employment of his powers for the purposes of the community. Whence shall proceed this one Will which is to guide all other wills 2—Either all the members of the community who have attained mature age assemble together so often as a new resolution is needed upon the common interests; all, without exception, express their opinion on the question proposed, so far as they understand it; and, after sufficient general delibera- FARTHER DEFINITION OF THE IDEA OF THE STATE, 179 tion, the majority-of voices decides the point,—to which decision all must thenceforward be subject in their ‘outward actions, whatever they may think in their own minds of its justice. If the community be constituted in this way, then each has by Right an equal share in the direction of the common purpose,—which direction in the State is called Government; and this freedom, which with reference to the State we call Political Freedom, is thus by Right equally divided among all. By Right, I have said, both in the former lecture with reference to the State, and in this with reference to the supposed family-union; for should there be any one who is not possessed of any opinions upon the common good, or who, if he do possess such opinions, yet cannot express them; then he would actually possess little or no influence in the ultimate determination of the community; but he would not be excluded from this influence by defect of Right, but only by his own incapacity.
Or, in the second case—the community may have made over to a committee composed of a few Individuals, or even to one Individual, the superintendence and direction of the whole;—and in this case they resign their own right of direction and judgment in the administration of Government,—but only so far as outward action is concerned, for in thought and speech they are still at liberty to do what they will,—and unconditionally subject their own practically active will to the will of their authorised committee or individual manager. In this method of prosecuting the common purpose, there is no place for what the State calls Political Freedom, but only the condition of subjection. Nevertheless, if all without exception have an equal share in all the advantages of the cominunity, and if all the individual powers are directed by the best possible insight towards the common good, and not towards any private advantage, then the management of the community is perfectly legitimate; and it has lost 180 LECIURE XI.
nothing by making over the direction to a few or even to one; but, on the contrary, has gained thereby, since many Individuals who could have contributed nothing available for the common good in the assembly, are no longer compelled to sacrifice their time in attending there, but may instead continue peaceably to practise that which they understand.