only be one proposition which is certain before the connection with others. For if there were many such propositions, they would either be not at all connected with the former, and then they would not belong with it to the same whole; or they would be thus connected; but since they are only to be connected by one and the same certainty — that is, z/the one theorem is true, then the other •must be true — they can not have independent cer tainty; for in that case one proposition might have independent certainty, although others had no cer tainty, and hence they would not be connected through common certainty.
Such a proposition, which has certainty before and independent of all connection, is a fundamental principle. Every science must have a fundamental principle; nay, it might consist of simply such one principle, which in that case could not be called fundamental, however, since it would not be the foundation of others. But a science also can not' have more than one fundamental principle, for else it would result in many sciences.
The other propositions which a science may con tain get certainty only through their connection with the fundamental principle; and the connec tion, as we have shown, is this: If the proposition A is true, then the proposition B is also true; and if B is true, then must C be true, etc. This con nection is called the systematic form of the whole, which results from the several component parts. Wherefore this connection? Surely not to produce an artistic combination, but in order to give cer tainty to propositions, which have not certainty in themselves. And thus the systematic form is not the object of science, but an accidence, a means, and on the condition that the science is to have a manifold of propositions. It is not the essence of science, but an accidental quality thereof Let science be a building, and let the chief ob ject of this building be firmness. The foundation is firm, and as soon as it is laid down, the object would therefore be attained. But since you can not live on the foundation, nor protect yourself by its means against the arbitrary attacks of enemies, or the unarbitrary attacks of the weather, you pro ceed to erect walls, and over the walls you build a roof. All the parts of the building you connect with the foundation and with each other, and thus the whole gets firmness. But you do not build a building in order to connect the parts; rather you connect the parts in order to make the building firm; and it is firm in so far as all its parts rest upon a firm foundation.
The foundation is firm, for it is not built on an other foundation, but rests on the solid earth. But whereupon shall we erect the foundation of our sci entific structure? The fundamental principles of our systems must and shall be certain in advance of the system. Their certainty can not be proven "j^itJiin the system; but every possible proof in the system presupposes already their certainty. If tJicy are certain, then of course all their results INTRODUCTION. I/ are certain; but from what does their own certainty follow f And even after we shall have satisfactorily an swered this question, does not a new and quite dif ferent one threaten us? We are going to draw our conclusions thus: If the fundamental principle is certain, then another proposition also is certain. How do we get at this thai f What is the ground of the necessary connection between the two, where by the one is to have the same certainty which be longs to the other? What are the conditions of this connection, and whence do we know that they are the conditions and the exclusive conditions and the only conditions of this connection? And how do we get at all to assume a necessary connection between different propositions, and exclusive but exhausted conditions of this connection?
In short, how shall the absolute certainly of the fundamental principle, and how shall the authorityto draw from it conclusions as to the certainty of other propositions, be demonstrated? That which the fundamental principle is to have itself and to communicate to all other propositions which occur in the science, I call the inner content of the funda mental principle and of science generally; the man ner in which it communicates this certainty to other propositions I call the jfo;?;/ of science. The ques tion is, therefore, How are form and content of a science possible? or how is science itself possible?
That which would give an answer to this question would be itself a science, and would be, more over, the science of science generally.
It is impossible to determine in advance of the investigation whether such an answer is possible or not; that is, whether our whole knowledge has a cognizable, firm basis, or whether it rests, after all — however closely its separate parts may be con nected — upon nothing, that is to say, upon nothing for us. But if our knowledge is to have a basis for us, then such an answer must be possible, and there must be a science which gives this answer. And if there is such a science, then our knowledge has a cognizable ground. Hence, in advance of the investigation, it is impossible to say whether our knowledge has a basis or has no basis at all; and the possibility of the science in question can only be demonstrated by its actual realization.
The naming of such a science, whereof the very possibility is as yet problematical, is altogether ar bitrary. Still, if it should appear that all the terri tory hitherto considered useful for the cultivation •/ of sciences has already been appropriated, and that only one piece of uncultivated land has been left vacant for the science of all other sciences; and if, moreover, it should appear that under a well-known name — the name of Philosophy — the idea of a sci ence exists which pretends to be, or wishes to be. also a science, and is only in doubt where to settle down; then it might not be improper to assign this science to the empty and uncultivated place. Wheth er the word Philosophy has hitherto signified precisely that very same object is immaterial; and, moreover, if this science should really thus turn out to be a science, it would doubtless very Justly dis card a name which it has hitherto borne from a surely not over great modesty, namely, that of a Dilettanteism. The nation which shall discover this science is well worthy of giving it a name from its own language, and might name it simply Science, or the Science of Knowledge. What has been here tofore called philosophy would thus be the science of science generally.
§ 2 — EXPLANATION OF THE CONCEPTION OF THE It is not allowable to draw conclusions from defi nitions. This rule signifies: from the fact that it is possible to think a certain characteristic in the description of a thing, which thing exists altogether independently of such a description, it is not allow able to conclude that this characteristic is therefore really discoverable in the thing; or, when we produce a thing after a conception formed of it, which coi. ception expresses the purposes of the thing, it is not allowable to conclude from the thinkability of the purpose that it is actually realized. On no ac count, however, can the above rule signify that we must have no well-defined purpose in our bodily or mental labors, but must leave it to our fancy or to our fingers what the result of our labor shall be. The inventor of the aerostatic balls was perfectly warranted in calculating the relation of the gas in the balls to the weight of the atmosphere, and thus to discover the velocity of movement of his machine, although he did not know yet whether he would ever be able to discover a gas sufficiently lighter than air; and Archimedes was able to cal culate the machine by which he could move the globe out of its place, although he knew well enough that he could find no place beyond the at traction of the earth from which to operate with his machine. Thus, also, with our science of know ledge. It is not as such something which exists in dependent of us, but rather something which must first be produced by the freedom of our mind, work ing in a certain direction, that is, if there is such a freedom, which, of course, can also not be known as yet Let us determine this direction in advance, and obtain a clear conception of wliat is to be our work. Whether we can produce it or not will ap pear from the fact whether we do produce it, but this is not yet our purpose. We at present merely wish to see what it really is we intend to do.
1st First of all, the described science is to be a science of science generally. Every possible science has one fundamental principle, which can not be proven in it, but must be certain in advance of it. But where, then, is this first principle to be proven? Evidently in that science which is to be the ground of all possible sciences. In this respect the science of knowledge would have a twofold object: Firstly, to show the possibility of fundamental principles generally; to show how, to what extent, and under what conditions, and perhaps in what degree some thing can be certain, and indeed to show what it really means to be certain; and, secondly, to prove particularly the fundamental principles of all possi ble sciences, which can not be proven in those sciences themselves.
Every science, which is to be a whole of compo nent parts, has a systematic fortn. This form — the condition of the connection of the deduced propo sitions with the fundamental principle, and the ground which justifies us in drawing conclusions from this connection, that the deduced propositions have necessarily the same certainty which pertains to the fundamental principle— can also, like the truth of the fundamental principle, not be demonstrated in the particular science itself, but is presupposed as the possibility of its form. Hence, a general science of knowledge must, moreover, show up the ground for the systematic form of all possible sci ences.
2d. The science of knowledge is itself a science. Hence it must also have one fundamental principle, which can not be proven in it, but must be presup posed for its very possibility as a science. But this fundamental principle can not be proven in another higher science, since otherwise this other higher science would be the science of knowledge. This fundamental principle of the science of knowledge, and hence of all sciences and of all knowledge, is, therefore, absolutely not to be proven; that is, it can not be deduced from a higher principle, the re> lation to which might demonstrate its certainty. Since, nevertheless, it is to be the basis of all cer tainty, it must be certain in itself, through itself and for the sake of itself. All other propositions will be certain, because it can be shown that they are in some respect related to it, but this one must be certain merely because it is related to itsel£ All • other propositions will only have a mediated cer tainty derived from it, but itself must have immeate certainty. Upon it all knowledge is grounded, without it no knowledge were indeed possible; but itself has its ground in no other knowledge, being, on the contrary, itself the ground of all knowledge. This fundamental principle is absolutely certain; that is, it is certain because it is certain. You can not inquire after its ground without contradiction. It is the ground of all certainty; that is, every thing which is certain is certain, because this fundamental principle is certain, and nothing is certain if it is not certain. It is the ground of all knowledge; that is, you know what it asserts, simply because you know any thing at all; you know it immediate ly when you know any thing at all. It accompanies all knowledge, is contained in all knowledge, and is presupposed by all knowledge. The science of knowledge, in so far as it is a science, and is to con sist of more than its fundamental principle — which seems necessary, since it is to furnish the funda mental principles of all sciences — must have a sys tematic form. It is evident that it can not derive this form, either in regard to its dcterminatcncss or in regard to its validity, from any other science, since itself is to furnish all other sciences their sys tematic form. Hence, the science of knowledge must contain this form within itself, and must it self show up the ground of this form. Let us con sider this a little, and it will directly appear what this assertion means. That whereof any thing is known we will, in the mean while, call the content, and that which is known thereof the form of a prop osition. (In the proposition, gold is a body; that whereof is known is gold and the body; that which is known of them is, that they are in a certain re spect equal, and might in so far replace each other. It is an affirmative proposition, and this relation is its form.)
No proposition is possible without content or without form. It must contain something whereof we know, and something which is known thereof! Hence, the first principle of the science of know ledge must have both content and form. Now, this first principle is to be immediately and of itself cer tain, and this can only signify: its content must determine its form, and its form its content Its form can only fit its content, and its content can only fit its form; every other form connected with that content, or every other content connected with that form, would cancel that principle itself, and thus annihilate all knowledge. Hence, the form of the absolute first principle of the science of knowledge is not only contained in that principle itself, but is also presented as absolutely valid for the content of that principle. Again: if there should be, besides this absolute first principle, still other fundamental principles of the science of knowledge — which in that case can only be partly absolute, and must be partly derived from the first principle, since other wise in the first case they would not be fundamen tal principles, and in the latter case not connected with the first and highest principle — then the abso lute part of these other fundamental principles could only be either the content or the form; and, like wise, the conditioned or derived part of these prin ciples could only be either the content or the form. If the content of these other fundamental principles be their absolute or unconditioned part, then the absolute first principle of the science of knowledge must condition the fonn of those contents; or if the form of those other principles be the uncondi tioned part, then their content must be conditioned by the first principle of the science of knowledge; and thus indirectly also their form, that is, in so fai as the form is to be form of the content. In either case, therefore, the form would be determined by the first absolute principle of the science of know ledge. And since it is impossible that there should be a fundamental principle not determined either in form or in content by the first absolute principle, (that is, if we are to have a science of knowledge at all,) it follows that there can only be three funda mental principles: one absolutely in and through itself determined both in form and in content; a INTRODUCTION. 2$ second one determined through itself in form; and a third one determined through itself in content. If there are still other propositions in the science of knowledge, they must be determined both in re gard to form and content by the fundamental prin ciple. Hence, a science of knowledge must deter mine the form of all its propositions, in so far as they are separately considered. But such a deter mination of the separate propositions is only thus possible: that they reciprocally determine each other. But each proposition must be perfectly de termined, that is, its form must suit only its and no other content, and its content must only suit its and no other form; for else such a proposition would not be equal to the first principle, in so far as that first principle is certain, and hence would not be certain.
If, nevertheless, all the propositions of a science of knowledge are to be different, which they must be if they are to be many propositions and not one proposition, then no proposition can obtain its com plete determination otherwise than through a single one of all propositions. And thus the whole series of propositions becomes determined, and no proposi tion can occupy another place in the system than that •which it occupies. Each proposition in the science of knowledge has its position determined by a de termined other proposition, and on its part deter mines the position of a determined third proposi tion. Hence, the science of knowledge establishes itself the form of its whole for itself.
This form of the science of knowledge is necessarily valid for its content For if the absolute first principle was immediately certain, that is, if its form was fit only for its content, and its content only for its form, and if through this first principle all possible subsequent propositions are determined, immediately or mediately, in form or content; if all subsequent theorems, in other words, are, as it were, contained already in the first one, then it fol lows that what holds good for the first must also hold good in regard to the others; that is, that their form is only fit for their content, and their content only for their form. It is true, this relates only to the separate propositions; but the form of the whole is nothing but the form of the separate propositions, thought in one; and what is valid for each separate must be valid for all, thought as one.
But the science of knowledge is to give not only itself its own form, but is also to give all otJicr pos sible sciences their form; and is to make certain the validity of this form for all other sciences. This can only be thought possible on condition that every thing which is to be a proposition of any other science must be already involved in some proposition of the science of knowledge, and hence must have obtained its proper form already in that science. This opens to us an easy way of getting back to the content of the absolute first principle of the science of knowledge, of which we can now say something more than was possible before. If we assume for the present that to be certain means simply to have an insight into the inseparability INTRODUCTION. -7 of a determined content from a determined form, (which is to be only a definition of a name, since a real definition of knowledge is simply impossible,) then we might understand already to some extent how the fact that the fundamental principle of all knowledge determines its form only through its content, and its content only through its form, could determine the form of all the content of knowledge; that is to say, if all possible content were contained in the content of that first prin ciple. If, therefore, there is to be an absolute first principle of all knowledge, this assumption must be correct; that is, the content of this first principle must contain all other possible content, but must itself be contained in no other content. In short, it must be the absolute content.
It is easy to remember that, in presupposing the possibility of a science of knowledge, and partic ularly of its first principle, we always presuppose that there is really a system in human knowledge. If such a system, however, is to be in it, it can be shown — even apart from our description of the sci ence of knowledge — that there must be such an ab solute first principle. If there is not to be any such system, two cases only are possible. Either there is no immediate certainty at all, and thef our knowledge forms many series or one infinite scries, wherein each theorem is derived from a higher one, and this again from a higher one, etc., etc. We build our houses on the earth, the earth rests on an elephant, the elephant on a tortoise, the tor- D toise again — who knows on what? — and so on ad infinitum. True, if our knowledge is thus con stituted, we can not alter it; but neither have we, then, any firm knowledge. We may have gone back to a certain link of our series, and have found every thing firm up to this link; but who can guar antee us that, if we go further back, we may not find it ungrounded, and shall thus have to abandon it? Our certainty is only assumed, and we can never be sure of it for a single following day.
Or the second case: Our knowledge consists of finite series, but of many finite series, each series ending in a fundamental principle, which has its ground in no other one, but only in itself; all these fundamental principles having no connection among each other, and being perfectly independent and isolated. In this case there are, perhaps, sev eral inborn truths in us, all more or less inborn, and in the connection of which we can expect no further insight, since it lies beyond these inborn truths; or there is, perhaps, a manifold simple in the things outside of us, which is communicated to us by means of the impression produced upon us by the things, but into the connection v.-hereof we can not penetrate, since there can not be any thing more simple than the simplest in the impression. If this second case is the truth, if human know ledge is in itself such a piecework — as the real knowledge of so many men unhappily is — if origin ally a number of threads lie in our minds, which are or can be connected with each other in no INTRODUCTION, 2Q point, then again we may not be able to alter this state of things, and our knowledge is, as far as it extends, certain enough; but it is no unit, it is a manifold knowledge. Our building stands firm, but, instead of being a connected structure, it is an aggregate of chambers, from none of which we can enter the other; a building wherein we always get lost, and never feel ourselves at home. There is no light in it; and in spite of our riches we always remain poor, because we can never calculate them, never consider them as a whole, and hence never know what we really possess; we can never use part of it to improve the rest, because no part is relatable to the rest. Nay, more: our knowledge will never be completed; we must expect every day that a new inborn truth may manifest itself in us, or that experience may furnish us with a new •simple. We must always be prepared to build a new house for ourselves. No general science of knowledge will be possible as containing the ground of other sciences. Each will be grounded in itself. There wi.ll be as many sciences as there are separate immediately certain propositions. But if neither the first case is to be correct, namely, that there are one or more mere fragments of a system, nor the second, that there are to be a manifold of systems, then a highest and absolute first fundamental principle must exist as the basis of a complete and unit-system in the human mind. From this first principle our knowledge may ex pand into ever so many series, each of which again may expand into series, etc., still all of them must rest firm upon one single link, which is not de pendent upon another one, which holds itself and the whole system by virtue of its own power. In this link we shall possess a globe, holding itself firm by virtue of its own gravitation, the central point whereof attracts with almighty force whatso ever we have but erected upon its surface and per pendicularly, and not in the air or obliquely, and which allows no grain of dust to be torn away from its sphere of power.
Whether such a system and its condition, a first principle, exist, can not be decided in advance of the investigation. This fundamental principle can neither be proven as mere principle, nor as the basis of all knowledge. Every thing depends upon the attempt. If we shall find a proposition which has the internal conditions of the fundamental prin ciple of all human knowledge, we shall try to dis cover whether it has also its external conditions, whether every thing we know or believe to know can be traced back to it If we succeed in this, we shall have proven by the realization of the science of knowledge that it is possible, and that there is a system of human knowledge, whereof it is the rep resentation. If we do not succeed in this, there either is no such system or we have merely failed in discovering it, and must leave the discovery to more fortunate successors. To maintain that there is no such system merely because we have failed to discover it would be an assumption, the refutation whereof is beneath the dignity of earnest investiga tion.
PART SECOND.
§ 3. — DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPTION OF THE To develop a conception scientifically is to assign to it its place in the system of human sciences gen erally, that is, to show what conception determines its position in the system, and of which conception it determines the position. But the conception of the science of knowledge generally, as well as of knowledge generally, can evidently have no position in the system of all sciences, since it is itself rather the place for all scientific conceptions, and assigns to all their positions in itself and through itself It is clear, therefore, that we can speak here only of a hypothetical development; that is, the question is, If we assume that there are sciences, and that there is truth in them, (which can not be known in ad vance of *the science of knowledge,) how is the science of knowledge related to these sciences?
This question also is answered by the mere con ception of that science. The latter sciences are related to it as the grounded is to its ground; they do not assign to it its place, but it assigns to them their places in itself and through itself. All we can, therefore, propose to ourselves here is a further explanation of this answer.
1. The science of knowledge is to be a science of all sciences. Here arises the question: How can the science of knowledge guarantee that it has furnished the ground, not only of all as yet discov ered and known, but also of all discoverable and knoivable sciences, and that it has completely ex hausted the whole field of human knowledge?