which involves only the form of positing, also in volve the form of oppositing? Hence, that form of acting, the oppositing, is posited absolutely, and with no attached condition. — A is posited as such simply because it is posited.
Hence, as sure as the proposition — A not = A occurs among the facts of empirical consciousness, there occurs among the acts of the Ego an oppos iting; and this oppositing, as far as its/*?;?;/ is con cerned, is absolutely and unconditionally possible, and is an acting which has no higher ground.
Through this absolute act the opposite, as mere opposite, is posited. Ever}' opposite, in so far as it is merely opposite, is simply by virtue of an abso lute act of the Ego, and has no other ground. Opposition generally is simply posited through the Ego.
But if any — A is to be posited, an A must be po sited. Hence, the act of oppositing is also, in an other respect, conditioned. "Whether the act at all is possible depends upon another act; hence, the act in its content, as acting generally, is conditioned; it is an acting in relation to another acting. The fojin of the act, however, (the How? namely, that it is not an act of positing, but of oppositing,)is uncon ditioned.
(Opposition is only possible on condition of the unity of consciousness of the positing and the oppositing. For if the consciousness of the first act were not connected with that of the second, then the second positing would not be an r^-positing, but an absolute positing. Oppositing it becomes only through its relation to a positing.
As yet we have only spoken of the act, as mere act, of the manner of acting. Let us now examine its product, = — A.
In — A we can again distinguish form and con tent. Through the form is determined, that it is an opposite; the content determines that it is an oppo site of a determined something, (of A,) that it is not this something.
The form of — A is determined simply through the act; it is an opposite because it is product of an oppositing; the content is determined through A: it is not what A is, and its whole essence consists in this, that it is not what A is. I know of — A simply that it is the opposite of A. But ivhat that is where of I know this, I can only know by knowing A.
Originally only the Ego is posited, and this alone is absolutely posited. (§ I.) Hence, an absolute oppositing can only refer to the Ego. The opposite of the Ego we call Non-Ego.
• As sure as the proposition —A is not A is un conditionally admitted as fact of empirical con sciousness, a non-Ego is absolutely opposited to tJie Ego. All we have said above in reference to opposit ing generally, is deduced from this original opposit ing, and hence is valid for it; it is, therefore, uncon ditioned in form, but conditioned in content. And thus we have also found the second principle of all human knowledge.
/8 7 HE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
Whatsoever appertains to the Ego, of that the opposite must appertain to the non-Ego.
(The genera] opinion is, that the conception of the non-Ego is a discursive conception, obtained by abstracting from all objects of representation. But the foolishness of this explanation can be easily demonstrated. If I am to represent an object, I must posit it in opposition to the representing sub ject Now, it is true that in the object of repre sentation there can and must be an X, whereby it discovers itself to be not the representing, but a represented; but no object of representation can possibly teach me, that every thing wherein this X occurs is represented object, and not representing subject; on the contrary, only by presupposing this law do I attain any object.)
By undertaking the same abstraction with this proposition, which we undertook with the first, we obtain the logical proposition — A is not A, which I should call the proposition of ofpositing. In the present place, this proposition can not yet be pro perly determined, or expressed in a formula, the reason whereof will appear in the following section.
By abstracting from the determined act of as serting this proposition, and looking merely to the form of drawing a conclusion from the being opposited of something to its being, we obtain the category of negation. This also can not be clearly developed till in the following section.
§ 3. THIRD, IN ITS FORM CONDITIONED FUNDA MENTAL PRINCIPLE.
Every step we take in our science brings us nearer to the point where every thing can be proven. In the first principle, nothing could be nor was to be proven; in the second, only the act of oppositing was not provable; but, this act once admitted, it was strictly shown that the opposite must be a Non-Ego. The third principle is al most throughout capable of proof, since it is not, like the second, conditioned in content, but only in form, and, moreover, conditioned in form by the two foregoing propositions.
It is conditioned in form signifies, the problem of the act it establishes is given by the two foregoing propositions, but not the solution of the problem. The solution is the result of an unconditioned and absolute act of reason.
We therefore commence with a deduction, and proceed as far as we can go. When we can go no further, we shall have to appeal to this absolute act.
i. In so far as the Non-Ego is posited, the Ego is not posited; for the Non-Ego completely cancels the Ego.
Now, the Non-Ego is posited in the Ego, for it is opposited; and all oppositing presupposes the iden tity of the Ego.
Hence, the Ego is not posited in the Ego in so far as the Non-Ego is posited in it.
SO THE SCIEXCE OF KNOWLEDGE, 2. But the Non-Ego can only be posited in so far as an Ego is posited in the Ego, (in the identical consciousness,) as the opposite of which it is posi ted.
Hence, in so far as the Non-Ego is posited in the Ego, the Ego also must be posited in it.
3. The conclusions of our ist and 2d are op posed to each other; yet both are developed from the second fundamental principle; hence, that second principle is opposed to itself and cancels itself.
4. But it cancels itself only in so far as the pos ited is canceled by the opposited, hence in so far as itself is valid.
Hence, it does not cancel itself. The second fun damental principle cancels itself and does not can cel itself.
5. If this is the case with the second principle, it must also be with the first principle. That first prin ciple cancels itself and does not cancel itself. For, If Ego is = Ego, then all is posited, which is pos ited in the Ego.
Now, the second principle is to be posited and not to be posited in the Ego.
Hence, Ego is not = Ego, but Ego is = to the Non-Ego, and Non-Ego = Ego.
All these results have been deduced from the established principles according to the laws of reflection presupposed as valid; they must be cor rect, therefore. But if they are correct, the identity of consciousness, the only absolute foundation of THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. <8 1 our knowledge, is canceled. This determines our problem. We must find an X, by means of which all these results may be correct, without destroying the identity of consciousness.
1. The opposites, to be united, are in the Ego as consciousness. Hence, X must also be in con sciousness.
2. Both the Ego and Non-Ego are products of original acts of the Ego, and consciousness itself is such a product of the first original act of the Ego, of the positing of the Ego through itself.
3. But our above results show that the act of which the Non-Ego is the product, that is, the oppositing, is not at all possible without X. Hence, X itself must be a product of an original act of the Ego. There must be, accordingly, an act of the human mind = Y, the product of which is X.
4. The form of this act Y is determined by the above problem. It is to be a uniting of the oppo sites (the Ego and the Non-Ego) without their mu tually canceling each other. The opposites are to be taken up into the identity of consciousness.
5. But the problem does not determine the How, or the manner of this uniting, nor even suggests it at all. We must, therefore, make an experiment, and ask: How can A and — A, being and not be ing, reality and negation, be thought together, without their mutually canceling each other?
6. It is not to be expected that any one will re ply otherwise but: They must mutually limit each other. If this answer is correct, the act Y is a S2 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, limiting of both opposites through each other, and X would signify the limits.
(Let me not be understood as asserting that the conception of limits is an analytical conception, in volved in, and to be developed out of, the union of reality and negation. It is true our two funda mental principles have given us the opposite con ceptions, and our first principle has given us the requirement to unite them. But the manner of uniting them has not been given, and is determined by a particular law of our mind, which law our ex periment was only to make us conscious of.)
7. The conception of limits, however, involves more than the required X; for it involves also the conceptions of reality and negation, which are tobe united. Hence, to get X pure, we must under take another abstraction.
8. To limit something signifies to cancel the re ality thereof not altogether, but only in part. Hence the conception of limits involves, besides the con ceptions of reality and negation, that of divisibility, (of quantitability generally, not of a determined quantity.) This conception is the required X, and hence, through the act Y, the Ego as well as the Non-Ego is posited divisible.
9. The Ego as ivcll as the Non-Ego are posited divisible; for the act Y can not succeed the act of oppositing, for in itself the act of oppositing has shown itself impossible; nor can it precede that act, for the act Y occurs merely to make the act of oppositing possible; and divisibility is nothing "but a divisible. Hence, the act Y and the act of oppositing occur in and with each other; both are one and the same, and are only distinguished in re flection. By oppositing, therefore, a Non-Ego to the Ego, both the Ego and the Non-Ego are posited divisible.
Let us now see whether the here established act has really solved the problem and united the opposites.
The first result is now determined as follows: The Ego is not posited in the Ego in so far, that is, with those parts of reality wherewith the Non-Ego is posited. That part of reality, which is ascribed to the Non-Ego, is canceled in the Ego.
This proposition at present does not contra dict the second result: in so far as the Non-Ego is posited, the Ego also must be posited; for both are posited as divisible in regard to their reality.
And only now can you say of either, it is sometiling. For the absolute Ego of the first funda mental principle is not something, (has no predicate and can have none;) it is simply what it is. But now all reality is in consciousness, and of this reality that part is to be ascribed to the Non-Ego which is not to be ascribed to' the Ego, and vice versa. Both are something. The Non-Ego is what the Ego is not, and vice versa. Opposed to the abso lute Ego, the Non-Ego is absolutely nothing, (but it can be opposed to the absolute Ego only in so far as it is an object of representation, as we shall see -84 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
hereafter;) opposed to the divisible Ego, the Non-Ego is a negative quantity.
The Ego is to be = Ego, and yet it is also to be opposed to itself. But it is self-equal in regard to consciousness; and in this consciousness the abso lute Ego is posited as indivisible, and the Ego, to •which the Non-Ego is opposed, as divisible. Hence, in the unity of consciousness, all the opposites are united; for in it even the Ego, in so far as a Non-Ego is opposed to it, is opposed to the absolute Ego; and this is, as it were, the test that the es tablished conception of divisibility was the correct one.
According to our presupposition, which can be proven only through the completion of the science of knowledge, only one absolute unconditioned, one in its content conditioned, and one in its form con ditioned principle is possible. Hence, no further principle can be possible. All that is uncondition ally and absolutely certain has been exhausted, and I might express the total in this formula: The Ego opposits in the Ego a divisible Non-Ego to a divisible Ego.
Beyond this cognition no philosophy can go; but every thorough philosophy ought to go to it, and by doing so will become science of knowledge. Whatsoever is hereafter to occur in the system of the human mind must be deducible from what we have here established.
REMARKS.
We have united the opposites, Ego and Non-Ego, through the conception of divisibility. By ab stracting from the content (the Ego and Non-Ego) and looking at the mere fonn of uniting opposites through the conception of divisibility, we obtain the logical proposition of the ground; that is, A is in part — A, and vice versa. Every opposite is re lated to its opposite in one characteristic = X; and all equals are opposed to each other in one characteristic X. Such an X is called, in the first instance, ground of relation; in the second in stance, ground of distinction. This logical propo sition our third fundamental principle both proves and determines.
Proves: for every opposite = — A is opposed to an A, and this A is posited. Through the positing of a —A you both cancel and do not cancel A. Hence, you only cancel A in part; and instead of the X in A, which is not canceled, you have pos ited in —A not —X, but X itself; and hence A is = —A in X.
Again, every opposite (— A = B) is self-equal by virtue of being posited in the Ego: A = A, B = B.
Now, you posit B = A; hence, B is not posited through A, for then it would be = A and not = B. (You would have only posited one, and not two.)
But if B is not posited through the positing of A, then it is in so far = — A; and through the positing of both as equal, neither A nor B, but an X, is posited, which X is = X and = A and = B.
Thus it appears how the proposition A = B can be valid, which in itself contradicts the proposition A = A. X = X,A=X, B = X; hence, A = B in so far as both is = X; but A = — B in so far as both is = — X.
Opposites are related and equals opposed to each other in only cnc part For, if they were op posed in many parts, that is, if the opposites them selves contained opposite characteristics, one of both would belong to that wherein they are equal, and hence they would not be opposites, and vice versa. Ever}' grounded judgment has, therefore, only one ground of relation and one ground of dis tinction. If it has more, it is not one judgment, but many judgments.
Determines: for only on condition that many things are posited at all as equals or as opposites, are they thus opposed or related in one character istic. But it is by no means asserted that abso lutely ever)' thing which may occur in our conscious ness, must be equal to another and opposed to a third.
A judgment, therefore, concerning that to which nothing can be related or opposed, does not come at all under the rule of this proposition of the ground, for it is not under the condition of its va lidity; it is not grounded, since, on the contrary, itself grounds all possible judgments; it has no ground, but furnishes itself the ground of all grounded. The object of all such judgments is the absolute Ego, and all judgments, whereof it is the subject, are valid absolutely and without further ground; whereof more below.
The act whereby, in comparing a twofold, you look up the mark wherein they are opposite*, is called the antithetical proceeding, generally spoken of as analytical, which expression, however, is less proper; partly because it permits the opinion that you can develop something out of a conception which you have not previously put into it by a syn thesis, and partly because the expression antitJietical signifies more clearly that it is the opposite of synthetical. For the synthetical proceeding con sists in this, that in opposites that characteristic is looked up wherein they are equal. In the mere logical form, judgments of the first class are called antithetical or negative, and judgments of the lat ter class synthetical or affirmative judgments.
Again: since we discovered, in the development of our third principle, that the act of uniting opposites in a third is not possible without the act of oppositing, and vice versa, it also follows that in logic anti thesis and synthesis are inseparable. No anti thesis — no positing of equals as opposites — without synthesis — without the previous positing of the equals as equals. No synthesis — no positing of opposites as equals — without antithesis — without the previous positing of the opposites as opposites. (As far as the content is concerned, mere analytical judgments have, therefore, no existence; and not only do they not carry us far, as Kant remarks, but they do not advance us a single step.)
Kant's celebrated question, which he placed at the head of his Critic of Pure Reason, How are syn thetical judgments a priori possible? has now been answered in the most universal and satisfactory manner. In our third principle we have estab lished a synthesis between the opposites, Ego and Non-Ego, by means of the posited divisibility of both, concerning the possibility of which no further question can be asked nor any further ground as signed; it is absolutely possible, and we are justi fied in establishing it without further ground. All other syntheses, which are to be valid, must be in volved in this one; must have been established in and with this one; and as soon as this is proven, the most convincing proof has been shown up that they are equally valid.
Must be involved in this one; and this shows us at the same time in the most determined manner, how we must henceforth proceed in the develop ment of our science. It is syntheses we are to ob tain, and hence our whole course of proceeding hereafter will be synthetical; every proposition will contain a synthesis. (At least in the theoretical part of our science, for in the practical part the very reverse is the case, as will appear hereafter.) But no synthesis is possible without a previous ana lysis; from this analysis, however, in so far as it is an act, we abstract, and only look up its product — the opposites. Hence, at every proposition hereafter we shall begin by looking up the opposites in volved in it, and \vhicb are to be united. Again, all our syntheses are to be involved in the high est synthesis, just shown up, and to be developed out of it. Hence, it will be our task to look up in the Ego and Non-Ego, which that synthesis unites, some opposite characteristics, which have not been united; and to unite these opposites through a new ground of relation, which, again, must be in volved in the highest ground of relation; next, it will be our task to look up new opposites in the op posites united by this second synthesis, and to unite them in a third synthesis; and to continue this course until we arrive at opposites which can no longer be perfectly united, whereby we shall then be forced to enter the practical part of our science.
As antithesis is not possible without synthesis, and vice versa, so neither is possible without a the sis; that is, without an absolute positing, whereby a certain A (the Ego) is posited, not as the equal of any other, nor as the opposite of any other, but is absolutely posited. This, when applied to our sys tem, gives it completeness and surety. It must be a system and one system; the opposites must be united so long as opposites still exist, and until the absolute unity is produced; which absolute unity, as will be shown hereafter, can, however, only be produced by a completed approach to the infinite, that is to say, never in time.
The necessity to opposit and unite in the above determined manner, rests immediately on our third Cp THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
fundamental principle; the necessity to unite at all, rests on the first highest and absolutely uncondi tioned principle. The_/<?rw of the system is ground ed in the highest synthesis; but tJiat a system is to be at all, is grounded in the absolute thesis.
There is, however, another application of our above remark which can not be left unnoticed here; that is, its application to the form of judg ments. For as we had synthetical and antithetical judgments, we shall also doubtless find thetical judgments, which in some respect will be utterly opposed to the former. For the correctness of an tithetical and synthetical judgments always pre supposed a ground, and a double ground, namely, one of relation and one of distinction. A thetical judgment would, therefore, be one wherein some thing would not be related or opposed to another, but would only be posited as equal to itself; hence, it would presuppose neither a ground of distinction nor of relation. But since the logical form requires some presupposition, this presupposition in theti cal judgments could only be a problem to find a ground.
The highest judgment of this kind is I am, wherein nothing is asserted of the Ego, the place of the predicate being left empty for any possible infinite determination of the Ego. All other judg ments (involved in this highest one) are of the same kind. For instance, Man is free. You may consider this either as a positive judgment — in which case it signifies, man belongs to the class of free THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 9!
beings; and in that case a ground of relation ought to be shown up between man and the class of free beings, which ground as ground of that freedom ought to be contained in the conception of free be ings generally, and particularly of man; but, far from being able to show up such a ground, we can not even point out a class of free beings; or you may consider, it as a negative judgment, in which case you posit man in opposition to all beings, which are subject to the law of natural necessity; but then you must first point out the ground of dis tinction between necessity and not-necessity; and you must show that the latter is not involved in the conception of man, but is involved in the concep tion of the opposite beings; and at the same time you must show a ground of relation wherein both are equal. But man, in so far as the predicate of freedom can be applied to him, that is, in so far as he is absolute, and not represented nor representable subject, has nothing in common with the beings of nature, and hence also is not to be opposited to them. Still, the logical form of the judgment, which is positive, demands that both conceptions be united. But they can not be united in any concep tion, and can only be united in the idea of an Ego, the consciousness whereof is determined by noth ing external, but which rather through its mere con sciousness determines all external; and such an idea itself is not thinkable, but involves for us a contra diction. Yet it is posited for us as our highest practical destination. Man is to draw infinitely nearer to the in itself unattainable freedom.
Thus, again, the resthetical judgment: A is beau tiful (that is, in A is a characteristic -which is also in the idea of the beautiful) is a thetical judgment; for I can not compare that characteristic with the ideal, since I do not know the ideal. It is rather a problem given to me, which is the result of my ab solute self-positing, to discover that ideal; but this problem can only be solved in a completed attain ment of the infinite, that is, never in time.
Hence, Kant and his successors have called these judgments very properly infinite judgments; al though not one, so far as I know, has explained them in a clear and definite manner.
It appears, therefore, that for thetical judgments no ground can be adduced; but their general pos sibility and validity is grounded in the absolute self-positing of the Ego. It is useful, and will fur nish the clearest insight into our science, if this manner of grounding thetical judgment is compared with that of grounding antithetical and synthetical judgments.
All opposites, which are opposed in a conception expressing their ground of distinction, agree in a higJicr (more universal) conception, which is called the conception of species; that is, a synthesis is presupposed, which contains both opposites, and in so far as they are equal to each other. Gold and Silver, for instance, are contained in the higher con ception of metal. (Hence, the logical rule of dcfinition, that it must state the higher conception, the ground of relation, and the specific difference, which constitutes the ground of distinction.)
Again, all equals are opposed to each other in a lower conception, expressive of some particular determination abstracted from in the higher concep tion; that is, all synthesis presupposes a previous antithesis. For instance, in the conception Body, you abstract from the peculiar determination of color, weight, smell, etc.; and hence any thing which fills space, and is impenetrable, and has weight, may now be a body, however different in regard to those specific determinations. (The science of knowledge determines what determinations are more universal or more special, and hence what conceptions are higher or lower. A conception is higher in pro portion as the mediating conceptions, whereby it is deduced from the highest, (that of reality,) are less. Y is a lower conception than X, if X occurs first in the series of its deduction from the highest conception, and vice versa.)
Quite different is it in regard to the absolutely posited, the Ego. A Non-Ego is posited in relation to it, and at the same in opposition to it, not in a JiigJicr conception, however, (which in that case would contain both, and would presuppose a higher synthesis, or at least a higher thesis,) but in a lower conception. The Ego' itself is posited into a lower conception, that of divisibility, so that it may be posited in relation (equality) to the Non-Ego; and in the same conception of divisibility it is also opposfted to the Non-Ego. Hence, there is here no ascent, as in every other synthesis, but a descent. The Ego and the Non-Ego, as posited in equality and opposition to each other, are both something (accidences) in the Ego, as divisible substance, and posited through the Ego as absolute and unlimitable substance, to which nothing is equal and nothing opposed. Hence, all judgments, of which the limitable or determinable Ego is logical sub ject, or of which something that determines the Ego is logical subject, must be limited or deter mined through something higher; but all judg ments, of which the absolute, undeterminable Ego is logical subject, can be determined by nothing higher, because the absolute Ego is determined through nothing higher; they have their ground and their determination altogether in themselves.
Now, in this consists the essence of critical philo sophy, that an absolute Ego is established as abso lutely unconditioned and determinable by nothing higher than itself; and in following up the results of this fundamental principle that philosophy be comes science of knowledge.
On the other hand, that philosophy is called dog matic, which establishes something else as both equal and opposed to the Ego; which something else is its pretendedly higher conception of the thing (ens) arbitrarily established by that philo sophy as the liigJicst of all conceptions. In critical philosophy the thing is posited in the Ego, in dog matic philosophy the Ego in the thing; critical phi- THE SCIEXCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 95 losophy is, therefore, immanent, because it posits all in the Ego; dogmatism is, on the contrary, transcen dent, because it proceeds beyond the Ego. In so far as dogmatism can be logical, Spinozism is its most logical product. If you wish to treat dogmatism from its own stand-point, as should be done, ask it why it assumes a thing in itself without higher ground, whereas it did ask for a higher ground in the case of the Ego. Ask the dogmatist, Why do you accept the thing as absolute, since you would not accept the Ego as absolute? He can show no warrant for so doing, and you are perfectly justified in requiring him to hold fast to his own principles, and to assume nothing without a ground; hence, to give you again a higher conception as the ground of the thing, and then again a higher con ception for that higher conception, and so on ad infinitum.
A thorough dogmatism either denies altogether that our knowledge has a ground, and that there is a system in the human mind, or it contradicts it self. A logical dogmatism is a skepticism, which doubts that it doubts, for it must cancel the unity of consciousness, and hence the whole logic. It is, therefore, no dogmatism, and contradicts itself by pretending to be one.
Thus Spinoza posits the ground of the unity of consciousness in a substance wherein it is neces sarily determined as well in regard to its content ^that is, in regard to its determined series of repre sentation) as in regard to its form of unity. But I $6 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.
ask him: What, then, is that, again, which contains the ground of the necessity of this substance, as •well in regard to its content (in regard to the dif ferent series of representations contained in it) as in regard to its form, (the form that in it all possible series of representation are to be exhausted, and to constitute a complete -whole?) Now for this ne cessity he gives no further ground, but says: It is so absolutely; and he says this because he is com pelled to assume some absolute first, some highest unity; but if he wants to do this, why did he not stop at the unity given in consciousness? "Why did he go beyond and imagine a higher unity, since nothing forced him to do so?* It would be absolutely impossible to explain how thinkers ever could have gone beyond the Ego, or, if they once went beyond it, how they ever could have come to a stand-still, if there were not a prac tical reason which explains this phenomenon. It •was a practical and not a theoretical ground, as they believed, which drove dogmatists to transcend the Ego; namely, a feeling of the dependence of our Ego, in so far as it is practical, upon a Non-Ego, which is in so far absolutely not subject to our legislation, and which is hence in so far free. Again, it was a practical reason which compelled ( Translator's Note. — This criticism of Spinoza applies with equal force to the school of dogmatic idealists which followed Fichte, and •which found its highest representatives in Schelling and HegeL Believing that they must go beyond the Ego and discover some other absolute — not so "subjective," as they foolishly fancied the Zgo to be — they fell into the same pit.)
TJfE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. 97 them to come to a stand-still somewhere; namely, the feeling of necessary subordination of the Non-Ego to the practical laws of the Ego. But this subordination has not at all existence as object of a conception, but simply as object of an idea; as something which is to be effected through us in an endless time, as will appear hereafter.
And thus it appears, after all, that dogmatism is not at all what it pretends to be, and that we have done it wrong in logically carrying out its princi ples. Its highest unity is indeed no other one than the unity of consciousness, and can be no other one; and its thing is the substrate of divisibility generally, or the highest substance, wherein both the Ego and the Non-Ego ( Spinoza s Intelligence and Extension) are posited.
Far from going beyond the absolute Ego, it never reaches even so far; at the utmost, as in Spinoza's system, it goes to our second and third principles, but not to the first unconditioned one. It was reserved for critical philosophy to take this last step, and thus to complete the science.
The first part of our system (the theoretical) is really, as will be seen hereafter, systematic Spinozism; but our system also has a second, practical part, through which the first part is grounded and determined, the whole science of knowledge com pleted, every thing which occurs in the human mind exhausted, and thus common-sense, ^hich all pre-Kantian philosophy insulted, and which our theoretical system seems to bring into a collision Q8 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE with philosophy, "which has no hope of ever being settled, forever reconciled with our science.
By completely abstracting from the dctcrmiiifd form of the judgment in our third principle, name ly, that it is an of positing or relating judgment, and looking only at the general manner of acting in it, namely, to limit one through another, we obtain the category of determination, (or, as Kant calls it, limitation.) For the positing of quantity generally, be it quantity of reality or of negation, is called II.
INTRODUCTORY.
WE have now established three logical proposi tions: that of Identity, which grounds all others; and those of Opposition and of the Ground, which mutually ground each other in the first. The latter two make synthesis generally possible, establish and furnish the ground of its form. Hence, we need nothing more to be certain of the formal validity of our future reflection. On the other hand, the first synthetical act, whereby we have united the Ego and the Non-Ego, has given us a content for all future syntheses; and, hence, we also need nothing further from this side. Our whole science of knowledge must be developed out of that first synthesis.
But, if any thing is to be developed out of it, the conceptions united in that synthesis must contain other conceptions not yet established or united, and our task is, therefore, now to discover them; which is done by looking up opposite character- IO2 THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE,