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On Prophesying by Dreams

Aristotle

Language:
English
Status:
Complete work
Authorship:
Written by the author
Condition of the text:
Clean text
Extent:
~2,530 words · 12 passages
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  • APAAristotle. (n.d.). On Prophesying by Dreams. SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/en/works/aristotle/on-prophesying-by-dreams
  • MLAAristotle. "On Prophesying by Dreams." SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/en/works/aristotle/on-prophesying-by-dreams.
  • ChicagoAristotle. On Prophesying by Dreams. SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/en/works/aristotle/on-prophesying-by-dreams.

What it is about

Do dreams foretell the future? Aristotle answers no, and explains why it looks as if they do.

Context and history

Antiquity's most sceptical text on dream divination: if one dream in a thousand comes true, we remember that one and forget the other nine hundred and ninety-nine. The argument from coincidence, stated in the fourth century BC. Part of the Parva naturalia, the eight short works that continue the De anima by applying its theory to particular phenomena of the living body. They are transmitted as a group and read best together.

Editorial context, not a citable source: unlike the passages of the work itself, these statements cannot be checked against the corpus.

As to the divination which takes place in sleep, and is said to be based on dreams, we cannot lightly either dismiss it with contempt or give it implicit confidence. The fact that all persons, or many, suppose dreams to possess a special significance, tends to inspire us with belief in it [such divination], as founded on the testimony of experience; and indeed that divination in dreams should, as regards some subjects, be genuine, is not incredible, for it has a show of reason; from which one might form a like opinion also respecting all other dreams. Yet the fact of our seeing no probable cause to account for such divination tends to inspire us with distrust. For, in addition to its further unreasonableness, it is absurd to combine the idea that the sender of such dreams should be God with the fact that those to whom he sends them are not the best and wisest, but merely commonplace persons. If, however, we abstract from the causality of God, none of the other causes assigned appears probable. For that certain persons should have foresight in dreams concerning things destined to take place at the Pillars of Hercules, or on the banks of the Borysthenes, seems to be something to discover the explanation of which surpasses the wit of man. Well then, the dreams in question must be regarded either as causes, or as tokens, of the events, or else as coincidences; either as all, or some, of these, or as one only. I use the word 'cause' in the sense in which the moon is [the cause]

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