Rhetoric (Treatise on Rhetoric)
- Language:
- English
- Translation:
- Theodore Buckley
- Status:
- Complete work
- Authorship:
- Written by the author
- Condition of the text:
- No scanning noise detected (automatic measure over the whole text, not checked by hand)
- Extent:
- ~210,000 words · 1,012 passages
Cite this work
- APAAristotle. (n.d.). Rhetoric (Treatise on Rhetoric) (Theodore Buckley, Trans.). Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/en/works/aristotle/rhetoric-treatise-on-rhetoric
- MLAAristotle. Rhetoric (Treatise on Rhetoric). Translated by Theodore Buckley. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/en/works/aristotle/rhetoric-treatise-on-rhetoric.
- ChicagoAristotle. Rhetoric (Treatise on Rhetoric). Translated by Theodore Buckley. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/en/works/aristotle/rhetoric-treatise-on-rhetoric.
Reference to the edition that SigPhi reproduces: SigPhi is its digital reproduction, not its publisher. The edition's year is not in the metadata (hence "n.d."), and the translator appears only when recorded.
What it is about
The Rhetoric: what persuasion is, by what means it works, and why it is not the same as deception.
Context and history
Aristotle distinguishes three sources of persuasion — the character of the speaker, the state of mind of the hearer, and the argument itself — and defines the enthymeme, the reasoning that leaves a premise unsaid because the audience already holds it. The second book is in fact the earliest systematic treatise on the emotions that survives: it examines anger, fear, shame, envy, not as passions but as states that words can produce and undo. It reads best alongside the Poetics and the Topics.
Editorial context, not a citable source: unlike the passages of the work itself, these statements cannot be checked against the corpus.
9 Κριτὴς τοῦ νόμου κάνων. Aristotle employs the same metaphor in his Ethics :---τοὺ γὰρ αὐὀρίστου, αὔριστος καὶ 6 κακών ἐστιν, ὥσπε; καὶ τῆς Λεσβίας οἰκοδομῆς, ὁ μολύβδινος κανών" πρὸς γὰρ τὸ σχῆμω τοῦ λίθον μετακινεῖται, καὶ οὐ μένει ὁ κα-ώ Lib. y. c. 10. See Lucretius, iv. 516.— Denique ut in fabrica, si prava est regula prima, Normague si fallax rectis regionibus exit, Omnia mendose fieri atque obstipa necesse est, etc. 7. Rea sons why as little as possible should be left to the judge. Ist. 2nd. 3rd. Sabi L etal Seay: ARISTOTLE’S ~y. unjust, whatever questions of this nature the legislator has not determined ; on these the judge must somehow or other make up his mind of himself, and not take instructions on them from the parties at issue. It would then be most admirably adapted to the purposes of justice, if laws properly enacted were, as far as circumstances admitted, of themselves to mark out all cases, and to abandon as few as possible to the discretion of the judge. And this because, in the first place, it is easier to get one or a few of good sense, and of ability to legislate and adjudge, than to get many 9 : and next to this, legislative enactments proceed from men carrying their views a long time back; [or, from men who have reflected on the subject for a long time ;] while judicial decisions are made off hand ; so that it is difficult for persons deciding under these circumstances to assign what is just and expedient: and, what is most of all to the point, is this, that the award of the legislator is not particular nor about present circumstances, but about what is future and general ; whereas the member of a popular assembly and the judge decide on points actually present and definite ; and under their circumstances, feelings of partiality, and dislike, and personal expediency, will, in…