A General View of Positivism
- Language:
- English
- Status:
- Complete work
- Authorship:
- Written by the author
- Condition of the text:
- No scanning noise detected (automatic measure over the whole text, not checked by hand)
- Extent:
- ~150,000 words · 704 passages
Cite this work
- APAAuguste Comte. (n.d.). A General View of Positivism. Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/en/works/auguste-comte/a-general-view-of-positivism
- MLAAuguste Comte. A General View of Positivism. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/en/works/auguste-comte/a-general-view-of-positivism.
- ChicagoAuguste Comte. A General View of Positivism. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/en/works/auguste-comte/a-general-view-of-positivism.
Reference to the edition that SigPhi reproduces: SigPhi is its digital reproduction, not its publisher. The edition's year is not in the metadata (hence "n.d."), and the translator appears only when recorded.
What it is about
Comte's own summary of positivism, published in 1848: the short way into a work that otherwise runs to six volumes.
Context and history
The French original is the 'Discours sur l'ensemble du positivisme'. Here, in a few pages, are the law of the three states — theological, metaphysical, positive — the classification of the sciences, and the claim that sociology must complete them. But here too is the other Comte, the one usually left out of the textbooks: the one who holds that a society is not held together by knowledge alone, and who proposes a 'religion of humanity' with its calendar and its secular saints. Mill, who admired him, thought that second part deplorable, and the argument has gone on ever since. It repays reading for seeing the two things together, which is how Comte thought them.
Editorial context, not a citable source: unlike the passages of the work itself, these statements cannot be checked against the corpus.
But the synthesis, which it is the social function of Philosophy to construct, will neither be real nor permanent, unless it embraces every department of human nature, whether speculative, effective, or practical. These three orders of phenomena react upon each other so intimately, that any system which does not include all of them must inevitably be unreal and inadequate. Yet it is only in the present day, when Philosophy is reaching the positive stage, that this which is her highest and most essential mission can be fully apprehended. [The Theological synthesis failed to include the practical side of human nature] The theological synthesis depended exclusively upon our affective nature; and this is owing its original supremacy and its ultimate decline. For a long time its influence over all our highest speculations was paramount. This was especially the case during the Polytheistic period, when Imagination and Feeling still retained their sway under very slight restraint from the reasoning faculties. Yet even during the time of its highest development, intellectually and socially, theology exercised no real control over practical life. It reacted, of course, upon it to some extent, but the effects of this were in most cases far more apparent than real. There was a natural antagonism between them, which though at first hardly perceived, went on increasing till at last it brought about the entire destruction of the theological fabric. A system so purely subjective could not harmonize with the necessarily objective tendencies and stubborn realities of practical life. Theology asserted all phenomena to be under the dominion of Wills more or less arbitrary: whereas in practical life men were led more and more clearly to the conception of invariable Laws. For without laws human action would have admitted of no rule or plan.…