Philosophical Works, v. 2 (of 4)
- Language:
- English
- Status:
- Complete work
- Authorship:
- Written by the author
- Condition of the text:
- No scanning noise detected (automatic measure over the whole text, not checked by hand)
- Extent:
- ~170,000 words · 806 passages
Cite this work
- APADavid Hume. (n.d.). Philosophical Works, v. 2 (of 4). Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/en/works/david-hume/philosophical-works-v-2-of-4
- MLADavid Hume. Philosophical Works, v. 2 (of 4). Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/en/works/david-hume/philosophical-works-v-2-of-4.
- ChicagoDavid Hume. Philosophical Works, v. 2 (of 4). Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/en/works/david-hume/philosophical-works-v-2-of-4.
Reference to the edition that SigPhi reproduces: SigPhi is its digital reproduction, not its publisher. The edition's year is not in the metadata (hence "n.d."), and the translator appears only when recorded.
What it is about
The second of the four volumes of Hume's philosophical works in the Green and Grose edition: the continuation of the 'Treatise of Human Nature'.
Context and history
The Green and Grose edition of 1874-75, in four volumes, of which the catalogue holds the first and second. These two contain the 'Treatise of Human Nature', which Hume published at twenty-eight and which, in his own words, 'fell dead-born from the press'. Everything is here: the thesis that all ideas come from impressions; the analysis of causation — we observe no necessary connection, only a constant conjunction which habit teaches us to expect; the attack on the notion of the self as a substance; and the distinction between is and ought, which has organised two centuries of moral argument. Volumes III and IV contain the essays and the 'Enquiries', the later and more readable restatement of the same, Those two volumes are not in the catalogue, but both Enquiries and the Essays are, as works of their own.
Editorial context, not a citable source: unlike the passages of the work itself, these statements cannot be checked against the corpus.
the external organs. Secondary, or reflective impressions, are such as proceed from some of these original ones, either immediately, or by the interposition of its idea. Of the first kind are all the impressions of the senses, and all bodily pains and pleasures: of the second are the passions, and other emotions resembling them. 'Tis certain that the mind, in its perceptions, must begin somewhere; and that since the impressions precede their correspondent ideas, there must be some impressions, which, without any introduction, make their appearance in the soul. As these depend upon natural and physical causes, the examination of them would lead me too far from my present subject, into the sciences of anatomy and natural philosophy. For this reason I shall here confine myself to those other impressions, which I have called secondary and reflective, as arising either from the original impressions, or from their ideas. Bodily pains and pleasures are the source of many passions, both when felt and considered by the mind; but arise originally in the soul, or in the body, whichever you please to call it, without any preceding thought or perception. A fit of the gout produces a long train of passions, as grief, hope, fear; but is not derived immediately from any affection or idea. The reflective impressions may be divided into two kinds, viz. the _calm_ and the _violent_. Of the first kind is the sense of beauty and deformity in action, composition, and external objects. Of the second are the passions of love and hatred, grief and joy, pride and humility. This division is far from being exact. The raptures of poetry and music frequently rise to the greatest height; while those other impressions, properly called _passions_, may decay into so soft an emotion, as to become in a manner imperceptible.…