The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics
- Language:
- English
- Status:
- Complete work
- Authorship:
- Written by the author
- Condition of the text:
- No scanning noise detected (automatic measure over the whole text, not checked by hand)
- Extent:
- ~13,900 words · 66 passages
Cite this work
- APAImmanuel Kant. (n.d.). The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics. Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/en/works/immanuel-kant/the-metaphysical-elements-of-ethics
- MLAImmanuel Kant. The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/en/works/immanuel-kant/the-metaphysical-elements-of-ethics.
- ChicagoImmanuel Kant. The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/en/works/immanuel-kant/the-metaphysical-elements-of-ethics.
Reference to the edition that SigPhi reproduces: SigPhi is its digital reproduction, not its publisher. The edition's year is not in the metadata (hence "n.d."), and the translator appears only when recorded.
What it is about
The second half of the Metaphysics of Morals: duties to oneself and to others, in detail.
Context and history
This is the least-read Kant and the most surprising: here he comes down from principles to cases — lying, avarice, servility, friendship — and one sees how his ethics actually works once it touches ground. This is an old English translation, in the public domain. The German original is also in the catalogue, and is what should be cited.
Editorial context, not a citable source: unlike the passages of the work itself, these statements cannot be checked against the corpus.
means (therefore not conditionally) but the end itself (therefore unconditionally), hence it is a categorical imperative of pure practical reason and one, therefore, which combines a concept of duty with that of an end in general. Now there must be such an end and a categorical imperative corresponding to it. For since there are free actions, there must also be ends to which as an object those actions are directed. Amongst these ends there must also be some which are at the same time (that is, by their very notion) duties. For if there were none such, then since no actions can be without an end, all ends which practical reason might have would be valid only as means to other ends, and a categorical imperative would be impossible; a supposition which destroys all moral philosophy. Here, therefore, we treat not of ends which man actually makes to himself in accordance with the sensible impulses of his nature, but of objects of the free elective will under its own laws- objects which he ought to make his end. We may call the former technical (subjective), properly pragmatical, including the rules of prudence in the choice of its ends; but the latter we must call the moral (objective) doctrine of ends. This distinction is, however, superfluous here, since moral philosophy already by its very notion is clearly separated from the doctrine of physical nature (in the present instance, anthropology). The latter resting on empirical principles, whereas the moral doctrine of ends which treats of duties rests on principles given a priori in pure practical reason. {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 35} IV. What are the Ends which are also Duties? They are: A. OUR OWN PERFECTION, B. HAPPINESS OF OTHERS. We cannot invert these and make on one side our own happiness, and on the other the perfection of others, ends which should be in themselves duties for the same person.…