The science of knowledge y J.G. Fichte. Tr. from the German A.E. Kroeger
- Language:
- English
- Status:
- Complete work
- Authorship:
- Written by the author
- Condition of the text:
- No scanning noise detected (automatic measure over the whole text, not checked by hand)
- Extent:
- ~110,000 words · 525 passages
Cite this work
- APAJohann Fichte. (n.d.). The science of knowledge y J.G. Fichte. Tr. from the German A.E. Kroeger. Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/en/works/johann-fichte/the-science-of-knowledge-y-j-g-fichte-tr-from-the-german-a-e-kroeger
- MLAJohann Fichte. The science of knowledge y J.G. Fichte. Tr. from the German A.E. Kroeger. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/en/works/johann-fichte/the-science-of-knowledge-y-j-g-fichte-tr-from-the-german-a-e-kroeger.
- ChicagoJohann Fichte. The science of knowledge y J.G. Fichte. Tr. from the German A.E. Kroeger. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/en/works/johann-fichte/the-science-of-knowledge-y-j-g-fichte-tr-from-the-german-a-e-kroeger.
Reference to the edition that SigPhi reproduces: SigPhi is its digital reproduction, not its publisher. The edition's year is not in the metadata (hence "n.d."), and the translator appears only when recorded.
What it is about
Fichte's 'Wissenschaftslehre', of 1794: the first attempt to rebuild the whole of Kant's philosophy from a single principle.
Context and history
The English title misleads a little: 'Wissenschaftslehre' means doctrine of science in the sense of the foundation of all knowing, not a philosophy of the natural sciences. Fichte starts from Kant and finds him unfinished: if the thing in itself is unknowable, he says, there is no need to posit it. His starting point is the act by which the I posits itself, and from that he derives, by opposition and limitation, the not-I and all the rest. It is among the hardest texts there are, and Fichte rewrote it many times without ever being satisfied. Without it neither Schelling nor Hegel is intelligible. Kroeger's translation is of the nineteenth century and corresponds to the first version, not the later ones.
Editorial context, not a citable source: unlike the passages of the work itself, these statements cannot be checked against the corpus.
At this point in history begins the German movement inaugurated by Kant. German philosophy has the task of exploring the subjective field exhaustively. Sceptic ism had explored it partially. Kant and Fichte com plete this subjective inventory of facts and processes of consciousness ; Schelling and Hegel compare the results with those of the old philosophy based on Greek ontology and demonstrate their substantial identity. The net outcome is the same in both. Psychology presupposes an absolute ego identical with Aristotle's purely active reason. (Scholasticism understood this actus purus to be God.) In Fichte's system we may see all the steps of de monstrating this astonishing result Moreover, we may see iu his various works all the stages of a consciousness awakening to realize the true significance of the con sequences that he derived from his own philosophy. This is a strange phenomenon in the history of philosophy. We are surprised to see a philosopher unconscious of the consequences of his own system. Kant was vividly conscious of his deductions, but he was not aware that there was a second series of deduc tions to be made from his system. Fichte discovered this second series, and united into one whole the critique of Pure Reason, and the critique of Practical Reason. He showed how the fundamental principle oi conscious- 3C PREFACE. 3C PREFACE. ness—" the ego is the ego " — unfolded into two principles, one of which is theoretical and leads to the "Pure Reason," while the other is a principle of the will, or a practical reason." But this second series (Fichte's) of deductions or consequences from the first series (Kant's) gave rise to a third series of deductions or consequences ; namely, a series of inferences as to the Absolute Ego or First Prin ciple presupposed by the Science of Knowledge. Fichte gradually became conscious of this third series of deduc tions, making continual progress as long as he lived.