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Second Treatise of Government

John Locke

Language:
English
Status:
Complete work
Authorship:
Written by the author
Condition of the text:
No scanning noise detected (automatic measure over the whole text, not checked by hand)
Extent:
~56,400 words · 268 passages
Cite this work
  • APAJohn Locke. (n.d.). Second Treatise of Government. Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/en/works/john-locke/second-treatise-of-government
  • MLAJohn Locke. Second Treatise of Government. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/en/works/john-locke/second-treatise-of-government.
  • ChicagoJohn Locke. Second Treatise of Government. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/en/works/john-locke/second-treatise-of-government.

Reference to the edition that SigPhi reproduces: SigPhi is its digital reproduction, not its publisher. The edition's year is not in the metadata (hence "n.d."), and the translator appears only when recorded.

What it is about

Second Treatise of Government (1689): government exists by the consent of the governed.

Context and history

State of nature, property founded in labour, separation of powers and the right of resistance against a tyrant. The American Declaration of Independence takes phrases from it almost verbatim. It is the founding text of political liberalism.

Editorial context, not a citable source: unlike the passages of the work itself, these statements cannot be checked against the corpus.

How it begins
varying from the right rule of reason, whereby a man so far becomes degenerate, and declares himself to quit the principles of human nature, and to be a noxious creature, there is commonly injury done to some person or other, and some other man receives damage by his transgression: in which case he who hath received any damage, has, besides the right of punishment common to him with other men, a particular right to seek reparation from him that has done it: and any other person, who finds it just, may also join with him that is injured, and assist him in recovering from the offender so much as may make satisfaction for the harm he has suffered. Sect. 11. From these two distinct rights, the one of punishing the crime for restraint, and preventing the like offence, which right of punishing is in every body; the other of taking reparation, which belongs only to the injured party, comes it to pass that the magistrate, who by being magistrate hath the common right of punishing put into his hands, can often, where the public good demands not the execution of the law, remit the punishment of criminal offences by his own authority, but yet cannot remit the satisfaction due to any private man for the damage he has received. That, he who has suffered the damage has a right to demand in his own name, and he alone can remit: the damnified person has this power of appropriating to himself the goods or service of the offender, by right of self-preservation, as every man has a power to punish the crime, to prevent its being committed again, by the right he has of preserving all mankind, and doing all reasonable things he can in order to that end: and thus it is, that every man, in the state of nature, has a power to kill a murderer, both to deter others from doing the like injury, which no reparation can compensate, by the example of the punishment that attends it from every body, and also to secure men from the attempts of a criminal, who having…

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