New Essays Concerning Human Understanding
- Language:
- English
- Status:
- Complete work
- Authorship:
- Written by the author
- Condition of the text:
- Some scanning errors (automatic measure over the whole text, not checked by hand) · 4 illegible passages, excluded from answers
- Extent:
- ~520,000 words · 2,477 passages
Cite this work
- APAGottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. (n.d.). New Essays Concerning Human Understanding. Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/en/works/leibniz/new-essays-concerning-human-understanding
- MLAGottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. New Essays Concerning Human Understanding. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/en/works/leibniz/new-essays-concerning-human-understanding.
- ChicagoGottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. New Essays Concerning Human Understanding. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/en/works/leibniz/new-essays-concerning-human-understanding.
Reference to the edition that SigPhi reproduces: SigPhi is its digital reproduction, not its publisher. The edition's year is not in the metadata (hence "n.d."), and the translator appears only when recorded.
What it is about
Leibniz's reply to Locke's Essay, chapter by chapter, cast as a dialogue between Philalethes, who speaks for Locke, and Theophilus, who speaks for him.
Context and history
He finished it around 1704, the year Locke died, and then withheld it: arguing with a man who could no longer answer struck him as unworthy. It appeared in 1765, almost fifty years after Leibniz's own death, and changed at a stroke how both were read — Kant had it in hand while thinking through the Critique.
Editorial context, not a citable source: unlike the passages of the work itself, these statements cannot be checked against the corpus.
ence are not exempt (from error) when they depend too much upon their past experience, as has happened to many in civil and military affairs ; because they do not consider sufficiently that the world changes, and that men become more skilful by finding a thousand new dexterities, while the deer and hares of the present do not become more cunning than those of the past. The consecutions of the brutes are only a shadow of reasoning, i.e. are only connections of the imagination and passages from one image to another, because in a new juncture which appears similar to the preceding they expect anew that connection which they formerly met with, as if things were united in fact because their images are united in the memory. It is true that reason also counsels us to expect ordinarily to see that happen in the future which is conformed to a long past experience, but it is not on this account a necessary and infalli ble truth, and success may cease when least expected, when the reasons change which have sustained it. Therefore the wisest men do not so commit themselves to it as not to try to discover, if possible, something of the reason of this fact in order to judge when it is necessary to make exceptions. For reason is alone capable of establishing sure rules, and supply ing what is wanting to those which were not such by inserting their exceptions ; and of finding at length certain connections in the force of necessary consequences, which often furnish the means of foreseeing the result without the necessity of experiencing the sense-connections of images, to which the brutes are reduced, so that that which justifies the internal