Beyond Good and Evil
- Language:
- English
- Status:
- Complete work
- Authorship:
- Written by the author
- Condition of the text:
- No scanning noise detected (automatic measure over the whole text, not checked by hand)
- Extent:
- ~68,600 words · 326 passages
Cite this work
- APANietzsche. (n.d.). Beyond Good and Evil. Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/en/works/nietzsche/beyond-good-and-evil
- MLANietzsche. Beyond Good and Evil. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/en/works/nietzsche/beyond-good-and-evil.
- ChicagoNietzsche. Beyond Good and Evil. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/en/works/nietzsche/beyond-good-and-evil.
Reference to the edition that SigPhi reproduces: SigPhi is its digital reproduction, not its publisher. The edition's year is not in the metadata (hence "n.d."), and the translator appears only when recorded.
What it is about
Beyond Good and Evil (1886): the book he himself presented as the reverse of Zarathustra, written for those who want arguments.
Context and history
It opens by asking why we want truth, and why not untruth. The answer is that behind every philosophy lies a biography and a will, and that philosophers have taken their prejudices for demonstrations. The distinction between master and slave morality is here, and is the most distorted part of his whole work. English translation from the complete edition edited by Oscar Levy (1909-1913), the one in the public domain. It is over a century old and it shows. The original is GERMAN and citation should follow the original, but of this work only the translation is here.
Editorial context, not a citable source: unlike the passages of the work itself, these statements cannot be checked against the corpus.
5. That which causes philosophers to be regarded half-distrustfully and half-mockingly, is not the oft-repeated discovery how innocent they are--how often and easily they make mistakes and lose their way, in short, how childish and childlike they are,--but that there is not enough honest dealing with them, whereas they all raise a loud and virtuous outcry when the problem of truthfulness is even hinted at in the remotest manner. They all pose as though their real opinions had been discovered and attained through the self-evolving of a cold, pure, divinely indifferent dialectic (in contrast to all sorts of mystics, who, fairer and foolisher, talk of "inspiration"), whereas, in fact, a prejudiced proposition, idea, or "suggestion," which is generally their heart's desire abstracted and refined, is defended by them with arguments sought out after the event. They are all advocates who do not wish to be regarded as such, generally astute defenders, also, of their prejudices, which they dub "truths,"--and VERY far from having the conscience which bravely admits this to itself, very far from having the good taste of the courage which goes so far as to let this be understood, perhaps to warn friend or foe, or in cheerful confidence and self-ridicule. The spectacle of the Tartuffery of old Kant, equally stiff and decent, with which he entices us into the dialectic by-ways that lead (more correctly mislead) to his "categorical imperative"--makes us fastidious ones smile, we who find no small amusement in spying out the subtle tricks of old moralists and ethical preachers.…