Plotinos Complete Works, v. 4
- Language:
- English
- Status:
- Complete work
- Authorship:
- Written by the author
- Condition of the text:
- Clean text · 1 illegible passages, excluded from answers
- Extent:
- ~91,800 words · 436 passages
Cite this work
- APAPlotinus. (n.d.). Plotinos Complete Works, v. 4. SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/en/works/plotinus/plotinos-complete-works-v-4
- MLAPlotinus. "Plotinos Complete Works, v. 4." SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/en/works/plotinus/plotinos-complete-works-v-4.
- ChicagoPlotinus. Plotinos Complete Works, v. 4. SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/en/works/plotinus/plotinos-complete-works-v-4.
What it is about
The fourth of the four volumes of Plotinus in Kenneth Guthrie's translation: the other edition in the corpus.
Context and history
Plotinus taught in Rome in the third century and did not write for publication; his pupil Porphyry gathered his writings after his death and arranged them in six groups of nine treatises — hence 'Enneads', 'nines' — an order that is not Plotinus's own. His philosophy starts from Plato and goes further: from the One, which is beyond being and beyond thought, the Intellect proceeds by emanation, and from that the Soul, and from that the sensible world; the human soul can retrace the way upwards, and Porphyry says his master achieved it four times. From this comes the whole of Neoplatonism, and through it pass Augustine, Dionysius, the Arabs, Ficino and the Renaissance. NOTE TO THE READER: the catalogue holds TWO English editions of the same material, 'Select Works of Plotinus' (Thomas Taylor's translation) and the four volumes of 'Plotinos Complete Works' (Kenneth Guthrie's), differently translated and differently arranged; and 'An Essay on the Beautiful' is Ennead I.6, which is inside both. This is not an error: they are different editions of the same author. A citation must always say which edition it uses, and had better give the Ennead and treatise number as well.
Editorial context, not a citable source: unlike the passages of the work itself, these statements cannot be checked against the corpus.
1. The (Aristotelian) ideal of living well and happiness are (practically) identical. Should we, on that account, grant even to animals the privilege of achieving happiness? Why might we not say that they live well, if it be granted them, in their lives, to follow the course of nature, without obstacles? For if to live well consist either in pleasure (pleasant passions, as the Epicureans taught), or in realizing one's own individual aim (the Stoic ideal), then this living well is, in either case, possible for animals, who can both enjoy pleasure, and accomplish their peculiar aim. Thus singing birds live a life desirable for them, if they enjoy pleasure, and sing conformably to their nature. If further we should define happiness as achieving the supreme purpose towards which nature aspires (the Stoic ideal), we should, even in this case, admit that animals share in happiness when they accomplish this supreme purpose. Then nature arouses in them no further desires, because their whole career is completed, and their life is filled from beginning to end. WHETHER PLANTS MAY BE TERMED HAPPY. There are no doubt some who may object to our admitting to happiness living beings other than man. They might even point out that on this basis happiness could not be refused to even the lowest beings, such as plants: for they also live, their life also has a purpose, by which they seek to fulfil their development. However, it would seem rather unreasonable to say, that living beings other than humans cannot possess happiness by this mere reason that to us they seem pitiable. Besides, it would be quite possible to deny to plants what may be predicated of other living beings, on the grounds that plants lack emotion. Some might hold they are capable of happiness, on the strength of their possessing life, for a being that lives can live well or badly; and in this way