The Will to Believe, and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy
- Language:
- English
- Status:
- Complete work
- Authorship:
- Written by the author
- Condition of the text:
- No scanning noise detected (automatic measure over the whole text, not checked by hand)
- Extent:
- ~110,000 words · 505 passages
Cite this work
- APAWilliam James. (n.d.). The Will to Believe, and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/en/works/william-james/the-will-to-believe-and-other-essays-in-popular-philosophy
- MLAWilliam James. The Will to Believe, and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/en/works/william-james/the-will-to-believe-and-other-essays-in-popular-philosophy.
- ChicagoWilliam James. The Will to Believe, and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/en/works/william-james/the-will-to-believe-and-other-essays-in-popular-philosophy.
Reference to the edition that SigPhi reproduces: SigPhi is its digital reproduction, not its publisher. The edition's year is not in the metadata (hence "n.d."), and the translator appears only when recorded.
What it is about
The 1897 collection headed by his most disputed essay: when is it legitimate to believe something the evidence does not settle?
Context and history
James's argument is narrower than the title suggests, and it is worth knowing, because the opposite has been attributed to him. It applies, he says, only when the option is living (both possibilities mean something to you), forced (not deciding is already deciding) and momentous (something irreversible is at stake), and only when the evidence cannot settle it by itself. In such cases — his examples are religious faith and trust in another person — demanding proof before committing is not neutrality: it is a way of choosing. The rest of the volume contains 'Is Life Worth Living?' and 'The Dilemma of Determinism', and the whole is the most readable way into American pragmatism.
Editorial context, not a citable source: unlike the passages of the work itself, these statements cannot be checked against the corpus.
history proves that one hypothesis after another has worked ill, has crumbled at contact with a widening knowledge of the world, and has lapsed from the minds of men. Some articles of faith, however, have maintained themselves through every vicissitude, and possess even more vitality to-day than ever before: it is for the 'science of religions' to tell us just which hypotheses these are. Meanwhile the freest competition of the various faiths with one another, and their openest application to life by their several champions, are the most favorable conditions under which the survival of the fittest can proceed. They ought therefore not to lie hid each under its bushel, indulged-in quietly with friends. They ought to live in publicity, vying with each other; and it seems to me that (the régime of tolerance once granted, and a fair field shown) the scientist has nothing to fear for his own interests from the liveliest possible state of fermentation in the religious world of his time. Those faiths will best stand the test which adopt also his hypotheses, and make them integral elements of their own. He should welcome therefore every species of religious agitation and discussion, so long as he is willing to allow that some religious hypothesis _may_ be {xiii} true. Of course there are plenty of scientists who would deny that dogmatically, maintaining that science has already ruled all possible religious hypotheses out of court. Such scientists ought, I agree, to aim at imposing privacy on religious faiths, the public manifestation of which could only be a nuisance in their eyes. With all such scientists, as well as with their allies outside of science, my quarrel openly lies; and I hope that my book may do something to persuade the reader of their crudity, and range him on my side.…