This argumentation, we reply, proves nothing against our position. ‘ Because thus direction of the mind is declared,’ i. e. because the Brahmazza passage, ‘ Gayatri indeed is all this,’ intimates that by means of the metre Gayatri the mind is to be directed on Brahman which is connected with that metre. Of the metre Gayatri, which is nothing but a certain special combination of syllables, it could not possibly be said that it is the Self of everything. We therefore have to understand the passage as declaring that Brahman, which, as the cause of the world, is connected with that product also whose name is Gayatri, is ‘ all this; ’ in accordance with that other passage which directly says, 4 All this indeed is Brahman’ ( Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 1). That the effect is in reality not different from the cause, we shall prove later on, under Sutra II, 1, 14. Devout meditation on Brahman under the form of certain effects (of Brahman) is seen to be men¬ tioned in other passages also, so, for instance, Ait. Ar. Ill, 3, 3, 12, 4 For the Bahvrz‘/£as consider him in the great hymn, the Adhvctryus in the sacrificial fire, the iT^andogas in the Mahavrata ceremony.’ Although, therefore, the previous passage speaks of the metre, Brahman is what is meant, and the same Brahman is again referred to in the passage about the light, whose purport it is to enjoin another form of devout meditation.
Another commentator 1 is of opinion that the term Gayatri (does not denote Brahman in so far as viewed under the form of Gciyatri, but) directly denotes Brahman, on account of the equality of number; for just as the Gayatri metre has four feet consisting of six syllables each, so Brahman also has four feet, (i. e. quarters.) Similarly we see that in other psssages also the names of metres are used to denote other things which resemble those metres in certain numerical relations; cp. for instance, Kh. Up. IV, 3, 8, where it is said at first, ‘Now these five and the other five make ten and that is the Krzta,’ and after that ‘these are again the Vira^* which eats the food.’ If we adopt this interpretation, Brahman only is spoken of, and the metre is not referred to at all. In any case Brahman is the subject with which the previous passage is concerned.
26. And thus also (we must conclude, viz. that Brahman is the subject of the previous passage), be¬ cause (thus only) the declaration as to the beings, &c. being the feet is possible.
That the previous passage has Brahman for its topic, we must assume for that reason also that the text designates the beings and so on as the feet of Gayatri. For the text at first speaks of the beings, the earth, the body, and the heart 2 *, and then goes on ‘ that Gayatri has four feet and is sixfold/ For of the mere metre, without any reference to Brahman, it would be impossible to say that the beings and so on are its feet. Moreover, if Brahman were not meant, there would be no room for the verse, ‘ Such is the great¬ ness, 5 &c. For that verse clearly describes Brahman in its own nature; otherwise it would be impossible to represent the Gayatri as the Self of everything as is done in the words, ‘ One foot of it are all the beings; three feet of it are what is immortal in heaven.’ The purusha-sukta also {Rik 1 The vrfttikara according to Go. An. in his /ika on the bha to the next Sutra.
2 Concerning the difficulty involved in this interpretation, cp.
Deussen, p. 183, note.
9 6 Samh. X, 90) exhibits the verse with sole reference to Brahman. Smrzti likewise ascribes to Brahman a like nature, ‘ I stand supporting all this world by a single portion of myself 5 (Bha. Gita X, 42). Our interpretation moreover enables us to take the passage, ‘that Brahman indeed which,’ &c. (Ill, 12, 7), in its primary sense, (i. e. to under¬ stand the word Brahman to denote nothing but Brahman.) And, moreover, the passage, ‘these are the five men of Brahman 5 (III, 13, 6), is appropriate only if the former passage about the Gayatri is taken as referring to Brahman (for otherwise the ‘ Brahman ’ in ‘ men of Brahman ’ would not be connected with the previous topic). Hence Brahman is to be considered as the subject-matter of the previous passage also. And the decision that the same Brahman is referred to in the passage about the light where it is recog¬ nised (to be the same) from its connexion with heaven, remains unshaken.
27. The objection that (the Brahman of the former passage cannot be recognised in the latter) on account of the difference of designation, is not valid because in either (designation) there is nothing contrary (to the recognition).
The objection that in the former passage (‘three feet of it are what is immortal in heaven 5 ), heaven is designated as the abode, while in the latter passage (‘ that light which shines above this heaven 5 ), heaven is designated as the boundary, and that, on account of this difference of desig¬ nation, the subject-matter of the former passage cannot be recognised in the latter, must likewise be refuted. This we do by remarking that in either designation nothing is contrary to the recognition. Just as in ordinary language a falcon, although in contact with the top of a tree, is not only said to be on the tree but also above the tree, so Brahman also, although being in heaven, is here referred to as being beyond heaven as well.
Another (commentator) explains: just as in ordinary language a falcon, although not in contact with the top of a tree, is not only said to be above the top of the tree but also on the top of the tree, so Brahman also, which is in reality beyond heaven, is (in the former of the two passages) said to be in heaven. Therefore the Brahman spoken of in the former passage can be recognised in the latter also, and it remains therefore a settled conclusion that the word £ light ’ denotes Brahman.
28. Pra/za (breath) is Brahman, that being under¬ stood from a connected consideration (of the passages referring to pra^a).
In the Kaushitaki-brdhma/za-upanishad there is recorded a legend of Indra and Pratardana which begins with the words, £ Pratardana, forsooth, the son of Divodasa came by means of fighting and strength to the beloved abode of Indra 5 (Kau. Up. Ill, 1). In this legend we read: £ He said: I am pra/za, the intelligent Self (pra^viatman), medi¬ tate on me as Life, as Immortality 5 (III, 2). And later on (III, 3), £ Pra/za alone, the intelligent Self, having laid hold of this body, makes it rise up. 5 Then, again (III, 8), £ Let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker. 5 And in the end (III, 8), £ That breath indeed is the intelligent Self, bliss, imperishable, immortal. 5 —Here the doubt presents itself whether the word pra/za denotes merely breath, the modification of air, or the Self of some divinity, or the individual soul, or the highest Brahman.— But, it will be said at the outset, the Sutra I, 1, 21 already has shown that the word pra/za refers to Brahman, and as here also we meet with characteristic marks of Brahman, viz. the words £ bliss, imperishable, immortal, 5 what reason is there for again raising the same doubt?—We reply: Because there are observed here characteristic marks of different kinds. For in the legend we meet not only with marks indicating Brahman, but also with marks pointing to other beings.
Thus Indra’s words, £ Know me only 5 (III, 1), point to the Self of a divinity; the words, £ Having laid hold of this body it makes it rise up, 5 point to the breath; the words, £ Let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know [34] H the speaker/ point to the individual soul. There is thus room for doubt.
If, now, the purvapakshin maintains that the term prazza here denotes the well-known modification of air, i. e. breath, we, on our side, assert that the word prazza must be under¬ stood to denote Brahman.—For what reason?—On account of such being the consecutive meaning of the passages. For if we examine the connexion of the entire section which treats of the prazza, we observe that all the single passages can be construed into a whole only if they are viewed as referring to Brahman. At the beginning of the legend Pratardana, having been allowed by Indra to choose a boon, mentions the highest good of man, which he selects for his boon, in the following words, ‘ Do you your¬ self choose that boon for me which you deem most beneficial for a man.’ Now, as later on prazza is declared to be what is most beneficial for man, what should prizza denote but the highest Self? For apart from the cognition of that Self a man cannot possibly attain what is most beneficial for him, as many scriptural passages declare. Compare, for instance, 6Ve. Up. Ill, 8, ‘A man who knows him passes over death; there is no other path to go. 5 Again, the further passage, ‘ He who knows me thus by no deed of his is his life harmed, not by theft, not by bhrfizzahaty 4 5 (III, i), has a meaning only if Brahman is supposed to be the object of knowledge. For, that subsequently to the cognition of Brahman all works and their effects entirely cease, is well known from scriptural passages, such as the following, ‘ All works perish when he has been beheld who is the higher and the lower’ (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8). Moreover, prazza can be identified with the intelligent Self only if it is Brahman.
For the air which is non-intelligent can clearly not be the intelligent Self. Those characteristic marks, again, which are mentioned in the concluding passage (viz. those inti¬ mated by the words ‘ bliss/ ‘ imperishable/ ‘ immortal ’) can, if taken in their full sense, not be reconciled with any being except Brahman. There are, moreover, the following passages, ‘ He does not increase by a good action, nor de¬ crease by a bad action. For he makes him whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds do a good deed; and the same makes him whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds do a bad deed; 5 and, ‘ He is the guardian of the world, he is the king of the world, he is the Lord of the world 5 (Kau. Up. Ill, 8). All this can be properly understood only if the highest Brahman is acknowledged to be the subject-matter of the whole chapter, not if the vital air is substituted in its place. Hence the word prazza denotes Brahman.
29. If it be said that (Brahman is) not (denoted) on account of the speaker denoting himself; (we reply that this objection is not valid) because there is in that (chapter) a multitude of references to the interior Self.
An objection is raised against the assertion that prazza de¬ notes Brahman. The word prazza, it is said, does not denote the highest Brahman, because the speaker designates him¬ self. The speaker, who is a certain powerful god called Indra, at first says, in order to reveal himself to Pratardana, ‘ Know me only, 5 and later on, ‘ I am pr&zza, the intelligent Self. 5 How, it is asked, can the pr&zza, which this latter passage, expressive of personality as it is, represents as the Self of the speaker, be Brahman to which, as we know from Scripture, the attribute of being a speaker cannot be ascribed; compare, for instance, Bri, Up. Ill, 8,8, Tt is without speech, without mind. 5 Further on, also, the speaker, i. e. Indra, glorifies himself by enumerating a number of attri¬ butes, all of which depend on personal existence and can in no way belong to Brahman, ‘ I slew the three-headed son of Tvash tri; I delivered the Arunmukhas, the devotees, to the wolves, 5 and so on. Indra may be called prazza on account of his strength. Scripture says, ‘ Strength indeed is pr&zza, 5 and Indra is known as the god of strength; and of any deed of strength people say, ‘ It is Indra’s work. 5 The personal Self of a deity may, moreover, be called an intelligent Self; for the gods, people say, possess unob¬ structed knowledge. It thus being a settled matter that some passages convey information about the personal Self H 2 IOO H 2 IOO of some deity, the other passages also—as, for instance, the one about what is most beneficial for man—must be inter¬ preted as well as they may with reference to the same deity. Hence prazza does not denote Brahman.
This objection we refute by the remark that in that chapter there are found a multitude of references to the in¬ terior Self. For the passage,‘ As long as prana dwells in this body so long surely there is life/ declares that that prazza only which is the intelligent interior Self—and not some particular outward deity—has power to bestow and to take back life. And where the text speaks of the eminence of the pranas as founded on the existence of the prazza, it shows that that prazza is meant which has reference to the Self and is the abode of the sense-organs \ Of the same tendency is the passage, ‘ Prazza, the intel¬ ligent Self, alone having laid hold of this body makes it rise up; 5 and the passage (which occurs in the passus, ‘Let no man try to find out what speech is/ &c.), ‘ For as in a car the circumference of the wheel is set on the spokes and the spokes on the nave, thus are these objects set on the subjects (the senses) and the subjects on the prazza. And that prazza indeed is the Self of pragna, blessed, imperishable, immortal. 5 So also the following passage which, referring to this interior Self, forming as it were the centre of the peripherical interaction of the objects and senses, sums up as follows, ‘ He is my Self, thus let it be known; 5 a summing up which is appropriate only if prazza is meant to denote not some outward existence, but the interior Self. And another scriptural passage declares ‘this Self is Brahman, omniscient 25 (B ri. Up. II, 5, 19). We therefore arrive at 1 The text runs, ‘ astitve ka prazzanazzz niArreyasam/ and Go. An. explains ‘ astitve prazzasthitau prazzanazzz indriyazzam sthitir ity arthata^ jrutrm aha.’ He as well as An. Gi. quotes as the text of the scriptural passage referred to ‘athato ni/breyasadanam ity adi.’ But if instead of ‘ astitve ka ’ we read ‘ asti tv eva/ we get the con¬ cluding clause of Kau. Up. Ill, 2, as given in Cowell’s edition.
2 Whence we know that the interior Self referred to in the Kau. Up. is Brahman.
IOI the conclusion that, on account of the multitude of references to the interior Self, the chapter contains information regard¬ ing Brahman, not regarding the Self of some deity.—How then can the circumstance of the speaker (Indra) referring to himself be explained?
30. The declaration (made by Indra about himself, viz. that he is one with Brahman) (is possible) through intuition vouched for by Scripture, as in the case of Vamadeva.
The individual divine Self called Indra perceiving by means of rzshi-like intuition 1 —the existence of which is vouched for by Scripture—its own Self to be identical with the supreme Self, instructs Pratardana (about the highest Self) by means of the words £ Know me only. 5 By intuition of the same kind the rzshi Vamadeva reached the knowledge expressed in the words, c I was Manu and Surya; 5 in accordance with the passage, ‘ Whatever deva was awakened (so as to know Brahman) he indeed became that ’ (B ri. Up. I, 4, 10). The assertion made above (in the purvapaksha of the preceding Sutra) that Indra after saying, ‘ Know me only, 5 glorifies himself by enumerating the slaying of Tvash/rz’s son and other deeds of strength, we refute as follows. The death of Tvash/rz’s son and similar deeds are referred to, not to the end of glorifying Indra as the object of knowledge—in which case the sense of the passage would be, c Because I accomplished such and such deeds, therefore know me 5 —but to the end of glorifying the cognition of the highest Self. For this reason the text, after having referred to the slaying of Tvash tri$> son and the like, goes on in the clause next following to exalt knowledge, ‘ And not one hair of me is harmed there. He who knows me thus by no* deed of his is his life harmed. 5 —(But how does this passage convey praise of knowledge?)—Because, we reply, its meaning is as follows: ‘ Although I do such cruel deeds, 1 I. e. spontaneous intuition of supersensible truth, rendered possible through the knowledge acquired In former existences.
yet not even a hair of mine is harmed because I am one with Brahman; therefore the life of any other person also who knows me thus is not harmed by any deed of his/ And the object of the knowledge (praised by Indra) is nothing else but Brahman which is set forth in a subsequent passage, 4 I am prazza, the intelligent Self/ Therefore the entire chapter refers to Brahman.
31. If it be said (that Brahman is) not (meant), on account of characteristic marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air (being mentioned); we say no, on account of the threefoldness of devout meditation (which would result from your interpretation); on account of (the meaning advocated by us) being ac¬ cepted (elsewhere); and on account of (characteristic marks of Brahman) being connected (with the pas¬ sage under discussion).
Although we admit, the pfirvapakshin resumes, that the chapter about the prazza does not furnish any instruction regarding some outward deity, since it contains a multitude of references to the interior Self; still we deny that it is concerned with Brahman.—For what reason?—Because it mentions characteristic marks of the individual soul on the one hand, and of the chief vital air on the other hand. The passage, 4 Let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker/ mentions a characteristic mark of the individual soul, and must therefore be held to point out as the object of knowledge the individual soul which rules and employs the different organs of action such as speech and so on. On the other hand, we have the passage, 4 But prazza alone, the intelligent Self, having laid hold of this body makes it rise up/ which points to the chief vital air; for the chief attribute of the vital air is that it sustains the body. Similarly, we read in the colloquy of the vital airs (Pra. Up. II, 3), concerning speech and the other vital airs, 4 Then prazza (the chief vital air) as the best said to them: Be not deceived; I alone dividing myself fivefold support this body and keep it/ Those, again, who in the passage quoted above read c this one (masc.), the bodymust give the following explanation, Prazza having laid hold of this one, viz. either the individual soul or the aggregate of the sense organs, makes the body rise up. The individual soul as well as the chief vital air may justly be designated as the intelligent Self; for the former is of the nature of intelligence, and the latter (although non-intelligent in itself) is the abode of other prazzas, viz. the sense organs, which are the instruments of intelligence. Moreover, if the word prazza be taken to denote the individual soul as well as the chief vital air, the prazza and the intelligent Self may be spoken of in two ways, either as being non-different on account of their mutual concomit¬ ance, or as being different on account of their (essentially different) individual character; and in these two different ways they are actually spoken of in the two following passages, £ What is prazza that is pra^vm, what is pra.gnk that is prazzaand, ‘ For together do these two live in the body and together do they depart.’ If, on the other hand, prazza denoted Brahman, what then could be different from what? For these reasons prazza does not denote Brahman, but either the individual soul or the chief vital air or both.
All this argumentation, we reply, is wrong, ‘ on account of the threefoldness of devout meditation.’ Your inter¬ pretation would involve the assumption of devout medi¬ tation of three different kinds, viz. on the individual soul, on the chief vital air, and on Brahman. But it is inap¬ propriate to assume that a single sentence should enjoin three kinds of devout meditation; and that all the passages about the prazza really constitute one single sentence (one syntactical whole) appears from the beginning and the concluding part. In the beginning we have the clause c Know me only/ followed by ‘ I am prazza, the intelligent Self, meditate on me as Life, as Immortality;’ and in the end we read, c And that prazza indeed is the intelligent Self, blessed, imperishable, immortal/ The beginning and the concluding part are thus seen to be similar, and we 1 Imaz# jariram instead of idazzz jariram.
VEDANTA-sft TRAS.
therefore must conclude that they refer to one and the same matter. Nor can the characteristic mark of Brahman be so turned as to be applied to something else; for the ten objects and the ten subjects (subjective powers) 1 cannot rest on anything but Brahman. Moreover, pr&zza must denote Brahman ‘on account of (that meaning) being accepted/ i. e. because in the case of other passages where characteristic marks of Brahman are mentioned the word prazza is taken in the sense of ‘ Brahman. 5 And another reason for assuming the passage to refer to Brahman is that here also, i. e. in the passage itself there is ‘ connexion' with characteristic marks of Brahman, as, for instance, the reference to what is most beneficial for man. The assertion that the passage, ‘ Having laid hold of this body it makes it rise up/ contains a characteristic mark of the chief vital air, is untrue; for as the function of the vital air also ultimately rests on Brahman it can figuratively be ascribed to the latter. So Scripture also declares, ‘ No mortal lives by the breath that goes up and by the breath that goes down. We live by another in whom these two repose 5 (Ka. Up. II, 5, 5 )* Nor does the indication of the in¬ dividual soul which you allege to occur in the passage, ‘Let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker/ preclude the view of prazza denoting Brahman.
For, as the passages, ‘ I am Brahman/ ‘ That art thou, 5 and others, prove, there is in reality no such thing as an individual soul absolutely different from Brahman r but Brahman, in so far as it differentiates itself through the mind (buddhi) and other limiting conditions, is called individual soul, agent, enjoyer. Such passages therefore as the one alluded to, (viz. ‘ let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker, 5 ) which, by setting aside all the dif¬ ferences due to limiting conditions, aim at directing the mind on the internal Self and thus showing that the 1 Yanka j'abdadaya^ ^anka prfthivyadaya^ ka dasa bhutamatra^ ^anka buddhindriyam ^anka buddhaya iti dasa. pra^amatra^. Yadva ^anendriyartha^ ipanka karmendriyartha^ ka pa^eti da^a bhfitamatra^ dvividhanindriyam pra^zzamatra dajeti bhavak. An. Gi.
individual soul is one with Brahman, are by no means out of place. That the Self which is active in speaking and the like is Brahman appears from another scriptural passage also, viz. Ke. Up. I, 5, ‘ That which is not expressed by speech and by which speech is expressed that alone know as Brahman, not that which people here adore.' The remark that the statement about the difference of prazza and pra^7?a (contained in the passage, ‘ Together they dwell in this body, together they depart 5 ) does not agree with that interpretation according to which prazza is Brahman, is without force; for the mind and the vital air which are the respective abodes of the two powers of cognition and action, and constitute the limiting conditions of the internal Self may be spoken of as different. The internal Self, on the other hand, which is limited by those twb adjuncts, is in itself non-differentiated, so that the two may be identified, as is done in the passage ‘pr&zza is pra gn& The second part of the Sutra is explained in a different manner also 1, as follows: Characteristic marks of the individual soul as well as of the chief vital air are not out of place even in a chapter whose topic is Brahman. How so? ‘ On account of the threefoldness of devout meditation.’ The chapter aims at enjoining three kinds of devout meditation on Brahman, according as Brahman is viewed under the aspect of pr&zza, under the aspect of pra^rn, and in itself. The passages, ‘ Meditate (on me) as life, as immortality. Life is prazza,’ and ‘ Having laid hold of this body it makes it rise up. Therefore let man worship it alone as uktha,’ refer to the prazza aspect. The introductory passage, ‘Now we shall explain how all things become one in that pra gn&l and the subsequent passages, ‘ Speech verily milked one portion thereof; the word is its object placed outside •/ and, ‘ Having by pra^vza taken possession of speech he obtains by speech all words &c., } refer to the pra^a aspect. The Brahman aspect finally is referred to in the following passage, ‘ These ten 1 Viz. by the vrz'ttik&ra.
io6 objects have reference to pra gnk, the ten subjects have reference to objects. If there were no objects there would be no subjects; and if there were no subjects there would be no objects. For on either side alone no¬ thing could be achieved. But that is not many. For as in a car the circumference of the wheel is set on the spokes and the spokes on the nave, thus are these objects set on the subjects and the subjects on the pr&zza.’ Thus we see that the one meditation on Brahman is here repre¬ sented as threefold, according as Brahman is viewed either with reference to two limiting conditions or in itself. In other passages also we find that devout meditation on Brahman is made dependent on Brahman being qualified by limiting adjuncts; so, for instance ( Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 2), £ He who consists of mind, whose body is prazza.’ The hypothesis of Brahman being meditated upon under three aspects perfectly agrees with the prazza chapter 1; as, on the one hand, from a comparison of the introductory and the concluding clauses we infer that the subject-matter of the whole chapter is one only, and as, on the other hand, we meet with characteristic marks of prazza, pra^Yia, and Brahman in turns. It therefore remains a settled con¬ clusion that Brahman is the topic of the whole chapter.
1 Ihapi tad yugyate explaining the ‘ iha tadyogat' of the Sutra.
Reverence to the highest Self!
In the first pada Brahman has been shown to be the cause of the origin, subsistence, and reabsorption of the entire world, comprising the ether and the other elements. More¬ over, of this Brahman, which is the cause of the entire world, certain qualities have (implicitly) been declared, such as allpervadingness, eternity, omniscience, its being the Self of all, and so on. Further, by producing reasons showing that some words which are generally used in a different sense denote Brahman also, we have been able to determine that some passages about whose sense doubts are entertained refer to Brahman. Now certain other passages present themselves which because containing only obscure indica¬ tions of Brahman give rise to the doubt whether they refer to the highest Self or to something else. We therefore begin the second and third padas in order to settle those doubtful points.
i. (That which consists of mind is Brahman) be¬ cause there is taught what is known from everywhere.
Scripture says, ‘All this indeed is Brahman, beginning, ending, and breathing in it; thus knowing let a man meditate with calm mind. Now man is made of determination (kratu); according to what his determination is in this world so will he be when he has departed this life. Let him there¬ fore form this determination: he who consists of mind, whose body is breath (the subtle body),’ &c. (. Kh. Up. Ill, 14). Concerning this passage the doubt presents itself whether what is pointed out as the object of meditation, by means of attributes such as consisting of mind, &c., is the embodied (individual) soul or the highest Brahman.
The embodied Self, the purvapakshin says.—Why?— Because the embodied Self as the ruler of the organs of action is well known to be connected with the mind and so on, while the highest Brahman is not, as is declared in several scriptural passages, so, for instance (Mu. Up. II, 1,2), io8 £ He is without breath, without mind, pure.’—But, it may be objected, the passage, ‘ All this indeed is Brahman,’mentions Brahman directly; how then can you suppose that the embodied Self forms the object of meditation?—This objec¬ tion does not apply, the purvapakshin rejoins, because the passage does not aim at enjoining meditation on Brahman, but rather at enjoining calmness of mind, the sense being: because Brahman is all this, ta^al&n, let a man meditate with a calm mind. That is to say: because all this aggregate of effects is Brahman only, springing from it, ending in it, and breathing in it; and because, as everything constitutes one Self only, there is no room for passion; therefore a man is to meditate with a calm mind. And since the sentence aims at enjoining calmness of mind, it cannot at the same time enjoin meditation on Brahman 1; but meditation is separately enjoined in the clause, £ Let him form the determination, i. e. reflection. 5 And thereupon the subsequent passage, £ He who consists of mind, whose body is breath, 5 &c. states the object of the meditation in words indicatory of the individual soul. For this reason we maintain that the meditation spoken of has the individual soul for its object. The other attributes also subsequently stated in the text, £ He to whom all works, all desires belong, 5 &c. may rightly be held to refer to the individual soul.