The attributes, finally, of being what abides in the heart and of being extremely minute which are mentioned in the pas¬ sage, £ He is my Self within the heart, smaller than a corn of rice, smaller than a corn of barley, 5 may be ascribed to the individual soul which has the size of the point of a goad, but not to the unlimited Brahman. If it be objected that the immediately following passage, £ greater than the earth,’ &c., cannot refer to something limited, we reply that smallness and greatness which are mutually opposite cannot indeed be ascribed to one and the same thing; and that, if one attribute 1 The clause £ he is to meditate with a calm mind 5 if taken as a guzzavidhi, i. e. as enjoining some secondary matter, viz. calmness of mind of the meditating person, cannot at the same time enjoin meditation; for that would involve a so-called split of the sentence (vakyabheda).
only is to be ascribed to the subject of the passage, smallness is preferable because it is mentioned first; while the great¬ ness mentioned later on may be attributed to the soul in so far as it is one with Brahman. If it is once settled that the whole passage refers to the individual soul, it follows that the declaration of Brahman also, contained in the passage, f That is Brahman 5 (III, 14, 4), refers to the individual soul 1, as it is clearly connected with the general topic. Therefore the individual soul is the object of meditation indicated by the qualities of consisting of mind and so on.
To all this we reply: The highest Brahman only is what is to be meditated upon as distinguished by the attributes of consisting of mind and so on.—Why?— £ On account of there being taught here what is known from everywhere. 5 What is known from all Vedanta-passages to be the sense of the word Brahman, viz. the cause of the world, and what is mentioned here in the beginning words of the passage, (‘ all this indeed is Brahman,’) the same we must assume to be taught here as distinguished by certain qualities, viz. consisting of mind and so on. Thus we avoid the fault of dropping the subject-matter under discussion and needlessly introducing a new topic.—But, it may be said, it has been shown that Brahman is, in the beginning of the passage, introduced merely for the purpose of intimating the injunc¬ tion of calmness of mind, not for the purpose of intimating Brahman itself.—True, we reply; but the fact nevertheless remains that, where the qualities of consisting of mind, &c. are spoken of, Brahman only is proximate (i. e. mentioned not far off so that it may be concluded to be the thing referred to), while the individual soul is neither proximate nor intimated by any word directly pointing to it. The cases of Brahman and the individual soul are therefore not equal.
2. And because the qualities desired to be ex¬ pressed are possible (in Brahman; therefore the passage refers to Brahman).
1 Give *pi dehadibrz>#hana£- ^yastvanyayad va brahmatety artha/2. An. Gi, I TO Although in the Veda which is not the work of man no wish in the strict sense can be expressed 1, there being no speaker, still such phrases as ‘desired to be expressed/ may be figuratively used on account of the result, viz. (mental) comprehension. For just as in ordinary language we speak of something which is intimated by a word and is to be received (by the hearer as the meaning of the word), as c desired to be expressed; 5 so in the Veda also whatever is denoted as that which is to be received is ‘desired to be expressed/ everything else ‘not desired to be expressed/ What is to be received as the meaning of a Vedic sentence, and what not, is inferred from the general purport of the passage. Those qualities which are here desired to be expressed, i. e. intimated as qualities to be dwelt on in meditation, viz. the qualities of having true purposes, &c. are possible in the highest Brahman; for the quality of having true purposes may be ascribed to the highest Self which possesses unimpeded power over the creation, subsist¬ ence, and reabsorption of this world. Similarly the qualities of having true desires and true purposes are attributed to the highest Self in another passage, viz. the one beginning, ‘The Self which is free from sin * ( Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 1).
The clause, ‘ He whose Self is the ether/ means ‘ he whose Self is like the ether;’ for Brahman may be said to be like the ether on account of its omnipresence and other qualities. This is also expressed by the clause, ‘ Greater than the earth/ And the other explanation also, accord¬ ing to which the passage means ‘he whose Self is the ether ’ is possible, since Brahman which as the cause of the whole world is the Self of everything is also the Self of the ether. For the same reasons he is called ‘ he to whom all works belong, and so on/ Thus the qualities here intimated as topics of meditation agree with the nature of Brahman. We further maintain that the terms ‘ consisting of mind/ and ‘ having breath for its body/ which the pfirvapakshin asserts 1 The discussion is brought on by the term ‘ vivakshita ’ in the Sutra whose meaning is ‘ expressed, aimed at/ but more literally ‘ desired to be expressed/ I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 3. Ill cannot refer to Brahman, may refer to it. For as Brahman is the Self of everything, qualities such as consisting of mind and the like, which belong to the individual soul, belong to Brahman also. Accordingly vSruti and Smrz’ti say of Brahman, ‘ Thou art woman, thou art man; thou art youth, thou art maiden; thou as an old man totterest along on thy staff; thou art born with thy face turned everywhere 5 ( 5 ve. Up. IV, 3), and ‘ its hands and feet are everywhere, its eyes and head are everywhere, its ears are everywhere, it stands encompassing all in the world 5 (Bha. Gita III, 13).
The passage (quoted above against our view), ‘ Without breath, without mind, pure, 5 refers to the pure (unrelated) Brahman. The terms ‘ consisting of mind; having breath for its body, 5 on the other hand, refer to Brahman as distinguished by qualities. Hence, as the qualities mentioned are possible in Brahman, we conclude that the highest Brahman only is represented as the object of meditation.
3. On the other hand, as (those qualities) are not possible (in it), the embodied (soul is) not (denoted by manomaya, &c.).
The preceding Sutra has declared that the qualities mentioned are possible in Brahman; the present Sutra states that they are not possible in the embodied Self. Brahman only possesses, in the manner explained, the qualities of consisting of mind, and so on; not the em¬ bodied individual soul. For qualities such as expressed in the words, ‘ He whose purposes are true, whose Self is the ether, who has no speech, who is not disturbed, who is greater than the earth, 5 cannot easily be attributed to the embodied Self. By the term ‘ embodied 5 (^arira) we have to understand ‘ residing 5 in a body. If it be objected that the Lord also resides in the body 1, we reply, True, he does reside in the body, but not in the body only; for jruti declares him to be all-pervading; compare, ‘ He is greater than the earth; greater than the atmosphere, omnipresent like the ether, eternal. 5 The individual soul, on the other 1 Because he is vyapin.
I 12 hand, is in the body only, apart from which as the abode of fruition it does not exist.
4. And because there is a (separate) denotation of the object of activity and of the agent.
The attributes of consisting of mind, and so on, cannot belong to the embodied Self for that reason also, that there is a (separate) denotation of the object of activity and of the agent. In the passage, 4 When I shall have departed from hence I shall obtain him’ ( Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 4), the word 4 him 5 refers to that which is the topic of discussion, viz. the Self which is to be meditated upon as possessing the attributes of consisting of mind, &c., as the object of an activity, viz. as something to be obtained; while the words, 4 1 shall obtain, 5 represent the meditating individual Self as the agent, i. e. the obtainer. Now, wherever it can be helped, we must not assume that one and the same being is spoken of as the agent and the object of the activity at the same time. The relation existing between a person medi¬ tating and the thing meditated upon requires, moreover, different abodes.—And thus for the above reason, also, that which is characterised by the attributes of consisting of mind, and so on, cannot be the individual soul.
5. On account of the difference of words.
That which possesses the attributes of consisting of mind, and so on, cannot be the individual soul, for that reason also that there is a difference of words.
That is to say, we meet with another scriptural passage of kindred subject-matter (Sat. Bra. X, 6, 3, 2), 4 Like a rice grain, or a barley grain, or a canary seed or the kernel of a canary seed, thus that golden person is in the Self. 5 There one word, i. e. the locative 4 in the Self, 5 denotes the embodied Self, and a different word, viz. the nominative 4 person, 5 denotes the Self distinguished by the qualities of con¬ sisting of mind, &c. We therefrom conclude that the two are different.
6. And on account of Smrzti.
Smrz’ti also declares the difference of the embodied Self and the highest Self, viz. Bha. Gita XVIII, 6r, ‘The Lord, O Ar^una, is seated in the heart of all beings, driving round by his magical power all beings (as if they were) mounted on a machine.’
But what, it may be asked, is that so-called embodied Self different from the highest Self which is to be set aside according to the preceding Sutras? vSruti passages, as well as Smrzti, expressly deny that there is any Self apart from the highest Self; compare, for instance, Brz. Up. Ill, 7, 23, ‘There is no other seer but he; there is no other hearer but he;’ and Bha. Giti XIII, 2, ‘And know me also, O BMrata, to be the kshetra^a in all kshetras.’
True, we reply, (there is in reality one universal Self only.) But the highest Self in so far as it is limited by its adjuncts, viz. the body, the senses, and the mind (mano-buddhi), is, by the ignorant, spoken of as if it were embodied. Simi¬ larly the ether, although in reality unlimited, appears limited owing to certain adjuncts, such as jars and other vessels. With regard to this (unreal limitation of the one Self) the distinction of objects of activity and of agents may be practically assumed, as long as we have not learned— from the passage, ‘That art thou’—that the Self is one only. As soon, however, as we grasp the truth that there is only one universal Self, there is an end to the whole practical view of the world with its distinction of bondage, final release, and the like.
7. If it be said that (the passage does) not (refer to Brahman) on account of the smallness of the abode (mentioned), and on account of the denotations of that (i. e* of minuteness); we say, no; because (Brahman) has thus to be contemplated, and be¬ cause the case is analogous to that of ether.
On account of the limitation of its abode, which is men¬ tioned in the clause, ‘ He is my Self within the heart,’ and on account of the declaration as to its minuteness contained in the direct statement, ‘ He is smaller than a grain of rice,’ &c.; the embodied soul only, which is of the size of an awl’s point, is spoken of in the passage under discussion, and not [34] I ii4 vedanta-s£jtras.
the highest Self. This assertion made above (in the purvapaksha of Sutra I, and restated in the purvapaksha of the present Sutra) has to be refuted. We therefore maintain that the objection raised does not invalidate our view of the passage. It is true that a thing occupying a limited space only cannot in any way be spoken of as omnipresent; but, on the other hand, that which is omnipresent, and therefore in all places may, from a certain point of view, be said to occupy a limited space. Similarly, a prince may be called the ruler of Ayodhy£ although he is at the same time the ruler of the whole earth.—But from what point of view can the omnipresent Lord be said to occupy a limited space and to be minute?—He may, we reply, be spoken of thus, ‘because he is to be contemplated thus.’ The passage under discus¬ sion teaches us to contemplate the Lord as abiding within the lotus of the heart, characterised by minuteness and similar qualities—which apprehension of the Lord is ren¬ dered possible through a modification of the mind—just as Hari is contemplated in the sacred stone called 5 alagr 4 m. Although present everywhere, the Lord is pleased when meditated upon as dwelling in the heart. The case is, moreover, to be viewed as analogous to that of the ether.
The ether, although all-pervading, is spoken of as limited and minute, if considered in its connexion with the eye of a needle; so Brahman also. But it is an understood matter that the attributes of limitation of abode and of minuteness depend, in Brahman’s case, entirely on special forms of con¬ templation, and are not real. The latter consideration dis¬ poses also of the objection, that if Brahman has its abode in the heart, which heart-abode is a different one in each body, it would follow that it is affected by all the imper¬ fections which attach to beings having different abodes, such as parrots shut up in different cages, viz. want of unity, being made up of parts, non-permanency, and so on.
8. If it is said that (from the circumstance of Brahman and the individual soul being one) there follows fruition (on the part of Brahman); we say, no; on account of the difference of nature (of the two).
But, it may be said, as Brahman is omnipresent like ether, and therefore connected with the hearts of all living beings, and as it is of the nature of intelligence and therefore not dif¬ ferent from the individual soul, it follows that Brahman also has the same fruition of pleasure, pain, and so on (as the indi¬ vidual soul). The same result follows from its unity. For in reality there exists no transmigratory Self different from the highest Self; as appears from the text, ‘ There is no other knower but he’ (B ri. Up. Ill, 7 > 23), and similar pas¬ sages. Hence the highest Self is subject to the fruition connected with transmigratory existence.
This is not so, we reply; because there is a difference of nature. From the circumstance that Brahman is connected with the hearts of all living beings it does not follow that it is, like the embodied Self, subject to fruition. For, between the embodied Self and the highest Self, there is the dif¬ ference that the former acts and enjoys, acquires merit and demerit, and is affected by pleasure, pain, and so on; while the latter is of the opposite nature, i.e. characterised by being free from all evil and the like. On account of this difference of the two, the fruition of the one does not extend to the other. To assume merely on the ground of the mutual proximity of the two, without considering their essentially different powers, that a connexion with effects exists (in Brahman’s case also), would be no better than to suppose that space is on fire (when something in space is on fire). The same objection and refutation apply to the case of those also who teach the existence of more than one omni¬ present Self. In reply to the assertion, that because Brahman is one and there are no other Selfs outside it, Brahman must be subject to fruition since the individual soul is so, we ask the question: How have you, our wise opponent, ascertained that there is no other Self? You will reply, we suppose, from scriptural texts such as, ‘ That art thou,’ ‘I am Brahman/ 'There is no other knower but he, 5 and so on. Very well, then, it appears that the truth about scriptural matters is to be ascertained from Scripture, and that Scripture is not sometimes to be appealed to, and on other occasions to be disregarded.
I 2 I 2 Scriptural texts, such as ‘that art thou,’ teach that Brahman which is free from all evil is the Self of the embodied soul, and thus dispel even the opinion that the em¬ bodied soul is subject to fruition; how then should fruition on the part of the embodied soul involve fruition on the part of Brahman? —Let, then, the unity of the individual soul and Brahman not be apprehended on the ground of Scripture.—In that case, we reply, the fruition on the part of the individual soul has wrong knowledge for its cause, and Brahman as it truly exists is not touched thereby, not any more than the ether becomes really dark-blue in con¬ sequence of ignorant people presuming it to be so. For this reason the Sutrakara says 1 ‘no, on account of the difference.’ In spite of their unity, fruition on the part of the soul does not involve fruition on the part of Brahman; because there is a difference. For there is a difference between false knowledge and perfect knowledge, fruition being the figment of false knowledge while the unity (of the Self) is revealed by perfect knowledge. Now, as the substance revealed by perfect knowledge cannot be affected by fruition which is nothing but the figment of false knowledge, it is impossible to assume even a shadow of fruition on Brahman’s part.
9. The eater (is the highest Self) since what is movable and what is immovable is mentioned (as his food).
We read in the Ka/^avalli (I, 3, 25), ‘ Who then knows where He is, He to whom the Brahmans and Kshattriyas are but food, and death itself a condiment? 5 This passage intimates, by means of the words ‘ food ’ and ‘ condiment,’ that there is some eater. A doubt then arises whether the eater be Agni or the individual soul or the highest Self; for no distinguishing characteristic is stated, and Agni as well as the individual soul and the highest Self is observed to form, in that Upanished, the subjects of questions 2.
1 Another interpretation of the later part of Sutra.
I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, IO.
II 7 The purvapakshin maintains that the eater is Agni, fire being known from Scripture as well (cp. B rL Up. I, 4, 6) as from ordinary life to be the eater of food. Or else the individual soul may be the eater, according to the passage, ‘ One of them eats the sweet fruit’ (Mu. Up. Ill, 1, 1). On the other hand, the eater cannot be Brahman on account of the passage (which forms the continuation of the one quoted from the Mu. Up.), ‘The other looks on without eating.’
The eater, we reply, must be the highest Self ‘ because there is mentioned what is movable and what is immov¬ able.’ For all things movable and immovable are here to be taken as constituting the food, while death is the condiment. But nothing beside the highest Self can be the consumer of all these things in their totality; the highest Self, however, when reabsorbing the entire aggre¬ gate of effects may be said to eat everything. If it is objected that here no express mention is made of things movable and things immovable, and that hence we have no right to use the (alleged) mention made of them as a reason, we reply that this objection is unfounded; firstly, because the aggregate of all living beings is seen to be meant from the circumstance of death being the condiment; and, secondly, because the Brahmans and Kshattriyas may here, on account of their pre-eminent position, be viewed as instances only (of all beings). Concerning the objection that the highest Self cannot be an eater on account of the passage quoted (‘the other looks on without eating’), we remark that that passage aims at denying the fruition (on the part of the highest Self) of the results of works, such fruition being mentioned in immediate proximity, but is not meant to negative the reabsorption of the world of effects (into Brahman); for it is well established by all the Vedanta-texts that Brahman is the cause of the creation, subsistence, and reabsorption of the world. There¬ fore the eater can here be Brahman only.
10. And on account of the topic under discussion.
That the highest Self only can be the eater referred to is moreover evident from the passage (Ka. Up. I, 3, 18), (‘ The knowing Self is not born, it dies not ’), which shows that the highest Self is the general topic. And to adhere to the general topic is the proper proceeding. Further, the clause, ‘ Who then knows where he is,’ shows that the cognition is connected with difficulties; which circumstance again points to the highest Self.
ii. The ‘two entered into the cave' (are the in¬ dividual soul and the highest Self), for the two are (intelligent) Selfs (and therefore of the same nature), as it is seen (that numerals denote beings of the same nature).
In the same Ka/^avalli we read (I, 3, 1), f There are the two drinking the reward of their works in the world, (i.e. the body,) entered into the cave, dwelling on the highest summit. Those who know Brahman call them shade and light; likewise those householders who perform the Tri;zcl-£iketa sacrifice.’
Here the doubt arises whether the mind (buddhi) and the individual soul are referred to, or the individual soul and the highest Self. If the mind and the individual soul, then the individual soul is here spoken of as different from the aggregate of the organs of action, (i. e. the body,) among which the mind occupies the first place. And a statement on this point is to be expected, as a question concerning it is asked in a preceding passage, viz. I, 1, 20, ‘There is that doubt when a man is dead—some saying he is; others, he is not. This I should like to know taught by thee; this is the third of my boons.’ If, on the other hand, the passage refers to the individual soul and the highest Self, then it intimates that the highest Self is different from the individual soul; and this also requires to be declared here, on account of the question contained in the passage (I, 2, 14), ‘ That which thou seest as different from religious duty and its contrary, from effect and cause, from the past and the future, tell me that.’
The doubt to which the passage gives rise having thus I ADHYAYA, 2 PAD A, II.
been stated, a caviller starts the following objection: neither of the stated views can be maintained.—Why?—On account of the characteristic mark implied in the circumstance that the two are said to drink, i. e. to enjoy, the fruit of their works in the world. For this can apply to the intelligent individual soul only, not to the non-intelligent buddhi. And as the dual form ‘drinking’ (pibantau) shows that both are drinking, the view of the two being the buddhi and the individual soul is not tenable. For the same reason the other opinion also, viz. of the two being the individual soul and the highest Self, cannot be main¬ tained; for drinking (i. e. the fruition of reward) cannot be predicated of the highest Self, on account of the mantra (Mu. Up. Ill, 1, 1), ‘The other looks on without eating.’
These objections, we reply, are without any force. Just as we see that in phrases such as ‘ the men with the umbrella (lit. the umbrella-men) are walking, 5 the attri¬ bute of being furnished with an umbrella which properly speaking belongs to one man only is secondarily ascribed to many, so here two agents are spoken of as drinking because one of them is really drinking. Or else we may explain the passage by saying that, while the individual soul only drinks, the Lord also is said to drink because he makes the soul drink. On the other hand, we may also assume that the two are the buddhi and the individual soul, the instrument being figuratively spoken of as the agent—a figure of speech exemplified by phrases such as ‘ the fuel cooks (the food). 5 And in a chapter whose topic is the soul no two other beings can well be represented as enjoying rewards. Hence there is room for the doubt whether the two are the buddhi and the individual soul, or the individual soul and the highest Self.
Here the purvapakshin maintains that the former of the two stated views is the right one, because the two beings are qualified as ‘entered into the cave.’ Whether we understand by the cave the body or the heart, in either case the buddhi and the individual soul may be spoken of as ‘ entered into the cave. 5 Nor would it be appropriate, as long as another interpretation is possible, to assume that a special place is here ascribed to the omnipresent Brahman. Moreover, the words ‘in the world of their good deeds 5 show that the two do not pass beyond the sphere of the results of their good works. But the highest Self is not in the sphere of the results of either good or bad works; according to the scriptural passage, ‘ It does not grow larger by works nor does it grow smaller.’ Further, the words ‘shade and light’ properly designate what is intelligent and what is non-intelligent, because the two are opposed to each other like light and shade. Hence we con¬ clude that the buddhi and the individual soul are spoken of.
To this we make the following reply:—In the passage under discussion the individual soul (vi^&ncltman) and the highest Self are spoken of, because these two, being both intelligent Selfs, are of the same nature. For we see that in ordinary life also, whenever a number is mentioned, beings of the same class are understood to be meant; when, for instance, the order is given, ‘ Look out for a second (i. e. a fellow) for this bull,’ people look out for a second bull, not for a horse or a man. So here also, where the mention of the fruition of rewards enables us to determine that the individual soul is meant, we understand at once, when a second is required, that the highest Self has to be understood; for the highest Self is intelligent, and therefore of the same nature as the soul.—But has it not been said above that the highest Self cannot be meant here, on account of the text stating that it is placed in the cave?—Well, we reply,.sruti as well as smrzti speaks of the highest Self as placed in the cave. Compare, for instance (Ka. Up. I, 2,12), ‘ The Ancient who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the abyss;’ Taitt.
Up. II, 1, ‘ He who knows him hidden in the cave, in the highest ether; ’ and, ‘ Search for the Self entered into the cave.’ That it is not contrary to reason to assign to the omni¬ present Brahman a special locality, for the purpose of clearer perception, we have already demonstrated. The attribute of existing in the world of its good works, which properly belongs to one of the two only, viz. to the individual soul, may be assigned to both, analogously to the case of the men, one of whom carries an umbrella. Their being compared to light I 2 I and shade also is unobjectionable, because the qualities of belonging and not belonging to this transmigratory world are opposed to each other, like light and shade; the quality of belonging to it being due to Nescience, and the quality of not belonging to it being real. We therefore understand by the two ‘ entered into the cave, 5 the individual soul and the highest Self.—Another reason for this interpretation follows.
12. And on account of the distinctive qualities (mentioned).
Moreover, the distinctive qualities mentioned in the text agree only with the individual Self and the highest Self. For in a subsequent passage (I, 3, 3), ‘ Know the Self to be the charioteer, the body to be the chariot,’ which contains the simile of the chariot, the individual soul is represented as a charioteer driving on through transmigratory existence and final release, while the passage (9), ‘ He reaches the end of his journey, and that is the highest place of Vish/zu/ repre¬ sents the highest Self as the goal of the driver’s course. And in a preceding passage also, (I, 2,12, ‘The wise, who by means of meditation on his Self, recognises the Ancient who is difficult to be seen, who has entered into the dark, who is hidden in the cave, wffio dwells in the abyss, as God, he indeed leaves joy and sorrow far behind,’) the same two beings are distinguished as thinker and as object of thought. The highest Self is, moreover, the general topic. And fur¬ ther, the clause, f Those who know Brahman call them,’ &c., which brings forward a special class of speakers, is in its place only if the highest Self is accepted (as one of the two beings spoken of). It is therefore evident that the passage under discussion refers to the individual soul and the highest Self.
The same reasoning applies to the passage (Mu. Up. Ill, 1, 1), ‘Two birds, inseparable friends/ &c. There also the Self is the general topic, and hence no two ordinary birds can be meant; we therefore conclude from the characteristic mark of eating, mentioned in the passage, c One of them eats the sweet fruit,’ that the individual soul is meant, and from vedanta-s6tras.
the characteristic marks of abstinence from eating and of in¬ telligence, implied in the words, 4 The other looks on without eating,’ that the highest Self is meant. In a subsequent mantra again the two are distinguished as the seer and the object of sight. 4 Merged into the same tree (as it were into water) man grieves at his own impotence (anira), bewildered; but when he sees the other Lord (ua) contented and knows his glory, then his grief passes away/ Another (commentator) gives a different interpretation of the mantra, 4 Two birds inseparable, 5 &c. To that mantra, he says, the final decision of the present head of discussion does not apply, because it is differently interpreted in the Paingi-rahasya Brahma^a. According to the latter the being which eats the sweet fruit is the sattva; the other being which looks on without eating, the individual soul (grid ); so that the two are the sattva and the individual soul (kshetra^a). The objection that the word sattva might denote the indi¬ vidual soul, and the word kshetra^a, the highest Self, is to be met by the remark that, in the first place, the words sattva and kshetra^a have the settled meaning of internal organ and individual soul, and are, in the second place, expressly so interpreted there, (viz. in the Paingi-rahasya,) 4 The sattva is that by means of which man sees dreams;