the embodied one, the seer, is the kshetra^/m; the two are therefore the internal organ and the individual soul. 5 Nor does the mantra under discussion fall under the purvapaksha propounded above. For it does not aim at setting forth the embodied individual soul, in so far as it is characterised by the attributes connected with the transmigratory state, such as acting and enjoying; but in so far rather as it transcends all attributes connected with the sa^sdra and is of the nature of Brahman, i. e. is pure intelligence; as is evident from the clause, 4 The other looks on without eating. 5 That agrees, moreover, with iruti and smrzti passages, such as, 4 That art thou, 5 and 4 Know me also to be the individual soul ’ (Bha. Gita XIII, 2). Only on such an explanation of the passage as the preceding one there is room for the declaration made in the concluding passage of the section, * These two are the sattva and the kshetra^vm; to him indeed who knows this no impurity attaches V—But how can, on the above interpretation, the non-intelligent sattva (i. e. the internal organ) be spoken of as an enjoyer, as is actually done in the clause, ‘ One of them eats the sweet fruit? ’—The whole passage, we reply, does not aim at setting forth the fact that the sattva is an enjoyer, but rather the fact that the intelligent individual soul is not an enjoyer, but is of the nature of Brahman. To that end 1 2 * * the passage under discussion metaphorically ascribes the attribute of being an enjoyer to the internal organ, in so far as it is modified by pleasure, pain, and the like. For all acting and enjoying is at the bottom based on the non-discrimination (by the soul) of the respective nature of internal organ and soul; while in reality neither the internal organ nor the soul either act or enjoy; not the former, because it is non-intelligent; not the latter, because it is not capable of any modification. And the internal organ can be considered as acting and enjoying, all the less as it is a mere presentment of Nescience. In agree¬ ment with what we have here maintained, Scripture (‘ For where there is as it were duality there one sees the other, 5 &c.; B ri. Up. IV, 5,15) declares that the practical assump¬ tion of agents, and so on—comparable to the assumption of the existence of elephants, and the like, seen in a dream— holds good in the sphere of Nescience only; while the pas¬ sage, ‘ But when the Self only is all this, how should he see another? ’ declares that all that practically postulated exist¬ ence vanishes for him who has arrived at discriminative knowledge.
13. The person within (the eye) (is Brahman) on account of the agreement (of the attributes of that person with the nature of Brahman).
1 Freedom from impurity can result only from the knowledge that the individual soul is in reality Brahman, The commentators explain ra^as by avidyd.
2 Tadartham iti, ^ivasya brahmasiddhyartham iti yavat, ^aitanyaMayapanna dhiA sukhadina pari/zamata iti, tatra purusho*pi bhaktrz'tvam ivanubhavati na tattvata iti vaktum adhyaropayati, Ananda Giri.
vedanta-sOtras.
Scripture says, £ He spoke: The person that is seen in the eye that is the Self. This is the immortal, the fearless, this is Brahman. Even though they drop melted butter or water on it (the eye) it runs away on both sides/ &c. ( Kh. Up.
IV, 15, i).
The doubt here arises whether this passage refers to the reflected Self which resides in the eye, or to the individual Self, or to the Self of some deity which presides over the sense of sight, or to the Lord.
With reference to this doubt the purvapakshin argues as follows: What is meant (by the person in the eye) is the reflected Self, i. e. the image of a person (reflected in the eye of another); for of that it is well known that it is seen, and the clause, £ The person that is seen in the eye/ refers to it as something well known. Or else we may appropriately take the passage as referring to the individual Self. For the individual Self (cognitional Self, vig'iianatman) which perceives the colours by means of the eye is, on that account, in proximity to the eye; and, moreover, the word £ Self’ (which occurs in the passage) favours this interpretation. Or else the passage is to be understood as referring to the soul animating the sun which assists the sense of sight; compare the passage (Bri. Up. V, 5, 2), £ He (the person in the sun) rests with his rays in him (the person in the right eye). 5 More¬ over, qualities such as immortality and the like (which are ascribed to the subject of the scriptural passage) may some¬ how belong to individual deities. The Lord, on the other hand 1, cannot be meant, because a particular locality is spoken of.
Against this we remark that the highest Lord only can be meant here by the person within the eye.—Why?— 4 On account of the agreement. 5 For the qualities men¬ tioned in the passage accord with the nature of the highest Lord. The quality of being the Self, in the first place, belongs to the highest Lord in its primary (non-figurative or non-derived) sense, as we know from such texts as £ That 1 Who, somebody might say, is to be understood here, because immortality and similar qualities belong to him not somehow only, but in their true sense.
is the Self,’ c That art thou.’ Immortality and fearlessness again are often ascribed to him in Scripture. The location in the eye also is in consonance with the nature of the highest Lord. For just as the highest Lord whom Scrip¬ ture declares to be free from all evil is not stained by any imperfections, so the station of the eye also is declared to be free from all stain, as we see from the passage, c Even though they drop melted butter or water on it it runs away on both sides.’ The statement, moreover, that he possesses the qualities of sa/^yadvama, &c. can be reconciled with the highest Lord only ( Kh. Up. IV. 15, 2, ‘They call him Sa^yadvama, for all blessings (v&ma) go towards him (sawyanti). He is also vamant, for he leads (nayati) all blessings (vcima). He is also Bhamanl, for he shines (bhati) in all worlds ’). Therefore, on account of agreement, the person within the eye is the highest Lord.
14. And on account of the statement of place, and so on.
But how does the confined locality of the eye agree with Brahman which is omnipresent like the ether?—To this question we reply that there would indeed be a want of agreement if that one locality only were assigned to the Lord. For other localities also, viz. the earth and so on, are attributed to him in the passage, ‘ He who dwells in the earth,’ &c. (B ri. Up. Ill, 7, 3). And among those the eye also is mentioned, viz. in the clause, ‘ He who dwells in the eye,’ &c. The phrase 4 and so on,’ which forms part of the Sutra, intimates that not only locality is assigned to Brahman, although not (really) appropriate to it, but that also such things as name and form, although not appro¬ priate to Brahman which is devoid of name and form, are yet seen to be attributed to it. That, in such passages as c His name is ut, he with the golden beard ’ ( Kh. Up. I, 6, 7, 6), Brahman although devoid of qualities is spoken of, for the purposes of devotion, as possessing qualities depending on name and form, we have already shown. And we have, moreover, shown that to attribute to Brahman vedanta-s£jtras.
a definite locality, in spite of his omnipresence, subserves the purposes of contemplation, and is therefore not con¬ trary to reason 1; no more than to contemplate Vishnu in the sacred ^alagram.
15. And on account of the passage referring to that which is distinguished by pleasure (i.e. Brah¬ man).
There is, moreover, really no room for dispute whether Brahman be meant in the passage under discussion or not, because the fact of Brahman being meant is established ‘ by the reference to that which is distinguished by pleasure/ For the same Brahman which is spoken of as characterised by pleasure in the beginning of the chapter 2, viz. in the clauses, ‘ Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brah¬ man/ that same Brahman we must suppose to be referred to in the present passage also, it being proper to adhere to the subject-matter under discussion; the clause. e The teacher will tell you the way 3 / merely announcing that the way will be proclaimed [by the teacher; not that a new subject will be started].—How then, it may be asked, is it known that Brahman, as distinguished by pleasure, is spoken of in the beginning of the passage?—We reply: On hearing the speech of the fires, viz.‘ Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman/ Upako^ala says, ‘I under¬ stand that breath is Brahman, but I do not understand that Ka or Kha is Brahman/ Thereupon the fires reply, ‘What is Ka is Kha, what is Kha is Ka/ Now the word Kha denotes in ordinary language the elemental ether. If therefore the word Ka which means pleasure were not applied to qualify the sense of ‘ Kha/ we should conclude 1 The /ikas say that the contents of this last sentence are hinted at by the word ‘ and ’ in the Sutra.
2 I. e. at the beginning of the instruction which the sacred fires give to Upako^ala, Kh. Up. IV, 10 ff.
3 Which words conclude the instruction given by the fires, and introduce the instruction given by the teacher, of which the passage ‘ the person that is seen in the eye/ &c. forms a part.
that the name Brahman is here symbolically 1 given to the mere elemental ether as it is (in other places) given to mere names and the like. Thus also with regard to the word Ka, which, in ordinary language, denotes the imperfect pleasure springing from the contact of the sense-organs with their objects. If the word Kha were not applied to qualify the sense of Ka we should conclude that ordinary pleasure is here called Brahman. But as the two words Ka and Kha (occur together and therefore) qualify each other, they intimate Brahman whose Self is pleasure, If 2 * in the passage referred to (viz. ‘ Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman’) the second Brahman (i. e. the word Brahman in the clause ‘ Ka is Brahman ’) were not added, and if the sentence would run ‘ Ka, Kha is Brahman/ the word Ka would be employed as a mere qualifying word, and thus pleasure as being a mere quality would not be represented as a subject of meditation. To prevent this, both words—Ka as well as Kha—are joined with the word Brahman (‘ Ka (is) Brahman, Kha (is) Brah¬ man’). For the passage wishes to intimate that pleasure also, although a quality, should be meditated upon as some¬ thing in which qualities inhere. It thus appears that at the beginning of the chapter Brahman, as characterised by pleasure, is spoken of. After that the Garhapatya and the other sacred fires proclaim in turns their own glory, and finally conclude with the words,‘ This is our knowledge, O friend, and the knowledge of the Self;’ wherein they point back to the Brahman spoken of before. The words,‘ The teacher will tell you the way ’ (which form the last clause of the concluding passage), merely promise an explanation of the way, and thus preclude the idea of another topic being started. The teacher thereupon saying, ‘ As water does not cling to a lotus leaf, so no evil deed clings to one who knows it 5 (which words intervene between the concluding 1 A^rayantarapratyayasyasrayantare kshepa^ pratika^, yatha brahma^abda^ paramatmavishayo namadishu kshipyate. Bha.
2 The following sentences give the reason why, although there is only one Brahman, the word Brahman is repeated.
vedanta-s6tras.
speech of the fires and the information given by the teacher about the person within the eye) declares that no evil attacks him who knows the person within the eye, and thereby shows the latter to be Brahman. It thus appears that the teacher’s intention is to speak about that Brahman which had formed the topic of the instruction of the fires; to represent it at first as located in the eye and possessing the qualities of Sa^eyadvama and the like, and to point out afterwards that he who thus knows passes on to light and so on. He therefore begins by saying, ‘ That person that is seen in the eye that is the Self.’
16. And on account of the statement of the way of him who has heard the Upanishads.
The person placed in the eye is the highest lord for the following reason also. From ^ruti as well as smrzti we are acquainted with the way of him who has heard the Upanishads or the secret knowledge, i. e. who knows Brahman. That way, called the path of the gods, is described (Pra. Up. I, io), ‘ Those who have sought the Self by penance, abstinence, faith, and knowledge gain by the northern path the sun. This is the home of the spirits, the immortal, free from fear, the highest. From thence they do not returnand also (Bha. Gita VIII, 34), 4 Fire, light, the bright fortnight, the six months of the northern progress of the sun, on that way those who know Brahman go, when they have died, to Brahman.’ Now that very same way is seen to be stated, in our text, for him who knows the person within the eye. For we read (Kk. Up. IV, 15, 5), ‘Now whether people perform obsequies for him or no he goes to light;’ and later on, ‘From the sun (he goes) to the moon, from the moon to lightning. There is a person not human, he leads them to Brahman. This is the path of the gods, the path that leads to Brah¬ man. Those who proceed on that path do not return to the life of man.’ From this description of the way which is known to be the way of him who knows Brahman we ascertain that the person within the eye is Brahman.
17. (The person within the eye is the highest), not any other Self; on account of the non-perma¬ nency (of the other Selfs) and on account of the im¬ possibility (of the qualities of the person in the eye being ascribed to the other Selfs).
To the assertion made in the purvapaksha that the person in the eye is either the reflected Self or the cognitional Self (the individual soul) or the Self of some deity the following answer is given.—No other Self such as, for instance, the reflected Self can be assumed here, on account of non-permanency.—The reflected Self, in the first place, does not permanently abide in the eye. For when some person approaches the eye the reflection of that person is seen in the eye, but when the person moves away the reflection is seen no longer. The passage ‘That person within the eye ’ must, moreover, be held, on the ground of proximity, to intimate that the person seen in a man’s own eye is the object of (that man’s) devout medi¬ tation (and not the reflected image of his own person which he may see in the eye of another man). [Let, then, another tnan approach the devout man, and let the latter meditate on the image reflected in his own eye, but seen by the other man only. No, we reply, for] we have no right to make the (complicated) assumption that the devout man is, at the time of devotion, to bring close to his eye another man in order to produce a reflected image in his own eye. Scripture, moreover, (viz. Kh. Up. VIII, 9, 1, ‘ It (the reflected Self) perishes as soon as the body perishes,’) declares the non-permanency of the reflected Self.—And, further, ‘ on account of impossibility ’ (the person in the eye cannot be the reflected Self). For immortality and the other qualities ascribed to the person in the eye are not to be perceived in the reflected Self.—Of the cognitional Self, in the second place, which is in general con¬ nexion with the whole body and all the senses, it can likewise not be said that it has its permanent station in the eye only. That, on the other hand, Brahman although all-pervading may, for the purpose of contemplation, be [34] K VED ANT A-SU TR AS.
spoken of as connected with particular places such as the heart and the like, we have seen already. The cognitional Self shares (with the reflected Self) the impossibility of having the qualities of immortality and so on attributed to it. Although the cognitional Self is in reality not different from the highest Self, still there are fictitiously ascribed to it (adhy&ropita) the effects of nescience, desire and works, viz. mortality and fear; so that neither immortality nor fearlessness belongs to it. The qualities of being the sa^yadvama, &c. also cannot properly be ascribed to the cognitional Self, which is not distinguished by lordly power (abvarya).—In the third place, although the Self of a deity (viz. the sun) has its station in the eye—according to the scriptural passage, 4 He rests with his rays in him ’—still Selfhood cannot be ascribed to the sun, on account of his externality (paragrupatva). Immortality, &c. also cannot be predicated of him, as Scripture speaks of his origin and his dissolution. For the (so-called) deathlessness of the gods only means their (comparatively) long existence. And their lordly power also is based on the highest Lord and does not naturally belong to them; as the mantra declares, 4 From terror of it (Brahman) the wind blows, from terror the sun rises; from terror of it Agni and Indra, yea, Death runs as the fifth.’—Hence the person in the eye must be viewed as the highest Lord only. In the case of this explanation being adopted the mention (of the person in the eye) as something well known and established, which is contained in the words 4 is seen ’ (in the phrase ‘ the person that is seen in the eye ’), has to be taken as referring to (the mental perception founded on) the ^astra which belongs to those who know; and the glorification (of devout meditation) has to be understood as its purpose.
18. The internal ruler over the devas and so on (is Brahman), because the attributes of that (Brah¬ man) are designated.
In B ri. Up. Ill, 7, i ff. we read, 4 He who within rules this world and the other world and all beings/ and later on, 4 He who dwells in the earth and within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is, who rules the earth within, he is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal,’ &c. The entire chapter (to sum up its contents) speaks of a being, called the antaryamin (the internal ruler), who, dwelling within, rules with reference to the gods, the world, the Veda, the sacrifice, the beings, the Self.— Here now, owing to the unusualness of the term (antar¬ yamin), there arises a doubt whether it denotes the Self of some deity which presides over the gods and so on, or some Yogin who has acquired extraordinary powers, such as, for instance, the capability of making his body subtle, or the highest Self, or some other being. What alternative then does recommend itself?
As the term is an unknown one, the purvapakshin says, we must assume that the being denoted by it is also an unknown one, different from all those mentioned above.— Or else it may be said that, on the one hand, we have no right to assume something of an altogether indefinite character, and that, on the other hand, the term antarya¬ min—which is derived from antaryamana (ruling within)— cannot be called altogether unknown, that therefore antar¬ yamin may be assumed to denote some god presiding over the earth, and so on. Similarly, we read (Bri. Up. Ill, 9, 16), ‘He whose dwelling is the earth, whose sight is fire, whose mind is light, 5 &c. A god of that kind is capable of ruling the earth, and so on, dwelling within them, because he is endowed with the organs of action; rulership is there¬ fore rightly ascribed to him.—Or else the rulership spoken of may belong to some Yogin whom his extraordinary powers enable to enter within all things.—The highest Self, on the other hand, cannot be meant, as it does not possess the organs of action (which are required for ruling).
To this we make the following reply.—The internal ruler, of whom Scripture speaks with reference to the gods, must be the highest Self, cannot be anything else.—Why so?— Because its qualities are designated in the passage under discussion. The universal rulership implied in the statement that, dwelling within, it rules the entire aggregate of created beings, inclusive of the gods, and so on, is an appropriate K 2 vedanta-sGtras.
attribute of the highest Self, since omnipotence depends on (the omnipotent ruler) being the cause of all created things.—The qualities of Selfhood and immortality also, which are mentioned in the passage, ‘ He is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal,’ belong in their primary sense to the highest Self.—Further, the passage, 4 He whom the earth does not know,’ which declares that the internal ruler is not known by the earth-deity, shows him to be different from that deity; for the deity of the earth knows itself to be the earth.—The attributes ‘unseen,’ ‘unheard,’ also point to the highest Self, which is devoid of shape and other sensible qualities.—The objection that the highest Self is destitute of the organs of action, and hence cannot be a ruler, is without force, because organs of action may be ascribed to him owing to the organs of action of those whom he rules.— If it should be objected that [if we once admit an internal ruler in addition to the individual soul] we are driven to assume again another and another ruler ad infinitum; we reply that this is not the case, as actually there is no other ruler (but the highest Self 1 ). The objection would be valid only in the case of a difference of rulers actually existing. —For all these reasons, the internal ruler is no other but the highest Self.
19. And (the internal ruler is) not that which the Smrzti assumes, (viz. the pradhana,) on account of the statement of qualities not belonging to it.
Good so far, a S&nkhya opponent resumes. The attributes, however, of not being seen, &c., belong also to the pradhana assumed by the S&nkhya-smrzti, which is acknowledged to be devoid of form and other sensible qualities. For their 1 According to Scripture, Nirankuya/tf sarvaniyantritva;^ srautam na ^a tadrhe sarvaniyantari bhedo na Mnumana^z mitibhaditam uttish/$ati. Ananda Giri. Or else, as Go. An. remarks, we may ex¬ plain: as the highest Self is not really different from the individual soul. So also Bhamati: Na Hnavastha, na hi niyantrantara;/* tena niyamyate ki m tu yo £ivo niyanta lokasiddha^ sa paramatmevopadhyava^edakalpitabheda^.
Smr/ti says, 4 Undiscoverable, unknowable, as if wholly in sleep 5 (Manu I, 5). To this pradhana also the attribute of rulership belongs, as it is the cause of all effects. Therefore the internal ruler may be understood to denote the pradhana. The pradhana has, indeed, been set aside already by the Sutra 1,1, 5, but we bring it forward again, because we find that attributes belonging to it, such as not being seen and the like, are mentioned in Scripture.
To this argumentation the Sutrak&ra replies that the word 4 internal ruler’ cannot denote the pradhana, because qualities not belonging to the latter are stated. For, although the pradhana may be spoken of as not being seen, &c., it cannot be spoken of as seeing, since the S&nkhyas admit it to be non-intelligent. But the scriptural passage which forms the complement to the passage about the internal ruler (B ri. Up. Ill, 7, 23) says expressly, ' Unseen but seeing, unheard but hearing, unperceived but perceiving, unknown but knowing.’ —And Selfhood also cannot belong to the pradh&na.
Well, then, if the term 4 internal ruler 5 cannot be admitted to denote the pradhana, because the latter is neither a Self nor seeing; let us suppose it to denote the embodied (indi¬ vidual) soul, which is intelligent, and therefore hears, sees, perceives, knows; which is internal (pratya/?^), and there¬ fore of the nature of Self; and which is immortal, because it is able to enjoy the fruits of its good and evil actions. It is, moreover, a settled matter that the attributes of not being seen, &c., belong to the embodied soul, because the agent of an action, such as seeing, cannot at the same time be the object of the action. This is declared in scriptural passages also, as, for instance (B ri. Up. Ill, 4? 2 )> ‘Thou couldst not see the seer of sight.’ The individual soul is, moreover, capable of inwardly ruling the complex of the organs of action, as it is the enjoyer. Therefore the internal ruler is the embodied soul.—To this reasoning the following Sutra replies.
20, And the embodied soul (also cannot be under¬ stood by the internal ruler), for both also (i. e, both *34 recensions of the Brzhad Ara^yaka) speak of it as different (from the internal ruler).
The word e not’ (in the Sutra) has to be supplied from the preceding Sutra. Although the attributes of seeing, &c., belong to the individual soul, still as the soul is limited by its adjuncts, as the ether is by a jar, it is not capable of dwelling completely within the earth and the other beings mentioned, and to rule them. Moreover, the followers of both.Scikhcis, i. e. the Kazzvas as well as the Madhyandinas, speak in their texts of the individual soul as different from the internal ruler, viz. as constituting, like the earth, and so on, his abode and the object of his rule. The Ka/zvas read (B ru Up. Ill, 7, 33), ‘He who dwells in knowledge;' the Madhyandinas, ‘ He who dwells in the Self.’ If the latter reading is adopted, the word ‘ Self 5 denotes the individual soul; if the former, the individual soul is denoted by the word £ knowledge; 5 for the individual soul consists of knowledge. It is therefore a settled matter that some being different from the individual soul, viz. the lord, is denoted by the term ‘ internal ruler.’—But how, it may be asked, is it possible that there should be within one body two seers, viz. the lord who rules internally and the individual soul different from him?—Why—we ask in return—should that be impossible?—Because, the opponent replies, it is contrary to scriptural passages, such as, ‘ There is no other seer but he, 5 &c., which deny that there is any seeing, hearing, perceiving, knowing Self, but the internal ruler under dis¬ cussion.—May, we rejoin, that passage not have the purpose of denying the existence of another ruler?—No, the opponent replies, for there is no occasion for another ruler (and therefore no occasion for denying his existence), and the text does not contain any specification, (but merely denies the existence of any other seer in general.)