with regard to Brahman; for whatever is perceived is perceived by the light of Brahman only so that sun, moon, &c. can be said to shine in it; while Brahman as selfluminous is not perceived by means of any other light.
Brahman manifests everything else, but is not manifested by anything else; according to such scriptural passages as, £ By the Self alone as his light man sits/ &c. (B ri. Up. IV, 3, 6), and £ He is incomprehensible, for he cannot be comprehended 5 (Bri. Up. IV, 2, 4).
23. Moreover Smrzti also speaks of him (i. e. of the prS^Tza Self as being the universal light).
Moreover that aspect of the pra^a Self is spoken of in Smrzti also, viz. in the Bhagavad Gita (XV, 6, 12), ‘ Neither the sun, nor the moon, nor the fire illumines that; having gone into which men do not return, that is my highest seat. 5 And ‘ The light which abiding in the sun illumines the whole world, and that which is in the moon and that which is in the fire, all that light know to be mine. 5 24. On account of the term, (viz. the term ‘ lord ’ applied to it) the (person) measured (by a thumb) (is the highest Lord).
We read (Ka. Up. II, 4, 12), ‘The person of the size of a thumb stands in the middle of the Self, 5 &c., and (II, 4, 13), ‘That person, of the size of a thumb, is like a light without smoke, lord of the past and of the future, he is the same to-day and to-morrow. This is that. 5 —The question here arises whether the person of the size of a thumb mentioned in the text is the cognitional (individual) Self or the highest Self.
The pfirvapakshin maintains that on account of the declaration of the person’s size the cognitional Self is meant. For to the highest Self which is of infinite length and breadth Scripture would not ascribe the measure of a span; of the cognitional Self, on the other hand, which is connected with limiting adjuncts, extension of the size of a span may, by means of some fictitious assumption, be predicated. Smrzti also confirms this, ‘Then Yama drew forth, by force, from the body of Satyavat the person of the size of a thumb tied to Yama’s noose and helpless 5 (Mahabh. Ill, 16763). For as Yama could not pull out by force the highest Self, the passage is clearly seen to refer to the transmigrating (individual soul) of the size of a thumb, and we thence infer that the same Self is meant in the Vedic passage under discussion.
To this we reply that the person a thumb long can only VED AN T A-s6 TR AS.
be the highest Lord.—Why?—On account of the term ‘ lord of the past and of the future.’ For none but the highest Lord is the absolute ruler of the past and the future.—Moreover, the clause ‘this is that’ connects the passage with that which had been enquired about, and therefore forms the topic of discussion. And w T hat had been enquired about is Brahman, ‘ That which thou seest as neither this nor that, as neither effect nor cause, as neither past nor future, tell me that ’ (I, 2, 14).—‘ On ac¬ count of the term,’ i. e. on account of the direct statement, in the text, of a designation, viz. the term ‘ Lord,’ we under¬ stand that the highest Lord is meant 1.—But still the question remains how a certain extension can be attributed to the omnipresent highest Self.—The reply to this is given in the next Sutra.
25. But with reference to the heart (the highest Self is said to be of the size of a span), as men are entitled (to the study of the Veda).
The measure of a span is ascribed to the highest Lord, although omnipresent with reference to his abiding within the heart; just as to ether (space) the measure of a cubit is ascribed with reference to the joint of a bamboo. For, on the one hand, the measure of a span cannot be ascribed directly to the highest Self which exceeds all measure, and, on the other hand, it has been shown that none but the highest Lord can be meant here, on account of the term ‘ Lord,’ and so on.—But—an objection may be raised—-as the size of the heart varies in the different classes of living beings it cannot be maintained that the declaration 1 This last sentence is directed against the possible objection that ‘^abda/ which the Sutra brings forward as an argument in favour of the highest Lord being meant, has the sense of ‘ sentence * (vakya), and is therefore of less force than linga, i. e. indicatory or inferential mark which is represented in our passage by the ahgush/Zzamatratd of the purusha, and favours the ^iva-interpretation. *Sabda, the text remarks, here means miti, i. e. direct enun¬ ciation, and jruti ranks, as a means of proof, higher than linga.
of the highest Self being of the size of a thumb can be explained with reference to the heart.—To this objection the second half of the Sutra replies: On account of men (only) being entitled. For the.rastra, although propounded without distinction (i. e. although not itself specifying what class of beings is to proceed according to its pre¬ cepts), does in reality entitle men 1 only (to act according to its precepts); for men only (of the three higher castes) are, firstly, capable (of complying with the precepts of the.yastra); are, secondly, desirous (of the results of actions enjoined by the.y&stra); are, thirdly, not excluded by pro¬ hibitions; and are, fourthly, subject to the precepts about the upanayana ceremony and so on 2 * *. This point has been explained in the section treating of the definition of adhikarA (P&rva Mim. S. VI, 1).—Now the human body has ordinarily a fixed size, and hence the heart also has a fixed size, viz. the size of a thumb. Hence, as men (only) are entitled to study and practise the.yastra, the highest Self may, with reference to its dwelling in the human heart, be spoken of as being of the size of a thumb.—In reply to the purvapakshin's reasoning that on account of the statement of size and on account of Smrfti we can under¬ stand by him who is of the size of a thumb the trans¬ migrating soul only, we remark that—analogously to such passages as ‘That is the Self,’ ‘That art thou 5 —our passage 1 I. e. men belonging to the three tipper castes, 2 The first reason excludes animals, gods, and rfshis. Gods cannot themselves perform sacrifices, the essential feature of which is the parting, on the part of the sacrificer, with an offering meant for the gods. ivVshis cannot perform sacrifices in the course of whose performance the ancestral rfshis of the sacrificer are invoked. —The second reason excludes those men whose only desire is emancipation and who therefore do not care for the perishable fruits of sacrifices.—The third and fourth reasons exclude the ASftdras who are indirectly disqualified for gastric works because the Veda in different places gives rules for the three higher castes only, and for whom the ceremony of the upanayana—indispensable for all who wish to study the Veda—is not prescribed.—Cp. Purva Mima/rcsa Sfftras VI, i.
teaches that the transmigrating soul which is of the size of a thumb is (in reality) Brahman. For the Vedantapassages have a twofold purport; some of them aim at setting forth the nature of the highest Self, some at teaching the unity of the individual soul with the highest Self. Our passage teaches the unity of the individual soul with the highest Self, not the size of anything. This point is made clear further on in the Upanishad, ‘ The person of the size of a thumb, the inner Self, is always settled in the heart of men. Let a man draw that Self forth from his body with steadiness, as one draws the pith from a reed. Let him know that Self as the Bright, as the Immortal’ (II, 6, 17).
26. Also (beings) above them, (viz. men) (are qualified for the study and practice of the Veda), on account of the possibility (of it), according to BadarAya^a.
It has been said above that the passage about him who is of the size of a thumb has reference to the human heart, because men are entitled to study and act according to the j-astra. This gives us an occasion for the following discussion. —It is true that the ^astra entitles men, but, at the same time, there is no exclusive rule entitling men only to the know¬ ledge of Brahman; the teacher, Badarayazza, rather thinks that the.rastra entitles those (classes of beings) also which are above men, viz. gods, and so on.—On what account?— On the account of possibility.—For in their cases also the different causes on which the qualification depends, such as having certain desires, and so on, may exist. In the first place, the gods also may have the desire of final release, caused by the reflection that all effects, objects, and powers are non-permanent. In the second place, they may be capable of it as their corporeality appears from mantras, arthavadas, itihasas, purazzas, and ordinary experience. In the third place, there is no prohibition (excluding them like »Shdras). Nor does, in the fourth place, the scriptural rule about the upanayana-ceremony annul their title; for that 7 99 7 99 ceremony merely subserves the study of the Veda, and to the gods the Veda is manifest of itself (without study). That the gods, moreover, for the purpose of acquiring knowledge, undergo discipleship, and the like, appears from such scriptural passages as 4 One hundred and one years Indra lived as a disciple with Pra^pati ’ (Kh. Up. VIII, 11, 3), and 4 Bhrzgu Varu/zi went to his father Varu/za, saying, 44 Sir, teach me Brahman” 5 (Taitt. Up. Ill, 1).—And the reasons which have been given above against gods and rishis being entitled to perform religious works (such as sacrifices), viz. the circumstance of there being no other gods (to whom the gods could offer sacrifices), and of there being no other ri shis (who could be invoked during the sacrifice), do not apply to the case of branches of knowledge. For Indra and the other gods, when applying themselves to knowledge, have no acts to perform with a view to Indra, and so on; nor have Bhrigu and other n ’shis, in the same case, to do anything with the circumstance of their belonging to the same gotra as Bhrzgu, &c. What, then, should stand in the way of the gods’ and ri shis’ right to acquire knowledge? —Moreover, the passage about that which is of the size of a thumb remains equally valid, if the right of the gods, &c. is admitted; it has then only to be explained in each par¬ ticular case by a reference to the particular size of the thumb (of the class of beings spoken of).
27. If it be said that (the corporeal individuality of the gods involves) a contradiction to (sacrificial) works; we deny that, on account of the observation of the assumption (on the part of the gods) of several (forms).
If the right of the gods, and other beings superior to men, to the acquisition of knowledge is founded on the assumption of their corporeality, &c., we shall have to admit, in conse¬ quence of that corporeality, that Indra and the other gods stand in the relation of subordinate members (anga) to sacrificial acts, by means of their being present in person just as the priests are. But this admission will lead to £ a contradiction in the sacrificial acts,’ because the circumstance of the gods forming the members of sacrificial acts by means of their personal presence, is neither actually observed nor possible. For it is not possible that one and the same Indra should, at the same time, be present in person at many sacrifices.
To this we reply, that there is no such contradiction.— Why?—On account of the assumption of several (forms).
For it is possible for one and the same divine Self to assume several forms at the same time.—How is that known?—From observation.—Fora scriptural passage at first replies to the question how many gods there are, by the declaration that there are £ Three and three hundred, three and three thou¬ sand/ and subsequently, on the question who they are, declares £ They (the 303 and 3003) are only the various powers of them, in reality there are only thirty-three gods 5 (B ri. Up. Ill, 9,1,2); showing thereby that one and the same divine Self may at the same time appear in many forms. After that it proceeds to show that these thirtythree gods themselves are in reality contained in six, five, &c., and, finally, by replying to the question, ‘Who is the one god? 5 that Breath is the one god, shows that the gods are all forms of Breath, and that Breath, therefore, can at the same time appear in many forms.—Smrz'ti also has a similar statement, £ A Yogin, O hero of the Bharatas, may, by his power, multiply his Self in many thousand shapes, and in them walk about on the earth. In some he may enjoy the objects, in others he may undergo dire penance, and, finally, he may again retract them all, just as the sun retracts the multitude of his rays. 5 If such Smrzti pas¬ sages as the above declare that even Yogins, who have merely acquired various extraordinary powers, such as subtlety of body, and the like, may animate several bodies at the same time, how much more capable of such feats must the gods be, who naturally possess all supernatural powers?
The gods thus being able to assume several shapes, a god may divide himself into many forms and enter into relation with many sacrifices at the same time, remaining all the while unseen by others, in consequence of his power to render himself invisible.
The latter part of the Sutra may be explained in a different manner also, viz. as meaning that even beings enjoying corporeal individuality are seen to enter into mere subordinate relation to more than one action. Sometimes, indeed, one individual does not at the same time enter into subordinate relation to different actions; one Brahma^a, for instance, is not at the same time entertained by many enter¬ tainers. But in other cases one individual stands in subor¬ dinate relation to many actions at the same time; one Brahma^a, for instance, may constitute the object of the reverence done to him by many persons at the same time. Similarly, it is possible that, as the sacrifice consists in the parting (on the part of the sacrificer with some offering) with a view (to some divinity), many persons may at the same time part with their respective offerings, all of them having in view one and the same individual divinity. The individuality of the gods does not, therefore, involve any contradiction in sacrificial works.
28. If it be said (that a contradiction will result) in respect of the word; we refute this objection on the ground that (the world) originates from the word, as is shown by perception and inference.
Let it then be granted that, from the admission of the corporeal individuality of the gods, no contradiction will result in the case of sacrificial works. Still a contradic¬ tion will result in respect of the ‘word’ (^abda).—How?—-The authoritativeness of the Veda has been proved ‘ from its independence,’ basing on the original (eternal) connexion of the word with its sense (‘the thing signified ’) 1. But now, although a divinity possessing corporeal individuality, such as admitted above, may, by means of its supernatural powers, be able to enjoy at the same time the oblations 1 The reference is to Pfirva Mima/rcsa Sutras I, 1, 5 (not to I, 2, 21, as stated in Muirs Sanskrit Texts, III, p. 69), vedanta-sOtras.
which form part of several sacrifices, yet it will, on account of its very individuality, be subject to birth and death just as we men are, and hence, the eternal connexion of the eternal word with a non-eternal thing being destroyed, a contradiction will arise with regard to the authoritative¬ ness proved to belong to the word of the Veda.
To this we reply that no such contradiction exists.—Why? — 4 On account of their origin from it.’ For from that very same word of the Veda the world, with the gods and other beings, originates.—But—an objection will be raised—in Sutra I, i, 2 (‘That whence there is the origin, &c. of this world 5 ) it has been proved that the world originates from Brah¬ man; how then can it be said here that it originates from the word? And, moreover, even if the origin of the world from the word of the Veda be admitted, how is the contradiction in regard to the word removed thereby, inasmuch as the Vasus, the Rudras, the Adityas, the VLrvedevas, and the Maruts 1 are non-eternal beings, because produced; and if they are non-eternal, what is there to preclude the noneternality of the Vedic words Vasu, &c. designating them? For it is known from every-day life that only when the son of Devadatta is born, the name Ya^/vadatta is given to him (lit. made for him) 2. Hence we adhere to our opinion that a contradiction does arise with regard to the ‘ word. 5 This objection we negative, on the ground that we observe the eternity of the connexion between such words as cow, and so on, and the things denoted by them. For, although the individuals of the (species denoted by the word) cow have an origin, their species 3 does not have an origin, since of (the three categories) substances, qualities, and actions the individuals only originate, not the species. Now it is with the species that the words are connected, not with the individuals, which, as being infinite in number, are not capable of entering into that connexion. Hence, although 1 In which classes of beings all the gods are comprised.
2 Which shows that together with the non-eternality of the thing denoted there goes the non-eternality of the denoting word.
8 Akrfti, best translated by etdos.
the individuals do not originate, no contradiction arises in the case of words such as cow, and the like, since the species are eternal. Similarly, although individual gods are admitted to originate, there arises no contradiction in the case of such words as Vasu, and the like, since the species denoted by them are eternal. And that the gods, and so on, belong to different species, is to be concluded from the descriptions of their various personal appearance, such as given in the mantras, arthavadas, &c. Terms such as ‘ Indra ’ rest on the connexion (of some particular being) with some particular place, analogously to terms such as ‘ army-leader; ’ hence, whoever occupies that particular place is called by that particular name.—The origination of the world from the‘ word 5 is not to be understood in that sense, that the word constitutes the material cause of the world, as Brahman does; but while there exist the ever¬ lasting words, whose essence is the power of denotation in connexion with their eternal sense (i. e. the akrztis denoted), the accomplishment of such individual things as are capable of having those words applied to them is called an origina¬ tion from those words.
How then is it known that the world originates from the word?—‘ From perception and inference.’ Perception here denotes Scripture which, in order to be authoritative, is independent (of anything else). ‘Inference’ denotes Smr/ti which, in order to be authoritative, depends on something else (viz. Scripture). These two declare that creation is preceded by the word. Thus a scriptural passage says, ‘At the word these Pra^*apati created the gods; at the words were poured out he created men; at the word drops he created the fathers; at the words through the filter he created the Soma cups; at the words the swift ones he created the stotra; at the words to all he created the i'astra; at the word blessings he created the other beings.’ And another passage says, ‘He with his mind united himself with speech (i.e. the word of the Veda.—Bru Up. I, 2,4). Thus Scripture declares in different places that the word precedes the creation.— Smrzti also delivers itself as follows, ‘In the beginning vedanta-sOtras.
vedanta-sOtras.
a divine voice, eternal, without beginning or end, formed of the Vedas was uttered by Svayambhu, from which all activities proceeded.’ By the ‘uttering’ of the voice we have here to understand the starting of the oral tradition (of the Veda), because of a voice without beginning or end ‘uttering 5 in any other sense cannot be predicated.—Again, we read, ‘In the beginning Ma¬ li e.rvara shaped from the words of the Veda the names and forms of all beings and the procedure of all actions.’ And again, ‘ The several names, actions, and conditions of all things he shaped in the beginning from the words of the Veda’ (Manu I, 21). Moreover,we all know from observa¬ tion that any one when setting about some thing which he wishes to accomplish first remembers the word denoting the thing, and after that sets to work. We therefore con¬ clude that before the creation the Vedic words became manifest in the mind of Pra^*apati the creator, and that after that he created the things corresponding to those words. Scripture also, where it says (Taitt. Bra. II, 2, 4, 2) ‘uttering bhur he created the earth,’ &c., shows that the worlds such as the earth, &c. became manifest, i.e. were created from the words bhur, &c. which had become mani¬ fest in the mind (of Pra^*apati).
Of what nature then is the ‘ word ’ with a view to which it is said that the world originates from the ‘word?’—It is the spho/a, the purvapakshin says 1. For on the as- 1 The purvapakshin, i. e. here the grammarian maintains, for the reasons specified further on, that there exists in the case of words a supersensuous entity called spho/a which is manifested by the letters of the word, and, if apprehended by the mind, itself mani¬ fests the sense of the word. The term spho/a may, according as it is viewed in either of these lights, be explained as the manifestor or that which is manifested.—The spho/a is a grammatical fiction, the word in so far as it is apprehended by us as a whole. That we cannot identify it with the ‘ notion ’ (as Deussen seems inclined to do, p. 80) follows from its being distinctly called va^aka or abhidhayaka, and its being represented as that which causes the conception of the sense of a word (arthadhihetu).
sumption that the letters are the word, the doctrine that the individual gods, and so on, originates from the eternal words of the Veda could not in any way be proved, since the letters perish as soon as they are produced (i. e. pronounced). These perishable letters are more¬ over apprehended as differing according to the pronun¬ ciation of the individual speaker. For this reason we are able to determine, merely from the sound of the voice of some unseen person whom we hear reading, who is reading, whether Devadatta or Ya^/zadatta or some other man. And it cannot be maintained that this apprehension of difference regarding the letters is an erroneous one; for we do not apprehend anything else whereby it is refuted. Nor is it reasonable to maintain that the ap¬ prehension of the sense of a word results from the letters.
For it can neither be maintained that each letter by itself intimates the sense, since that would be too wide an assump¬ tion 1; nor that there takes place a simultaneous appre¬ hension of the whole aggregate of letters; since the letters succeed one another in time. Nor can we admit the explan¬ ation that the last letter of the word together with the im¬ pressions produced by the perception of the preceding letters is that which makes us apprehend the sense. For the word makes us apprehend the sense only if it is itself apprehended in so far as having reference to the mental grasp of the constant connexion (of the word and the sense), just as smoke makes us infer the existence of fire only when it is itself apprehended; but an apprehension of the last letter combined with the impressions produced by the preceding letters does not actually take place, because those impressions are not objects of perception 2. Nor, again, can it be maintained that (although those im- 1 For that each letter by itself expresses the sense is not observed; and if it did so, the other letters of the word would have to be declared useless.
2 In order to enable us to apprehend the sense from the word, there is required the actual consciousness of the last letter plus the impressions of the preceding letters; just as smoke enables us to vedAnta-s6tras.
vedAnta-s6tras.
pressions are not objects of perception, yet they may be inferred from their effects, and that thus) the actual per¬ ception of the last letter combined with the impressions left by the preceding letters—which impressions are appre¬ hended from their effects—is that which intimates the sense of the word; for that effect of the impressions, viz. the remembrance of the entire word, is itself something con¬ sisting of parts which succeed each other in time.—From all this it follows that the spho/a is the word. After the apprehending agent, i. e. the buddhi, has, through the ap¬ prehension of the several letters of the word, received rudimentary impressions, and after those impressions have been matured through the apprehension of the last letter, the spho/a presents itself in the buddhi all at once as the object of one mental act of apprehension.—And it must not be maintained that that one act of apprehension is merely an act of remembrance having for its object the letters of the word; for the letters which are more than one cannot form the object of one act of apprehension.—As that spho/a is recognised as the same as often as the word is pronounced, it is eternal; while the apprehension of difference referred to above has for its object the letters merely. From this eternal word, which is of the nature of the spho/a and possesses denotative power, there is produced the object denoted, i. e. this world which consists of actions, agents, and results of action.
Against this doctrine the reverend Upavarsha maintains that the letters only are the word.—But—an objection is raised—it has been said above that the letters no sooner produced pass away!—That assertion is not true, we reply; for they are recognised as the same letters (each time they are produced anew).—Nor can it be maintained that the recognition is due to similarity only, as in the case of hairs, for instance; for the fact of the recognition being a re¬ cognition in the strict sense of the word is not contradicted by any other means of proof.—Nor, again, can it be said infer the existence of fire only if we are actually conscious of the smoke. But that actual consciousness does not take place because the impressions are not objects of perceptive consciousness.
that the recognition has its cause in the species (so that not the same individual letter would be recognised, but only a letter belonging to the same species as other letters heard before); for, as a matter of fact, the same individual letters are recognised. That the recognition of the letters rests on the species could be maintained only if whenever the letters are pronounced different individual letters were apprehended, just as several cows are apprehended as different individuals belonging to the same species. But this is actually not the case; for the (same) individual letters are recognised as often as they are pronounced. If, for instance, the word cow is pronounced twice, we think not that two different words have been pronounced, but that the same individual word has been repeated.—But, our opponent reminds us, it has been shown above, that the letters are apprehended as different owing to differences of pronunciation, as appears from the fact that we apprehend a difference when merely hearing the sound of Devadatta or Ya^vzadatta reading.—Although, we reply, it is a settled matter that the letters are recognised as the same, yet we admit that there are differences in the apprehension of the letters; but as the letters are articulated by means of the conjunction and disjunction (of the breath with the palate, the teeth, &c.), those differences are rightly ascribed to the various character of the articulating agents and not to the intrinsic nature of the letters