themselves. Those, moreover, who maintain that the individual letters are different have, in order to account for the fact of recogni¬ tion, to assume species of letters, and further to admit that the apprehension of difference is conditioned by ex¬ ternal factors. Is it then not much simpler to assume, as we do, that the apprehension of difference is conditioned by external factors while the recognition is due to the intrinsic nature of the letters? And this very fact of recognition is that mental process which prevents us from looking on the apprehension of difference as having the letters for its object (so that the opponent was wrong in denying the existence of such a process). For how should, for instance, the one syllable ga, when it is pronounced in vedAnta-s6tras.
the same moment by several persons, be at the same time of different nature, viz. accented with the udatta, the anudatta, and the Svarita and nasal as well as non-nasal 1? Or else 2 —and this is the preferable explanation—we assume that the difference of apprehension is caused not by the letters but by the tone (dhvani). By this tone we have to understand that which enters the ear of a person who is listening from a distance and not able to distinguish the separate letters, and which, for a person standing near, affects the letters with its own distinctions, such as high or low pitch and so on. It is on this tone that all the distinctions of udatta, anudatta, and so on depend, and not on the intrinsic nature of the letters; for they are recognised as the same whenever they are pronounced. On this theory only we gain a basis for the distinctive apprehension of the udatta, the anudatta, and the like. For on the theory first propounded (but now rejected), we should have to assume that the distinctions of udatta and so on are due to the processes of conjunction and disjunction described above, since the letters themselves, which are ever re¬ cognised as the same, are not different. But as those processes of conjunction and disjunction are not matter of perception, we cannot definitely ascertain in the letters any differences based on those processes, and hence the apprehension of the udatta and so on remains without a basis.—Nor should it be urged that from the dif¬ ference of the udatta and so on there results also a difference of the letters recognised. For a difference in one matter does not involve a difference in some other matter which in itself is free from difference.
Nobody, for instance, thinks that because the individuals 1 4 How should it be so?’ i.e. it cannot be so; and on that account the differences apprehended do not belong to the letters themselves, but to the external conditions mentioned above.
2 With ‘ or else * begins the exposition of the finally accepted theory as to the cause why the same letters are apprehended as different. Hitherto the cause had been found in the variety of the upadhis of the letters. Now a new distinction is made between articulated letters and non-articulated tone.
are different from each other the species also contains a difference in itself.
The assumption of the spho/a is further gratuitous, be¬ cause the sense of the word may be apprehended from the letters.—But—our opponent here objects—I do not assume the existence of the spho/a. I, on the contrary, actually perceive it; for after the buddhi has been impressed by the successive apprehension of the letters of the word, the spho/a all at once presents itself as the object of cognition. —You are mistaken, we reply. The object of the cognitional act of which you speak is simply the letters of the word.
That one comprehensive cognition which follows upon the apprehension of the successive letters of the word has for its object the entire aggregate of the letters constituting the word, and not anything else. We conclude this from the circumstance that in that final comprehensive cognition there are included those letters only of which a definite given word consists, and not any other letters. If that cognitional act had for its object the spho/a—i.e. something different from the letters of the given word—then those letters would be excluded from it just as much as the letters of any other word. But as this is not the case, it follows that that final comprehensive act of cognition is nothing but an act of remembrance which has the letters of the word for its object.—Our opponent has asserted above that the letters of a word being several cannot form the object of one mental act. But there he is wrong again. The ideas which we have of a row, for instance, or a wood or an army, or of the numbers ten, hundred, thousand, and so on, show that also such things as comprise several unities can become the objects of one and the same cognitional act. The idea which has for its object the word as one whole is a derived one, in so far as it depends on the determination of one sense in many letters 1; in the same way as the idea of a 3 I. e. it is not directly one idea, for it has for its object more than one letter; but it maybe called one in a secondary sense because it is based on the determinative knowledge that the letters, although more than one, express one sense only.
[34] P wood, an army, and so on.—But—our opponent may here object—if the word were nothing else but the letters which in their aggregate become the object of one mental act, such couples of words as ^"ara and ra^*a or pika and kapi would not be cognised as different words; for here the same letters are presented to consciousness in each of the words constituting one couple.—There is indeed, we reply, in both cases a comprehensive consciousness of the same totality of letters; but just as ants constitute the idea of a row only if they march one after the other, so the letters also constitute the idea of a certain word only if they follow each other in a certain order. Hence it is not contrary to reason that the same letters are cognised as different words, in consequence of the different order in which they are arranged.
The hypothesis of him who maintains that the letters are the word may therefore be finally formulated as follows. The letters of which a word consists—assisted by a certain order and number—have, through traditional use, entered into a connexion with a definite sense. At the time when they are employed they present themselves as such (i. e. in their definite order and number) to the buddhi, which, after having apprehended the several letters in succession, finally comprehends the entire aggregate, and they thus unerringly intimate to the buddhi their definite sense. This hypothesis is certainly simpler than the complicated hypothesis of the grammarians who teach that the spho^a is the word. For they have to disregard what is given by perception, and to assume something which is never perceived; the letters apprehended in a definite order are said to manifest the spho/a, and the spho/a in its turn is said to manifest the sense.
Or let it even be admitted that the letters are differ¬ ent ones each time they are pronounced; yet, as in that case we necessarily must assume species of letters as the basis of the recognition of the individual letters, the function of conveying the sense which we have demon¬ strated in the case of the (individual) letters has then to be attributed to the species.
21 I From all this it follows that the theory according to which the individual gods and so on originate from the eternal words is unobjectionable.
29. And from this very reason there follows the eternity of the Veda.
As the eternity of the Veda is founded on the absence of the remembrance of an agent only, a doubt with regard to it had been raised owing to the doctrine that the gods and other individuals have sprung from it. That doubt has been refuted in the preceding Sutra.—The present Sutra now confirms the, already established, eternity of the Veda. The eternity of the word of the Veda has to be assumed for this very reason, that the world with its definite (eternal) species, such as gods and so on, originates from it.—A mantra also (‘ By means of the sacrifice they followed the trace of speech; they found it dwelling in the rzshis,’ Rig-ve da Sawh. X, 71, 3) shows that the speech found (by the rz'shis) was permanent.—On this point Vedavyasa also speaks as follows: ‘Formerly the great rishis, being allowed to do so by Svayambhu, ob¬ tained, through their penance, the Vedas together with the itih&sas, which had been hidden at the end of the yuga/ 30. And on account of the equality of names and forms there is no contradiction (to the eternity of the word of the Veda) in the renovation (of the world); as is seen from 6ruti and Smrzti.
If—the purvapakshin resumes—the individual gods and so on did, like the individual animals, originate and pass away in an unbroken succession so that there would be no break of the course of practical existence including denominations, things denominated and agents denominating; the con¬ nexion (between word and thing) would be eternal, and the objection as to a contradiction with reference to the word (raised in Sutra 27) would thereby be refuted. But if, as 5 ruti and Smrz'ti declare, the whole threefold world periodically divests itself of name and form, and is entirely dissolved (at the end of a kalpa), and is after that produced anew; how can the contradiction be considered to have been removed?
To this we reply: 4 On account of the sameness of name and form/—Even then the beginninglessness of the world will have to be admitted (a point which the teacher will prove later on: 11,1,36). And in the beginningless sa/^-sara we have to look on the (relative) beginning, and the dissolution connected with a new kalpa in the same light in which we look on the sleeping and waking states, which, although in them according to Scripture (a kind of) dis¬ solution and origination take place, do not give rise to any contradiction, since in the later waking state (subse¬ quent to the state of sleep) the practical existence is carried on just as in the former one. That in the sleeping and the waking states dissolution and origination take place is stated Kaush. Up. Ill, 3, 4 When a man being asleep sees no dream whatever he becomes one with that pra^/a alone. Then speech goes to him with all names, the eye with all forms, the ear with all sounds, the mind with all thoughts. And when he awakes then, as from a burning fire, sparks proceed in all directions, thus from that Self the pr&/zas proceed, each towards its place; from the pranas the gods, from the gods the worlds/ Well, the purvapakshin resumes, it may be that no contradiction arises in the case of sleep, as during the sleep of one person the practical existence of other persons suffers no interruption, and as the sleeping person himself when waking from sleep may resume the very same form of practical existence which was his previously to his sleep. The case of a mahapralaya (i. e. a general annihilation of the world) is however a different one, as then the entire current of practical existence is interrupted, and the form of existence of a previous kalpa can be resumed in a subsequent kalpa no more than an individual can resume that form of existence which it enjoyed in a former birth.
This objection, we reply, is not valid. For although a mahapralaya does cut short the entire current of practical existence, yet, by the favour of the highest Lord, the Lords (tsvara), such as Hirazzyagarbha and so on, may continue the same form of existence which belonged to them in the preceding kalpa. Although ordinary animated beings do not, as we see, resume that form of existence which belonged to them in a former birth; still we cannot judge of the Lords as we do of ordinary beings. For as in the series of beings which descends from man to blades of grass a successive diminution of knowledge, power, and so on, is observed—although they all have the common attribute of being animated—so in the ascending series extending from man up to Hirazzyagarbha, a gradually increasing manifes¬ tation of knowledge, power, &c. takes place; a circumstance which 5 ruti and Smrzti mention in many places, and which it is impossible to deny. On that account it may very well be the case that the Lords, such as Hira/zyagarbha and so on, who in a past kalpa were distinguished by superior knowledge and power of action, and who again appear in the present kalpa, do, if favoured by the highest Lord, continue (in the present kalpa) the same kind of existence which they enjoyed in the preceding kalpa; just as a man who rises from sleep continues the same form of existence which he enjoyed previously to his sleep. Thus Scripture also declares, ‘ He who first creates Brahman (Hirazzyagarbha) and delivers the Vedas to him, to that God who is the light of his own thoughts, I, seeking for release, go for refuge 5 (vSVet. Up. VI, 18). vSaunaka and others more¬ over declare (in the Anukramazzis of the Veda) that the ten books (of the Rig-ve da) were seen by Madhu^Mandas and other ri shis 1. And, similarly, Smrzti tells us, for every Veda, of men of exalted mental vision (ri shis) who ‘ saw* 5 the sub¬ divisions of their respective Vedas, such as ka^as and so on. Scripture also declares that the performance of the sacrificial action by means of the mantra is to be preceded by the knowledge of the rzshi and so on,‘ He who makes another person sacrifice or read by means of a mantra of which he 1 Which circumstance proves that exalted knowledge appertains not only to Hirazzyagarbha, but to many beings.
does not know the rishi, the metre, the divinity, and the Brahma^a, runs against a post, falls into a pit 1, &c. &c., therefore one must know all those matters for each mantra’ (Arsheya Brahma^a, first section).—Moreover, religious duty is enjoined and its opposite is forbidden, in order that the animate beings may obtain pleasure and escape pain. Desire and aversion have for their objects pleasure and pain, known either from experience or from Scripture, and do not aim at anything of a different nature. As therefore each new creation is (nothing but) the result of the religious merit and demerit (of the animated beings of the preceding creation), it is produced with a nature resembling that of the preceding creation. Thus Smrzti also declares, ‘To whatever actions certain of these (animated beings) had turned in a former creation, to the same they turn when created again and again. Whether those actions were harmful or harmless, gentle or cruel, right or wrong, true or untrue, influenced by them they proceed; hence a cer¬ tain person delights in actions of a certain kind.’—More¬ over, this world when being dissolved (in a mahapralaya) is dissolved to that extent only that the potentiality (i*akti) of the world remains, and (when it is produced again) it is produced from the root of that potentiality; otherwise we should have to admit an effect without a cause. Nor have we the right to assume potentialities of different kind (for the different periods of the world). Hence, although the series of worlds from the earth upwards, and the series of different classes of animate beings such as gods, animals, and men, and the different conditions based on caste, a^rama, religious duty and fruit (of works), although all these we say are again and again interrupted and thereupon produced anew; we yet have to understand that they are, in the beginningless sa^sara, subject to a certain determinate¬ ness analogous to the determinateness governing the con¬ nexion between the senses and their objects. For it is impossible to imagine that the relation of senses and senseobjects should be a different one in different creations, so 1 Viz. naraka, the commentaries say.
that, for instance, in some new creation a sixth sense and a corresponding sixth sense-object should manifest them¬ selves. As, therefore, the phenomenal world is the same in all kalpas and as the Lords are able to continue their previous forms of existence, there manifest themselves, in each new creation, individuals bearing the same names and forms as the individuals of the preceding creations, and, owing to this equality of names and forms, the admitted periodical renovations of the world in the form of general pralayas and general creations do not conflict with the authoritativeness of the word of the Veda. The permanent identity of names and forms is declared in.Sruti as well as Smriti; compare, for instance, Rik. Sawh. X, 190, 3, ‘As formerly the creator ordered sun and moon, and the sky, and the air, and the heavenly world; ’ which passage means that the highest Lord arranged at the beginning of the present kalpa the entire world with sun and moon, and so on, just as it had been arranged in the preceding kalpa. Compare also Taitt. Brahm. Ill, 1, 4, 1, ‘Agni desired: May I become the consumer of the food of the gods; for that end he offered a cake on eight potsherds to Agni and the K>/ttikas.’ This passage, which forms part of the injunction of the ish/i to the Nakshatras, declares equality of name and form connecting the Agni who offered and the Agni to whom he offered \ Smriti also contains similar statements to be quoted here; so, for instance, ‘Whatever were the names of the rzshis and their powers to see the Vedas, the same the Unborn one again gives to them when they are produced afresh at the end of the night (the mahapralaya). As the various signs of the seasons return in succession in their due time, thus the same beings again appear in the different yugas. And of whatever individuality the gods of the 1 Asmin kalpe sarvesh&m pramnam dahapakapraka^akari yo sryam agnir drAyate so*yam agni^ purvasmin kalpe manushya^ san devatvapadaprapakaw karmanush/Myasmin kalpa eta g ^anma labdhavan ata^ pfirvasmin kalpe sa manushyo bhavini m saffzgmm ajr/tyagnir iti vyapadhyate.—Sayawa on the quoted passage.
vedanta-sOtras.
past ages were, equal to them are the present gods in name and form.’
31. On account of the impossibility of (the gods being qualified) for the madhu-vidyi, &c. (Taimini (maintains) the non-qualification (of the gods for the Brahma-vidya).
A new objection is raised against the averment that the gods, &c. also are entitled to the knowledge of Brahman. The teacher, Caimini, considers the gods and similar beings not to have any claim.—Why?—On account of the impos¬ sibility, in the case of the so-called Madhu-vidya, &c. If their claim to the knowledge of Brahman were admitted, we should have to admit their claim to the madhu-vidya (‘the knowledge of the honey ’) also, because that also is a kind of knowledge not different (from the knowledge of Brahman). But to admit this latter claim is not possible; for, according to the passage, ‘ The Sun is indeed the honey of the devas ’ ( Kh. Up. Ill, 1,1), men are to meditate on the sun (the god Aditya) under the form of honey, and how, if the gods themselves are admitted as meditating worshippers, can Aditya meditate upon another Aditya?—Again, the text, after having enumerated five kinds of nectar, the red one, &c. residing in the sun, and after having stated that the five classes of gods, viz. the Vasus, Rudras, Adityas, Maruts, and S&dhyas, live on one of these nectars each, declares that 4 he who thus knows this nectar becomes one of the Vasus, with Agni at their head, he sees the nectar and rejoices,’ &c., and indicates thereby that those who know the nectars enjoyed by the Vasus, &c., attain the greatness of the Vasus, &c. But how should the Vasus themselves know other Vasus enjoying the nectar, and what other Vasu-greatness should they desire to attain?—We have also to compare the pas¬ sages ‘Agni is one foot, Aditya is one foot, the quarters are one foot ’ (. Kh. Up. Ill, 18, 2); ‘Air is indeed the absorber ’ (Kh. Up. IV, 3,1); ‘ Aditya is Brahman, this is the doctrine.’ All these passages treat of the meditation on the Self of certain divinities, for which meditation these divinities themselves are not qualified.—So it is likewise impossible that the ri shis themselves should be qualified for meditations con¬ nected with rzshis, such as expressed in passages like B ri. Up. II, 2, 4, £ These two are the rzshis Gautama and Bharadvaga.; the right Gautama, the left Bharadva^a.’—Another reason for the non-qualification of the gods is stated in the following Sutra.
32. And (the devas, &c. are not qualified) on account of (the words denoting the devas, &c.) being (used) in the sense of (sphere of) light.
To that sphere of light, the purvapakshin resumes, which is stationed in the sky, and during its diurnal revolutions illumines the world, terms such as Aditya, i. e. the names of devas, are applied, as we know from the use of ordinary language, and from Vedic complementary passages 1. But of a mere sphere of light we cannot understand how it should be endowed with either a bodily form, consisting of the heart and the like, or intelligence, or the capability of forming wishes 2. For mere light we know to be, like earth, entirely devoid of intelligence. The same observation applies to Agni (fire), and so on. It will perhaps be said that our objection is not valid, because the personality of the devas is known from the mantras, arthavadas, itihasas, purazzas, and from the conceptions of ordinary life 3; but we contest the relevancy of this remark. For the conceptions of ordi¬ nary life do not constitute an independent means of know¬ ledge; we rather say that a thing is known from ordinary life if it is known by the (acknowledged) means of know¬ ledge, perception, &c. But none of the recognised means of knowledge, such as perception and the like, apply to the 1 As, for instance, ‘ So long as Aditya rises in the east and sets in the west' ( Kh. Up. Ill, 6, 4).
2 Whence it follows that the devas are not personal beings, and therefore not qualified for the knowledge of Brahman.
3 Yama, for instance, being ordinarily represented as a person with a staff in his hand, Varuzza with a noose, Indra with a thunder¬ bolt, &c. Sec.
2 18 matter under discussion. Itihasas and pura^as again being of human origin, stand themselves in need of other means of knowledge on which to base. The arthavada passages also, which, as forming syntactical wholes with the injunctory passages, have merely the purpose of glorifying (what is enjoined in the latter), cannot be considered to constitute by themselves reasons for the existence of the personality, &c. of the devas. The mantras again, which, on the ground of direct enunciation, &c., are to be employed (at the dif¬ ferent stages of the sacrificial action), have merely the purpose of denoting things connected with the sacrificial performance, and do not constitute an independent means of authoritative knowledge for anything 1.—For these reasons the devas, and similar beings, are not qualified for the knowledge of Brahman.
33. BAdaraya/za, on the other hand, (maintains) the existence (of qualification for Brahma-vidyS, on the part of the gods); for there are (passages indicatory of that).
The expression ‘ on the other hand’ is meant to rebut the purvapaksha. The teacher, Badaraya^a, maintains the existence of the qualification on the part of the gods, &c. For, although the qualification of the gods cannot be ad¬ mitted with reference to the madhu-vidya, and similar topics of knowledge, in which the gods themselves are implicated, still they may be qualified for the pure knowledge of Brah¬ man, qualification in general depending on the presence of desire, capability, &c. 2 Nor does the impossibility of quali¬ fication in certain cases interfere with the presence of qualifi¬ cation in those other cases where it is not impossible. To the case of the gods the same reasoning applies as to the case of men; for among men also, all are not qualified for everything, Brahma^as, for instance, not for the ra£*asuya-sacrifice 3.
1 On the proper function of arthavada and mantra according to the Mimatfzsa, cp. Arthasa/rcgraha, Introduction.
3 Which can be offered by kshattriyas only.
And, with reference to the knowledge of Brahman, Scrip¬ ture, moreover, contains express hints notifying that the devas are qualified; compare, for instance, B ri, Up. 1,4,10, ‘ Whatever Deva was awakened (so as to know Brahman) he indeed became that; and the same with ri shis;’ Kh.
Up. VIII, J, <z, ‘They said: Well, let us search for that Self by which, if one has searched it out, all worlds and all desires are obtained. Thus saying, Indra went forth from the Devas, Viro^ana from the Asuras/ Similar statements are met with in Smrzti, so, for instance, in the colloquy of the Gandharva and Ya^vliavalkya 1.—Against the objection raised in the preceding Sutra (32) we argue as follows. Words like aditya, and so on, which denote devas, although having reference to light and the like, yet convey the idea of certain divine Selfs (persons) endowed with intelligence and pre-eminent power; for they are used in that sense in mantras and arthavada passages. For the devas possess, in consequence of their pre-eminent power, the capability of residing within the light, and so on, and to assume any form they like. Thus we read in Scripture, in the arthavada passage explaining the words ‘ ram of Medhatithi/ which form part of the Subrahma^ya-formula, that ‘ Indra, having assumed the shape of a ram, carried off Medhatithi, the descendant of Ka^va 5 (Shadv. Br. I, 1). And thus Smrz'ti says that ‘Aditya, having assumed the shape of a man, came to Kunti. 5 Moreover, even in such substances as earth, in¬ telligent ruling beings must be admitted to reside, for that appears from such scriptural passages as ‘ the earth spoke/ ‘ the waters spoke/ &c. The non-intelligence of light and the like, in so far as they are mere material elements, is admitted in the case of the sun (aditya), &c. also; but—as already remarked—from the use of the words in mantras and 1 £rautalingen&num&naMdha/ft darrayitva smartenapi tadbadha/ra dar-rayati smartam iti. Km atra brahma amritam ki m svid vedyam anuttamam, ^intayet tatra vai gatvd gandharvo mam a^rikkhala, Vbvavasus tato ragan vedanta^wanakovida iti mokshadharme ^anakaya^avalkyasazravadat prahlada^agarasa/^vada^ koktanumanasiddhir ity artha^.
VEDANTA-sdTRAS.
arthavadas it appears that there are intelligent beings of divine nature (which animate those material elements).