But syntactical unity cannot be established unless it be on the ground of there being a want of a complementary part of speech or sentence. If you therefore construe the connexion of the passages without having regard to the fact that the latter passage demands as its complement that both bodies (which had been spoken of in the former passage) should be understood as referred to, you destroy all syntactical unity and so incapacitate yourselves from arriving at the true meaning of the text. Nor must you think that the second passage occupies itself with the subtle body only, for that reason that the latter is not easily distinguished from the Self, while the gross body is easily so distinguished on account of its readily perceived loath¬ someness. For the passage does not by any means refer to such a distinction—as we conclude from the circumstance of there being no verb enjoining it—but has for its only subject the highest place of Vishnu, which had been men¬ tioned immediately before. For after having enumerated a series of things in which the subsequent one is always superior to the one preceding it, it concludes by saying that nothing is beyond the Person.—We might, however, accept the interpretation just discussed without damaging our general argumentation; for whichever explanation we receive, so much remains clear that the K£/^aka passage does not refer to the pradhana.
4. And (the pradhina cannot be meant) because vedAnta-sOtras.
there is no statement as to (the avyakta) being something to be cognised.
The Sankhyas, moreover, represent the pradhina as some¬ thing to be cognised in so far as they say that from the knowledge of the difference of the constitutive elements of the pradhana and of the soul there results the desired isolation of the soul. For without a knowledge of the nature of those constitutive elements it is impossible to cognise the difference of the soul from them. And some¬ where they teach that the pradMna is to be cognised by him who wishes to attain special powers.—Now in the passage under discussion the avyakta is not mentioned as an object of knowledge; we there meet with the mere word avyakta, and there is no sentence intimating that the avyakta is to be known or meditated upon. And it is impossible to maintain that a knowledge of things which (knowledge) is not taught in the text is of any advantage to man.—For this reason also we maintain that the word avyakta cannot denote the pradhdna.—O u r interpretation, on the other hand, is unobjectionable, since according to it the passage mentions the body (not as an object of know¬ ledge, but merely) for the purpose of throwing light on the highest place of Vishnu, in continuation of the simile in which the body had been compared to a chariot.
5. And if you maintain that the text does speak (of the pradhAna as an object of knowledge) we deny that; for the intelligent (highest) Self is meant, on account of the general subject-matter.
Here the Sankhya raises a new objection, and maintains that the averment made in the last Sutra is not proved, since the text later on speaks of the pradhana—which had been referred to as the Undeveloped—as an object of knowledge. ‘ He who has perceived that which is without sound, without touch, without form, without decay, without taste, eternal, without smell, without beginning, without end, beyond the great and unchangeable, is freed from the jaws of death 5 (Ka. Up. II, 3,15). For here the text speaks of the pradh&na, which is beyond the great, describing it as possessing the same qualities which the Sankhya-smr/ti ascribes to it, and designating it as the object of perception. Hence we con¬ clude that the pradhana is denoted by the term avyakta.
To this we reply that the passage last quoted does repre¬ sent as the object of perception not the pradhana but the intelligent, i. e. the highest Self. We conclude this from the general subject-matter. For that the highest Self continues to form the subject-matter is clear from the fol¬ lowing reasons. In the first place, it is referred to in the passage, ‘Beyond the person there is nothing, this is the goal, the highest Road; 5 it has further to be supplied as the object of knowledge in the passage, ‘ The Self is hidden in all beings and does not shine forth, 5 because it is there spoken of as difficult to know; after that the restraint of passion, &c. is enjoined as conducive to its cognition, in the passage, ‘ A wise man should keep down speech within the mind; 5 and, finally, release from the jaws of death is declared to be the fruit of its knowledge. The Sankhyas, on the other hand, do not suppose that a man is freed from the jaws of death merely by perceiving the pradhana, but connect that result rather with the cognition of the intelli¬ gent Self.—The highest Self is, moreover, spoken of in all Vedanta-texts as possessing just those qualities which are mentioned in the passage quoted above, viz. absence of sound, and the like. Hence it follows, that the pradhana is in the text neither spoken of as the object of knowledge nor denoted by the term avyakta.
6. And there is question and explanation relative to three things only (not to the pradhana). To the same conclusion we are led by the consideration of the circumstance that the Ka/^avalli-upanishad brings forward, as subjects of discussion, only three things, viz. the fire sacrifice, the individual soul, and the highest Self. These three things only Yama explains, bestowing thereby the boons he had granted, and to them only the questions of Na&ketas refer. Nothing else is mentioned or enquired about. The question relative to the fire sacrifice is con¬ tained in the passage (Ka. Up. I, 1, 13), ‘Thou knowest, O Death, the fire sacrifice which leads us to Heaven; tell it to me, who am full of faith.’ The question as to the indi¬ vidual soul is contained in I, 1, 20, ‘There is that doubt when a man is dead, some saying, he is; others, he is not. This I should like to know, taught by thee; this is the third of my boons. 5 And the question about the highest Self is asked in the passage (I, 2, 14), ‘ That which thou seest as neither this nor that, as neither effect nor cause, as neither past nor future, tell me that. 5 —The corresponding answers are given in I, 1,15, ‘ Yama then told him that fire sacrifice, the beginning of all the worlds, and what bricks are required for the altar, and how many; 5 in the passage met with con¬ siderably later on (II, 5, 6; 7), ‘Well then, O Gautama, I shall tell thee this mystery, the old Brahman and what happens to the Self after reaching death. Some enter the womb in order to have a body as organic beings, others go into inorganic matter according to their work and according to their knowledge; 5 and in the passage (I, 2,18), ‘The knowing Self is not born nor does it die, 5 &c.; which latter passage dilates at length on the highest Self. But there is no ques¬ tion relative to the pradhana, and hence no opportunity for any remarks on it.
Here the Sankhya advances a new objection. Is, he asks, the question relative to the Self which is asked in the pas¬ sage, ‘ There is that doubt when a man is dead, 5 &c., again resumed in the passage, ‘ That which thou seest as neither this nor that, 5 &c., or does the latter passage raise a distinct new question? If the former, the two questions about the Self coalesce into one, and there are therefore altogether two questions only, one relative to the fire sacrifice, the other relative to the Self. In that case the Sutra has no right to speak of questions and explanations relating to three subjects.—If the latter, you do not consider it a mistake to assume a question in excess of the number of boons granted, and can therefore not object to us if we assume an explanation about the pradhana in excess of the number of questions asked.
To this we make the following reply.—We by no means assume a question in excess of the number of boons granted, being prevented from doing so by the influence of the opening part of that syntactical whole which constitutes the Ka^avalli-upanishad. The Upanishad starts with the topic of the boons granted by Yama, and all the following part of the Upanishad—which is thrown into the form of a colloquy of Yama and Na^iketas—carries on that topic up to the very end. Yama grants to Na^iketas, who had been sent by his father, three boons. For his first boon Na^iketas chooses kindness on the part of his father towards him, for his second boon the knowledge of the fire sacrifice, for his third boon the knowledge of the Self. That the knowledge of the Self is the third boon appears from the indication contained in the passage (I, 1, 20), ‘There is that doubt —; this is the third of my boons/—If we therefore supposed that the passage, ‘ That which thou seest as neither this nor that/ &c., raises a new question, we should thereby assume a question in excess of the number of boons granted, and thus destroy the connexion of the entire Upanishad.—But—the S&nkhyawill perhaps interpose—it must needs be admitted that the pas¬ sage last quoted does raise a new question, because the subject enquired about is a new one. For the former question refers to the individual soul, as we conclude from the doubt ex¬ pressed in the words, ‘ There is that doubt when a man is dead—some saying, he is; others, he is not/ Now this individual soul, as having definite attributes, &c., cannot constitute the object of a question expressed in such terms as, ‘ This which thou seest as neither this nor that/ &c.; the highest Self, on the other hand, may be enquired about in such terms, since it is above all attributes. The appearance of the two questions is, moreover, seen to differ; for the former question refers to existence and non-existence, while the latter is concerned with an entity raised above all definite attributes, &c. Hence we conclude that the latter question, in which the former one cannot be recognised, is a separate question, and does not merely resume the subject of the former one.—All this argumentation is not valid, we reply, since we maintain the unitv of the highest Self and the individual Self. If the individual Self were different from the highest Self, we should have to declare that the two questions are separate independent questions, but the two are not really different, as we know from other scrip¬ tural passages, such as £ Thou art that. 5 And in the Upanishad under discussion also the answer to the question, £ That which thou seest as neither this nor that, 5 viz. the passage, £ The knowing Self is not born, it dies not 5 —which answer is given in the form of a denial of the birth and death of the Self—clearly shows that the embodied Self and the highest Self are non-different. For there is room for a denial of something only when that something is possible, and the possibility of birth and death exists in the embodied Self only, since it is connected with the body, but not in the highest Self.—There is, moreover, another passage conveying the same meaning, viz. II, 4, 4, £ The wise when he knows that that by which he perceives all objects in sleep or in waking, is the great omnipresent Self, grieves no more. 5 This passage makes the cessation of all grief dependent on the knowledge of the individual Self, in so far as it possesses the qualities of greatness and omnipresence, and thereby declares that the individual Self is not different from the highest Self. For that the cessation of all sorrow is con¬ sequent on the knowledge of the highest Self, is a recognised Vedanta tenet.—There is another passage also warning men not to look on the individual Self and the highest Self as different entities, viz. II, 4, 10, £ What is here the same is there; and what is there the same is here. He who sees any difference here goes from death to death. 5 —The fol¬ lowing circumstance, too, is worthy of consideration. When Na&ketas has asked the question relating to the existence or non-existence of the soul after death, Yama tries to induce him to choose another boon, tempting him with the offer of various objects of desire. But Na^iketas remains firm.
Thereupon Death, dwelling on the distinction of the Good and the Pleasant, and the distinction of wisdom and ignor¬ ance, praises Na£iketas, £ I believe Na&ketas to be one who desires knowledge, for even many pleasures did not tear thee away 5 (I, 2, 4); and later on praises the question asked by Na^iketas, 4 The wise who, by means of meditation on his Self, recognises the Ancient who is difficult to be seen, who has entered into the dark, who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the abyss, as God, he indeed leaves joy and sorrow far behind ’ (I, 2, 12). Now all this means to intimate that the individual Self and the highest Self are non-different. For if Na^iketas set aside the question, by asking which he had earned for himself the praise of Yama, and after having received that praise asked a new question, all that praise would have been bestowed on him unduly. Hence it follows that the question implied in I, 2, 14, 4 That which thou seest as neither this nor that/ merely resumes the topic to which the question in I, 1, 20 had referred.— Nor is there any basis to the objection that the two questions differ in form. The second question, in reality, is concerned with the same distinction as the first. The first enquires about the existence of the soul apart from the body, &c.; the second refers to the circumstance of that soul not being subject to sa^sara. For as long as Nescience remains, so long the soul is affected with definite attributes, &c.; but as soon as Nescience comes to an end, the soul is one with the highest Self, as is taught by such scriptural texts as 4 Thou art that/ But whether Nescience be active or inactive, no difference is made thereby in the thing itself (viz.
the soul). A man may, in the dark, mistake a piece of rope lying on the ground for a snake, and run away from it, frightened and trembling; thereon another man may tell him, 4 Do not be afraid, it is only a rope, not a snake; 5 and he may then dismiss the fear caused by the imagined snake, and stop running. But all the while the presence and subse¬ quent absence of his erroneous notion, as to the rope being a snake, make no difference whatever in the rope itself. Exactly analogous is the case of the individual soul which is in reality one with the highest soul, although Nescience makes it appear different. Hence the reply contained in the passage, 4 It is not born, it dies not/ is also to be con¬ sidered as furnishing an answer to the question asked in I, 1, 20.—The Sutra is to be understood with reference to the distinction of the individual Self and the highest Self which VEDANTA-sOtRAS.
results from Nescience. Although the question relating to the Self is in reality one only, yet its former part (I, i, 20) is seen specially to refer to the individual Self, since there a doubt is set forth as to the existence of the soul when, at the time of death, it frees itself from the body, and since the specific marks of the sa^sara-state, such as activity, Sz:c. are not denied; while the latter part of the question (I, 2, 14), where the state of being beyond all attributes is spoken of, clearly refers to the highest Self.—For these reasons the Sutra is right in assuming three topics of question and explanation, viz. the fire sacrifice, the individual soul, and the highest Self. Those, on the other hand, who assume that the pradhana constitutes a fourth subject discussed in the Upanishad, can point neither to a boon connected with it, nor to a question, nor to an answer. Hence the pradhana hypothesis is clearly inferior to our own.
7. And (the case of the term avyakta) is like that of the term mahat. While the Sankhyas employ the term c the Great one,’ to denote the first-born entity, which is mere existence 1 (? viz. the intellect), the term has a different meaning in Vedic use. This we see from its being connected with the Self, See. in such passages as the following, c The great Self is beyond the Intellect ’ (Ka. Up. I, 3, 10); ‘ The great omnipresent Self 5 (Ka. Up. I, 2, 22); ‘ I know that great person 5 ( 5 ve. Up. Ill, 8). We thence conclude that the word avyakta also, where it occurs in the Veda, cannot denote the pradh&na.—The pradhana is therefore a mere thing of inference, and not vouched for by Scripture.
8. (It cannot be maintained that a^a means the 1 The commentators give different explanations of the Sattamatra of the text. — Sattamatre sattvapradhanaprakrfter adyapari^ame. Go. An. — Bhogapavargapurusharthasya maha/^^abditabuddhikaryatvat purushapekshitaphalakara^a^ sad u^yate tatra bhavapratyayo * pi svarupartho na samanyava^i karyanumeyaw mahan na pratyaksham iti matra^abda^. Ananda Giri.
pradhana) because no special characteristic is stated; as in the case of the cup.
Here the advocate of the pradhana comes again forward and maintains that the absence of scriptural authority for the pradhana is not yet proved. For, he says, we have the following mantra (SVe. Up. IV, 5), ‘There is one red, white, and black, producing manifold offspring of the same nature. There is one a^*a who loves her and lies by her; there is another who leaves her after having enjoyed her.’—-In this mantra the words £ red/ ‘ white/ and £ black ’ denote the three constituent elements of the pradhana. Passion is called red on account of its colouring, i. e. influencing pro¬ perty; Goodness is called white, because it is of the nature of Light; Darkness is called black on account of its covering and obscuring property. The state of equipoise of the three constituent elements, i. e. the pradhana, is denoted by the at¬ tributes of its parts, and is therefore called red—white—black.
It is further called a^d, i. e. unborn, because it is acknow¬ ledged to be the fundamental matter out of which everything springs, not a mere effect.—But has not the word a^a the settled meaning of she-goat?—True; but the ordinary meaning of the word cannot be accepted in this place, because true knowledge forms the general subject-matter.— That pradh&na produces many creatures participating in its three constituent elements. One unborn being loves her and lies by her, i. e. some souls, deluded by ignorance, approach her, and falsely imagining that they experience pleasure or pain, or are in a state of dulness, pass through the course of transmigratory existence. Other souls, again, which have attained to discriminative knowledge, lose their attachment to prakrzti, and leave her after having enjoyed her, i. e. after she has afforded to them enjoyment and release. —On the ground of this passage, as interpreted above, the 1 As the meaning of the word a^a is going to be discussed, and as the author of the Sfitras and -Sankara seem to disagree as to its meaning (see later on), I prefer to leave the word untranslated in this place.—Sankara reads—and explains,—in the mantra, sarupa-6 (not sarfipam) and bhuktabhog&m, not bhuktabhogyam.
vedanta~s6tras.
followers of Kapila claim the authority of Scripture for their pradhana hypothesis. To this argumentation we reply, that the quoted mantra by no means proves the Sankhya doctrine to be based on Scripture. That mantra, taken by itself, is not able to give additional strength to any doctrine. For, by means of some supposition or other, the terms a^a, &c. can be reconciled with any doctrine, and there is no reason for the special assertion that the Sankhya doctrine only is meant. The case is analogous to that of the cup mentioned in the mantra, 4 There is a cup having its mouth below and its bottom above’ (Bn.Up. II, 2, 3). Just as it is impossible to decide on the ground of this mantra taken by itself what special cup is meant—it being possible to ascribe, somehow or other, the quality of the mouth being turned downward to any cup—; so here also there is no special quality stated, so that it is not possible to decide from the mantra itself whether the pradhana is meant by the term aor some¬ thing else.—But in connexion with the mantra about the cup we have a supplementary passage from which we learn what kind of cup is meant, ‘ What is called the cup having its mouth below and its bottom above is this head.’—Whence, however, can we learn what special being is meant by the a^*i of the vSVetayvatara-upanishad?—To this question the next Stitra replies.
9. But the (elements) beginning with light (are meant by the term a£*&); for some read so in their text. By the term agci. we have to understand the causal matter of the four classes of beings, which matter has sprung from the highest Lord and begins with light, i. e. comprises fire, water, and earth.—The word 6 but ’ (in the Sutra) gives emphasis to the assertion.—This aga is to be considered as comprising three elementary substances, not as consisting of three gu^as in the Sankhya sense. We draw this conclusion from the fact that one sakha, after having related how fire, water, and earth sprang from the highest Lord, assigns to them red colour, and so on. ‘ The red colour of burning fire (agni) is the colour of the elementary fire (te^as), its white colour is the colour of water, its black colour the colour of earth, 5 &c. Now those three elements—fire, water, and earth— we recognise in the vSVetajvatara passage, as the words red, white, and black are common to both passages, and as these words primarily denote special colours and can be applied to the Sankhya gu/zas in a secondary sense only. That passages whose sense is beyond doubt are to be used for the interpretation of doubtful passages, is a generally acknow¬ ledged rule. As we therefore find that in the ^SVetlrvatara— after the general topic has been started in I,1,‘ The Brahmanstudents say, Is Brahman the cause? 5 —the text, previous to the passage under discussion, speaks of a power of the highest Lord which arranges the whole world (‘ the Sages devoted to meditation and concentration have seen the power belonging to God himself, hidden in its own qualities 5 ); and as further that same power is referred to in two subsequent complementary passages (‘ Know then, Prakrzti is Mayd, and the great Lord he who is affected with Maya; 5 ‘ who being one only rules over every germ; 5 IV, 10, 11); it cannot possibly be asserted that the mantra treating of the a gk refers to some independent causal matter called pradhdna. We rather assert, on the ground of the general subject-matter, that the mantra describes the same divine power referred to in the other passages, in which names and forms lie unevolved, and which we assume as the antecedent condition of that state of the world in which names and forms are evolved. And that divine power is represented as three-coloured, because its products, viz. fire, water, and earth, have three distinct colours.—But how can we maintain, on the ground of fire, water, and earth having three colours, that the causal matter is appropriately called a three-coloured a£*a? if we consider, on the one hand, that the exterior form of the genus a^d (i. e. goat) does not inhere in fire, water, and earth; and, on the other hand, that Scripture teaches fire, water, and earth to have been pro¬ duced, so that the word a^a cannot be taken in the sense ‘non-produced V—To this question the next Sutra replies.
1 Here there seems to be a certain discrepancy between the 10. And on account of the statement of the assumption (of a metaphor) there is nothing con¬ trary to reason (in a^a denoting the causal matter); just as in the case of honey (denoting the sun) and similar cases.
The word a^a neither expresses that fire, water, and earth belong to the goat species, nor is it to be explained as meaning ‘unborn;’ it rather expresses an assumption, i. e. it intimates the assumption of the source of all beings (which source comprises fire, water, and earth), being compared to a she-goat. For as accidentally some she-goat might be partly red, partly white, partly black, and might have many young goats resembling her in colour, and as some he-goat might love her and lie by her, while some other he-goat might leave her after having enjoyed her; so the universal causal matter which is tri-coloured, because comprising fire, water, and earth, produces many inanimate and animate beings similar to itself, and is enjoyed by the souls fettered by Nescience, while it is abandoned by those souls which have attained true knowlege.—Nor must we imagine that the distinction of individual souls, which is implied in the preceding explanation, involves that reality of the multi¬ plicity of souls which forms one of the tenets of other philo¬ sophical schools. For the purport of the passage is to intimate, not the multiplicity of souls, but the distinction of views of the Sfttra writer and -Sankara. Govindananda notes that according to the Bhashyakrft a^a means simply maya—which interpretation is based on prakarawa—while, according to the Sutrakr/t, who explains aga on the ground of the.Oandogya-passage treating of the three primary elements, a^a denotes the aggregate of those three elements constituting an avantaraprakrz'ti.—On -San¬ kara’s explanation the term aga presents no difficulties, for maya is aga, i.e. unborn, not produced. On the explanation of the Shtra writer, however, aga cannot mean unborn, since the three primary elements are products. Hence we are thrown back on the rh^i signification of a^a, according to which it means she-goat. But how can the avantara-prakrzti be called a she-goat? To this question the next Shtra replies.
I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, II. the states of bondage and release. This latter distinction is explained with reference to the multiplicity of souls as ordinarily conceived; that multiplicity, however, depends altogether on limiting adjuncts, and is the unreal product of wrong knowledge merely; as we know from scriptural passages such as, ‘ He is the one God hidden in all beings, all-pervading, the Self in all beings, 5 &c.—The words ‘ like the honey 5 (in the Sutra) mean that just as the sun, although not being honey, is represented as honey ( Kh. Up. Ill, 1), and speech as a cow (B ri. Up. V, 8), and the heavenly world, &c. as the fires (B ri. Up. VI, 2, 9), so here the causal matter, although not being a she-goat, is metaphori¬ cally represented as one. There is therefore nothing con¬ trary to reason in the circumstance of the term a^*a being used to denote the aggregate of fire, water, and earth.
11. (The assertion that there is scriptural autho¬ rity for the pradhana, &c. can) also not (be based) on the mention of the number (of the Sankhya categories), on account of the diversity (of the categories) and on account of the excess (over the number of those categories). The attempt to base the Sankhya doctrine on the mantra speaking of the a gk having failed, the Sankhya again comes forward and points to another mantra: ‘ He in whom the five “five-people” and the ether rest, him alone I believe to be the Self; I who know believe him to be Brahman’ (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 17). In this mantra we have one word which expresses the number five, viz. the five-people, and then another word, viz. five, which qualifies the former; these two words together therefore convey the idea of five pentads, i.e. twenty-five. Now as many beings as the number twentyfive presupposes, just so many categories the Sankhya system counts. Cp. Sankhya K&rika, 3: ‘ The funda¬ mental causal substance (i.e. the pradhana) is not an effect. Seven (substances), viz. the Great one (Intellect), and so on, are causal substances as well as effects. Sixteen are effects. The soul is neither a causal substance nor an effect. 5 [34] S As therefore the number twenty-five, which occurs in the scriptural passage quoted, clearly refers to the twenty-five categories taught in the Sankhya-smrzti, it follows that the doctrine of the pradhana, &c. rests on a scriptural basis.