forms and names are contained is the Brahman, the Immor¬ tal, the Self' {Kh. Up. VIII, 14, 1).
There arising a doubt whether that which here is called ether is the highest Brahman or the ordinary elemental ether, the purvapakshin declares that the latter alternative is to be embraced, firstly, because it is founded on the con¬ ventional meaning of the word ‘ether;’ and, secondly, because the circumstance of revealing names and forms can very well be reconciled with the elemental ether, as that which affords room (for all things). Moreover, the passage contains no clear indicatory mark of Brahman, such as creative power, and the like.
To this we reply, that the word ‘ether’ can here denote the highest Brahman only, because it is designated as a different thing, &c. For the clause, ‘That within which these two are contained is Brahman,’ designates the ether as something different from names and forms. But, excepting Brahman, there is nothing whatever different from name and form, since the entire world of effects is evolved exclusively by names and forms. Moreover, the complete revealing of names and forms cannot be accom¬ plished by anything else but Brahman, according to the text which declares Brahman’s creative agency, ‘ Let me enter (into those beings) with this living Self (^*iva atman), and evolve names and forms ’ ( Kh. Up. VI, 3, 2). But—it may be said—from this very passage it is apparent that the living Self also (i. e. the individual soul) possesses revealing power with regard to names and forms.—True, we reply, but what the passage really wishes to intimate, is the non¬ difference (of the individual soul from the highest Self). And the very statement concerning the revealing of names and forms implies the statement of signs indicatory of Brahman, viz. creative power and the like.— Moreover, the terms ‘the Brahman, the Immortal, the Self’ (VIII, 14) indicate that Brahman is spoken of.
42. And (on account of the designation) (of the highest Self) as different (from the individual soul) in the states of deep sleep and departing. In the sixth prapa/^aka of the Bnhadara^yaka there is given, in reply to the question, ‘ Who is that Self? ’ a lengthy exposition of the nature of the Self, ‘ He who is within the heart, among the pri/zas, the person of light, consisting of knowledge’ (B ri. Up. IV, 3, 7). Here the doubt arises, whether the passage merely aims at making an additional statement about the nature of the transmi¬ grating soul (known already from other sources), or at establishing the nature of the non-transmigrating Self.
The pfirvapakshin maintains that the passage is concerned with the nature of the transmigrating soul, on account of the introductory and concluding statements. For the intro¬ ductory statement, ‘ He among the prd«as who consists of knowledge/ contains marks indicatory of the embodied soul, and so likewise the concluding passage, ‘ And that great unborn Self is he who consists of cognition/ &c. (IV, 4, 22). We must therefore adhere to the same subjectmatter in the intermediate passages also, and look on them as setting forth the same embodied Self, represented in its different states, viz. the waking state, and so on.
In reply to this, we maintain that the passage aims only at giving information about the highest Lord, not at making additional statements about the embodied soul.—Why?— On account of the highest Lord being designated as different from the embodied soul, in the states of deep sleep and of departing from the body. His difference from the embodied soul in the state of deep sleep is declared in the following passage, ‘ This person embraced by the intelligent (prag-na.) Self knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within.’ Here the term, ‘ the person/ must mean the embodied soul; for of him it is possible to deny that he knows, because he, as being the knower, may know what is within and without.
The ‘intelligent Self/ on the other hand, is the highest Lord, because he is never dissociated from intelligence, i. e.—in his case—all-embracing knowledge. — Similarly, the passage treating of departure, i. e. death (‘ this bodily Self mounted by the intelligent Self moves along groaning ’), refers to the highest Lord as different from the individual Self. There also we have to understand by the ‘ embodied one 5 the individual soul which is the Lord of the body, while the ‘ intel¬ ligent one ’ is again the Lord. We thus understand that ‘ on account of his being designated as something different, in the states of deep sleep and departure,’ the highest Lord forms the subject of the passage.—With reference to the purvapakshin’s assertion that the entire chapter refers to the embodied Self, because indicatory marks of the latter are found in its beginning, middle, and end, we remark that in the first place the introductory passage (‘He among the pranas who consists of cognition’) does not aim at setting forth the character of the transmigrating Self, but rather, while merely referring to the nature of the transmigrating Self as something already known, aims at declaring its identity with the highest Brahman; for it is manifest that the immediately subsequent passage, ‘as if thinking, as if moving 1,’ aims at discarding the attributes of the transmigrating Self. The concluding pas¬ sage again is analogous to the initial one; for the words, ‘ And that great unborn Self is he who,’ &c., mean: We have shown that that same cognitional Self, which is observed among the pri^as, is the great unborn Self, i. e. the highest Lord.—He, again, who imagines that the pas¬ sages intervening (between the two quoted) aim at setting forth the nature of the transmigrating Self by represent¬ ing it in the waking state, and so on, is like a man who, setting out towards the east, wants to set out at the same time towards the west. For in representing the states of waking, and so on, the passage does not aim at describing the soul as subject to different states or transmigration, but rather as free from all particular conditions and trans¬ migration. This is evident from the circumstance that on Ganaka's question, which is repeated in every section, ‘ Speak on for the sake of emancipation/ Ya^viavalkya replies each time, ‘ By all that he is not affected, for that person is not attached to anything’ (B ri. Up. IV, 3, 14-16). And later on he says (IV, 3, 22), ‘ He is not followed by 1 The stress lies here on the ‘ as if/ which intimate that the Self does not really think or move.
good, not followed by evil, for he has then overcome all the sorrows of the heart/ We have, therefore, to conclude that the chapter exclusively aims at setting forth the nature of the non-transmigrating Self.
43. And on account of such words as Lord, &c. That the chapter aims at setting forth the nature of the non-transmigrating Self, we have to conclude from that circumstance also that there occur in it terms such as Lord and so on, intimating the nature of the non-transmigrating Self, and others excluding the nature of the transmigrating Self. To the first class belongs, for instance,‘ He is the lord of all, the king of all things, the protector of all things/ To the latter class belongs the passage, £ He does not be¬ come greater by good works, nor smaller by evil works/— From all which we conclude that the chapter refers to the non-transmigrating highest Lord.
Reverence to the highest Self!
1. If it be said that some (mention) that which is based on inference (i. e. the pradhana); we deny this, because (the term alluded to) refers to what is con¬ tained in the simile of the body (i.e. the body itself); and (that the text) shows. In the preceding part of this work—as whose topic there has been set forth an enquiry into Brahman—we have at first defined Brahman (I, 1, <z ); we have thereupon refuted the objection that that definition applies to the pradh&na also, by showing that there is no scriptural authority for the latter (1,1,5), and we have shown in detail that the common purport of all Vedanta-texts is to set forth the doctrine that Brahman, and not the pradhana, is the cause of the world. Here, however, the Sankhya again raises an objection which he considers not to have been finally disposed of.
It has not, he says, been satisfactorily proved that there is no scriptural authority for the pradhana; for some.yakhcts contain expressions which seem to convey the idea of the pradhana. From this it follows that Kapila and other supreme rzshis maintain the doctrine of the pradhana being the general cause only because it is based on the Veda.—As long therefore as it has not been proved that those passages to which the Sankhyas refer have a different meaning (i. e. do not allude to the pradhana), all our previous argumentation as to the omniscient Brahman being the cause of the world must be considered as unsettled. We there¬ fore now begin a new chapter which aims at proving that those passages actually have a different meaning.
The Sankhyas maintain that that also which is based on inference, i. e. the pradhana, is perceived in the text of some ^akhas. We read, for instance, they say, in the Kanaka (I, 3, 11), ‘Beyond the Great there is the Undeveloped, beyond the Undeveloped there is the Person.’ There we recognise, named by the same names and enumerated in the same order, the three entities with which we are acquainted from the Sdnkhya-smr/ti, viz. the great principle, the Un¬ developed (the pradMna), and the soul 1. That by the Un¬ developed is meant the pradhana is to be concluded from the common use of Smrz’ti and from the etymological inter¬ pretation of which the word admits, the pradMna being called undeveloped because it is devoid of sound and other qualities. It cannot therefore be asserted that there is no scriptural authority for the pradMna. And this pradhana vouched for by Scripture we declare to be the cause of the world, on the ground of Scripture, Smr/ti, and ratiocination.
Your reasoning, we reply, is not valid. The passage from the Kanaka quoted by you intimates by no means the existence of that great principle and that Undeveloped which are known from the Sankhya-smrzti. We do not recognise there the pradhana of the ScLnkhyas, i. e. an inde¬ pendent general cause consisting of three constituting elements; we merely recognise the word ‘ Undeveloped,’ which does not denote any particular determined thing, but may—owing to its etymological meaning, ‘that which is not developed, not manifest * — denote anything subtle and difficult to distinguish. The Sankhyas indeed give to the word a settled meaning, as they apply it to the pradMna; but then that meaning is valid for their system only, and has no force in the determination of the sense of the Veda. Nor does mere equality of position prove equality of being, unless the latter be recognised indepen¬ dently. None but a fool would think a cow to be a horse because he sees it tied in the usual place of a horse. We, moreover, conclude, on the strength of the general subjectmatter, that the passage does not refer to the pradhana the fiction of the Sankhyas, ‘ on account of there being referred 1 The Great one is the technical S&nkhya-term for buddhi, avyakta is a common designation of pradhana or prakn'ti, and purusha is the technical name of the soul. Compare, for instance, Sankhya Kar. 2, 3.
to that which is contained in the simile of the body/ This means that the body which is mentioned in the simile of the chariot is here referred to as the Undeveloped. We infer this from the general subject-matter of the passage and from the circumstance of nothing else remaining.—The immediately preceding part of the chapter exhibits the simile in which the Self, the body, and so on, are compared to the lord of a chariot, a chariot, See., ‘ Know the Self to be the lord of the chariot, the body to be the chariot, the intellect the charioteer, and the mind the reins. The senses they call the horses, the objects of the senses their roads.
When he (the Self) is in union with the body, the senses and the mind, then wise people call him the enjoyer/ The text then goes on to say that he whose senses, &c. are not well controlled enters into sa^s&ra, while he who has them under control reaches the end of the journey, the highest place of Vish/zu. The question then arises: What is the end of the journey, the highest place of Vishzzu? Whereupon the text explains that the highest Self which is higher than the senses, &c., spoken of is the end of the journey, the highest place of Vishzzu. ‘ Beyond the senses there are the objects, beyond the objects there is the mind, beyond the mind there is the intellect, the great Self is beyond the in¬ tellect. Beyond the great there is the Undeveloped, beyond the Undeveloped there is the Person. Beyond the Person there is nothing—this is the goal, the highest Road/ In this passage we recognise the senses, &c. which in the preceding simile had been compared to horses and so on, and we thus avoid the mistake of abandoning the matter in hand and taking up a new subject. The senses, the intellect, and the mind are referred to in both passages under the same names. The objects (in the second passage) are the objects which are (in the former passage) designated as the roads of the senses; that the objects are beyond (higher than) the senses is known from the scriptural passage representing the senses as grahas, i.e. graspers, and the objects as atigrahas, i. e.
superior to the grahas (B ri. Up. Ill, 3). The mind (manas) again is superior to the objects, because the relation of the senses and their objects is based on the mind. The intellect (buddhi) is higher than the mind, since the objects of enjoy¬ ment are conveyed to the soul by means of the intellect. Higher than the intellect is the great Self which was repre¬ sented as the lord of the chariot in the passage, £ Know the Self to be the lord of the chariot/ That the same Self is referred to in both passages is manifest from the repeated use of the word £ Self; 5 that the Self is superior to intelli¬ gence is owing to the circumstance that the enjoyer is naturally superior to the instrument of enjoyment. The Self is appropriately called great as it is the master.— Or else the phrase £ the great Self’ may here denote the intellect of the first-born Hira/zyagarbha which is the basis of all intellects; in accordance with the following Smrz’tipassage f it is called mind, the great one; reflection, Brahman; the stronghold, intellect; enunciation, the Lord; highest knowledge, consciousness; thought, remembrance 1 / and like¬ wise with the following scriptural passage, £ He (Hira^yagarbha) who first creates Brahman and delivers the Vedas to him’ (SVet. Up. VI, 18). The intellect, which in the former passage had been referred to under its common name buddhi, is here mentioned separately, since it may be repre¬ sented as superior to our human intellects. On this latter explanation of the term £ the great Self, 5 we must assume that the personal Self which in the simile had been compared to the charioteer is, in the latter passage, included in the highest person (mentioned last); to which there is no objec¬ tion, since in reality the personal Self and the highest Self are identical.—Thus there remains now the body only which had before been compared to a chariot. We therefore con- 1 Satfzkalpavikalparfipamananajaktya haira^yagarbhi buddhir manas tasya^ vyash/imana^su samash/itaya vyaptim aha mahan iti. Sa^kalpadi^aktitaya tarhi sawdehatmatva/^ tatraha matir iti. Mahatvam upapadayati brahmeti. Bhogya^atadharatvam aha pur iti. Ni^ayatmakatvam aha buddhir iti. Kirthaktimattvam aha khyatir iti. Niyamanajaktimatvam aha favara iti. Loke yat prakrfsh/affz £$anam tato*natirekam aha pra^eti. Tatphalam api tato narthantaravishayam ity aha sawvid iti. A^itpradhanatvam aha kitir iti. ^atasarvarthanusawdhana^aktim aha smr/th keti. Ananda Giri.
elude that the text after having enumerated the senses and all the other things mentioned before, in order to point out the highest place, points out by means of the one remaining word, viz. avyakta, the only thing remaining out of those which had been mentioned before, viz. the body.
The entire passage aims at conveying the knowledge of the unity of the inward Self and Brahman, by describing the soul’s passing through sa^sara and release under the form of a simile in which the body, &c. of the soul—which is affected by Nescience and therefore joined to a body, senses, mind, intellect, objects, sensations, &c.—are compared to a chariot, and so on.—In accordance with this the subsequent verse states the difficulty of knowing the highest place of Vishnu ( £ the Self is hidden in all beings and does not shine forth, but it is seen by subtle seers through their sharp and subtle intellect ’), and after that the next verse declares Yoga to be the means of attaining that cognition. 6 A wise man should keep down speech in the mind, he should keep down the mind in intelligence, intelligence he should keep down within the great Self, and he should keep that within the quiet Self/—That means: The wise man should restrain the activity of the outer organs such as speech, &c., and abide within the mind only; he should further restrain the mind which is intent on doubtful external objects within intelli¬ gence, whose characteristic mark is decision, recognising that indecision is evil; he should further restrain intelligence within the great Self, i. e. the individual soul or else the fundamental intellect; he should finally fix the great Self on the calm Self, i. e. the highest Self, the highest goal, of which the whole chapter treats.—If we in this manner review the general context, we perceive that there is no room for the pradhana imagined by the Sankhyas.
2. But the subtle (body is meant by the term avyakta) on account of its capability (of being so designated).
It has been asserted, under the preceding Sutra, that the term c the Undeveloped’ signifies, on account of the general [34] R vedAnta-s£jtras.
subject-matter and because the body only remains, the body and not the pradhana of the Sankhyas.—But here the following doubt arises: How can the word ‘ unde¬ veloped 5 appropriately denote the body which, as a gross and clearly appearing thing, should rather be called vyakta, i. e. that which is developed or manifested?
To this doubt the Sutra replies that what the term avyakta denotes is the subtle causal body. Anything subtle may be spoken of as Undeveloped. The gross body indeed cannot directly be termed ‘undeveloped,’ but the subtle parts of the elements from which the gross body originates may be called so, and that the term de¬ noting the causal substance is applied to the effect also is a matter of common occurrence; compare, for instance, the phrase ‘ mix the Soma with cows, i.e. milk ’ (Rig-ve da S. IX, 46,4). Another scriptural passage also—‘ now all this was then undeveloped’ (B ru Up. I, 4, 7)—shows that this, i. e. this developed world with its distinction of names and forms, is capable of being termed undeveloped in so far as in a former condition it was in a merely seminal or potential state, devoid of the later evolved distinctions of name and form.
3. (Such a previous seminal condition of the world may be admitted) on account of its dependency on him (the Lord); (for such an admission is) according to reason.
Here a new objection is raised.—If, the opponent says, in order to prove the possibility of the body being called undeveloped you admit that this world in its antecedent seminal condition before either names or forms are evolved can be called undeveloped, you virtually concede the doctrine that the pradhana is the cause of the world. For we Sankhyas understand by the term pradhana nothing but that antecedent condition of the world.
Things lie differently, we rejoin. If we admitted some antecedent state of the world as the independent cause of the actual world, we should indeed implicitly admit the pradhana doctrine. What we admit is, however, only a previous state dependent on the highest Lord, not an independent state. A previous stage of the world such as the one assumed by us must necessarily be admitted, since it is according to sense and reason. For without it the highest Lord could not be conceived as creator, as he could not become active if he were destitute of the po¬ tentiality of action. The existence of such a causal poten¬ tiality renders it moreover possible that the released souls should not enter on new courses of existence, as it is destroyed by perfect knowledge. For that causal potenti¬ ality is of the nature of Nescience; it is rightly denoted by the term ‘ undeveloped; ’ it has the highest Lord for its substratum; it is of the nature of an illusion; it is a universal sleep in which are lying the transmigrating souls destitute for the time of the consciousness of their individual character 1. This undeveloped principle is some¬ times denoted by the term &kai*a, ether; so, for instance, in the passage, ‘ In that Imperishable then, O Gargi, the ether is woven like warp and woof’ (Bri. Up. Ill, 8, 11).
Sometimes, again, it is denoted by the term akshara, the Imperishable; so, for instance (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2), ‘ Higher, than the high Imperishable.’ Sometimes it is spoken of as Mdya, illusion; so, for instance (Sve. Up. IV, 10), c Know then PrakWti is Maya, and the great Lord he who is affected with Mctya.’ For May4 is properly called un¬ developed or non-manifested since it cannot be defined either as that which is or that which is not.—The statement of the Kanaka that ‘ the Undeveloped is beyond the Great 1 Nanu na bi^a^aktir vidyaya dahyate vastutvad atmavan nety &ha avidyeti. Ke&t tu prati^ivam avidya^aktibhedam i^anti tan na avyaktavyakntadhabdayas tasya bhedakabhavad ekatve*pi sva^aktya vi&trakaryakaratvad ity aha avyakteti. Na tasya ^ivajrayatvaflz giva^abdavaiyasya kalpitatvad avidyarupatvat ta^Mabdalakshyasya brahmavyatirekad ity &ha parame^vareti. Mayavidyayor bhedad fovarasya maya^rayatva^ ^ivanam avidya^rayateti vadanta/ra pratyaha mayamayiti. Yatha mayavino maya paratantra tathaish&pity artha^. Pratitau tasya j yfcetanapeksham aha mahasuptir iti. Ananda Giri.
R 2 one ’ is based on the fact of the Great one originating from the Undeveloped, if the Great one be the intellect of Hira^yagarbha. If, on the other hand, we understand by the Great one the individual soul, the statement is founded on the fact of the existence of the individual soul depending on the Undeveloped, i. e. Nescience. For the continued existence of the individual soul as such is altogether owing to the relation in which it stands to Nescience. The quality of being beyond the Great one which in the first place belongs to the Undeveloped, i.e. Nescience, is attri¬ buted to the body which is the product of Nescience, the cause and the effect being considered as identical. Al¬ though the senses, &c. are no less products of Nescience, the term c the Undeveloped’ here refers to the body only, the senses, &c. having already been specially mentioned by their individual names, and the body alone being left.—-Other interpreters of the two last Sutras give a somewhat different explanation 1.—There are, they say, two kinds of body, the gross one and the subtle one. The gross body is the one which is perceived; the nature of the subtle one will be explained later on. (Ved. Su. Ill, i, i.) Both these bodies together were in the simile compared to the chariot; but here (in the passage under discussion) only the subtle body is referred to as the Undeveloped, since the subtle body only is capable of being denoted by that term. And as the soul’s passing through bondage and release depends on the subtle body, the latter is said to be beyond the soul, like the things (arthavat), i. e. just as the objects are said to be beyond the senses because the activity of the latter depends on the objects.—But how—we ask those interpreters—is it possible that the word ‘ Undeveloped ’ should refer to the subtle body only, while, according to your opinion, both bodies had in the simile been represented as a chariot, and so equally constitute part of the topic of the chapter, and equally remain (to be mentioned in the a 1 Sfitradvayasya vr/ttikrfdvyakhyanam utthapayati. Go. An, AMryadeayamatam utthapayati. An. Gi.
passage under discussion)?—If you should rejoin that you are authorised to settle the meaning of what the text actually mentions, but not to find fault with what is not mentioned, and that the word avyakta which occurs in the text can denote only the subtle body, but not the gross body which is vyakta, i. e. developed or manifest; we invalidate this rejoinder by remarking that the determin¬ ation of the sense depends on the circumstance of the passages interpreted constituting a syntactical whole. For if the earlier and the later passage do not form a whole they convey no sense, since that involves the abandonment of the subject started and the taking up of a new subject.