? Bentley seems to suspect this story as applying to Phalaris, “‘ because,’’ says he, ‘“‘ Conon, a writer in Julius Cesar’s time, gives us the very same narrative; but, instead of Phalaris, he says it was Gelon that Stesichorus spoke of. And the circumstances of Gelon’s history seem to countenance Conon; for Gelon was in great favour and esteem with the Himereans.”’ Conon, Narrat. 42. Bentl. in Phalaris. p. 38.
onar. xx.| RHETORIC, -67 conjunction with him, to chastise the stag. The man said [that he would be able] if he would take the bit, and himself were to mount him with his darts. When, however, he had agreed to this, and the man was mounted, the horse, instead of being revenged, was himself already the slave of the man. And in the same way do you also (says he) look to it, lest, in your wish to avenge yourselves on your enemies, you suffer in the same way as the horse; for already, through your choice of a commander with independent power, you have the bit in your mouths: but if you assign him a body guard, and permit him to mount into the saddle, you will become, from that moment forth, the slaves of Phalaris.”
And ®sop, when pleading at Samos in behalf of 6.
a demagogue who was tried for his life, said, “‘ That a fox in crossing a river was thrust out of her course into a drain, and that, being unable to get out, she was harassed for a long time, many horse leeches having got hold of her; but a hedgehog wandering by, when he saw her, taking compassion on her, asked whether he should pick off the horse leeches from her; that the fox however would not permit him; but on his asking why, she replied, ‘ Because these are indeed already filled from me, and now suck but a little blood; if, however, you should pick them off, others, who are hungry, coming up will drain off the little blood which remains. But (said he), Oh Samians, thus also does this man no longer injure you; for he is wealthy: should you, however, put him to death, others who are poor will come, who will exhaust you while they filch the public money.”; But fables are adapted to deliberative oratory, and possess this advantage; that to hit upon facts which have occurred in point is difficult; but with regard to fables it is comparatively easy. For an orator ought to construct them just as he does his illustrations, if he be able to discover the point of similitude, a thing which will be easy if he be of a philosophical 7. Fables are suited to the deliberative orator: 8. being easy.
9. He who has not enthymems will use examples as proofs, and put them first. He who has enthymems uses examples as testimonies, and uts them t.
turn of mind, Cases, then, in the shape of fabies, are the easier to bring forward; but those are more availing with a view to deliberation, which are put upon the ground of facts; because, generally speaking, the future resembles the past‘.
It will, moreover, be right for one who has not enthymems to employ his examples like positive proofs; since the persuasive efficacy of your speech will be produced by them: but one who possesses [enthymems | should employ them like evidence, putting them forward after his enthymems, in way of a conclusion. Because, if they be put first, they bear resemblance to induction; and induction, except in few instances, is not proper to rhetoric; whereas when put in at the end, they resemble evidence; and a witness in every case influences belief. On which account, there is moreover a necessity imposed on him who puts them first of citing ‘many; for him, however, who states them in conclusion even one is sufficient; for a credible witness, though but single, is serviceable.
The number, then, of the species of examples, how many they are, and how and when they are to ‘be used, has been stated.
3 He again remarks on the facility here ascribed to minds of a philosophical turn, when, in speaking of metaphors, he remarks, τὸ ὅμοιον Kai ἐν πολὺ διέχουσι ϑεωρεῖν, εὐστόχου, lib, iii. cap. xi. § 5.
4 This is the principle on which he has all along recommended example as more peculiarly available to the views οἵ the deliberative orator. At the end of his illustrations of tle subject of demonstrative rhetoric, after stating amplification to be more proper to it than either of the other common means of persuasion, he says, τὰ παραδείγματα τοῖς συμβουλευτικοῖς" ἐκ yao τῶν προγεγονότων τὰ μέλλοντα καταμαντευόμενοι Kpi-νομεν, lib. i. cap. ix. § 40. Neither, says he, (cap. iv. § 8,) ought the orator to rely on the result of his own observation, ἀλλ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εὑρημένων LaTopiKds εἶναι, πρὸς τὴν περὶ τούτων σνμβουλήν.
OMAP. XX1.} RHETORIC. 169 Of Moral Sentirrents,—what they are, and of how many species,—how they are to be employed,—and what advantages they possess.
On the subject of the use of maxims, after it has been stated what a maxim is, it will most easily become clear both in what cases, on what occasions, and what persons it befits to avail themselves of the enunciation of maxims in their speeches.
Now the maxim is an assertion, and yet not respecting particulars, as what kind of person Iphicrates was, but on some general subject; neither is it on every general subject ', as, that what is straight is opposed to what is curved; but it is respecting as many subjects as moral conduct is concerned about, and as are objects of choice or avoidance in acting. So that, as the enthymem is a form of reasoning nearly { confined 7 to this description of subjects, both the conclusions of enthymems and their premises, after the syllogistic form has been done away, become maxims*., ‘Take an instance: “A man who is 1 Having told you that maxims are certain general propositions, he cautions you against supposing that every general proposition deserves this appellation. For example, mathematical truths are asserted in propositions, general enough it is true, which however do not come up to the notion which Aristotle would have you form of the γνώμη. I hardly know whether it be allowable to attempt an explanation of Aristotle from a popular comedy; but those readers who remember the School for Scandal, may probably derive some illustration of this subject from the ‘ sentiments’ there put in the mouth of Joseph Surface; e.g. “ The heart that is conscious of its own integrity, is ever slow to credit another’s treachery.” Act iv. scene 3, ? In other words, the maxim is to the enthymem what propositions are to syllogisms. Not to every enthymem does the γνώμη hold this relation, but to such only as are σ΄ nversant with “the actions and passions of common life.” Aristotle has not ventured to tell us that a// enthymems relate to these subjects; he says only that ‘‘ nearly” all of them are so cme versant; περὶ τυιούτων ἐστὶ σχεδόν.
1. Maxim, γνώμη.
2. Its defi - nition, Conclusions of most enthymems are maxims, 8. Maxims are of four kinds, 4. i, μετ᾽ ἐπιλόγου. il. ἄνευ ἐπιλόγου.
5.
6. Those μετ᾽ ἐπι- λόγου are either, Ist, part of an enthymem; _ or 2nd. Enthymenioatic, in his sound mind never ought to educate his children so as to be too highly skilled*.” Now this is a maxim: but if the reason, and the cause why he should not do so, be added, the whole [conjointly | wfll become an enthymem; thus, ‘‘ ————— for besides the indolence which they contract, they will attach to themselves the bitter jealousy of the citizens.” Again, this: “There is not a man who in every respect is happy‘:” and the following: “There is not one of all mankind who is free®,” are maxims: and the last becomes an enthymem, if added to the following proposition, “ —-—— for either he is the slave of money or of fortune.”
If, then, the maxim be what it has been described, there will necessarily be four kinds of maxims: for either they will be with the annexed reason, or without it. Now the maxims which need proof are all such as assert any thing which contravenes received opinion, or is doubtful; but those which state nothing contrary to people’s notions [do well enough | without the addition of proof. And of these last it cannot but be that some will need no proof®, from their having been previously known; as, “ The best thing for a man, as it seems to me at least, is health;’—because to nine-tenths of mankind this seems to be the case: and that others simultaneously with their being uttered become evident to such as turn their attention to them; as, ‘ There is no lover who does not always love.” And again, of those which have proof subjoined, some are a part of an enthymem, just as, “ A man who is in his sound mind never ought,” etc. Others are essentially enthymems, and not part of an enthymem; the which obtain more than any other species. And these are all those in which the reason for what is asserted appears wrought in, as 3 Euripides, Medea, 294.
4 From a lost drama of Euripides, entitled Sthenobeea.
§ Euripides, Hecuba, 864.
® I have ventured thus to render ἐπίλογος - for that such is Aristotle’s meaning, is evident from his having himself used ἀπόδειξις, at the beginning of the section, to denote the same thing.
ChA. XXI.| RHETORIC. 171 in this maxim: “ Being yourself a mortal, do not cherish immortal wrath:”—for the assertion that, * one ought not always to cherish wrath,” is a maxim; that, however, which is added, viz. “because you are a mortal,” states the reason why. Similar to which is the following: “ It is fitting that a mortal conceive mortal notions, not that a being destined to death should think of what is immortal ’.”
From what has been said it has then become evident, as well how many the species of maxims are, as also to what kind of subjects they are severally adapted. For on subjects which may be questioned, or contravene received opinions, the orator must not use those without the reason annexed; but let him either, prefixing the reason, use the conclusion as a maxim, thus—“ For my part, as then it neither is good to be exposed to envy, nor to be indolent, I assert that it is not good to be educated;” or, stating this [ which here is the conclusion | first, swbjoin that which was prefixed*. Observing that on subjects which do not contravene received opinions, but are doubtful, that he annex the reason why as concisely as possible. And on subjects such as these the apophthegms of the Lacedzemonians are very suitable, and sayings which have an air of mystery; as if one were to apply that which Stesichorus said before the Locrians, ‘that they ought not to be insolent, lest their cigalas should sing upon the ground 9, The employment of maxims becomes him who is 7 So also says Horace:— Quid eternis minorem Consiliis animum fatigas? Od. ii. 11, 11.
A notion, by the way, which Aristotle controverts elsewhere, Nich. Eth. x. 7. | ® To state the rule in the words of Hobbes, it is this—‘“ A sentence not manifest ought to be either inferred or confirmed; inferred, (as in the text,) confirmed thus,—A wise man will not have his children over-learned, (prefixing what, in the former disposition, had been put last,) seeing too much learning both softens a man’s mind, and procures him envy among his fellow-citizens,”’ (and subjoining what before had been prefixed.)
® Meaning, lest their country should be so utterly devastated as that not a tree would remain for a cigala to sit upcn.
These last are most approved.
7. Maxims not evident must have the reason prefixed or subjoined.
8. With concise - ness 9. Maxims suit the old.
mon ones are useful.
12. Old sayings. 13. It is good to contravene ἃ common maxim.
rather advanced in life; and particularly as respects subjects about which each happens to be well informed!°, Since for one not so advanced in age to sport maxims is bad taste, just as it is for him to have recourse to fables: and the use of them on subjects about which one is ignorant is silly, and argues a want of education. ‘There is a sufficient sign of the truth of this; for the boors of the country are of all other people most fond of hammering out maxims, and set them forth with great volubility. Also the stating generally a maxim which is, in fact, not general, is most especially befitting in appeals to the feelings, and in the act of exciting indignation; and then either at the beginning, or after the proof. Again, it is proper to avail one’s self of maxims which are current and common, if they be of any service; for from their being common they appear to be correct, as though every one acknowledged their truth!!:; this one, for instance, (if the orator be exhorting persons to face the hazard, though they have not sacrificed, ) “ One omen there is which is best, to defend one’s country;”—or to face it, though they be few in number,—“ Mars is common;” and to cut off the children of their foes, what though they have done no injury,—“ He is a fool who, after slaying the father, still spares the child!?.”
Some old sayings too are maxims; for example, the expression, “ Next neighbour to an Athenian.” It is also proper to quote maxims which even contravene the current sayings, (I mean by current sayings such as this, “ Know thyself;” or this, “Too much of one thing is good for nothing;”) whenever your moral character may be likely to show itself to greater advantage, or the thing spoken is said in an impas- ‘0 A young man ought not to use maxims. 1! On the principle,—Vox populi est vox Dei. 12 So thought Lee’s hero, Cesar Borgia, for he tells Ma chiavel in the tragedy, *Tis not my way to lop, for then the tree May sprout again; but roct him, and he lies Never to bluster. Act v. sc. 2.
CHAP. ΧΧΙ.] RHETORIC. 173 sioned manner. The speaking in an impassioned manner is, as if one in a passion were to assert, ‘‘ that it was a falsehood that one ought to know himself; at least, this man, had he known himself, would never have claimed to be your general'*.” The moral character appears better [when we contradict a maxim ] thus, “it does not become men, as some assert, to love as though they were about to hate, but to hate as though they were about to love.” And we ought to give a manifestation of our moral principle by means of the diction we employ, otherwise to subjoin the reason; for instance, either stating the sentence thus, “we ought to love, not as they tell us, but as though always about to love, for the other is the part of an insidious man:” or thus, “the common maxim does not please me; for it is the duty of the true friend at least to love as though he were always about to love.” ‘“* Nor again [does this please me], that we ought to carry nothing to excess; since ’tis our duty to hate the wicked at least to the very extreme.”
They contribute, too, a considerable aid to our orations: first owing to the vanity of the audience; for they feel a pleasure if one, speaking generally, happens to hit upon ideas which they hold on any particular point. My meaning, however, will be plain in this way, as also the manner in which we ought to catch at them; for the maxim, as has been stated, is an assertion universally, and men feel delighted when that is asserted universally, which they happen previously to have taken up as their opinion upon particulars. If, for instance, a man chanced to have bad neighbours or children, he would hail the man who should say, “nothing is more annoying than dwelling near people,” or, “nothing is more silly than to beget children.”
13 The words probably of some panegyrist of Iphicrates, who, in the warmth of declamation, must have produced a very great effect by contradicting a maxim so generally received, and which bore an authority more than human, (6 celo descendit γνῶθι ceavrdv,) while at the same time he placed the merit of the general in a most striking light. For the original obscurity of Iphicrates, see book i chap. vii ὁ 32 ims aid a speech.
i, From gratifying the vanity of the audience,’ 174 ARISTOTLE’S [βοοκ τι So thar we should form a guess, some how or other as to the opinions which our audience happen to have taken up with; then to speak on these subjects ge- 16. nerally conformably to them. This one advantage ii, They give the speech an air of character.
the application of maxims must needs possess, and another superior to it; for it gives our orations an air of character. But those orations bear an impress of character in which the principle is manifest, Arid all maxims produce this effect by reason of the speaker’s asserting universally on things which are the objects of deliberate choice: so that should the maxims be good, they make the speaker also to ap+ pear a man of worthy character.
Such, then, be our discussion on the subject of the maxim, of its nature, its species, the manner in which it is to be employed, and the advantages which it possesses.
Of Enthymems.
Let us speak generally of enthymems, in what way we ought to seek for them, and afterwards of the topics, (τόποι,) for the nature of the two is respectively different!.
It has been stated before, that the enthymem is a kind of syllogism, also in what way it is a syllogism, and in what respect it differs from the syllogism of logic; for we should make our conclusions without taking up our assumptions either many stages back, or all of them together: the one process from its length is obscure; the other, from its stating what is plain, is waste of words.
And this is the reason why men of no education have more persuasive influence over the mob than ' See the argument founded on the distinction between them, chup. xxvi, } 1, CHAP. XXII. ] RHETORIC, 78 men of high acquirements, as the poet? says, “that the unlearned speak more in unison with the feelings of the mob;” for the latter address them in common and general points, the former, from the store of their information, in a manner which comes home to them. So that we are not to found our address on any thing which may seem to the purpose, but on certain definite points; such, for example, as seem right to the judges, or those whose opinions they acknowledge; and the reason for this is, that it will appear to be the case either to all or most of them: moreover we should draw our conclusions not only from necessary, but also from contingent premises %, First, then, you ought to be aware that it is necessary, respecting every subject on which you have to speak and to draw conclusions, whether it be through the medium of the rhetorical syllogism‘, or of any other whatsoever, to be masters either of all or some of the facts inherent in it: for having none of them, you will not be able to draw your ififerences from any thing®. My meaning is this: how shall we be able to give advice to the Athenians, whether they ought to go to war, without being informed what their forces are, whether naval or military, or both; and these in how great numbers; also what are their resources; or their allies and enemies; and yet further, what former wars they have waged, and in what manner, and other points of this description: or how to eulogize them, unless we be informed of the sea-fight at Salamis, or the battle at Marathon, or the exploits achieved by them in behalf of the Heraclide, or some other such points; for it is on the real or apparent honourable traits attaching to each object that all oratcrs found their panegyrics, And in the same 3 Euripides, Hippolytus, 989.
* We should allege not τεκμήρια alone, but εἴκοτα as well. __ ἃ Πολιτικὸς συλλογισμὸς means the syllogism peculiar to. thetoric. Victor. vid. Animadyv.
§ Aristotle has himself given an outline of the kind of infcrmation which ought to be possessed with a view to speaking on five of the most important questicns of deliberative oratory, book i. chap. 4, ii, They must be on definite points, iii. Our conclusions must be drawn both necessarily and contingently. 4. We must know the facts of the casein every spe cies of oratory. 5. Deliberative, 6. Epideictic, Judicial.
8.
170 ARISTOTLE’S LBOOK If, way it is on their opposites that they ground their reprehension, always looking out for any thing of that nature which either attaches, or appears to attach, to the subject; suppose [the case of a censure passed on the Athenians] because they subjected the Greeks to themselves, and reduced to a state of servitude the people of Augina and Potidza, who were their allies against the barbarian, and bore off the prize of highest worth®; and every other transaction of this nature, and whatever other such error may attach to them. And in the same way those orators who accuse and defend, construct their accusations and defences on a view of existing circumstances’: there is no difference in your pursuing this process, whether it be respecting Athenians or Lacedzemonians, men or gods. For in advising Achilles, or in praising or blaming him, in accusing and defending him, we must assume the traits which attach, or appear to attach, to his character; in order that from among their number we may, in so praising or blaming him, allege whatever things honourable or base attach to him; and in accusing or defending him, whatever things just or unjust; and in advising him, whatever is beneficial. or injurious. And in a similar manner respecting any business whatsoever; as, respecting justice, the question whether it be expedient [must be discussed ] on the ground of what appertains to justice or expediency. So that as all men appear thus to construct their proofs, whether they draw their inferences with greater accuracy or remissness, (for they do not make their assumptions out of every subject, but from those circumstances which are inherent in each question,) and by reason that it is manifestly impossible otherwise to prove; it is evident, then, that it is necessary, as I said in the Topics, to be in pos- 6 Herodotus, viii. 93.
7 Having illustrated his meaning by two examples, taken respectively from subjects of deliberative and demonstrative rhetoric, he concludes with a third from the subjects recognised by judicial; it being his great object to keep awake in the memory of the reader the original rand division of questions.
CHAP. XXII.] RHETORIC. 77 session of certain select propositions on points which may occur, and are most convenient: and [it is evident | that the orator should conduct his inquiry respecting questions which arise on the sudden in the same manner, not turning his view aside to indefinite points, but to the actual points of the case which the oration is concerning; and embracing in his sketch the greatest number he is able, and those coming the nearest tothe point; for in proportion as he is master of the greater number of the things inherent in the case, by so much the easier will it be to effect. proof; and in proportion as these are the nearer to the point, in the very same proportion will they be more peculiar, and less vague. By vague I mean, the praising Achilles because he is a man, and one of the deified heroes, and made war against Troy; for these are points attaching to a thousand others beside: so that such an orator no more praises Achilles than he does Diomed. But by peculiar I mean, those which be-‘fall no one else than to Achilles, for instance, the slaying Hector, the bravest of the Trojans; and Cycnus, who, being himself invulnerable, prevented -all the forces from landing; and that he joined the expedition the youngest, and without being bound by an oath; and whatever other topics are of this description. One element of enthymems, then, is that of selection; and this is the first which partakes of the nature of topics.
And now let us state the elements of enthymems; (but by place® and element of an enthymem I mean the samething). First, however, let us treat of those points concerning which it is necessary first to speak. For of enthymems there are two species; the one species are confirmative, that such is or is not the fact; and the other refutative: and they differ just as, in logic, the syllogism and the elenchus differ. And the confirmative enthymem is the deducing a conclusion from acknowledged premises; the refuta- 8 Cum pervestigare argumentum aliquud volumus, dovos nosse debemus:; sic enim appellate sunt he quasi sedes, e quibus argumenta promuntur. Cicero, Topic. cap. ii.
N ll. The orator must seiae the peculiar points.
pt 2.
The topic | of seleetion.
14. Twe sorts of enthymems: δεικτικὰ. ἐλεκτικὰ ts, tive, however, is the deducing an inference which is not admitted. Now the general arguments nearly on each class of subjects necessary and useful to be known are in our possession; for propositions have been selected on each [branch of rhetoric]; so that the topics out of which one must allege his enthymems, whether on questions of good or evil, just or unjust, honourable or dishonourable, select points moreover respecting the dispositions, the passions, and the habits, having been collected above, are likewise actually before us.
But let us, in a different manner, further make assumptions respecting all the classes of rhetoric, and putting a mark on them severally as we proceed, state both the refutative and confirmative elements, as well as those of apparent enthymems, which, however, are not really enthymems, for neither in truth are they [the elements of actual] syllogisms. When these points have been elucidated, we shall discuss the subject of starting objections to enthymems, and the means of their solution, from what sources we ought to adduce them.
CHAP. XXIII, Elements of Enthymems.
‘THERE is one element of confirmative enthymems, derivable from contraries; for we should consider, whether the contrary quality be inherent in the contrary subject; deing away the argument [ grounded thereon | if it be not inherent; and if it be inherent, founding one thereon ourselves: for example, the argument that “Temperance is good, because intemperance is injurious:” or, as it is in the Messeniac! oration, “If war be the cause of our present trou- _? An oration spoken by Alcidamas in behalf of the Messenians, referred to above, i, 13, § 3. See the Sophism. Hudé- CHAP. XXIII} rcHETORIC. 179 bles, of course we shall put ourselves right again with the return of peace.” And, “If in truth it be not just to be angry with those who unwillingly do us harm; neither, if one on compulsion shali do good to any one, is it his duty to be grateful to him.” And, “If to speak falsely is among men available to persuade; there is no anomaly in supposing, on the contrary, that many things which are true fail of being believed.”
Another is derivable from conjugate inflections?; for the qualities must either be inherent consistently, ἢ or not at all; for example, the argument, that ‘the just is not in every case a good, for then also would that which is justly be well; now it is not, however, desirable to die justly *.
Another from relatives; for if to one party attach the idea of his having acted honourably or justly, to the other also will attach that of having suffered {honourably, etc.]. Also, if to command be just, so also is the having executed [the command]; for example, just as that farmer of the revenue, Diomedon ‘4 said of the revenues, “If it be not base for you t« put them up for sale, neither is it for us to purchase them.” And if the idea that he has suffered justly or honourably be on the side of the patient, so will it also be on that of the agent; and if on that of the agent, then also on that of the patient. There is, however, in this way of arguing, room for passing off some false reasoning®: for if the person has justly suffered any thing, he indeed has justly been a sufferer, but perhaps not so at your hands. On which ? See book i. 7, § 272. Hobbes calls this cognomination, or affinity of words.
4 Cicero illustrates this “ place”? by a similar example; ** Nam δὲ Rhodiis turpe non est portorium locare, nec Hermaereontt quidem turpe est conducere.”? De Inven. lib. i.
5 Upon this fallacy the reasoning of Cleon was grounded in the debate about the Mityleneans; and Dioclotus, in his reply, uniformly strives at exposing it, while he urges, that how. ever they might merit death, the Athenians were not the people who should inflict it. Thucyd. lib. iii.
N ὁ 2. ii. Of conjugate infleetions, iv. From eomparison in three ways. i. a fortiori.
il. ἃ minore.
ὅ. iii. By parity of . reasoning.
account we should view the question separately,— whether the patient deserve to suffer, and whether the agent have a right to inflict the suffering; that done, to employ the facets in whatever way may suit our purpose: for at times, considerations of this kind do not harmonize; just as in the Alemzon of Theodectus, “ Did no man hate thy mother?” In his reply he tells her, that it is fitting to consider the points taken separately; and when Alphesibeea asks how, taking her up, he says, “That she indeed deserved death, they did decree; but at the same time that I ought not to be the slayer.” And just so the trial respecting Demosthenes, and of the persons who slew Nicanor. For when they had been adjudged to have slain him justly, it appeared that he had also been justly put to death. Again, respecting the person who met his death at Thebes, respecting whom some one bade the question be decided, whether he were deserving death; as though it were not unjust to slay one who deserved to die.
Another element is derivable from the relations of greater and less®; for instance: “If not even the gods know every thing, hardly I should suppose do men;” for it is to say, that if the quality be not inherent in that which would more naturally possess it; then it is evident, that in that which would less naturally possess it, it is not inherent.
And the argument, that “he assaults his neighbours, who even does so to his father;” is derived from the element, if the less probability exist, so also does the greater; [which is available] in reference to whether of the two points it may be needful to prove, whether that it is or is not the fact.
And again, by parity of reasoning, when it is said, “« And is thy father to be pitied in that he has lost his children, and is not in truth CG{neus who has lost his noble offspring?” and the argument, “ If indeed Theseus committed no wrong, neither did Paris;” and, “Tf Tyndarus’ sons did not act unjustly, neither did 6 The argument ἃ fortiori.
CHAP. XXIII. ] RHETORIC. 18} Paris; and this, “Suppose Hector did slay Patroclus, Paris slew Achilles;” and this, “If other artists are not to be held cheap, neither are philosophers;” and, “If generals are not held cheap because they are frequently vanquished, neither are sophists;” and that, “If it behoves an individual to have a care for your glory, it also behoves you to regard that of Greece.”