Another element arises from the consideration of time’, as Iphicrates urged in his oration against Harmodius, “that if before my doing it, I had claimed to have the honour of a statue, ye would have granted it; will ye not then grant it me now that I have achieved it?—Do not, therefore, engage yourselves under promises, when about to receive; and, when you have experienced the benefit, withdraw them.” And, on another occasion, in reference to the Thebans permitting Philip to pass through into Attica, the argument that, “if, before his aiding them against the Phocians, he had claimed a passage, they would have promised; it were then an absurd thing, if, because he threw himself on them, and had confidence in them, they should not let him march through®.”
Another element is deduced from assertions made respecting yourself retorted upon your adversary; and the term is of exceeding service, as is exemplified 7 Under this head he considers both Time generally, and also Opportunity (καιρὸς, which, however, have been thus distinguished—Xpovos ἐστὶν ἐν ᾧ καιρὸς, καὶ Καιρὸς, ἐν ᾧ χρόνος οὐ πολύς. Hippocrates, in Precept. 61. Καιρὸς again has been described as ὁ προσφυὴς καὶ ἁρμόδιος ἑκάστῳ χρόνος.
8 A striking instance of appeal to this topic occurs in Mace beth, act i.
Lady Maebeth. then you were a man; Nor time, nor place, Did then adhere, and yet you would make both: They have made themselves, and that their fitness now Does unmake you.
See also Thucyd. book i. 140; ii. 6. Demosthenes frequently employs this topic, as in Olynth. iii. τένα χρόνον, ἢ τίνα κα poy, ὦ ἄνδρες AOnvaio:, τοῦ πάροντος βέλτω Cnteite. The force of the appeal thus made cannot be better illustrated than by the trequencey Οἱ iis employment, 6. v. From respect of time.
7. vi. From. retorting assertions on your adver Bary.
in the Teucer; one too it is of which Iphicrates availed himself against Aristophon, when he put the question home to him, whether he would betray the fleet for a bribe; and on his denying that he would, then said he, “ Would you, who are Aristophon, not betray them, and shall I, who am Iphicrates?” You ought, however, to be dealing with an opposite party, who appears in a greater degree to have been guilty of injustice; otherwise it would appear ridiculous, were any one laying an accusation against an Aris: tides, to allege this; but it ought always to tend directly to the discredit of him who lays the impeachment; for, generally speaking, the plaintiff presumes himself better than the defendant; this notion, then, it behoves us to refute. And generally it is absurd when one chides in another what he does himself, or would feel inclined to do; or exhorts him to do what he does not himself, neither would be induced to do.
Another place is from definitions®; as, “that the genius is nothing else than either the deity, or his production. And yet whoever conceives the existence of the production of a deity, must necessarily think at the same time that gods are in existence!°.” And, as Iphicrates said, “that that man was most noble who was the best; for that there did not attach any nobility to Harmodius and Aristogiton before they had achieved some noble exploit.” And his proof that himself was more nearly akin to them, by saying, “ At any rate my deeds are more akin to those of Harmodius and Aristogiton, than yours are!!.” And, as was said in that speech about Paris, 9 In addition to the instances of recourse to this topic quoted in the text, we may mention that of expediency in the speech of the Plateans (Thucydides, iii. 56); and one used by Alcibiades in his speech at Sparta, vi. 89, πᾶν τὸ ἐναντιούμενον TH δυναστεύοντι, δῆμος ὀνομασταὶ, K.T. Xr.
10 One of the arguments used by Socrates to prove his behef in the existence of gods; for if, as was granted, he held the existence of his attending spirit (τὸ δαιμόνιον), then necessarily must it either be itself a god, or at least a divine production. See Plato, Apolg. Soer.
δ See the concluding chapter of Tacitus’s Life of Agricola, CHAP. ΧΧΊΣΙ. RHETORIC. 183 “Α} will be free to acknowledge that the intemperate do not acquiesce in the enjoyment of a single person.” And the reason on account of which Socrates refused to go to Archelaus, “ because,” said he, “it is a disgrace for one who has been treated well to be unable to make a retort on terms of equality, just as it would be for one who has been treated zl.” For all these deduce their inferences about the points respecting which they speak, after having defined and ascertained the question.
Another element is deducible from the number of 9 senses in which a word may be taken, as in the Topics respecting the acceptations of the word rightly. Another from taking the different bearings of the case; as, “If all act unjustly for three objects, for the sake either of this, or this, or this, and from two of these motives it is impossible that he should have acted; but that he acted on the third, not even the accusers themselves allege.” Another from induction, as may be illustrated from the oration respecting Peparethus, to establish that “women every where discern truly respecting their children; because first at Athens the mother made the matter clear to Mantias, the orator, when undertaking a suit against his son; and again at Thebes, when Ismenias and Stilbon were at issue on the point, the Dodonian woman proved the child to be the son of Ismenias; and on this account they considered Thessaliscus to be the son of Ismenias. And again, from the law of Theodectes, “If people do not give their own horses in charge to those who manage those of others amiss, nor [their ships] to those who overturn the ships of others; neither ought we, if in every case it happens in the same way, to employ those who but ill protect the safety of others, for our own protection.” And, as Alcidamas asserted, that “all pay honour to the wise, at least the Parians honoured Archilochus, what though he was a calumniator of them; and the Chians, Homer, who was not their citizen; the Mitylenzans, Sappho, though she was a woman; and the Lacedwmonians, who of viii. From the number of meanings of the term, ix. From the division.
x. From induetion.
xi. From former decisions.
all people are the least attached to learning, made Chilon one of their senators; the Greeks of Italy also honoured Pythagoras, and the people of Lampsacus buried Anaxagoras, though a foreigner, and honour him even to this day; the Athenians again were prosperous while they abode by the laws of Solon, and the Lacedemonians, while by those of Lycurgus; also at Thebes, at the time that the magistrates were men of learning, the state enjoyed prosperity.”
Another element of enthymems is derivable from a former decision of the same, a similar, or opposite question; more especially indeed if all men so decide, and that uniformly; and otherwise, [if not all,] but the majority; or the wise, either all, or most of them; or the good; or if the very judges themselves, or those whom they approve, or those in opposition to whom they cannot decide (as for instance those on whom they depend); or those contrary to whom it is not becoming to decide; for instance, a god, or a father, or teacher, [happen so to have decided}. Just on the principle of the appeal of Autocles to Mixidemides, “ whether it beseemed the awful goddesses to render an account to the Areopagus, and not Mixidemides?” QOr,as Sappho insisted, ‘that to die was an evil, the gods having so decided; since [had it not been 807} they would themselves have died;” or as Aristippus told Plato when he asserted something, as he thought, rather dogmatically, “ Yet,” said he, ‘our companion at least held no such thing,” meaning Socrates. And Hegesippus, having first consulted the oracle at Olympia, put the question secondly at Delphi,—whether he [ Apollo] was of the same opinion as his father; as though it were disgraceful to contradict a father. And of Helen, as Isocrates wrote’, that ““she was worthy, since indeed Theseus judged her so.” And of Paris, ‘“‘ whom the goddesses 12 "Eypawev, because demonstrative orations were seldom composed for delivery, but rather, as we should say, for the closet, book ili. c. 12, ὁ 6, ἡ μὲν ἐπιδεικτεκὴ λέξες γραφικω-TaTy, τὸ γὰρ ἔργον αὐτῆς ἀνάγνωσις. See note chap. xi. § 7.
CHAP. XXIII] RHETORIC. 185 preferred 15, and of Evagoras, as Isocrates says, that must needs be virtuous, “since Conon, when unfortunately passing by every one else, came to Evagoras.”
Another element arises from an enumeration of 13.
parts; as in the Topica, “what kind of motion the soul is; it is either of this, or that description.” And an instance occurs in the Socrates of Theodectes: “Toward what temple hath he been guilty of impiety? whom of the gods which the ritual of our state acknowledges, hath he not honoured?”
Another consists in, Since, in the generality of instances, it happens that on the same circumstances somewhat is consequent whether good or evil, the exhortation or dissuasion by means of these consequences, the accusation or defence, the praising or blaming; for instance, on education is consequent envy, which is an evil; and the being wise, which is a good: [on the one hand then you may assert that] men should not seek to be educated, because it is not good to be envied; [on the other that] it is fitting to be educated, for it is good to be wise. In this topic’, with the addition of that on possibility, and the other {universal means of proof }, as they have been stated, consists the system of Calippus.
Another occurs, when we want to exhort or dissuade respecting two propositions, and those opposed to each other; and to avail ourselves of the forementioned argument in the case of both. The difference [between this and the element last mentioned ] is, that in it the opposition is merely between any propositions which may happen, it here holds between contraries: for instance, a priestess was endeavouring to prevent her son from becoming a public speaker; 18. See book i. chap. vi. § 26; where, in stating that to be good which is an object of preference, he cites these two instances.
44 It is, however, a mode of argument sometimes so fallae cious, that we may say with Ovid, ————careat successibus opto Quisquis ad eventu facta notanda putat. Phyllis Demoph.
xii, From the enumeration of parts.
xiii, From the consequents, xiv. From the dilemma.
xv. From the different motives of mankind.
xvi. From analogy.
xvii, From the similarity of conseguents.
186 ARISTOTLE’S, BOOK II because, said she, “If on the one hand you speak what is *ust, men will hate you; if what is unjust, the gods.” [Here then it might be retorted], therefore you ought to become a public speaker; for, “if you speak what is just, the gods will love you; if what is unjust, men’®.” And this is equivalent to the proverb “of buying dirt as well as salt.” And the retortion is this, when on each of two contraries good and evil is consequent, they being respectively opposed.
Another arises from the circumstance, that men do not approve the same things privately as before the world; but when in public, they praise beyond all things what is just and honourable; but within themselves they prefer what is expedient: the orator should endeavour to infer whichever suits his purpose, for this element is of sovereign use in exposing anomalies of opinion.
Another element is deducible from the analogy of results; as Iphicrates urged when they compelled his son to serve who was under the standard age, because he was tall, that “if they esteem great children as men, they assuredly will vote small men to be children.” And Theodectes, in the oration respecting the law, asked, “Do ye make the mercenaries, such as Strabax and Charidemus, citizens on account of their virtue, and will ye not make exiles of those among the mercenaries who have committed these intolerable acts?”
Another arises out of the argument, that if the result be the same, the principle from which it arises will be the same; just as Xenophanes used to argue, that “they are equally guilty of impiety who assert that the gods were produced, as those who assert that they die; for in both cases it happens that in some period or other the gods do not exist.” And generally 15 See an instance of this mode of arguing used by Tiresias, Euripides, Pheenisse, 968. Of this kind is also the argument of Gamaliel: ‘If this counsel or this work be of men, it will come to nought; but, if it be of God, ye cannot overthrow it.”
CHAP, XXIII.] RHETORIC. 187 assuming that the result of each act is in every case identified with it. [Take this argument as an illustration |: “ Ye are about to pronounce, not respecting Socrates, but respecting the pursuit in general, whether it be right to addict one’s self to philosophy.” And this, “that the giving earth and water is the being slaves.” And “that the participating in the common peace is the performing of what is enjoined.” Now we are to take whichever side may suit our purpose.
Another may be deduced from the circumstance, that the same persons do not choose the same things subsequently as before, but contrariwise; as, for instance, this appeal:—‘‘If, when in banishment, we fought that we might return; shall we, now that we have returned, take to flight, in order that we may not fight'®?” For one while they chose abiding in their country at the expense of fighting; at another, the possibility of avoiding fighting at the expense of non-continuance in their native land.
Another element which may be resorted to is, the assertion that a thing either exists or was produced, for the sake of that for which it might have existed or been produced; as if some one were to give a person any thing, in order that by taking it from him he may annoy him. Whence also it has been said, “" ΤῸ many, fortune, not bearing them good will, gives great good luck; but it is in order that they may _receive the more conspicuous calamities!7.”. And this from the Meleager of Antiphon: ‘ Not in order that they might slay the beast, but that they may become witnesses, before Greece, of Meleager’s valour.” And that insinuation in the Ajax of Theodectes, “that Diomede chose Ulysses, not as any compliment, but in order that his attendant might at the same time be his inferior.” For it is very possible that he did so on this account.
Another, common both to the judicial and deliberative orators, is the consideration of the motives 36 From an Uration by Lysias. % Evertére domos totas optaniibus ipsis Dii faciles.
XvViil. From the inconsistency of men, xix. From assuming a possible end as the real one.
ἢ; xx. From considering the motives.
xxi. From that which is incredible yet true.
which stimulate or retard men, and ‘the objects with a view to which they both act and avoid; for these are such as, if they be actually in existence, we needs must proceed to action; for instance, if the undertaking be possible, and easy, and beneficial, either to the person in question himself, or to his friends, or pernicious to his enemies, and entailing loss on them; or if the loss be less than the object proposed '*. And it is upon these considerations that orators exhort, and on their opposites that they dissuade; moreover they both defend and accuse upon the ground of these considerations; they rest their defences on those which are used to dissuade, and their accusations on those used to exhort!®. The whole system of Calippus, as well as that of Pamphilus, is nothing more than this element.
Another is deducible from circumstances which appear to have taken place, but which are improbable, on the ground that they would not seem to be facts, had they not well nigh occurred or actually done so; and that they have a yet stronger claim to belief; for men apprehend as truths either facts or probabilities; if then it be passing belief, and not probable, it will be true?°; for at all events, it is not on account of its likelihood and plausibility that it has this appearance of being the case. Just as Androcles of the burgh Pithos, said in his impeachment 18 Ilpayua: by this word he designates the object of desire and pursuit. Victor.
19 That is to say, those very same faculties which the deliberative orator would employ in exhorting a person to act, would, if existing in reference to one under accusation, be turned against him by the judicial speaker as circumstances confirmative of suspicion. And, vice versd, the circumstances of difficulty attending the undertaking, which would be employed to dissuade from its attempt, might be alleged in de-Jence of an individual under suspicion, as points of the case which render his guilt improbable.
2 The argument may be formally stated thus: Men believe either what is actual fact, or probable; this is believed; this therefore is either fact, or probable; it is not probable, therefore it is fact. It is needless to observe that the slight possibility, that it may be neither one nor the other, is completeiy siurred over.
_ CHAP ΧΧΙΠ.} RHETORIC. 1839 of the law, when the multitude were tumultuous as he spoke, “‘ The laws require some law to set them right, for the very fishes require salt;” and yet it is neither likely nor plausible that creatures bred in the brine of the sea should require salt. ‘‘ Nay, the olive lees require oil,” and yet it is a fact not to be credited, that the very things from which oil is produced should require oil.”
Another element, REFUTATIVE, is the consideration of contradictions; if there occur any contradiction under all the circumstances of time, conduct?!, sayings, and the like. And this independently, respecting your adversary, as “‘ He tells you that he loves you, yet did he conspire with the thirty [tyrants |;” or independently respecting yourself, ‘‘ He tells you that I am litigious, but is not able to prove that I have brought any action into court;” or respecting both yourself and the adversary distinctly, ‘ This man never lent any thing, but I have ransomed many of you.”
Another, applicable to those who have been calumniated, or who appear so, whether men or actions, is the explaining the cause of the mistaken notion; for there is some circumstance, on account of which it appears to be the case; for example, when a certain woman had come in contact with her son, she seemed from her embracing him to have had connexion with the youth; when, however, the circumstance which eaused it had been stated, the charge was quashed. And as in the Ajax of Theodectes, Ulysses tells Ajax why, though he is braver than Ajax, he does not seem so.
Another is derived from the cause, if-that be in 25.
existence, arguing that the effect is also; and should it not exist, that neither does the effect. For cause, 21 Thus M. Livius Salinator having at one period narrowly escaped conviction for embezzlement, afterwards, when he was made Censor, disfranchised all the tribes except that by whose vote he had been acquitted, “quod aut prius se injuste condemnassent; aut postea tantos honores non recte tribuissent.” Aur. Victor. de viris illus.
23. Refue tative ele ment.
i, From consideration of contradietions.
ii. From explanation.
eause to effect, and vice versa.
and that of which it is the cause, exist conjointly, and nothing exists without a cause. Just as Leoda mas in his defence, when Thrasybulus accused: him, because he had been inscribed with infamy on a pillar in the Acropolis, but erased it in the time of the thirty tyrants, urged, “‘that it was not possible, because the thirty tyrants would put greater confidence _in him, while his hatred toward the democracy refv. From observing whether the fact could have been done better.
v. From the anomaly of the present act to the past.
vi, From errors before commi mained inscribed in public.”
Another is, the observing whether the thing respecting which the party is deliberating, or acting, or has acted, did or does admit of being on another and better footing; since it will become evident that, if this be the case, he has not acted; since no one voluntarily, and of his own knowledge, deliberately chooses what is bad. ‘This, however, involves a fallacy; for in many cases it becomes clear [ only ] when too late, how it might have been managed better, whereas it was before unknown.
Another, which occurs when any thing anomalous to former acts is about to be done, is the considering the both in connexion; just as Xenophanes advised the people of Elea, when they asked him whether they should sacrifice and sing a dirge to Leucothea 33 or not, “if they conceived her to be a deity, not to sing a dirge; but if a human being, not to sacrifice.”
Another element is, the accusing or defending on the ground of errors committed; for instance, in the Medea of Carcinus, some persons accuse her because she slew her children, [alleging] that at all events they were not forthcoming; for, respecting the send- _ ing away her children, Medea was in fault: she, vii. From however, defends herself [alleging that, if any one}, she would have murdered Jason, not her children; which in truth had she done, she would have erred in not doing the other. And this element and species of enthymem constitutes the whole of that system of Theodorus, which is first.
Another is deducible from the name; as Sophocles 22 Ino, Cadmi filia, nonne Leucothea nominata ἃ Grecis, Matuta habetur a nostris? Cicero, Tusc. i. 12.
CHAF. XXIII.] ΚΗΒ, «ὍΞΙΟ. 131 says, “ Steel in truth you are, and bear the name.” And as they are wont to say ix their praises of the gods*3; and as Conon used to call Thrasybulus, “rash in counsel,” (Θρασύβουλος); and Herodicus told Thrasymachus, “ You are always rash in fight, ‘Opacipayoc); and Polus, “ You always are a colt,” ‘Tlédoc); and Draco the legislator, that “his laws were not those of a man, but of a dragon™4; for they were harsh.” And as the Hecuba of Euripides says of Venus, “ The very name of the goddess rightly begins with folly®.” And as Charemon says, “ Pentheus, rightly named from the calamities”® awaiting Refutative enthymems, however, are more in repute than the confirmative; by reason of the refutative enthymem being a setting contraries briefly together; and because things when put in contrast are more palpable to the auditor. Of all forms of reasoning, however, as well confirmative as refutative, those produce the greatest effect?’, which are of such a description that, on the commencement of their enunciation, men anticipate the conclusion, yet without their being superficial; for the hearers on their own parts, feel a pleasure 33, in having of themselves anti- 23 Though he does not inform us what mode of praise this is to which he alludes, we may infer that it consisted in punning on their respective appellations as often as the case admitted it.
*4 Tn this solitary instance of all the tissue does our language admit of preserving the pun of the original; and this, while it will serve sufficiently to illustrate our author’s meaning, will not leave him any great cause to regret that he has lost the force of the others.
% Folly, in Greek ἀφροσύνη. The tragedian seems to have strained the etymology of ᾿Αφροδίτη to suit his purpose. However, there are no iiberties which punsters and theorists will not take. The words occur in the Troades, 990. Byron, speaking of love, says, “‘ Begun in Folly, closed in Tears.” Giaour.
% Tlivbea, εἶ rt: respecting this word, see a note, book i.
% For the principles on which this pleasure arises, see Ὁ. i.
el, § 21, on the ground that the apprehension of them is facili« the equivocation of the term, sons why refutative enthymems are more in repute than con firmative 1. Fallacious enthymems.
Ist. From the diction of twokinds, i. Asserting a conclusion not inferred.
ti. Ambiguous ter ms, e‘c.
cipated it; and [next to these may we class | all those, by which the hearers are left behind, just so much as that they apprehend them simultaneously with their having been enunciated, Elements of Apparent Enthymems.
JusT as it is possible that [one form of reasoning] may be a syllogism, and that another, without really being such, may appear to be so; even so it must needs be with respect to the enthymem also, that one description should really be enthymems, and another not, however they may appear to be; for the enthymem is a species of syllogism.
But the elements of these apparerit enthymems are, one derivable from the diction: and of this, the first kind is, as in logic, the asserting your last proposition with all the air of a conclusion, although you have deduced no [legitimate] inference at all: thus, “ So and so is assuredly not the case, necessarily, therefore, so and so is.” And the expressing yourself in the course of your reasonings concisely and pointedly; for this kind of style is the very province of the enthymem, and this kind of fallacy is, it is probable, that which is [demonstrated ] “the result of the style of the diction;” but the stringing together the heads of many syllogisms, is a good expedient with a view to expressing yourself with all the air of syllogism in your style; thus, “that he preserved some, avenged others, emancipated the Greek people.” For each of these propositions has been demonstrated from others; and when they are put in conjunction, it appears that something results ever from them. Another kind arises from similarity of names, as the assertion, that tated, and our admiration excited; and § 27 on the principle that τὸ σοφὸν δοκεῖν ἡδύ. For our self-admiration is gratified by so easily perceiving the drift of the speaker.
CHAP. XXIV. RHETORIC. 193 ‘the mouse is an excellent animal, being that from which the most esteemed of all rites have derived their name;” for of all rites, the mysteries are held in most esteem. Or, if any one in praising a dog, were to embrace in his panegyric the dog in the heavens, or Pan; because Pindar thus addresses him, “Ὁ blessed being, whom the inhabitants of Olympus call the all-various dog of the mighty goddess.” Or the arguing, that “it is a most disgraceful thing, that there should be not even a dog inthe house; and therefore it is evident that a dog is honourable.” And the assertion, that Mercury is “communicative” above all the gods, because Mercury alone is called “common.” And the stating that λόγος, speech, is most excellent; because the good are worthy of λόγος, esteem, not of wealth: for the words (λόγου ἄξιον) are not used in a single sense.
Another [element of fallacy] is the asserting conjointly what is true separately; or separately, what is true conjointly; for as it appears to be the same thing, what though in many instances it be not the same, the orator should practise whatever method is more available to his purpose. The saying of Euthydemus is neither more nor less than an instance of this; the declaration, for instance, that “he knew there was a galley in the Pireus',” for he knew each [separate fact of his assertion]. And to declare of one who knows the constituent letters, “‘ that he knows the verse*;” for the verse isthe same thing. Again, the saying that “as twice so much is prejudicial, he denied that the one was wholesome; for it is absurd that two good things should constitute one that is noxious.” Thus enunciated, it is adapted to refutation; but thus it is confirmative; “ for two evils do not constitute one good,” etc. But the whole topic ' An instance of the flagrant absurdity which may arise from taking conjointly what is true only separately: Euthydemus knew there were galleys in existence, and he was in the Pireus when he had this knowledge; he knew therefore that there were galleys in the Pireus, i. 6. he being in the Pireus.
3 Of this nature was the sneering recommendation uf a Dictionary as a book of generai information.
Oo 3. 2nd.From division and come position, 194 ARISTOTLE’S [soox τι.
is replete wih fallacy. Such again is the saying of Polycrates respecting Thrasybulus, that he had deposed thirty tyrants*;” for he takes them conjointly. Or, as in the Orestes of Theodectes, from distinct cases, “‘It is just that she who has slain her husband should die; as also that a son at least should avenge his father, Now, are not these the very things that have been done?” for, taking the cases conjointly, perhaps it is no longer just. This may also come under the fallacy of omission, for it is not explained ‘by whom [she should be put to death |.”
Another element is the doing away or establishing a point by exaggeration’: and this occurs when without having shown that [the prisoner ] has really committed the crime, [the accuser] proceeds to exaggerate it; for this fallacy causes it to appear (when the accused employs the exaggeration) that he has not done the deed; or, (supposing it be the accuser who gets into a passion,) that he has done it. Thus then there is no enthymem; for the hearer is sophistically brought over to a belief either that [the accused] has or has not done it, without any proof having been adduced.
Another is the argument drawn from a sign®, for this also is illogical; as if one were to say, “ Lovers are an advantage to states; for the love of Harmodius and Aristogiton deposed the tyrant Hipparchus.” And if one were to say, “ Dionysius is a robber, for he is a wicked man;” for this also is illogical, because not every wicked man is a thief, although every thief is a wicked man.
3 The fallacy consists in this, that it leads you to suppose that Thrasybulus had destroyed thirty distinct tyrannies, whereas he had in fact only suppressed one, the power of which happened to be shared between thirty different individuals.
4 This is the first of the fallacies which are independent of the diction, and may be termed, for the sake of distinction, real or material fallacies.
5. Meaning of course the specific σημεῖον, for no fallacy can result from the τεκμήριον, vid. book i. chap. ii. § 16. This pce he has elsewhere denominated τὸ παρὰ τὴν dyvo:sp τοῦ thie κου.
CHAP. KXtV.{ RHETORIC. 195 Another is the arguing from an accidental cir- 6. cumstance; exemplified in that which Polycrates® acide said about mice, that “they lent their aid by gnaw- dents of a ing through the [enemy’s] bowstrings.” Or sup- thing. posing one to declare, “that the being bidden to supper is the most honourable; for Achilles was wroth, on account of his not being invited by the Greeks at Tenedos:” he however was enraged, as though he was treated with disrespect, and this occurred upon his not being invited.
Another arises from establishing the consequent; 7. as in the oration respecting Paris, [it is contended | iach that “he is of a noble spirit; because, despising that as a the society of many, he abode on Ida by himself;” logical for, because the noble-spirited are thus disposed, Py Ps" he, too, it should seem, is noble-spirited. Again, not. “Since he is both foppish in his dress, and strolls about by night, he is an adulterer;” because adulterers are persons of such habits’. Similar to this is also the argument, that “the poor, because they dance and sing in the temples; and that exiles, because it is permitted them to dwell where they list, [are happy.]|” For as these advantages belong to those who appear to be happy; they too would appear to be happy, to whom they belong. Moreover, the case varies with the circumstances of the transaction; on which account, the argument falls under the charge of omission.
Another arises from stating as a cause that which 8. in fact is not; [arguing], for instance, on its having ata happened “simultaneously,” or “after;” for men do that as ἃ assume that what occurs “subsequently,” [occurs] Causé. “by means of” [that which preceded], and more ja: a especially those engaged in state affairs; just as cause. Demades [insinuated] “that the administration of 6 This Polycrates was one of the Sophists; he was mentioned above (§3). The circumstance respecting the mice is recorded by Herodotus, ii. 141.