Again, the business of exciting attention is common to all the divisions of a speech, wherever it may be necessary; for the audience relax their attention any where rather than at the beginning. For which reason it is ridiculous to range this head at the beginning, when more particularly every one is at the summit of attention. So that, whenever it is convenient, we may use the formulary, “Lend me your whole attention, for the question does not affect me any more than yourselves;” and this one,—‘“for I will relate to you a thing so strange, so wonderful, as you never yet heard.” But this is just what Prodicus says he used to do,—‘‘ whenever the audience happen to nod, to insert, by the bye, a display of his penteconta-drachmial demonstration®.” But that these things are referred to the hearer not in his proper capacity as such, is evident; for all create unfavourable impressions or do them away in their exordia: as, “ O king, I confess indeed, that not with haste,” etc.®: and again, “" Why such long preludes’.”
They, too, employ exordia who have, or appear to have, the worse case; for it is better to pause any where than on the case itself. On which account servants tell not what is asked them, but all the circumstances, and make long preambles.
But the means out of which we must conciliate have been stated, and each other point of that nature’: and, as it is well remarked by the poet, “ Grant that I may reach the Pheeacians ἃ friend and object of tneir compassion;” we ought, therefore, to aim at 5 Prodicus professed to teach a mode of reasoning with universal success in all descriptions of cases: the premium ΟΠ initiation being fifty drachms, he called it Πεντηκοντάδραχμον. Plato in Cratyl.
4 Sophocles, Antig. 223.
7 Euripides, Iph. in Taur. 1162. ® See book ii. chap. 1, § 5.
CHAP. XIV. J LIETORIC. 255 these two objects. And in demonstrative orations, you should cause the hearer to suppose that he is praised simultaneously with the subject, either in his own person or his family, or in his maxims of conduct, or at least somehow or other. For true it is, as Socrates remarks, that “ΤῸ praise Athenians before an Athenian audience is no difficult thing, however it may be in the presence of Lacedzmonians %.” But the exordia of deliberative rhetoric are derived from those of judicial: but this species has them naturally least of all the three; for indeed the audience are aware of the subject; and the case needs no exordium except 1. on account of the speaker himself; 2. or his opponent; or 3. if the audience conceive of the importance of the matter otherwise than he could wish, thinking it either too serious or too trifling: with a view to which objects respectively there is a ii necessity for either exciting or doing away a prejudice, or for amplification or diminution. On account of these things there is need of exordium; 4. or other- it wise for the sake of ornament; since without it a speech appears hastily got up. Of this sort was the panegyric of Gorgias on the Eleans; for without any thing like the preluding display of gesture and attitude in the Gymnasium, he begins forthwith,—“ O Elis, city blest by fortune!”
Topics for removing Imputations to your Prejudice.
Tovcuine the subject of an imputation cast upon you, one means of removing it will be the recurring to those topics, by means of which one might do away ® This sentiment has been already quoted, book i. chap. 9, § 30, in illustration of the rule Σκοπεῖν παρ᾽ οἷς ὁ ἔπαινος. The remark of Socrates may be found in Plato’s Menexenus, but differenfly expressed.
A complis ment to be paid te the audience, Exordia of deliberative oratory wanted only in four cases. i, On account of the speaker.
impress the hearer with the value of the case, iv. For the sake of embellishment.
1. Topics to refute aspersions, i. Removing unfuvourable impressions.
2. ii. Contradicting the point.
3. iii. By extenuation and excuse.
4. iv. By ~ecrimipation of the accuser.
comparison with others. 6. vi. By ascertaining whether the 256 ARISTOTLF’S ἴβοοχ mr, any surmises prejudicial to him; for it matters not whether they be entertained in consequence of the allegations of any one or not. So that this topic is universally applicable.
Another mode is, the confronting it like a point under litigation, [arguing] either that it is not the case, or is not hurtful, or not to the particular individual; or that it is not of such importance, or not’ unjust, or not considerable, or not disgraceful, or of no consequence; for in points of this description the question originates: just as Iphicrates argued against Nausicrates; for he pleaded, that he did what the prosecutor alleged, and indeed hurt him, but yet did not act unjustly. Or confessedly acting unjustly he may offer some equivalent: e. g. though hurtful, yet was it honourable; though painful, yet was it beneficial; by some other such expedient.
Another method is, the arguing that the action is merely a fault, or an error!, or that it was necessary; such as the plea of Socrates, ‘‘ that he trembled, not as the calumniator alleged, that he might appear an old man, but of necessity; since his eighty years of age did not overtake him of his own choice.” And you may attempt a commutation of motives; 6. g. ‘that he did not wish to hurt, but to do this or that, and not what the accuser insinuated; but that it so happened that hurt was sustained. But that it were fair enough to hate him, had he acted purposely with a view to this taking place.”
Another mode is, the considering whether the prosecutor has either now or formerly, in his own person, or in that of his connexions, been involved in the charge. Another, whether others, whom they themselves acknowledge not liable to the imputation, be also comprehended; for instance, if he acknowledge an adulterer to be exempt from the charge, surely then also is this or that person. Another consists in ascertaining whether he has cast any false jmputations on others; or whether, like the party in 1 For the distinctions between ἀμαρτήματα and dtvynuarta, see book i. chap. 15, § 16.
CHAP. XV. ] RHETORIC. 257 the present case, any other has calumniated persons, or whether, without direct imputation, any ever were suspected who have yet appeared innocent. Another, in raising a counter prejudice against the calumniator; for it is absurd, if, while the man is himself void of credit, his words obtain it. Another, in inquiring whether a decision has been already made; just as Euripides did in reply to Hygiznon, who, in an action of Antidosis, accused him as being an impious person, inasmuch as exhorting to perjury he wrote,—* The tongue hath sworn, but the mind is unsworn?;” for Euripides argued, “that by bringing into court the decisions of the Dionysiac contest he acted unjustly; for there he had given, or would give an account, should he wish to impeach him.” Another, in impeaching calumny itself, as to how great an evil it is; and this because it produces decisions foreign to the point, and that it relies not on the strength of its case.
But the citing presumptive signs is a topic common to both parties: thus, in the Teucer, Ulysses insinuatés that “he is of kin to Priam; for [his mother] Hesione was Priam’s sister.” He, however, replies on the ground that, “'Telamon, his father, was the enemy of Priam, and that he did not denounce the spies.”
Another, peculiar to an accuser, is, for one after bestowing short praise to censure at great length putting forward great virtues briefly, or very many _which are not relevant], then to censure in one point which bears home upon the case. Such methods are the most crafty and malignant; for they attempt injury by means of one’s virtues, by blending them with a man’s failings.
But it is a resource common to the calumniator and one who meets a calumny, that, as it is possible for the same action to have been done from many motives, by the calumniator, indeed, facts should be taken in a bad sense, as he sakes his selection οὖν motives on the worse side; while by the respondent » 3 Hippolytus, 612.
accuset as been proved a. calumniator before. 7. vii. By raising a counter prejudice. 8. viii. the affair has been already decided.
9. ix. By declaiming against calumny itself.
x, Citing the presumptive signs: a topic useful to both.
xi. Prais- ? ing alittle to blame much, This suits the accuser.
xii. By assuming the motives which suit your ™~ it should be made on the better. Take, for instance, the fact that Diomede chose Ulysses: one will say it was, “because he conceived Ulysses to be the bravest;” the other, that “it was not, but because he alone could not become a rival, such a poltroon was he.”
Thus much, then, on the subject of imputations.
Of the Narration.
Of the Narration.
1. the In demonstrative speeches the narration is not given narration in continuity, but in scattered portions; for one must in epideic- 3: Ξ ticoratory gO over the actions out of which the speech arises: isnot con- for a speech is a kind of compound, having one porhot dis, tion, indeed, independent of art, [since the speaker is jointed. not at all the cause of the actions themselves, | and another portion originating in art; and this last-is either the showing that it is fact should it be incredible, or such either in character or degree, or in showing all these points at once. Owing to this, there are times when one ought not to narrate every fact successively; because this mode of exposition is difficult to remember. From some, then, establish the eharacter for courage, from others for wisdom, and from others for justice. The one style of narration is too simple; the other has the grace of variety, and is not 3. so void of elegance. But you have only to awaken the recollection of facts well known; on which aceount, many subjects will stand in no need of narration: supposing, for instance, you would praise Achilles, because all are acquainted with his actions; but you must employ them at once. But in praising Critias, an orator must narrate; for not many are acquainted with his exploits. {. Inju- | But now people tell us, ridiculously enough, that dicial, the the narration should be rapid. And yet I would say, ti: rg wust 88 did one to a baker, who inquired “whether he CHAP. XVI.} RHETORIC. 259 should knead his bread hard or soft,’ --- “ What,” make the said he, “ is it then impossible to knead it properly?” prt And so here [in rhetoric a mean is to be observed]. ‘For one should not narrate at too great length, just as he should not make too long an exordium, nor state his proofs [too fully]. For neither in this case does propriety consist either in rapidity or conciseness, but in a mean betwixt both: and this is the stating just so much as will make the matter clear, or as will cause one to conceive that it has taken place, or that the party has inflicted hurt, or committed injustice, or that the case is of that importance which the speaker wishes to establish; and to the opposite party the opposite points will avail. And ὅ. and an orator should narrate, by the bye, such incidents hex Thaw as conduce to his own excellence: thus, “I all along in favour used to instruct them in what was just, bidding them οὗ the not to abandon their children,”—or, to the villany te of the other party;— ‘‘—but he replied to me, that wherever he might be he should have other children.”
Which, Herodotus says, was the reply of the Egyptians on their revolting'. Or whatever is pleasing to the judges.
In the case of a defendant, the matter will be more 6. The brief; the points for dispute being, either that it has poop not taken place, or is not hurtful, or not unjust, or ration is not of such importance. So that on acknowledged "ef; points he need not pause, unless they conduce in some degree to the objects suggested; e. g. if the fact be acknowledged, but its injustice disputed. Moreover, you should mention as already done those things which, in the course of being done, failed of producing pity or horror. The story of Alcinous is an instance, which is despatched to Penelope in sixty verses. And as Phayllus does in the circle, and the opening scene of the Gineus. The narra- 8. and tion should also convey a notion of the character: C0"""9* this will be secured, if we know what gives rise to press of the moral character. One source is the manifesta- character tion of deliberate choice; and of what kind is moral eet ΗΝ 1 See Herodotus, ti. 30.
.Φ ing moral purpose.
9. ii. By narration of the concomitant circumstances, iii. By speaking with feel- "Ἔ character we ascertain from knowing of what kind this is; and of what kind the deliberate choice is, from being acquainted with its proposed end. Hence the doctrines of mathematics have no display of character, for neither have they deliberate choice; and this for that they have not the influence of motive?: but the Socratic discourses [have this display], for they treat concerning subjects of this kind. But those things convey a notion of character, which is consequent upon the several characters’; 6. g. “ Whilst saying this he began to hasten off;” for this manifests a hardihood and rusticity of character. And be cautious not to speak coldly as from the understanding merely, as orators do now-a-days, but as though from the deliberate choice’. “I, for 1 wished and deliberately preferred this; and if I profit nothing by it, then it is the more honourable:” for the one is characteristic of a prudent®, the other of a good man: since [the proposed end] of the prudent consists in pursuing the expedient; of a good man, in pursuing what is honourable. And should any circumstance be incredible, you must subjoin the reason; as Sophocles does. He furnishes an example in the Antigone, that she mourned more for her brother than for a husband or children; for these, if lost, might again be hers.
** But father now and mother both bemg lost, A brother’s name can ne’er be hail’d again®.”
2 See the next chapter, § 8.
3 Using, in fact, the σημεῖον of the action as an evidence of the thought, or taking the result of the feeling for the feeling itself; as Pericles does when alluding to the morose looks of the Lacedemonians, a process which, though ingenious, yet often leads to a fallacy.
4 Which is wild regulated by the wnderstanding. See Nich. Eth. book iii. chap. 2, 3, etc.
5 That is, the prudent speak from the dictates of the understanding solely, the good on the impulse of deliberate choice.
6 Sophocles, Antigone, 911. See the speech of the wife of Intaphernes to Darius, on asking the life of a brother in preference to those of her husband or children:—Q βασιλεῦ, avng μέν μοι ἂν ἄλλος γένοιτο, εἰ δαίμων ἐθέλοι, καὶ τέκνα ἄλλα, εἰ ταῦτα ἀποβάλοιμι᾽ πατρὸς δὲ καὶ μητρὸς οὐκ ἔτι μεῦ ζωόντων, ἀδελφεὸς ἂν ὦλλος οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ yévorro. Herodotus, Thalia, eHAP. XVI." RHETORIC. 261 But if you should have no reason to offer, then avow “that you are well aware that you speak what exceeds belief, but that such is your nature:” for the world discredit a man’s doing any thing voluntarily, except what is expedient.
Again, draw your remarks out of those things which are indicative of the passions; narrating both their attendant circumstances, and those which the audience know, and which attach peculiarly either to the speaker himself or his adversary:—“ He, having scowled at me, departed.” And as Aéschines said of Cratylus, “that whistling and snapping his fingers—:” for they have a tendency to persuade: therefore these things which they know, become indices of that which they do not know. Such instances one may get in abundance out of Homer:— “Thus Penelope spoke, and the old woman covered her face with her hands’:” for those who are beginning to shed tears cover their eyes. And forthwith insinuate yourself as a person of a certain character, in order that they may look upon you as one of such a description, and your adversary [as the reverse]: but beware of observation as you do it. And that it is easy to effect this we may observe in those who report any thing to us; for respecting the communication (of which as yet we know nothing), we cap. 119. See the reply of Robert Duke of Normandy to William Rufus, justifying himself for allowing him to get water during the siege at Mont St. Michael:—‘‘ How am I to blame? should I have suffered our brother to die of thirst, what other have we if we had lost him?” Lord Lyttleton, vol. i. p. 111. Compare the words of Edward I. on hearing at the same time of the death of his father and infant son, ‘‘ that the death cfa son was a loss which he might hope to repair; the death of a yather was a loss irreparable.”” Hume. And the lines qucted in “‘ the Antiquary,” vol. iii. chap. 11:— He turned him right and round again, Said, Scorn na at my mither; Light loves I may get mony a ane, But minnie ne’er anither.
¥ Odyssey, book xix 361.
10. Let the narration be παθητι- KM, and ἠθική ration least used in deliberative oratory.
still catch a kind of guess®. But the narration must be carried on in different parts, and, in some instances, even at the commencement.
But in deliberative speeches narration occurs least of all, because no one narrates respecting what is yet to be: if, however, there should be any narration, it will be respecting things which have already happened, that the recollection of them having been awakened, the judges may determine better on the future; the orator either reprehending or praising them: but he is not then performing the functions proper to him as an adviser. If, however, the thing narrated be incredible, see you promise*to state a reason for it immediately *, and to submit it to whom they please: like the Jocasta of Carcinus in his Gédipus, who always keeps promising when he who was seeking out her son inquires of her: and the Hzemon of Sophocles 10, Of the Proof.
1, Proof Proor should be demonstrative; and the points of in judicial oratory: four points. 1. The fact, ii, The mischief. iii. The degree.
dispute being four, you must demonstrate by producing proof respecting the particular point at issue: thus, if the adversary question the fact, you must at the trial produce proof of this point above the rest; should it be that he did xo harm, then of that point; and so should he urge that the action is not of the importance supposed, or that it was done justly: [and it must be done in the latter cases] exactly in the same way as if the inquiry were respecting the mat- 8 See the Trachinie of Sophocles, verse 869, where part of the Chorus conjecture, from the dejected looks of the nurse as she approaches, that some calamity is about to be announced.
® An instance of this occurs in the statement of finance which Pericles laid before the Athenians, to substantiate the hopes which he had held out to them. Thucyd. ii. 13. 10 See the Antigone, 635, etc.
CHAP. XVII.] RHETORIC. 208 ter of fact. And let it not escape us that in this single inquiry, it must needs be that one party is guilty': for it is not ignorance which is to blame, as though any were to dispute on a point of justice. So that, in this inquiry, the circumstance should be employed; but not in the other [three].
But, in demonstrative rhetoric, amplification, for the most part, will constitute the proof, because the facts are honourable and useful; for the actions should be taken on credit?, since, even on these subjects, a speaker on very rare occasions does adduce proof, if either the action be passing belief, or if another have the credit of 108.
But, in deliberative speeches, the orator may either contend that the circumstances will not take place, or that what he directs will indeed take place, but that it is not just, or not beneficial, or not in such a degree. And it will be well for him to observe whether any falsehood appears in the extraneous observations of his adversary; for these appear as so many convincing proofs, that he is false in the case of the other more important statements.
And example is best adapted to deliberative rhetoric; while enthymem is more peculiar to judicial‘. For the former is relative to the future; so that out of what has been heretofore, we needs must adduce examples: the latter respects what is or is not matter of fact, to which belong more especially demonstration and necessity; for the circumstances of the past involve a necessity. The speaker ought not, however, to bring forward his enthymems in a continued series, but to blend them by the way; should he not do this, they prove an injury one to the other, ‘ He states the same doctrine in the Nich. Eth. v. 2:— οὐ yao ὥσπερ ἐν τοὶς συναλλάγμασι περὲ τοῦ γιγνέσθαι ἀμφισ-βητοῦσιν ὧν ἀνάγκη τὸν ἕτερον εἶναι μοχθηρὸν ἂν μὴ διὰ λήθην αὐτὸ δρῶσιν, kK. τ.λ.
2 “For the facts are taken for granted; so that it only remains to invest them with grandeur.”” Book i. chap. 9, ὁ 40.
3. Victorius notices the use of the phrase αἰτίαν ἔχειν in a good sense.
* He asserts this, and assigns the reason, at the end of his consideration of demonstrative rhetoric book i. c. 9 & 40.
2. iv. The moral character of the action.
3.
In epideicticthe proof is made by amplifica tion.
4, In deliberative we must observe the fallacies of the adversary, for these are a part of our proof.
5. Example best suited to it.: 6. How enthy- | mems are to be used Notina series, 7. Nor on all subjects.
8. Nor to excite any emotions or pasgions.
3. But maxims may be used in the proof and narration, sons why deliberative is more difficult than judicial oratory.
i. It is on the future.
ii, Judifor there is some limit on the score of quautity too:— “ Oh friend, since you have spoken just so much as a prudent man would®;” but the poet does not say, of such a quality. Neither should you seek after enthymems on every subject; otherwise you will be doing the very thing which some philosophers do. who infer syllogistically conclusions in themselves better known, and more readily commanding belief, than the premises out of which they deduce them. And when you would excite any passion, do not employ an enthymem; for either it will expel the passion, or the enthymem will be uttered to no purpose; for the emotions which happen at the same time expel each other, and either cancel or render one or the other feeble. Neither when one aims at speaking with the effect of character, ought he at all to aim at the same time at enthymem; for demonstration possesses neither an air of character, nor deliberate choice. But a speaker should employ maxims alike in narration and in proof; for it has an expression of character:—‘ Yes; I delivered it, even knowing that one ought never to repose implicit confidence.” And if one speak with a view to excite passion:— “ And injured though I be, yet I do not repent; for the gain, indeed, is on his side, but justice on mine.”
And deliberative is more difficult than judicial rhetoric, and probably enough,—because it respects the future; whereas, in the latter, the question is respecting the past, which has already become matter of absolute science, even to diviners, as Epimenides the Cretan used to say; for he did not exercise his art of divination respecting things yet to be, but respecting those which had already happened indeed, but which were obscure: again, in judicial questions, 5 The words of Menelaus to Pisistratus, the son of Nestor. Odyssey, lib. iv. 204. The force of the illustration here seems to be this: the poet, no less than the philosopher, thought it no small praise to know when to stop; so that, without allusion to the prudence of what had been said, (to the category of quality, rovabra,) he commends him merely on the score of ita due quantity.
CHAP. XVII.] RHETORIC. 265 thee is the law as the basis of reasonings; but for one who has something wherewith to begin, it is easier to discover means of proof. Neither has [deliberative rhetoric | many opportunities of digression; none, for instance, in reference to an adversary, or respecting one’s self, or in order to excite passion ®; but it possesses these opportunities least of all the three branches, unless it depart from its proper province. If, then, you are at a loss, you should do what the rhetoricians at Athens do, and particularly Isocrates; for in the course of deliberative speaking he accuses the Lacedzemonians, for instance, in the panegyric, and Chares in the speech about the alliance. But in demonstrative speaking, you should insert praise in the speech by way of episode, as Isoerates does, for he all along keeps introducing some-_thing. And that saying of Gorgias, ‘That he never failed of something to say,” is nothing more nor less than this: for if he be speaking of Achilles, he praises Peleus, then A®acus, then his goddess mother, and so, too, valour in the abstract; or he does something or another in this strain. _ Now the language of one who possesses proof, should be both fraught with the impress of character, and fitted to convey the proof. But if you possess not enthymems, let it convey an impression of your character; and the show of goodness more befits ἃ virtuous man, than accuracy of speech.
But of enthymems the refutative are more approved than the confirmative’: because in the case of as many as produce reductio ad absurdum, it is more plain that a conclusion has really been arrived at; for opposites, when set by each other, are more clearly recognised.
§ Now, according to the early part of this work, all this is done easily enough in judicial cases, since there the judge has no personal interest, and easily resigns himself to the speaker; but in deliberative rhetoric, every one addressed is supposed, more or less, to have an interest in the question at issue, and is therefore more jealous of the speaker’s artifice. Booki.c.
"? See book ii. chap. 23, § 30.
cial oratory has law for 4 basis.
iii. The deliberative orator cannot digress so easily.
12. If you have enthymems speak ἢ ἠθικῶς and ἀπο- δεικτι- κως.
If not, only ἠθικῶς; 13. Refutative en thymems better than confirmative.
14. Mode of replying to our adversary. The first speaker must give his proofs and anticipate objections, 15. The lastspeaker must refute the adversary’s arguments, and draw opposite inferences. The reason why.
16. Cha ractor of 16. Cha ractor of Touching reasonings directed against the adversary, they are not in any thing different in species; but it belongs to the province of proof to do away his arguments, some by starting an objection, others by contrary inference®. And the speaker who begins, ought, both in deliberative and judicial rhetoric,. first to state his own proofs; and subsequently to meet objections by doing them away, or by treating them with contempt beforehand. But should the points objected to be many, first he must confront the objections, as did Callistratus in the Messeniac assembly; for previously having swept away what his adversaries would be likely to allege in this way, he then spoke on his own part. But the last speaker should speak first what makes against the adversary’s speech, doing it away, and drawing opposite inferences; and particularly should his arguments have been well received. For just as one’s mind does not cordially receive a person on whom a slur has been previously cast; in the same way neither does it favourably listen to a speech, if the opposite speaker appear to have spoken truly. It is necessary, then, to gain a footing in the hearer’s mind for the intended speech; and it will be gained if you sweep away objections: wherefore a speaker, having combated either all, or the most important, or the most approved arguments of his adversary, or those which readily admit a contrary inference, is in this way to substantiate his own case:— ** The fame οὗ th’ Goddesses I ’Il first defend,— For Juno and 2 In this she first lays hold of the most silly point.— Thus much, then, of proof. But as to the effect of character, since the saying * See the Troades of Euripides, 969, where Hecuba, replying to the defence made by Helen, lays hold of that part of it which seemed to insinuate that the three goddesses had been instrumental to her abandonment of her husband;—a point which, it wil. readily be perceived, was E’Y’EAETKTON, CHAP. XVII.] RHETORIC. 267 some things respecting one’s self, either is invidious, thespeakor involves prolixity, or a liability to contradiction; οὐ best ΠΟ;; a vey and respecting another, either slander or rusticity;— py introit behoves one to introduce another as speaking: the ducing ἃ thing which Isocrates does in the speech respecting ‘r4 per- Philip, and in the Antidosis; and as Archilochus conveys reproof, for he introduces the father saying, in an iambic line respecting his daughter, “ There is not any thing which may not be expected, nothing which may be affirmed impossible on oath;” and Charon, the mechanic, in that iambic whose beginning is, “I regard not the wealth of Gyges;” and as Sophocles introduces Hzemon pleading in behalf of Antigone to his father, as though another character were speaking.
But it is necessary sometimes to alter the form of 17. Enour enthymems, and to make them into maxims!9: τῶν for example, “It behoves men of sense to come to sionally ta reconciliation while yet successful; for thus will be altered they be the greatest gainers.” But, in enthymematic rep στον form, it is thus: “ If persons ought then to be reconciled when the reconciliation will be most to their advantage and profit, they should be reconciled while yet they are successful.”
Of Interrogation and Ridicule.
Bor respecting interrogation, it is the happiest time 1. Inter for employing it when an admission has been made Tog@tion in such a way, that a single further question being be emput, an absurdity occurs: thus Pericles asked Lam- ge te pon respecting the initiation to the rites of [Ceres] ἐπ ah. the protectress; and on his saying, “That it was not surdity possible for him, an uninitiated person, to hear it,” will re--—he asked “Whether he knew himself?” when ™* See book ii. chap. 21, § 2.
2. ii, When your con- - elusion will be established by it.
3. iii. When the opponent must contradict himself.
iv. When we reduce our opponent to sophistical answers. Caution as to interrogations.
5. How to answer an equivocal question.
i. By distinction, ii. By anticipation.
he said he did, [Pericles subjoined, ] “ And how do you know who are uninitiated?”
Next to this is the crisis, when [of two points] one is clear, and it is manifest to the party putting the question, that his adversary will concede the other; for one ought, after having ascertained by inquiry the one proposition, not to interrogate further respecting the point which is clear, but state the conclusion. Just as Socrates, when Meletus denied that he believed in the gods, asked ‘‘ Whether he asserted the being of any demon?” When heallowed that he had, Socrates asked, ‘‘ Whether these demons were not either sons of the gods, or something of divine nature?” And when he allowed it, “Ts there, then,” said he, “one who thinks that sons of the gods exist, and not the gods themselves?”’
Again, when one is likely to exhibit the adversary as speaking contradictions, or somewhat revolting to general opinion.
Fourthly, when he may not be able to rid himself 4. of the question otherwise than by a sophistical answer: for if he answer in this way, sat zt is, and is not, or partly is, and partly is not,—or, one way it is, another way is not; the hearers hoot him off, being at a loss for his meaning.
Under any other circumstances do not attempt interrogation; for should the party interrogated start an objection to the question, you appear. to have been overcome: since it is not possible to put many questions by reason of the imbecility of the hearer, On which account we ought, as much as possible, to compress even our enthymems.
But one must give his answers to equivocal questions with a distinction!, and not concisely; and to what seems a contradiction, by directly offering an explanation in the reply, before the interrogator can put the next succeeding question, or draw the inference he aims at; for it is no difficult thing to 1 See the answer of our Saviour to the captious question of the Pharisees,—‘‘ What thinkest thou? Is it lawful to give tribute unto Cesar, or not?"* Matt. xxii. 17—22.
PHAP, XVIII. J RHETORIC. 269 foresee on what the speech turns. Be this, however, and the means of answering, clear to us from the Topics. And as to a party drawing his conclusion, 6. iii. By if his question produce that conclusion, you are to ¢xPlaneassign the cause: as Sophocles, when questioned by Pisander, “ Whether it had been his opinion, as it had of the other commissioners, to establish the four hundred,” acknowledged that it had.— But how,” rejoined the other, “seemed it not to you to be wrong?” He said it did. “ Did you not, then, do that which was wrong?” “Yes, forsooth,” replied he, “for I had no better alternative.” And as the Lacedemonian, when called to an account respecting his ephorship, on having the question put, “ Whether the rest appeared to him to have perished justly,” _ said they did. “ Then,” retorted the other, “ did you not enact the same things as they?” And when he acknowledged that he had, “ Would not you also,” said he, “for they did this on a bribe; I did not, but merely from judgment.” Wherefore one ought not No quesafter the conclusion to put a further question, nor to (ἴθι to be Ξ ᾿ ᾿? put after put, interrogatively, the conclusion itself, unless the the contruth lies abundantly on our side. clusion. But with respect to Ridicule, inasmuch as it seems 7. Ridito possess a kind of use in disputation”, and as “one rie dea ought,” says Gorgias, “to mar the grave earnestness of our adversary by ridicule, and his ridicule by sober earnestness,” making the remark justly enough,—it has been stated in the Poetic? how many species of ridicule there are; whereof, some befit the gentleman, others do not: so that each must see to it that he take that which befits himself. But the playing a man off is more gentlemanly than buffoonery; for the former produces the ridicule for his own sake, the buffoon for that of another.
$ * Ridiculum acri Fortius et melius plerumque secat res.”” Hor, Sat. i. 10, 14.
must incline the hearers favourably.
2. ii, We lity me plify an diminish.
3. iii, We maust excite the hearers.
4. iv. We must awaken the memory.
270 ARISTOTLE’S TBcoK ΗἹ, CHAP, XIX.
Of the Peroration.
THE peroration is composed of four things:—of getting the hearer favourable to one’s self, and ill-disposed towards the adversary; and of amplification and extenuation; and of placing the hearer under the ᾿ influence of the passions; and of awakening his reiii, collection.