If virtue is a δύναμις εὐεργετικὴν Which of the species of virtue do you consider the greatest?
Would you consider δικαιοσύνη a greater virtue than πρᾳότης ὃ Can you prove this assumption by the τόπος, ra μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ καὶ συμφέροντος ποιητικὰ, μείζω ὕ (vide chap. vii. 7.)
Give the definitions of the species of virtue, as these are στοιχεῖα from which εἴδη in demonstrative oratory are deduced.
Have demonstrative and deliberative oratory any points in common? (vide chap. ix. 35.)
Have the demonstrative and judicial any points in common? (chap. ix. 38.)
What is the difference between ἔπαινος and ἐγκώμιον?
On what principle must we show a man to have acted to be worthy of praise? (vide chap. viii. 32.).
Is coincidence of circumstances admissible as an indication of the προαίρεσις?
Which are the best indications of a man’s habits?
To which of the species of oration are amplification and extenuation peculiarly adapted? | Is the παράδειγμα adapted to one species more than another?
Why do you consider it more adapted to the deliberative?
To which species is the enthymem most adapted?
CHAP, X, In considering the nature of the sources from which the εἴδη of judicial orations are deduced, what are the three questions which Aristotle proposes to consider?
Define the τὸ ἀδικεῖν.
Do you conceive, generally speaking, that whatever men do εἰδύτες they do ἑκόντες?
2a Does the προαίρεσις characterize all actions which men de ἑκόντες ὃ Does the προαέρεσις characterize all actions which men do εἰξότες ὃ Mention the causes of actions which men do προαιροῦμενοι and παρὰ τὸν νόμον.
Must the accuser consider the τένων, καὶ πόσων ἕνεκα, or the inducement, to exist in his adversary?
What are the efficient causes of those actions which men do not dc αὑτοὺς ὃ Of this class of actions which men do not δι᾿ αὑτοὺς, but ἐξ ἀνάγκης, what are the specific causes which Aristotle mentions?
What are the efficient causes of those actions which men do δι᾿ αὑτοὺς ὃ Into how many species does Aristotle divide the Soekuc?
Mention the logical differences, which, when added to the genus ὄρεξις, give the species βούλησις, ὀργὴ and ἐπιθυμέα ὃ Enumerate the seven causes of actions.
Can the ἡλικίαι and ἕξεις be called the true causes of human actions?
Have they their consequences which when added to the true causes give additional weight to the argument?
Why does Aristotle omit to treat of the ἡλικίαι and ἕξεις under the judicial species?
Does Aristotle infer, from the definitions of the seven causes of human actions, the ends of the agents? (chap. x. 12, 13, 14, et seq.)
From which of the seven causes of actions does he infer the ends of those actions which men do δι᾿ αὑτοὺς ὃ When Aristotle says, that all such things as men do δι᾿ avrove are real or apparent goods, why does he make the dis- Am I then to understand that all things which men do willingly, and consequently all things which they do unjustly, are really or apparently good, and really or apparently pleasant, and that these are the ὧν ἕνεκα ἀδικοῦσι ὃ With what view has Aristotle introduced the συμφέρον in the judicial species of oration, when he had previously con- ON AR'STOTLE’S RHETORIC. 355 sidered it as the τὸ τέλος of the deliberative? (chap. x.
Do I understand you to say, that he introduces it because it is the end of human action?
You have before stated that the εὐδαιμονία was the σκόπος of human pursuit, and now state that the συμφέρον and ἀγαθὸν are the τὸ τέλος of actions; explain the meaning of the words σκόπος and τέλος.
- Give the definition of ἡδονὴ and λύπη.
How would you infer the definition of the ἡδύ and λυπηρόν!
Are these definitions the στοιχεῖα from which Aristotle deduces the εἴδη in this chapter!?
What division does Aristotle make and premise of the πῶς ἔχοντες ἀδικοῦσι ὃ What are the three subdivisions of the ὅταν οἴωνται ἑαυτοῖς δυνατὸν?
Why does Aristotle refer the discussion of the δυνατὸν πραχθῆναι to the second book of Rhetoric ὃ Explain why the second part of the division, viz. ἑαυτοῖς δυνατὸν, should belong more especially to the judicial species, when the δυνατὸν πραχθῆναι is considered as a τόπος.
Enumerate the threefold subdivision of the ὅταν οἴωνται ἑαυτοῖς δυνατὸν.
To what things do those persons trust who rely on the punishment being less than the gain, if detected? (third _ member of the subdivision. ) Enumerate the things to which those persons trust who hope to escape punishment if detected: (second member of the subdivision.)
Why should right and wrong be defined in reference to two kinds of law?
Why is the twofold distinction of persons (πρὸς otc) in reference to whom right and wrong is defined, necessary ἢ (3.)
The reader is referred to Hobbes’ Brief of the Art of Rhetorick, for an enumeration of the τόποι throughout this treatise.
How many species of law does Aristotle enumerate?
What is the subdivision of the νόμος ἴδιος ὕ (2.)
What do you understand by the νόμος κοινὸς?
Give the definition of ro ἀδικεῖσθαι.
From whence does Aristotle infer this definition? (chap.
Wast is the threefold division which Aristotle makes of ἐγκλήματα, or accusation?
Why does Aristotle decline treating of the ἐγκλήματα διὰ πάθος in this chapter ἢ In what kind of cases do men, generally and specifically speaking, manifest the προαέρεσις in action? (chap. x. 4.)
Is it necessary for an accuser to lay great stress on the προαίρεσις?
Under what circumstances, or with what dispositions, de men act by deliberative choice? (chap. xii. 1.)
Do you consider that the depravity and injustice of an act is manifested by the προαίρεσις of the agent?
Are they a σημεῖον or τεκμήριον of deliberate choice ἢ Is the προαέρεσις a σημεῖον or τεκμήριον of depravity and injustice?
How many distinctions of right and wrong (d«aia καὶ ἀγαθὰ) are there?
Why is this twofold distinction made?
Into how many species does Aristotle divide the subaltern genus ἄγραφα?
Can you give a reason why the species “remarkably virtuous and vicious,” (τὰ μὲν καθ᾽ ὑπερβολὴν, &c.,) is not included in the written law?
When Solon was asked why he had not enacted a special law against parricide, what was his answer?
Does not this answer give the reason why ἄδικα of this species are not included in the written law ἑκόντων τῶν νομοθετῶν?
Mention some virtues, which as falling under the species καθ᾽ ὑπερβολὴν, &c., are not noticed in written laws?
Is it because they are so universally acknowledged and required, that they are not noticed in written laws?
What is the second species of τὰ δικαία and ἄδικα ἢ What is the cause of this defect in the written law of states?
Give the definition of equity.
What is the standard by which the degrees in criminality may be ascertained?
With what view does Aristotle infer εἴδη, ὁσὰ ἄν ἦ ἀπὸ μείζονος ἀδικίας ἢ (vide chap. ix. 39, with respect to the αὔξησις, and Book ii. 26.)
What kind of injuries are comparatively the more severely felt?
You stated in reply to questions in the first book, (chap. x.) that κακέα generally, and ἀκρασία specifically, were the causes of acts of injustice characterized by the προαίρεσις, how then would you ascertain the comparative enormity of ἀδικήματα ὃ (vide Annotationes Schrader.)
Are ἀδικήματα of this description estimated by the hurt done, or the προαίρεσις of the agent? (xii. 5.)
If the hurt done be irremediable, is the act of injustice capable of being amplified?
Will the definition of ἀδικήματα depend on the πρόνοια of the agent? (vide Annotationes xiv. 5.)
-Am I then to understand that ἀδικήματα which are irremediable, incapable of being adequately punished, of being revenged, which are done frequently, and ἐκ προνοίας, may be considered μείζονα ὃ CHAP. XV, How many distinctions of the πίστεις ἄτεχναι are there ὃ Into how many species is the distinction νόμοι subdivided ἢ?
Into how many subaltern genera is the distinction paprupec (chap. xv. 13) divided?
Into how many subaltern species is the subaltern genus παλαιοὶ μάρτυρες subdivided?
What kind of persons and things constitute the lowest species to the subaltern species, (περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν γενομένων) of the μάρτυρες παλαιοὶ ἢ (vide chap. xv. 13, 14.)
What kind of things and persons constitute the lowest species to the subaltern species (περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐσομένων) of the μάρτυρες παλαιοὶ ἢ (chap. xv. 14.)
Is the lowest species to the subaltern species, (περὶ μὲ; τῶν 358 ANALYTICAL QUESTIONS.
γενομένων,) Viz. poets and illustrious men, most adapted to the judicial species of oration?
Is the iowest species to the subaltern species, (περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἐσομένων,) Viz. soothsayers, oracles, and proverbs, equally serviceable in the deliberative as in the judicial species of oration?
Into how many subaltern species is the subaltern genus μάρτυρες πρόσφατοι divided? (chap. xv. 13.)
What kind of things and persons constitute the lowest spe~-cies to the subaltern species (οἱ μὲν μετέχοντες τοῦ κινδύνου) of the μάρτυρες πρόσφατοι ἢ (chap. xv. 15, last line.)
What kind of persons constitute the lowest species to the subaltern species (οἱ δὲ ἐκτὸς κινδύνου) of the μάρτυρες πρόσφαro? (chap. xv. 15, first line.)
Which of the two lowest species (viz. the of γνώριμοι, and οἱ ἂν δόξωσι ψεύδεσθαι, or Viva voce evidence, ) is most entitled to credit?
Aristotle has hitherto treated of the different kinds of μάρτυρες, and he then proceeds to consider the manner in which their credit is to be amplified and extenuated by the orator; if the orator then has no witnesses to support his case, by what arguments must he diminish the credit of testimony? (chap. xv. 17.)
To what circumstances does testimony speak ἢ (18.)
Is the impeachment of the veracity of a witness by an enthymem (ἐξ εἰκότων) a solid objection to his testimony?
Am I then to understand, that if the orator has no testimony to adduce, he must, Ist. Insist on the propriety of the judge deciding, γνώμ τῇ ἀρίστῃ. (vide Book I. chap. xv. 5, 12, 17. Book 1. chap. xxv. 10.)
2nd. That cixora are better than witnesses, as they are never open to corruption.
3rd. That εἴκοτα are never convicted of falsehood?
If the orator has witnesses to support his case, by what arguments stould he corroborate their testimony, and extenuate the εἴκοτα?
What two precepts does Aristotle give with respect to the extenuation and amplification of the συνθῆκαι and βάσανοι?
What is the fourfold division with respect to oaths ὃ GENERAL QUESTIONS ON THE JUDICIAL SPECIES OF ORATION.
In treating of the judicial species of oration, what docs Aristotle propose that the orator should first consider in his accusation?
If the question be simply whether his adversary has committed an injury, the orator must prove,—what? (chap. x. 2.)
If an act of injustice has been committed, but that act of injustice has not been defined by the written law, under which species of law must he prove his case? (chap. xiii. 14; xv. 4.)
Am I then to understand, that in inquiring whether his adversary has committed an act of injustice, the orator’s first business is to prove that he has acted for some end; secondly, that he was a likely person to commit it; and thirdly, that the object injured was a person likely to be injured?
Are these the three general points which he must prove against his adversary?
What is the specific point he must prove against his adversary?
Why is the general question, Whether the adversary has committed an act of injustice, (chap. x. xi. xii.) and the specific question, Whether he has acted unjustly, (chap. xiii. distinguished? (vide chap. x. 7.)
To prove that his adversary has acted unjustly against the state, or a private individual, what must the orator urge against his adversary? (chap. xiii. 7.)
If the act is clearly done by a voluntary agent, on what principle must the orator prove his adversary to have acted? (chap. xiii. 7.)
360 GENERAL QUESTIONS.
If the act is clearly done by deliberative choice, what is the next question an orator must prove against his adversary? (chap. xiil. 9.)
To prove simply that his adversary has acted unjustly, how many specific questions arise for the orator’s consideration?
Are they not three?.
lst. Whether he has violated the written law? (chap. xili. 9.
2nd. If 3A has not violated the written law, whether he has acted with depravity so excessive as not to be defined by the written law? (chap. xiii. 12.)
3rd. Whether he has acted in violation of equity? (chap.
ON ARISTOTLE’S RHETORIC.
BOOK II.—CHAP. I.
You stated in reply to questions in the first book, that Aristotle had made three distinctions of πέστεις, viz. διὰ τοῦ ἤθους, διὰ τῶν ἀκροατῶν, διὰ τῶν λόγων: which of these three distinctions has he already treated of, and which is he now proceeding to discuss?
What is the end of Rhetoric, or the object which an orator in speaking has always in view? (vide Annotationes, chap. i. 2.)
How does the investment of one’s self with moral character effect persuasion in the auditor? (vide Schrader’s note, 1, 3.)
Must the qualifications by which the speaker invests himself with moral character, be perceived from the speech as ' existing in him, (vide Book I. chap. ii. 4,) or known to have existed in him before?
From the three distinctions of πέστεις, what do you infer to be the three great accomplishments of a perfect orator?
Do I understand you to say, proof by enthymem, investment of himself with moral character, and the excitement of the passions in his auditors?
What are the three causes of a speaker’s effecting persuasion through moral character?
If a speaker appears to be a man capable of imparting benefits to the state, does he effect persuasion through moral character, by his virtue? (vide chap. ix. 4, definition of virtue.)
When Demosthenes in the oration for the crown makes use of the following words,— "ANN ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐκεῖνος 6 καιρὸς Kal ἣ ἡμέρα ἐ, εἰνη οὗ μόνον εὔνουν καὶ πλούσιον ἄνδρα ἐκάλει, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρηκολουθηκότα τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, καὶ συλλελογισμένον ὀοθῶς τίνος ἕνεκα ταῦτ᾽ ἔπραττεν ὃ Φίλιππος καὶ τί βουλόμενος" ὁ γὰρ μὴ: ταῦτ᾽ εἰδὼς μηδ᾽ ἐξητακὼς πόῤῥωθεν ἐπιμελῶς, οὔτ᾽ εἰ εὔνους ἦν οὔτ᾽ εἰ πλού-σιος, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἤμελλεν ὅ τι χρὴ ποιεῖν εἴσεσθαι οὐδ᾽ ὑμῖν ἕξειν συμβουλεύειν. ἐφάνην τοίνυν οὗτος ἐν ἐκείνῇ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐ ἐγώ, καὶ παρελθὼν εἶπον. εἰς ὑμᾶς, ἅ μου δυοῖν ἕνεκ᾽ ἀκούσατε προσέ-χοντες τὸν γοῦν, ἑνὸς μέν, ἵν᾽ εἰδῆτε ὅ ore μόνος τῶν λεγόντων καὶ πολιτευομένων ἐγὼ τὴν τῆς εὐνοίας τάξιν ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς οὐκ ἔλιπον, ἀλλὰ καὶ λέγων καὶ γράφων ἐξηταζόμην τὰ δέονθ᾽ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς φοβεροῖς, ἑ ἑτέρου δέ, ὅτι μικρὸν ἀναλώσαντες χρόνον πολλῳ πρὸς τὰ λοιπὰ τῆς πάσης πολιτείας ἔσεσθ᾽ ἐμπειρό-τεροι;----to which distinction of πέστεις does he recur, and through which of the causes φρόνησις, ἀρετὴ, or εὔνοια, does he endeas vour to effect persuasion?
What are the three questions which Aristotle proposes for consideration in treating of the passions? (Book II. chap. i. 9.)
With what view was this threefold division necessary?
Is it possible to obtain τόποι calculated for the excitement of the passions without a knowledge of these three questions proposed by Aristotle? (Book II. chap. i. 9.)
Give the definition of anger.
Is this definition proposed as a στοιχεῖον from which the γόποι are afterwards inferred ἢ Does not Aristotle explain this definition by two propositions, viz.
Ist. Anger is against some individual on account of contempt to one’s self or friends.
- 2nd. Pain is not so much the consequent of anger as a certain pleasure?
Explain the reference which these two explanatory propositions have to the definition of anger.
To what cause do you attribute the sensation of pain in anger?
To what causes (which are two) do you attribute the sensation of pleasure in anger?
Can you give any other reasons why pleasure should be a consequent? (Book I. chap. x. 17, 18; chap. xi. 10, 12, 13.)
Could you infer a reason from the definition of Syme in the first book?
Is the ἡ ὀργὴ a generic or specific term!?
Under what generic term do you class the ἡ ὀργὴ What is the object of anger?
What is the cause of anger?
How many species of the ὀλιγωρία are there?
Does not Aristotle prove that the καταφρόνησις is a species of ὀλιγωρία from the definition of ὀλιγωρία?
Do you consider the ἐπήρεασμος to be a distinct species of ὀλιγωρία?
Explain how Aristotle from its own definition proves the ἐπηρεασμὸς to be a distinct species of ὀλιγωρία.
Is slight attended with a certain pleasure?
You have before stated in reply to questions in the former book, that all actions done by men ἑκόντες are ἀγαθὰ ἢ φαινό-μενα ἀγαθὰ, ἢ ἡδέα ἢ φαινόμενα ἡδέα: can you show that if the ὀλιγωρία be ἃ Sematicy act, it must be consequently ἡδύ ἢ φαινόμενον dv?
Why should it not be ἀγαθὸν ἢ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν ἢ (Book To what cause do you attribute the pleasure which the o ὑβρίζων feels?
How then are men affected when they feel anger?
With what kind of persons do they feel angry?
What are the causes of this passion?
‘What is it incumbent on the orator to prove, to excite anger against his adversary?
What kind of person must he prove his adversary to be, tc merit anger?
When Aéschines uses the following arguments in his oration against Ctesiphon, does he endeavour to excite anger against Demosthenes? and by which of the causes ὀλιγωρία, or its species, does he endeavour to excite it against his adversary?
Δεύτερον δὲ καὶ πολὺ τούτου μεῖζον ἀδίκημα ἠδίκησεν, ὅτι τὸ βουλευτήριον τὸ τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἄρδην ἔλαθεν ὑφελόμενος καὶ μετήνεγκεν εἰς Θήβας εἰς τὴν Καδμείαν, τὴν κοινωνίαν τῶν πράξεων τοῖς Βοιωτάρχαις συνθέμενος" καὶ τηλι- = 364° ANALYTICAL QUESTIONS καύτην abroc αὐτῷ δυναστείαν κατεσκεύασεν, ὥστ᾽ ἤδη παριὼν ἐπι τὸ βῆμα πρεσβεύσειν μὲν ἔφη ὅποι ἂν αὐτῷ δοκῇ, κἂν μὴ ὑμεῖς ἐκπέμπητε, εἰ δέ τις αὐτῷ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἀντείποι, καταδουλού-μενος τοὺς ἄρχοντας καὶ συνεθίζων μηδὲν αὐτῷ ἀντιλέγειν διαδι-κασίαν ἔφη γράψειν τῶ βήματι πρὸς τὸ στρατηγεῖον᾽ πλείω γὰρ ὑμᾶς ἀγαθὰ ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ ἔφη ἀπὸ τοῦ βήματος πεπονθέναι ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐκ τοῦ στρατηγείου. μισθοφορῶν δ᾽ ἐν τῷ ξενικῷ. κεναῖς χώραις, καὶ τὰ στρατιωτικὰ χρήματα κλέπτων, καὶ τοὺς μυρίους ξένους ἐκμισθώσας ᾿Αμφισσεῦσι πολλὰ διαμαρτυρομένον καὶ σχετλιάζοντος ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις ἐμοῦ, προσέμιξε φέρων avap-πασθέντων τῶν ξένων τὸν κίνδυνον ἀπαρασκεύῷ τῇ πόλει. τί γὰρ ἂν οἴεσθε Φίλιππον ἐν τοῖς τότε καιροῖς εὔξασθαι; οὐ χωρὶς μὲν πρὸς τὴν πολιτικὴν δύναμιν χωρὶς δ᾽ ἐν ᾿Αμφίσσῃ πρὸς τοὺς ξένους διαγωνίσασθαι, ἀθύμους δὲ τοὺς Ἕλληνας λαβεῖν τηλικαύ-της πληγῆς γεγενημένης; καὶ τηλικούτων κακῶν αἴτιος γεγενη-μένος Δημοσθένης οὐκ ἀγαπᾷ εἰ μὴ δίκην δέδωκεν, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μὴ καὶ χρυσῷ στεφάνῳ στεφανωθήσεται ἀγανακτεῖ" οὐδ᾽ ἱκανόν ἐστιν αὐτῷ ἐναντίον ὑμῶν κηρύττεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μὴ τῶν ἙἭ λλήνων ἐναντίον ἀναῤῥηθήσεται, τοῦτ᾽ ἤδη ἀγανακτεῖ. οὕτως, ὦ ἔοικε, πονηρὰ φύσις μεγάλης ἐξουσίας ἐπιλαβομένη δημοσίας ἀπεργάζεται συμφοράς.
As the ἡ zpaivore is the contrary to the ἡ ὀργὴ, and the τόποι are therefore inferred ratione contrariorum, it will be necessary to propose many questions on this chapter.
What is the definition of the ἡ πράῦνσις?
You stated in reply to a former question, that pain and pleasure were consequent to the τὰ πάθη and σημεῖα of the ἡ βούλησις, (chap. iv.) but are they both consequent to the ἡ πράῦνσις, and which is the σημεῖον of the βούλησις in this passion?
What is the definition of the τὸ φιλεῖν ἢ Can you infer from this definition that a friend is perceived from the indications of the ἡ βούλησις ὃ What are the σημεῖα of the ἡ βοῦλησις? (8.)
How many species of the ἡ φίλιο are there? (28.)
What are the causes which give occasion to the pidu ~ ON ARISTOTLE’S: RHETORIC, 365 What is the difference between the ἡ ὀργὴ and the ἡ ἔχθρα?
How many differences does Aristotle enumerate?
How many, and what are the causes of the ἡ ἔχθρα which Aristotle enumerates? (30.)
You have stated that the ἡ ὀργὴ is felt on a count of the ἡ ὀλιγωρία and its species; but if a man is habitually addicted to the ἡ ὀλιγωρία and its species, are our sentiments those of the ἡ ὀργὴ or ἡ ἔχθρα ὃ Do anger and hatred ever differ with respect to the objects against whom they are felt? (xxxi. line 3, 4.)
Can you class both these passions under the genus ὀρέξεις ἄλογοι?
Does the sensation of the ἡ λύπη accompany the ἔχθρα ὃ (xxxi. line 10.)
Which of the two passions, the ἡ ὀργὴ and the ἡ ἔχθρα, does Aristotle consider as incurable?
You stated in a former chapter that the ἡ τιμωρία was the object of the ἡ ὀργὴ, what is the object of the ἡ ἔχθρα ἢ (xxxi. line 6.
Whee kind of person will an orator describe his adversary to be, when he endeavours to excite feelings of hatred against him in his auditors?
Give the definition of the ὁ φόβος.
Does it follow from this definition that all the ra κακὰ are the objects of the ὁ φόβος?
What kind of evils then excite the ὁ φόβος?
Is it absolutely necessary for the sensation of the ὁ φόβος that the evil should be close at hand?
Can you mention any circumstances, or characters in life, which excite the ὁ φόβος in others? (vii. et seq.)
What is the reason that men are not afraid of such evils as death?
Am I to understand that some hope of safety is essential in the sensation of the ὁ φόβος ἢ (xiv.)
Is deliberation also essential in the sensation of the ὁ φόβος?
If the τὰ κακὰ be of such a description as to annihilate all hope of safety, and prevent all deliberation in the sufferer, what is the τὸ πάθος which under such circumstances is felt?
In what chief respects do the sensations of the ὁ φόβος and τὸ δεινὸν differ?
Do I understand you to say, “In the feeling of hope and anxiety, and excitement of deliberation, which accompany the one, but are annihilated in the other?”
Do they differ also in any other remarkable respect? (chap. v. 12, line 4; chap. viii. 13, line 4.)
Do I understand you to say, “ In the sensation of the ὁ ἔλεος if the τὰ κακὰ were to happen to others and not to ourselves?”
Is the difference discoverable in the case of Amasis?
Give the definition of the τὸ ϑαῤῥεῖν.
What is the twofold division which Aristotle makes of the men who feel the τὸ ϑάρσος ἢ (xviii.)
What illustration does Aristotle give in support of this distinction?
To which of the three species of oration do you consider appeals to the ὁ φόβος most peculiar ὃ Give me a reason why you consider them most peculiar to the εἴδος συμβουλευτικὸν. (Confer Book I. chap. iii. 4, with the definition of the ὁ ¢6Goc.)
In which of the three species do you consider appeals to the ἡ ὀργὴ, ὁ φθόνος, and ὁ ἔλεος, most likely to occur ἢ Does Aristotle approve of such appeals to the ὁ δικαστῇ; ἢ (Book i. chap. i. 5.)
Give the definition of the αἰσχύνη.
Do only acts of depravity, or do the σημεῖα of such specific vices as illiberality, flattery, &c., ever excite the ἡ αἰσχύνη ἢ.
Give me a σημεῖον of the ἡ κολακεία ὃ Give the definition of the ἡ χάρις.
Has this word two distinct significations? (vide Schrader Annotationes. ) Which of these two significations is expressive of the ré πάθος ὃ; With what view does Aristotle explain the ἡ χάρις as implying gratuitous benevolence?
Is it for the purpose of showing how it may be amplified?
What division of the ai ὀρέξεις does Aristotle make in this chapter? (iii.)
To which division do you consider such ἐπιθυμίαι as hunger and thirst belong?
Is it necessary that the party benefited must be ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ δεήσει to constitute the ἡ χάρις? 3: Is it necessary that the party benefiting should assist the other ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ χρεία Give the definition of the ὁ ἔλεος.
What kind of persons are most sensible of the ὁ ἔλεος ὃ What reason does Aristotle give that the of παντελῶς απο-AwAdrec do not feel the ὁ ἔλεος ὃ Why do not the οἱ ὑπερευδαιμονεῖν οἰόμενοι feel the ὁ ἔλεος?
What reason does Aristotle give that the oi ὄντες ἐν ὀργῇ ἢ Sapper do not feel the ὁ ἔλεος ἢ (vi.)
Can you give another reason drawn from the definition of the ἡ ὀργὴ and ὁ ἔλεος?
Can you class the ἡ ὀργὴ and ὁ ἔλεος under the genus ὄρεξεις ἄλογοι ὃ What kind of persons do men pity?
Give me a reason why you except the σφόδρα ἐγγὺς ὦσιν οἰκειότητι.
In what respects do the τὸ δεινὸν and ὁ ἔλεος differ? (xii.)
Can you give a reason why certain characters, when represented on the stage, excite pity?
= What passion is directly opposed to the ὁ ἔλεος ὃ Can you class the ἡ νέμεσις and ὁ ἔλεος under the same genus of the ra πάθη ἢ What is the logical difference which when added to the generic term, gives the specific terms ἡ νέμεσις and ὁ ἔλεος ὃ (i. line 4.)
Does not Aristotle define the ἡ νέμεσις and ὁ φθόνος by a comparison of each with the ὁ ἔλεος?
Do you consider the ἡ νέμεσις and ὁ ἔλεος to proceed from the same virtuous dispositions? (ἀπό τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἤθους.)
If they do not proceed from the same virtuous dispositions, could they be classed under the same genus of the ra πάθη ὃ Is the ὁ φθόνος opposed in a measure only, or does it differ entirely from the 6 ἔλεος?
In what respects do they agree, and in what differ?
Can ‘you infer that the opposite feelings are consequent to these passions?
What is the opposite feeling and consequent to the ὁ φθόνος?
What is the opposite feeling and consequent to the ὁ ἔλεος?
Do you consider that the ὁ φθόνος and ἡ νέμεσις dispossess us of pity ἢ What kind of person must the orator show his adversary to be, when he wishes to excite indignation against him in his auditor?
Can you infer from its definition that the ἡ νέμεσις is felt at the virtues? (viii.)
You have stated that the ἡ νέμεσις and the ὁ ἔλεος are directly opposed to each other, and are under the same genus; can you infer therefore, that if the ἡ νέμεσις is not felt at the virtues, the ὁ ἔλεος is not felt at the vices of others? - CHAP. X, Give the definition of the ὁ φθόνος.
What are the three distinct parts in this definition, which should be distinguished, to obtain a clear understanding of the τόποι ἢ 4 When Aristotle says that such persons are likely to feel envy as have equals, from which part of the definition does he infer this τόπος ὃ What kind of a person must an orator represent his adversary to be when he wishes to excite the ὁ φθόνος in the judge?
CHAP, XI.
Give the definition of the ὁ ζῆλος. Does the ὁ ζῆλος differ from the ὁ φθόνος ὃ In what respects do they differ?
»νγ νυ» Can the ὁ ζῆλος be felt at the vices of others?
To what genus of the ra πάθη does the ὁ ζῆλος belong?
Is the ἡ καταφρόνησις opposed only, or is it the contrary to the ὁ ζῆλος?
Why is it necessary that an orator should consider the ra ἤθη of his auditors in reference to their passions, habits, ages, and fortunes?
Does Aristotle use the expression τὰ ἤθη as implying only a certain disposition peculiar to men at a certain time of life, or as implying the ai ἕξεις, or the virtues and vices?
Are the τὰ ἤθη the effects, or are they only consequent tc the ai ἡλίκιαι and τύχαι of men?
You have stated that the orator should consider the ra ἤθη of his auditors in reference to their passions, habits, &c.; under which of the three distinctions of πέστεις would you place this part of Rhetoric? (vide Riccobon in cap. xii. hujus libri.)
Do you consider that, when Aristotle treats of the ra πάθη, ae ἕξεις, and τὰ ἤθη, he considers them to have a relation to the three species of oration?
You stated in reply to a question in the former book, that. the ai ἡλέκιαι and τύχαι of men were not the true causes of actions, but when added to the true causes, give additional weight to an argument in judicial inquiry, (vide Book I. chap. x.) do you consider that the orator should adapt his oration to the τὰ ἤθη of his auditors in reference to their passions, habits, &c., in the demonstrative and judicial species?
What, generally speaking, are the ra ἤθη consequent to youth and old age?
What are the ra ἤθη consequent to the middle-aged?
Why does Aristotle treat of the ra ἤθη of the young and old before those of the middle-aged?
What, generally speaking, are the ra ἤθη of the noble, the rich, and the powerful!?
1 For a distinct enumeration of the τὰ ἤθη as far as the seventeenth chapter, the reader is referred to Hobbes’ Brief, as a distinct exposition would swell these questions to an unnecessary length.
What reason does Aristotle adduce in this chapter for his treating of the ra ἤθη ἢ Did Aristotle treat of any ἤθη in the first book of Rhetoric ἢ Why did he treat of the γα ἡδη cura τὰς πολιτείας in the first book?
Of the τόποι περὶ δυνατῶν καὶ ἀδυνάτων do you consider the τὸ γεγονὸς and τὸ ἐσόμενον both equally applicable to the judicial and deliberative species of orations?
The reader is referred to Hobbes’ Brief for an exposition of the τόποι in this chapter.
CHAP. XX, Are the παράδειγμα and ἐνθύμημα common to all the species of oration?
As Aristotle says that the παράδειγμα is like induction, explain in what points they resemble, and in what they differ. (vide Riccobon in cap. xx. hujus libri.)
How many distinctions of παράδειγμα are there?
Into how many species is the τὸ αὐτὸν ποιεῖν, or matter invented by the orator, subdivided?
Explain what is meant by the species παραβολὴ?
When Cicero, in his oration against Catiline, says,—“ Quod si ex tanta latrocinio iste unus tolletur; videbimur fortasse ad breve quoddam tempus cura et metu esse relevati; periculum autem residebit, et erit inclusum penitus in venis atque visceribus reipublice. Ut sepe homines egri morbo gravi cum estu febrique jactantur, si aquam gelidam biberint, primo relevare videntur; deinde multo gravius vehementiusque afflictantur; sic hic morbus, qui est in republica, relevatus istius pena vehementius, civibus reliquis, ingravescet;” is this a παραβολὴ OF λόγος?
When Agrippa Menenius says, “Tempore, quo in homine, non, ut nunc, omnia in unum consentiebant, sed singulus membris suum cuique “~nsilium, suus sermo fuerat, indignatas reliquas partes, sua cura, suo labore ac ministerio ventri omnia queri: ventrem, in medio quietum, nihil aliud, quam datis voluptatibus frui; conspirasse inde, ne manus ad os cibum ferrent, nec os acciperet datum, nec dentes conficerent. Hac ira, dum ventrem fame domare vellent, ipsa una membra totumque corpus ad extremam tabem venisse. Inde apparuisse, ventris quoque haud segne’ ministerium esse: nec magis ali, quam alere eum, reddentem in omnes corporis partes hunc, quo vivimus vigemusque, divisum pariter in venas maturum, confecto cibo, sanguinem. Is this a παραβολὴ or λόγος?
Which of the two distinctions of the παράδειγμα do you consider most persuasive in deliberative oratory?
If the orator has not enthymems at command, how does Aristotle recommend him to use the παράδειγμα?
But if the orator has both enthymems and examples at command, which does he recommend should be placed before the other?
In the passage quoted from Cicero does he follow Aristotle’s precept or not?
Why is the παράδειγμα and its species, when placed before the enthymems, little adapted to a speech?
What advantage is gained by placing the παράδειγμα after the enthymem?
In placing the παράδειγμα after the enthymem will one be a sufficient proof, or are several requisite?
Give the definition of the 7 γνώμη.
Are the conclusions of enthymems ever γνώμαι How many subaltern genera of the ἡ γνώμη are there?
Into how many species is the subaltern genus ἄνευ ἐπιλόγου subdivided?
Into how many species is the other subaltern genus μετ᾽ ἐπιλόγου subdivided?
Explain what kind of yv@pa those are which require not the annexation of the ἐπίλογος.
Explain what kind of γνώμαι those are which require the annexation of the ἐπίλογος.
You have stated that each subaltern genus is subdivided into two species would you be correct in saying that the 150 species of the subaltern genus (ἄνευ ἐπιλόγου) require not the annexation of the ἐπίλογος, because they were understood before uttered; and that the 2nd species of the same subaltern genus require not the annexation of the ἐπίλογος, because they are understood as soon as uttered; and that the 8rd species of the subaltern genus (μετ᾽ ἐπιλόγου) are parts of enthymems: and that the 4th species of the same subaltern genus are essentially enthymems, and have the ἐπίλογος as it were inserted in them?
What division does Aristotle make with respect to the use of γνώμαι ὃ (i.)
On dubious and incredible subjects, which of the above species dues Aristotle recommend to be used?
On subjects not altogether incredible, but obscure, which of the above species does he recommend to be used? (vi. ai & ενθυμήματι καὶ μὲν.)
We now come to the third! use of γνώμαι (τίσιν ἀρμόττει): is the use of γνώμαι equally suited to all ages and conditions of persons?
Ought γνώμαι not universally true to be indiscriminately used in every part of a speech?
In what occasions then should γνώμαι of this description only be used, and ought they to have the ἐπέλογος?
Are yvwpa which are generally admitted to be true, admissible in every part of a speech?
Are the γνώμαι which contravene current sayings (παρὰ ra δεδημοσιευμέναις) equally admissible in every part of a speech ἢ On what occasions then is it fit that they should be used?
xiii. πᾶ will the τὸ ἤθος be made to appear βέλτιον?
Do I understand you to say “by being manifested in the diction, or by annexing the reason forthe received opinion?”
What advantages does the use of γνώμαι contribute to the orator?
When the orator wishes to give his speech an air of moral character by the use of γνώμαι, what principle must he manifest?
1 Aristotle has treated of the τίσιν ἀρμόττει first, in violation of his proposed arrangement in the beginning of the chapter.
In the following quotation from Demosthenes περὶ τοῦ Στεφάνοῦ 1 is there a γνώμη §?
"AXN ob διὰ ταῦτα προεῖντο τοὺς J hg saci: ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτούς, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὲρ εὐδοξίας καὶ τιμῆς ἤθελον τοῖς δεινοῖς αὑτοὺς διδόναι, ὀρθῶς καὶ καλῶς βουλευόμενοι. πέρας μὲν γὰρ. ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου ϑάνατος, κἂν ἐν οἰκίσκῳ τις αὑτὸν καθείρξας τηρῇ" δεῖ δὲ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ἐγχειρεῖν μὲν ἅπασιν ἀεὶ τοῖς καλοῖς, τὴν ἀγαθὴν προβαλλομένους ἐλπίδα, φέρειν δ᾽ ὅ τι ἂν ὁ ϑεὸς διδῷ γενναίως.
To which species does it belong, and why does it not require the annexation of the ἐπέλογος?
CHAP. XXII. XXIII. XXIV.
The reader is referred to Hobbes’ Brief on the subject of these chapters.
CHAP. XXV. XXVI.
You stated in reply to a question in the first book, that the πίστεις διὰ τοῦ δείκνυσθαι, &c., were divided into two species, ἐνθύμημα and παράδειγμα: what subdivision does Aristotle make of the ἐνθύμημα in the second book? (Book II. chap. xxii. 14.)
How many modes of the ἡ λύσις, or solution of arguments, are there?
Explain the different methods of starting an objection.
How is an εἰκὸς solvable?
How is a παράδειγμα solvable?
How is a τεκμήριον solvable ἢ