How is ἃ σημεῖον solvable?
What reason does Aristotle give for not considering ei 70 αὔξειν καὶ μειοῦν as τόποι ἐνθυμήματος?
How is a solution of them effected?
ON ARISTOTLE’S RHETORIC.
BOOK III.—CHAP. I.
Wuat importance does Aristotle ascribe to the λέξις in rhee toric ὃ Does he ascribe any importance to the ὑπόκρισις?
In what does he consider it to consist? (iv.)
But why does he treat only of the λέξις when he ascribes importance to the ὑπόκρισις? (vi. and vii.)
Does he make any distinction between the style of poetry and orations?
CHAP, II.
Define the λέξεως ἀρετὴ, or excellence of style.
Why does Aristotle object to the too frequent use of γλώτταις or exotic words, πεποιήμενοις or newly-coined words,. and δίπλοις or compound words?
Is the orator obliged to confine himself to the use of the κύρια or words in common use, or is he at liberty to use the other species occasionally?
What advantage does the use of the κύρια contribute to “style?
What advantage does the use of the γλώτταις, &c. contribute to style when sparingly used? | ANALYTICAL QUESTIONS, 375 _ When Aristotle says that in the use of ornament we should seek to escape observation, and avoid a studied manner, what would be the consequence of the neglect of this twofold precept? (iv.)
Does Aristotle lay great stress on the proper use of appropriate metaphors in an oration?
For the selection of metaphors what precepts does Aristotle give? (ix. xii. xiii.)
From what sources then are appropriate metaphors deduced ἢ (xiii.)
CHAP, III.
What nouns does Aristotle mention as contributing to a frigid style?
When do epithets render an oration frigid?
Is the too frequent use of appropriate epithets approved by Aristotle?
When do you conceive a metaphor and epithet unbecoming? (chap. ii. 9.)
In what respect does the εἰκὼν differ from the μεταφορὰ?.
Why does Aristotle caution the orator against the too frequent use of the εἰκὼν?
Can the μεταφορὰ be enunciated as the εἰκὼν, and the εἰκὼν as μεταφορὰ?
How would you change a μεταφορὰ to an εἰκὼν?
On what principle must the εἰκὼν be constructed to be appropriate?
In what does excellence of style (λέξεως ἀρετὴ) consist?
On what does purity of style (τὸ ἑλληνίζειν) depend?
Do I understand you to say the first consists in the proper use of words, and the latter in their clear and proper arrange ment?
Why does Aristotle distinguish the ro ἑλληνίζειν, (chap. v.) the ὄγκος, (chap. vi.) and the τὸ πρέπον, (chap. vii.) from the ro σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως? (chap. viii.)
37€ ANALYTICAL QUESTIONS Do I understand you to say, because the first are essential to style, or by which it becomes calculated to effect persuasion, and the latter only accidental to style, or contributing to give it elegance and beauty?
CHAP VI.
How is elevation of style (ὁ ὄγκος) attained ἢ When will the τὸ πρέπον, or becoming in style, be attained ἢ You say that the τὸ πρέπον in style will be attained, if it be passionate, expressive of moral character, and suited to the subject; what do you mean by the τὸ ἦθος λέξεως? (vide Annotationes vii. 6. Vater.)
When Aristotle treats of the τὸ ἦθος in style, do you consider the τὸ ἦθος λέξεως as belonging to the ἐν τῷ ἤθει τοῦ λέγοντος, one of the distinctions of πέστεις in the first book?
In treating of the πέστις ἤθικη in the second book, and again in this book, on the subject of style, explain the threefold manner in which Aristotle has treated of this distinction of πέστεις. (vide Riccobon in Lib. 11. cap. i. p. 153, and Lib. III. cap. vii. p. 246.)
When Aristotle says the style is becoming when adapted to the ἕξεις, what meaning do you attach to the word ἕξεις?
What precepts does Aristotle give on the ro σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως ὃ How many species of the ὁ ῥυθμὸς does Aristotle mention?
Of these, which is the only one, out of which it is impossible to construct any metre, and therefore appropriate?
Which of the two species of Pans is most proper for the commencement and the conclusion of a speech?
Define the λέξις εἰρομένη and κατεστραμμένη.
How many species of the περίοδος are there?
In treating of the τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως What division does Aristotle make?
How many distinctions of the τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως are there?
Which of these is the most proper for orations?
How many species of the περίοδος are there?
What do you mean by a περίοδος ἀφελὴς?
Of the περίοδος which consists of clauses, what subdistinction does Aristotle make? (7. 9.)
What is meant by the παρέσωσις and παρομοίωσις ὃ Does the invention of the ἀστεῖα and eddoxipovvra.of style belong to rhetoric?
What reason can you give from the first book of rhetoric that they do not? (Book I. chap. ii.) 3 Which do you consider.are the most approved ἀστεῖα and εὐδοκιμοῦντα of style?
Why are the simile and metaphor most approved?
Can you infer from Aristotle’s general inference that “ those beauties and elegancies of style are most approved which are the quickest in communicating information,” any particular rule for the selection of ἐνθυμήματα or arguments?
In treating of such ἀστεῖα as metaphor, simile, enthymem, and antithesis, why has Aristotle treated of antithesis as belonging to the τὸ σχῆμα τὴς λέξεως, and the others κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ λεγομένου ἢ (chap. ii. 6; ix. 7.)
Enumerate the ἀστεῖα with which the orator should seek to grace his speech.
How does metaphor differ from personification?
You have stated that such metaphors are most approved as are not too obvious; how will an orator avoid this fault in the selection of his metaphors, and at the same time render them more approved? (vi.)
When will a sentence be more elegant?
Do I understand you to say in proportion as it contains 8 greater number of these ornaments?
Are hyperboles and proverbs ever metaphors?
Do these contribute to the elegance of a sentence?
373 ANALYTICAL QUESTIONS.
Does the use of hyperbole become the young as well as the old!
CHAP, XII.
What distinction of style does Aristotle first make when he wishes to ascertain the kind of style most adapted to each species of oration?
How many species of the λέξις ἀγωνιστικὴ are there?
To which species of oration are the λέξις ἤθικη and παθητέκη most adapted?
Which of the two species of oration, the judicial or deliberative, require the greatest accuracy of style?
Does the λέξις ἀγωνιστικὴ Suit the demonstrative species?
Is nicety and precision essential in the judicial species, and what is the objection to too great nloety and precision in the deliberative species? | However ready we may be to acknowledge the wonderful acuteness and subtlety of Aristotle’s mind, in unfolding the whole art of rhetoric, his judgment of true wit, from the samples afforded in this chapter, convinces us, that he was a more profound philosopher than agreeable companion. We have therefore, perhaps prudently, refrained from noticing the witty spplivations of metaphor and hyperbole, which he has made, as some general questions on the λέξεις will be subsequently introduced.
GENERAL QUESTIONS ON THE SECOND PART OF RHETORIC.
In treating of the λέξις does Aristotle propose to consider first its nature and the matter of which it is formed? In doing this does he consider, Ist. ‘The matter of which it is composed as words; 2nd. Its forms—of which one is the essential or modification of the matter, by which it becomes adapted to its purpose of effecting persuasion; and another, which | is the accidental, or the figure, or modification of the matter, by which it becomes adapted to its purpose of pleasing the ear: 3rd. Of the ἀστεῖον, or introduction of metaphor, apothegm, and wit ἢ Aristotle has hitherto treated of the nature of style and its modifications; what does he secondly, and lastly, propose to consider?
Enumerate the τά μέρη of orations. | Why does Aristotle object to more than the πρόθεσις and πίστις?
How many and what are the ra μέρη which Aristotle treats of?
Why has he treated of them when he set out with objecting to them? | 380 GENERAL QUESTIONS To which cf the species of oration is the διήγησις peculiar?
Does the deliberative species always require as many parts as the judicial? and which are the parts which it does not require?
When does it require the προοίμιον (xiv. 11) ἀντιπαραβολὴ and ἐπάνοδος?
Is the ἐπίλογος always necessary in the judicial species ὃ Of how many parts will a judicial oration delivered by an accuser be composed?
Under which of these parts is the ra πρὸς αντίδικον or refutation, and the ἀντιπαραβολὴ or contrast of arguments, included when the oration is delivered by an accused?
Why should they not be included in the προοέμιο» or ἐπίέ-λογος? (4.)
Give the definition of προοίμιον.
From what sources are the προοίμια in the demonstrative species drawn? (2.)
What ought to be the chief object of a judicial προοίμιον? (6.)
From what sources are judicial προοίμια drawn ἕ Who is most likely to draw the matter of his προοίμιον ἐκ -ov \éyovroc—the accuser or accused?
Turn to the oration against Verres (Act. Sec. Lib. iii.) and tell me from which of the sources Cicero’s exordium is drawn.
In which of the parts of a judicial oration, delivered by an accused, would the orator be most likely to have recourse to the πίστεις ἐν τῶ ἤθει τοῦ λέγοντος?
Are they admissible in all parts?
In which part of the oration does the accuser introduce the τὰ πρὸς διαβολήν?
What is the objection to their being mentioned in the προ-οίἰμιον ἢ?
In which part of the oration does the accused reply to the τὰ πρὸς διαβολήν f?
What is the orator’s object when his προοίμιον is drawn ἐκ τοῦ axpoarou? (7.)
Dees the deliberative species always require the προοίμιον?
ON ARISTOTLE’S RHETORIC. 38] The reader is referred to Hobbes’ Brief for the τόποι on this chapter.
CHAP, XVI.
What kind of διήγησις does Aristotle prefer in the demonstrative species of oration?
May the proof and amplification be blended in this species? (vide Riccobon in cap. xvi. hujus libri.).
What is the objection to a continuous διήγησις (ἐφεξῆς) in this species?
In a judicial oration should the διήγησις be ἐφεξῆς or κατὰ μέρος?
What matter does the accuser naturally relate in his διή-γησις? (iv. line 6.)
How does the διήγησις of an accused differ from an accuser’s?
What relation is there between the διήγησις and the riaric!?
On what points should an accused refrain from dwelling, and when should both the accuser and the accused dilate on circumstances in the διήγησις ἢ (8.)
Is it of consequence to the orator to vest himself with moral character, and to adapt his διήγησις to the πίστις, in order that the one may support the other.
Is it of consequence to the orator to vest himself with moral character, (7,) and ought he to do this at the commencement of his διήγησις? (10.)
1 Quoniam narratio est rerum explicatio, et quedam quasi sedes ac fundamentum constituende fidei, ea sunt in ea servanda maxime, que etiam in reliquis dicendi partibus, que partim sunt necessaria, partim assumta ad ornandum. - Nam ut dilucide probabiliterque narremus, necessarium est; sed assumimus etiam suavitatem. Probabilis autem narratio erit, si personis, si temporibus, si locis ea, quee narrabuntur, consentient; si cujusque facti et eventi causa ponetur, si testata dici videbuntur, si cum hominum opinione, auctoritate, si cum lege, cum more, cum religione conjuncta, si probitas narrantis significabitur, si antiquitas, si memoria, si orationis veritas, et vite fides. Suavis autem narratio est, que habet admirationes, exitus inopinatos, interpositos motus animorum, colloquia personarum, dolores, iracundias, metus, letitias, cupiditates. ‘Cicero, de Orator. Partit.
382 GENERAL QUESTIONS ᾿ Does the deliberative species of orations require a διήγησις? When is ἃ διήγησις used in this species? When it is used has it the resemblance to the παράδειγμα ὃ What are the four questions for proof in an accuser’s oration?
Has the διήγησις previously prepared the judge?
Can you repeat the division which Aristotle made of ἐγκλήματα in the first book, (chap. xiii. 7,) and reconcile it with the questions to be proved by an accused as stated in this chapter, viz.
either ὅτι οὗ γέγονεν or ὅτι οὐκ ἔβχλαβε Or ὅτι οὐτόσονδε, ἢ ὅτι δικαίως? ' ‘Suppose the accuser charges the accused with a deliberative injury, what cause will he assign for the action done? (Book Suppose the accused is compelled by weight of testimony to acknowledge the commission of the act and hurt done, but denies the προαίρεσις: if he proved that the act was done μὴ é¢ αὗτον or ἐξ avayxne,—would it be a refutation of the accuser!? (vide Book I. chap. x. 6.)
Suppose the accused acknowledges the act to have been done, and that act to have been hurtful, but denies the προαίρεσις, on which points will he dwell in the refutation?
What do you mean by refutation,” and is the refutation in a measure different from proof?
What chiefly constitutes proof in the demonstrative species? (3.)
What species of the πίστις διὰ τοῦ δείκνυναι is mostly used in the deliberative?
‘ Aut jure factum, depellendi aut ulsciscendi doloris gratia, aut pietatis, aut pudicitie, aut religionis, aut patrie nomine, aut denique necessitate, inscitia, casue Nam que motu animi et perturbatione facta sine ratione sunt, ea defensionem contra crimen, in legitimis judiciis, non habent, in liberis disceptationibus habere possunt. Cic. Orat. Partit.
? Ea que ad fidem faciendam pertinent in confirmationem et reprehensionem dividuntur. In confirmando nostra probare volumus; in reprehendendo redarguere contraria. Quoniam igitur omne quod. in controversiam venit, id aut sit, necne sit, aut quid sit, aut quale sit, queritur primo conjectura, in altero definitio, in tertia ratio. Cic. Orat. Partit.
ON ARISTOTLE 5 RHETORIC. 383 Do you recollect any precepts which Aristotle gives on the use of enthymems as proofs?
Why should they not be used when the orator seeks to excite the passions?
Why should they not be used é¢effc, or in a continued series?
To which of the three distinctions of πέστεις in the first ‘book, and to which species does Aristotle reduce the ra πρὸς divides How is the refutation effected by enthymenn? (Book II. chap. xxv. 1.)
Ought not an accuser to notice the objections which the accused is likely to bring forward before he states his own? _ Why should he not, and when is a violation of this order unobjectionable?
Ought the accused to refute his adversary before introducing his own proofs?
What reason can you assign for this order in the proof?
Are γνώμαι admissible as proofs, and which species is the best? (Vide Book II. chap. xxi.)
Can you mention any cases in which the orator may inter-. rogate with success?
Is the ἐρώτησις prudent on every question, and when is it not?
What answer is the best to an equivocal ἐρώτησις?
What distinction does Aristotle make between εἰρωνεία and βωμολοχία?
What does the orator propose to do in the ἐπίλογος?
Why should an accuser prefer the ἐπίλογος to the other parts of the oration, for exciting the passions and prejudices of his audience against his adversary?
Which part of the oration of an accused is opposed to the ἐπίλογος of an accuser?
In what kind of judicial cases will the ἀνάμνησις be used instead of τὸ εἰς ra πάθη τὸ; ἀκροατῆν κατασ-ῆσαι ὃ 384 GENERAL QUESTIONS.
Will every case admit of the excitement of the passions in the ἐπίλογος?
What kind of cases require the excitement of anger, hatred, and pity?
Is it necessary to the excitement of anger in the ἐπίλογος, that the orator should show in the πίστις that his adversary has acted with the ὀλιγωρία and its species?
Why is it? | Do I understand you to say because these are the στοιχεῖα out of which anger is excited? (vide Book II. chap. ii.)
Why does the conciliation of the hearer in the ἐπίλογος naturally follow the πέστις?
Why does amplification and extenuation naturally follow the τὸ κατασκευάσαι εὖ τὸν ἀκροατῆν?
Should the ἀνάμνησις be long or brief?
APPENDIX TO THE ANALYSIS OF ARISTOTLE’S RHETORIC, CONTAINING THE ORIGINAL DEFINITIONS.
BOOK I.
I.—1. RueErtoric corresponds with Logic, since ἀμφότεραι περὶ τοιούτων τινῶν εἰσιν, ἃ κοινὰ τρόπον τινὰ. ἁπάντων ἐστ' γνωρίζειν, καὶ οὐδεμιᾶς ἐπιστήμης ἀφωρισμένης.
2. But since men do it not only εἰκῆ, but also διὰ συνήθειαν, ἀπὸ ἕξεως, εἴη ἂν αὐτὸ καὶ ὁδοποιεῖν, and therefore τὴν airiay θεω-ρεῖν ἐνδέχεται. Consequently, there must be an art of Rhetoric.
3. But previous writers have done but little towards it, for. ai πίστεις ἔντεχνόν ἐστι μόνον" τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα προσθῆκαι, and they have neglected enthymems, ὅπερ ἐστὶ σῶμα τῆς πίστεως.
4, But appeals to the passions, οὐ περὶ τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν, 5. ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν δικαστήν" which is unjust, and avoided by the Areopagus.
6. The business of the pleader is only with the fact, ὅτι ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, i} γέγονεν ἢ ov γέγονεν" not with the question of its importance.
7. Laws would therefore be best, if they could mark out (dcopiZery) all cases, and leave but little to the judges, both on account of the difficulty of getting many good men to legislate, and because ai μὲν νομοθεσίαι ἐκ πολλοῦ σκεψαμένων γί-γνονται" αἱ δὲ κρίσεις ἐξ ὑπογύου" and because the legislator does not judge for the present and particular case, but for the future and universal, and is therefore free from prejudice or passion.
9. Therefore the exordium, narrative, etc. have nothing to do with the art, as all that aims at making the judge ποιόν τινα, 2c 10. Although δημηγορικὴ is superior to δικανικὴ, all men prefer the latter, because it best admits of superfluity and false reasoning.
11. Now ἡ μὲν ἔντεχνος μέθοδος περὶ τὰς πίστεις ἐστίν" ἡ δὲ πίστις, ἀπόδειξίς τις" ἔστι δ᾽ ἀπόδειξις ῥητορικὴ, ἐνθύμημα" καὶ ἔστι τοῦτο, ὡς εἰπεῖν ἁπλῶς, κυριώτατον τῶν πίστεων" τὸ δὲ ἐνθύpnpa, συλλογισμὸς τις δῆλον δ᾽, ὅτι ὁ μάλιστα τοῦτο δυνάμενος θεωρεῖν, ἐκ τίνων καὶ πῶς γίγνεται συλλογισμὸς, οὗτος καὶ ἐνθυ-μηματικὸς ἂν εἴη μάλιστα. But he must also know not Logic only, but the subjects (περὶ ποῖα) enthymems are, and their differences from the syllogisms of Logic. For τό re ἀληθὲς, kal τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ἀληθεῖ, τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστι δυνάμεως ἰδεῖν" and from a natural aptness to discover truth, man has an aptness in conjecturing probabilities.
12. Rhetoric is useful, 1. διὰ τὸ φύσει εἶναι κρείττω τἀ-ληθῆ καὶ τὰ δίκαια τῶν ἐναντίων. 2. because, on account of the unscientific character of some hearers, ἀνάγκη διὰ τῶν κοι-γῶν ποιεῖσθαι τὰς πίστεις Kal Tove λόγους" 8. τἀναντία δεῖ. δύ-νασθαι πείθειν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς, in order to confute ἄλλον χρώμενον μὴ δικαίως τοῖς λόγοις αὐτοῖς, which Dialectic and Rhetoric alone can do. 4. ἄτοπον, εἰ τῷ σώματι μὲν αἰσχρὸν μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν ἑαυτῷ, λόγῳ δ᾽ οὐκ αἰσχρόν" ὃ μᾶλλον ἴδιόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώπου τῆς τοῦ σώματος χρείας.
18. The improper use of Rhetoric is an objection common to all things except ἀρετή.
14. The business of Rhetoric οὐ τὸ πεῖσαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἰδεῖν, τὰ πιθανὰ, and both τὸ πιθανὸν, καὶ τὸ φαινόμενον πεθανον, as in Dialectic. ἡ γὰρ σοφιστικὴ οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῇ προαι-ρέσε. Βαυΐῦ' ἴῃ Rhetoric ἔσται ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὃ δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν, ῥήτωρ" but in Dialectic, σοφιστὴς μὲν κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν, διαλεκτικὸς δὲ οὗ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν.
II.—1. Rhetoric is defined to be δύναμις περὶ ἕκαστον τοῦ θεωρῆσαι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν" and that on any given subject (περὶ τοῦ δοθέντος).
2, Τῶν δὲ πίστεων αἱ μὲν ἄτεχνοί εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ ἔντεχνοι' ἄτεχνα δὲ λέγω, ὅσα μὴ δι ἡμῶν πεπόρισται, ἀλλὰ προῦπῆρχεν᾽ οἷον μάρτυρες, βάσανοι, συγγραφαὶ, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα" ἔντεχνα δὲ, ὅσσ διὰ τὴς μεθόδου καὶ Ov ἡμῶν κατασκευασθῆναι δυνατόν" ὥστε δεὶ τούτων τοῖς μὲν. χρήσασθαι, τὰ δὲ εὑρεῖν.
3. The ἔντεχνοι πίστεις are of three kinds. 1. ἐν τῷ ἤθει OF ARISTOTLE’S RHETORIC. 387 τοῦ λέγοντος" 2. ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατὴν διαθεῖναί πως" 3. ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ.
4, The first takes place when the speaker makes himself appear worthy of credit; the second, when the hearer is excited with any feeling; the third, when a real or apparent truth is shown.
7. Rhetoric is οἷον παραφυές τι τῆς Διαλεκτικῆς, καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἤθη πραγματείας (i. 6. πολιτικῆς).
8. The means of persuading are either ἐνθύμημα = ῥητορικὸς συλλογισμὸς, OF παράδειγμα --Ξ ῥητορικὴ ἐπαγωγή, by one of which all men persuade.
9. Now, to show ὅτι ἐπὶ πολλῶν καὶ ὁμοίων, οὕτως ἔχει, in Logic is ἐπαγωγή, but in Rhetoric παράδειγμα" but that, τίνῶν ὄντων, ἕτερόν τι διὰ ταῦτα συμβαίνειν παρὰ ταῦτα τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι, ἣ καθόλου, ἣ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, is in Logic called συλχογισμὸς, but in Rhetoric ἐνθύμημα.
10. Although example is often used, yet enthymematic reasonings are most applauded (θορυβοῦνται).
11. As in medicine, universals are alone considered by Rhetoric, and it is ἐκ τῶν ἤδη βουλεύεσϑαι εἰωθότων.
12. As the reader is supposed to be ἁπλοῦς, the ἀσυλλόγιστα are better than the συλλελογισμένα, for the latter are not εὐπα-ρακολούθητα διὰ τὸ μῆκος.
18. We can only reason from τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ἔχειν καὶ ἄλλως.
14. But as there are but few ἀναγκαῖα which form rhetorical syllogisms, they are generally contingent (we ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ). Hence ἐνθυμήματα are said to be ἐξ εἰκότων καὶ ἐκ σημείων" But εἰκὸς is ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γιγνόμενον" οὐχ ἁπλῶς δὲ" ἀλλὰ τὸ περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν οὕτως ἔχον πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, πρὸς ὃ εἰκὸς, ὡς τὸ καθόλου πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος. But of σήμεια, the one οὕτως ἔχει, ὡς τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστόν τι πρὸς τὸ καθόλου" but the other ὡς τῶν καθόλου τι πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος" and of these the ἀναγκαῖον is called τεκμήριον but the μὴ ἀναγκαῖον has no name to distinguish it.* 19. But παράδειγμα 1 is an ἐπαγώγη, but ἃ ὡς “μέρος πρὸς μέρος. ὅμοιον πρὸς ὅμοιον, ὅταν ἄμφω μὲν ἦ ὑπὸ τὸ ἀυτὸ γενος, γνωρι-μώτερον δὲ θάτερον ἦ θατέρου.
* The best explanation of the difficulties of this passage will be found in Mansell’s Logic, Appendix, note E. Some useful illustrations will also be found in the notes to the translation, pp. 17—21.
2c2z 3&8 APPENDIX TO THE ANAL SIS 21. Those syllogisms are properly logical and rhetorical, which are of equal extent with the arts themselves, in reference to which the τόποι are used. For these are common περὶ πολλῶν διαφερόντων εἴδει, SUCh as lesser and greater, etc. But the εἴδη are confined to their respective subjects; thus there are προτάσεις concerning physics, that are of no use in morals, etc.
The τόποι convey no specific knowledge, as they are περὶ οὐδὲν ὑποκείμενον, but the εἴδη, if well selected, will gradually produce a science distinct from the Dialectic and Rhetoric.
22. "Evdn = ai καθ᾽ ἕκαστον γένος ἴδιαι προτάσεις.
Τόποι = αἱ κοιναὶ ὁμοίως πάντων.
111.---ΞἸ. There are three εἴδη of Rhetoric, as there are three kinds of hearers, and the speech consists of three things; 1, ὁ λέγων. 2. περὶ ov λέγει. 3. πρὸς ὅν.
2. The hearer is either θεωρὸς περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως, (the skill of the orator,) or κριτὴς, i.e. κριτὴς ἢ τῶν γεγενημένων, ἢ τῶν μελλόντων, the latter being ἐκκλησιαστὴς, the former δικαστής.
3. Hence oratory is thus divided:— Business. Time. End. προτροπὴ 0 μέλλων. συμφέρον 1. συμβουλευτικὴ and and ᾿ἀποτροπὴ. βλαβερόν. κατηγορία ὁ γενόμενος. δίκαιον 2, δικανικὴ and and ἀπολογία. ἄδικον. ἔπαινος ὁ παρὼν, butsome- καλὸν 8. ἐπὶδεικτικὴ or times the others and ψόγος. by recollection or αἰσχρόν anticipation.
8. In all three kinds we must have propositions on δυνατὸν and ἀδύνατον, εἰ γέγονεν, ἣ μη, ὅτι μέγα ἢ μικρὸν, δίκαιον ἣ ἄδικον, καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν, etc.
IV.—1. Excluding ἀδύνατα, ἀναγκαῖα, and ἀπὸ τύχης γε- νομενα ἀγαθὰ, Aristotle enumerates five things περὶ ὧν συμ-βουλεύονται πάντες. 1. πόροι. 2. πόλεμος καὶ εἰρήνη. 8. φυ-λακὴ τῆς χώρας. 4. εἰσαγόμενα καὶ ἐξαγόμενα. ὅ. νομοθεσία. Then follow the εἴδη of each, and the knowledge necessary and useful.* * As these are fully enumerated by Hobbes, I shall here omit them, as in all similar cases, ” el δϑὲώ..»Ψὕ.; Ee Cl —— wT Ύ νυ.
OF ARISTOTLE’S RHETOKIC. 389 V.—1. As to the Epideictic orator, εὐδαιμονία is his aim, περὶ γὰρ ταύτης, Kal τῶν εἰς ταύτην συντεινόντων, καὶ τῶν ἐναν-τίων ταύτῃ, αἱ τε προτροπαὶ καὶ αἱ ἀποτροπαὶ πᾶσαί εἶσι.
3. But εὐδαιμονία is, Istly, εὐπραξία μετὰ ἀρετῆς 2Qndly, αὐταρκεία ζωῆς" 3rdly, ὁ βίος ὁ μετὰ ἀσφαλείας ἥδιστος" Athly, εὐσθένεια κτημάτων καὶ σωμάτων, pera δυνάμεως φυλακτικῆς τε καὶ πρακτικῆς τούτων.
4. Now he is αὐταρκέστατος, ᾧ ὑπάρχει τά τ᾽ ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά. Ἔστι δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ μὲν, τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν, καὶ τὰ ἐν σώματι" ἔξω δὲ, εὐγένεια, καὶ φίλοι, καὶ χρήματα, καὶ τιμή" 7. The parts of wealth are νομίσματος πλῆθος, γῆς, χωρίων κτῆσις" ἔτι δὲ, ἐπίπλων κτῆσις καὶ βοσκημάτων καὶ ἀνδραπόδων πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει καὶ κάλλει διαφερόντων. And all these must be ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ἐλευθέρια καὶ χρήσιμα. But the most useful are τὰ κάρπιμα" the liberal, τὰ πρὸς ἀπόλαυσιν. And they are κάρπιμα ἀφ᾽ ὧν ai πρόσοδοι" but ἀπολαυστικὰ, ἀφ᾽ ὧν μηδὲν παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν γίγνεται, 6 τι καὶ ἄξιον. ᾿Ασφαλεία consists in possessing wealth ὥστ᾽ ἐφ᾽ αὑτῷ εἶναι τὴν χρῆσιν αὐτῶν.
8. Εὐδοξία, τὸ ὑπὸ πάντων σπουδαῖον ὑπολαμβάνεσθαι.
9. Τιμὴ, σημεῖον εὐεργετικῆς δόξης.
Evepyecia, ἣ εἰς σωτηριαν, καὶ ὅσα αἴτια τοῦ εἶναι, ἣ εἰς πλοῦτον, ἣ εἴς τι τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν.
12. ᾿ἸΙσχὺς, δύναμις τοῦ κινεῖν ἕτερον, ὡς βούλεται.
15. Evynpia, βραδυτὴς γήρως μετ᾽ ἀλυπίας.
16. Φίλος, ὅστις, ἃ οἴεται ἀγαθὰ εἶναι ἐκείνῳ, πρακτικός ἐστιν αὐτῶν de ἐκεῖνον. A man who possesses many such, enjoys πολυφιλία and χρηστοφιλία.
17. Evruyia δὲ ἔστιν, ὧν ἣ τύχη ἀγαθῶν αἰτία, ταῦτα γίγνε-σθαι καὶ ὑπάρχειν 7} πάντα, ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα, ἣ τὰ μέγιστα.
18. As ἀρετὴ is most closely connected with ἔπαινος, Aristotle proceeds to τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος of deliberative oratory.
VI.—1. And these are ra συμφέροντα πρὸς τὰς πράξε:ς, τὸ δὲ συμφέρον ἀγαθὸν, which must therefore be considered. ᾿Αγαθὸν is defined to be ὃ ἂν αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα 7 αἱρετόν" καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα ἄλλο αἱρούμεθα" καὶ οὗ ἐφίεται πάντα, ἢ πάντα τὰ αἴ-σθησιν ἔχοντα, ἣ νοῦν, ἢ εἰ λάβοι νοῦν" καὶ ὅσα ὁ νοῦς ἂν ἑκάστῳ ἀποδοίη" καὶ ὅσα 6 περὶ ἕκαστον.
3. And goods follow ἣ ἅμα, ἢ ὕστερον. A copious enumeration of the τόποι next follows, for which see Hobbes.
18. Enumeration of τὰ ἀμφισβητήσιμα ἀγαθά.
VII.—1. In order to enumerate the τόποι of comparative good and expediency, which the deliberative orator must discuss, Aristotle defines ὑπερέχον, τοσοῦτον, καὶ ἔπι' and ὑπερε-Xopevor, TO ἐνυπάρχον. Observing, μεῖζον μὲν ἀεὶ καὶ πλεῖον πρὸς ἔλαττον" μέγα δὲ καὶ μικρὸν, καὶ πολὺ καὶ ὀλίγον, πρὸς τὸ τῶν πολλῶν μέγεθος" καὶ ὑπερέχον μὲν, τὸ μέγα" τὸ δὲ ἐλλεῖπον, μικρόν" καὶ πολὺ καὶ ὀλίγον ὡσαύτως. Then follow the τύποι. See Hobbes.
VIII.—1. To be able πείθειν καὶ καλῶς συμβουλεύειν, one ought to be able τὰς πολιτείας ἁπάσας λαβεῖν, καὶ τὰ ἑκάστης ἔθη, καὶ νόμιμα, καὶ συμφέροντα διελεῖν. For, 1. πείθονται πάν-τες τῷ συμφέροντι. 2. κυρία ἡἣ τοῦ κυρίου ἀπόφανσις.
8. There are four πολιτεῖαι, δημοκρατία, ὀλιγαρχία,. ἀρισ-τοκρατία, μοναρχία" so that the ruling and judicial functions will be one part of these or the whole. But δημοκρατία i is defined, πολιτεία, ἐ ἐν a κλήρῳ διανέμονται τὰς ἀρχάς" ὀλιγαρχία, ἐν ἡ οἱ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων" ἀριστοκρατία, ἐν 7) οἱ κατὰ παιδείαν. But. by παιδεία 1 mean τὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ γόμου κειμένην. But μον-«ρχία is that, ἐν ἡ εἷς ἁπάντων κύριός ἐστι and ἡ ἡ μὲν κατὰ τάξιν τινὰ, is called βασιλεία" but ἡ ἀόριστος, τυραννίς.
5. Their respective τέλη are, Of δημοκρατία, ἐλευθερία. ὀλιγαρχία, πλοῦτος. ἀριστοκρατία, τὰ περὶ παιδείαν καὶ τὰ νόμιμα. τυραννίδος, φυλακή.
IX.—1. But as ethical character is also necessary in the speaker, and as virtue and vice are the objects of the Epideictic orator, and also enable us to appear ποιοί τινες κατὰ TO ἦθος, Which is the second πίστις ἔντεχνος, We must thoraiee define thus: 3. Καλὸν, ὃ ὃ ἂν ov αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν ὃν ἐπαινετὸν 7 ἢ ὃ ἂν ἀγα-θὸν ὃν ἡδὺ ἦ, ὅτι ἀγαθόν. And, if so, ἀρετὴ must needs be καλὸν" ἀγαθὸν yap ὃν ἐπαινετὸν ἐστιν. 4. But ἀρετὴ is, as it seems, δύναμις ποριστικὴ ἀγαθῶν καὶ φυλακτική" καὶ δύναμις εὐεργετικὴ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων καὶ πάντων περὶ πάντα. 5. Its parts are δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη, μεγαλοπρέπεια, μεγα-λοψυχία, ἐλευθεριότης, πραότης, φρόνησις, σοφία. 1. Which are thus defined: Δικαιοσύνη, ἀρετὴ, rs ἣν τὰ αὑτῶν ἕκαστοι - ἔχουσι, καὶ ὡς ὁ νόμος" but ἀδικία, dv ἣν τὰ ἀλλότρια, οὐχ ὡς ὁ νόμος. 8. ᾿Ανδρεία, oe ἣν πρακτικοί εἰσι τῶν καλῶν ἔργων ἐν τοῖς κινδύ-. νοις, καὶ ὡς ὁ "ὑμὸς κελεύει, καὶ ὑπηρετικοὶ τῷ νόμῳ" but δειλέα the reverse. 9. Σωφροσύνη, ἀρετὴ, δι᾿ ἣν πρὸς τὰς ἡδενὰς τοῦ OF ARISTOTLE’S RHETORIC. 391 σώματος οὕτως ἔ ἔχουσιν, ὡς ὃ γόμος κελεύει" but ακολασία the reverse. 10. Ἐλευθεριότης, περὶ χρήματα εὖ ποιητική" but ἀνελευθερία the reverse. 11. Μεγαλοψυχέα, ἀρετὴ μεγάλων ποιητικὴ εὐεργετημάτων" but μικροψυχία the reverse. 12. Me-γαλοπρέπεια, a ἀρετὴ ἐν δαπανήμασι μεγέθους ποιητική" but μικρο-ψυχία and μικροπρέπεια the reverse. 18. Φρόνησις, ἀρετὴ δια-νοίας, καθ᾽ ἣν εὖ βουλεύεσθαι δύνανται περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν τῶν εἰρημένων εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν.
Then follows a copious list of τὰ καλά.
82. But as praise results from moral action, we must endeavour to show that the person commended has always acted κατὰ προαίρεσιν. He defines ἔπαινος, λόγος ἐμφανίζων μέγεθος ἀρετῆς.
35. "Ἔχει δὲ κοινὸν εἶδος ὁ ἔπαινος καὶ αἱ συμβουλαί' ἃ γὰρ ἐν τῷ συμβουλεύειν ὑπόθοιο ἂν, ταῦτα, Reeaneriie τῇ Asker, ἐγκώμια γίγνεται.
38. In praise, we may also use ra ἀυξητικὰ, as εἰ μόνος, ἣ πρῶτος, ἢ μετ᾽ ὀλίγων, ἢ καὶ ὁ μάλιστα πεποίηκεν. τὰ ἐκ τῶν χρόνων καὶ τῶν καιρῶν καὶ εἰ πολλάκις.
Χ. Judicial Oratory requires us to consider three things, ἕν μὲν, τένων, καὶ πόσων ἕνεκα ἀδικοῦσι" δεύτερον δὲ, πῶς αὐτοὶ διακείμενοι" τρίτον δὲ, τοὺς ποίους, καὶ πῶς ἔχοντας.
3. Aristotle then defines τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὸ βλάπτειν ἑ ἑκόντα παρὰ τὸν νόμον. But νόμος is either ἴδιος or κοινός. Ἴδιος is that, καθ᾽ ὃν γεγραμμένον πολιτεύονται" but κοινὸς, ὅσα ἄγραφα made πᾶσιν ὁμολογεῖσθαι δοκεῖ. Men ἑκόντες, ὅσα εἰδότες, καὶ μὴ ἀναγκαζόμενοι. Ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἑκόντες, οὗ πάντα προαιρούμενοι" ὅσα δὲ προαιρούμενοι, εἰδότες ἅπαντα" οὐδεὶς γὰρ, ὃ προαιρεῖται, ἀγνοεῖ. But the motives through which προαιροῦνται βλάπ-τειν, Kal φαῦλα ποιεῖν παρὰ τὸν νόμον, are κακία and ἀκρασία.
6. The motives of injustice.
7. Motives of all actions are either “ Ὁ ΜῈ 5“ Ἂν dv αὐτοὺς οὗ δὲ αὐτοὺς. δι᾿ ἔθος de ὄρεξιν διὰ ri ᾿ἐξ ἀνάγκης λογιστικὴν ἢ ἄλογον, i. 6. either through βούλησις, ὀργὴ, or ἐπιθυμία.
‘ 12. Now τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης are τὰ τοιαῦτα γιγνόμενα, ὅσων ἥ. τε αἰτία ἀόριστος, καὶ μὴ ἕνεκά του γίγνεται" καὶ μήτε ἀεὶ, μήτε ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, μήτε τεταγμένως.
18.. But τὰ Φύσει, ὅσων ἥ τε αἰτία ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ τεταγμένη" γὰρ ἀεὶ, ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ὡσαύτως ἀποβαίνει.
14. Τὰ Big are ὅσα παρ᾽ ἐπιθυμίαν ἣ τοὺς λογισμοὺς γίγνετα δι αὐτῶν τῶν πραττόντων.
15. "Ede δὲ, ὅσα διὰ τὸ πολλάκις πεποιηκέναι ποιοῦσι.
16. ᾿Δογισμῷ δὲ, 7 τὰ δοκοῦντα συμφέρειν ἐ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων dya-θῶν, ἢ ὡς τέλος, ἢ ὡς πρὸς τὸ τέλος, ὅταν διὰ τὸ συμφέρο, πράττηται.
17. Διὰ θυμὸν δὲ καὶ ὀργὴν τα τιμωρητικά.
ες But we must observe that ἡ κόλασις τοῦ πάσχοντος ἕνεκά ἐστιν" ἣ δὲ τιμωρία τοῦ ποιοῦντος, ἵνα ἀποπληρωθῇ.
18. Δι ἐπιθυμίαν δὲ πράττεται, ὅσα φαίνεται ἡδέα.
XI.—1. Ἡδονὴ is defined to be κίνησις τις τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ κατάστασις ἀθρόα καὶ αἰσθητὴ εἰς τὴν ὑπαρχουσαν φύσιν" λύπη, δὲ τοὐναντίον.
Enumeration of τὰ ἡδέα.
XII. Πῶς ἔχοντες ἀδικοῦσι, καὶ ποῖα, καὶ ποίους.
For this chapter, see Hobbes.
XIII.—. Division of laws into Ἰδιοι and κοινοί, and consequently of ra ἀδικήματα καὶ δικαιώματα.
5. Aristotle defines ἀδικεῖσθαι, τὸ ὑπὸ ἑκόντος τὰ ἄδικα was yew* adding, τὸ γὰρ ἀδικεῖν ὥρισται πρότερον ἑκούσιον εἶναι.
11. As there are τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν ἀδίκων δύο εἴδη" τὰ μὲν γεγραμμένα" τὰ δὲ ἄγραφα" 80, of these latter é ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν καθ᾽ ὑπερβολὴν ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας, ἐφ᾽ οἷς ὀνείδη καὶ ἔπαινοι, καὶ ἀτιμίαι καὶ τιμαὶ, καὶ δωρεαί" οἷον, τὸ χάριν ἔχειν τῷ ποιήσαντι εὖ, καὶ ἀντευποιεῖν τὸν εὖ ποιήσαντα" but others are τοῦ ἰδίου νόμου καὶ γεγραμμένου ἔλλειμμα, 1. 6. ἐπιεικὲς or equity, which is defined τὸ mapa τὸν γεγραμμένον νόμον δίκαιον. And this happens, τὰ μὲν ἑκόντων, τὰ δὲ ἀκόντων τῶν νομοθετῶν" ἀκόντων μὲν, ὅταν: λάθῃ: ἑκόντων δὲ, ὅταν μὴ δύνωνται διορίσαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον μὲν ἦ καθόλου εἰπεῖν, μὴ ἦ δὲ, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ.
15. And hence ra ἐπιεικῆ are those deeds, ἐφ᾽ οἷς δεῖ συγ-γνώμην ἔχειν.
18. And Equity consists in looking rather to the προαέρεσις than the πράξις.
XIV. Enumeration of the degrees of guilt. See Hobbes.
ΝΟΥ CO OCC CC ΘΟ: OF ARISTOTLE’S RHETORIC, 393 XV.—1. The ἄτεχνοι πίστεις are γόμοι, μάρτυρες, συνθῆκαι, βάσανοι, ὅρκοι.
3. Arguments for the use or opposition of the laws.
13. Μάρτυρές εἰσι διττοὶ, οἱ μὲν παλαιοὶ, οἱ δὲ πρόσφατοι. Καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν μετέχοντες τοῦ κινδύνου" οἱ δὲ ἐκτός. Παλαιοὶ, οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ οἱ χρησμολόγοι, the former περὶ τῶν γενομένων, the latter περὶ τῶν ἐσομένων.
Also proverbs are μαρτυρία.
15. Πρόσφατοι, ὅσοι γνώριμοι τὶ κεκρίκασι' χρήσιμοι yap ai τούτων κρίσεις τοῖς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀμφισβητοῦσιν.
Manner of using or invalidating witnesses.
20. Use of συνθῆκαι. See Hobbes.
26. Use of βάσανοι.
27. In regard to oaths, there is a fourfold division, ἢ yap δίδωσι, καὶ λαμβάνει, ἣ οὐδέτερον" ἣ τὸ μὲν, τὸ δ᾽ οὔ" καὶ τούτων ἣ δίδωσι μὲν, οὐ λαμβάνει δέ" ἣ λαμβάνει μὲν, δίδωσι δὲ οὐ.
Manner of using the oath under the different circumstances.
BOOK II.
I. Havine discussed deliberative and epideictic oratory, Aristotle now turns to judicial, observing: ἕνεκα κρίσεώς ἐστιν ἡ ἹῬητορική" καὶ γὰρ τὰς συμβουλὰς κρίνουσι, καὶ ἡ δίκη κρίσις ἐστίν" therefore we must not only consider ὅπως ἀποδεικτικὸς ἔσται καὶ πιστὸς ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸν ποῖόν τινα καὶ τὸν κριτὴν κατασκευάζειν.
4, And this is chiefly important for the speaker εἰς τὰς συμβουλὰς, but for the hearer εἰς τὰς δίκας. For men form different opinions according as they are φιλοῦντες, μισοῦντες, ὀργιζόμενοι, OF πρᾷάως ἔχοντες, ἐπιθυμοῦντες, ΟΥ̓ εὐέλπιδες.
ὅ. Τοῦ μὲν οὖν αὐτοὺς εἶναι πιστοὺς τοὺς λέγοντας τρία ἐστὶ τὰ αἴτια" τοσαῦτα γάρ ἐστι, Oe ἃ πιστεύομεν ἔξω τῶν ἀποδείξεων. Ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα φρόνησις, καὶ ἀρετὴ, καὶ εὔνοια. ' 7. But how men may appear virtuous and prudent, may be learnt from the chapter on virtues.
But εὐνοία must be derived from a knowledge of τὰ πάθη, which are δι᾿ ὅσα μεταβάλλο:τες διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις, οἷς ἕπεται λύπη καὶ ἡδονή" οἷον, ὀργὴ, ἔλεος, φόβος, Kat ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἐναντία. Δεῖ δὲ διαιρεῖν [ra] περὲ ἕκαστον εἰς τρία" λέγω δ᾽, οἷον wept ὀργῆς, πῶς τε διακείμενοι ὀργίλοι εἰσὶ, καὶ τίσιν εἰώθασιν ὀργίζεσθαι, καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις.
II. Anger is defined to be ὄρεξις μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας φαινο-μένης διὰ φαινομένην ὀλιγωρίαν τῶν εἰς αὐτὸν, ἣ εἰς αὐτοῦ τινα μὴ προσηκόντως.. 2. Thus anger will always be against a particular object, and all anger will be accompanied by a certain pleasure, ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλπίδος τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι. 3. ἡ ὀλιγωρία ἔστιν ἐνέργεια δόξης περὶ τὸ μηδενὸς ἄξιον φαινόμενον" but there are three kinds of ὀλιγωρία, καταφρόνησις, Wi aa and ὕβρις.
For the enumeration of the feelings and objects of anger, see Hobbes.
IIL.—1. As τῷ ὀργίζεσθαι ἐναντίον τὸ πραὔνεσθαι, Aristotle defines πράνσις, κατάστασις καὶ ἠρέμησις ὀργῆς.