2. Practical And a proof of this statement is the following; irS^ho^ for in no science is there any attention paid to this, building; neither in practical, nor productive, nor speculiu- tive science. For neither does one who builds a house make at the same time as many things as are accidental to the house when it is built, for these are infinite; there is no hindrance, for example, but that the house, when it has been con- structed should prove to some persons agreeable, but to others injurious, and to others serviceable, and, as I may say, different firom all entities, of none of which the building art is snd a specula- productivc. And, in the same manner, neither tive proof of it docs the geometrician speculate into things which om geometry..^ ^j^.^ ^^^ ^^^ accidental to figures, nor whether there is any difference between a wooden triangle and a triangle having angles equal to two right angles.
I Aristotle here shows that though there is no possibility of ther0 f)eing a science of accidents, yet that there may exist one conversant about the substances wherein these accidents inhere. . « Twfe book VIII. chap. X.
* Th3 T»asoning that follows is w^l woiihy of attention.
CE. II.J NO SCIENCE CF ACOIDBNT 161 And this coincidence takes place rationally; s. Thijyiew for the accidental subsists us it were in name JftSj JmS!*"''* merely. Wherefore, aflber a certain mode, Plato dental confina. judiciously arranged nonentity about the art J^S^ofSie of the Sophist. For the arguments of the sophist. Sophists are employed about the accident, as I may say, most especially of all things; for they ask, for instance, whether a musician and a grammarian are a different person or the same 1 and whether the musical Coriscus and Coriscus are the same? and whether everything which may exist, yet not always, has been generated? wherefore, whether in case A man is musical he has been made grammatical? and whether in case he is grammatical he has been made musical 1 and as many other arguments, no doubt, as there are of this kind; for accident appeara to be a something that hovers on the confines of nonentity.^ Now, this is evident also from such arguments as the foregoing; for of those things that subsist in a different way from accidents there is generation and cor- ruption: but this is not the case with those things that subsist according to accident.
Nevertheless, however, must we further dis- 4. The nature cuss concerning accident, as far as is possible, what Se aSsWen/ is its nature, and on account of what cause it may account exists; for at the same time, perhaps, will it be eSstwice of a evident on account of what reason also there is •cience of it. not a science of it. Since, therefore, there are in entities some things that are always disposed in a similar manner, and from necessity, — a necessity that is not denominated according to what is violent, but that which we have spoken of in the case of its not being admissible for a thing to be otherwise than it. is, — and since other things, though ^hese are not of necessity, to be sure, nor always, yet are in existence for the most part,. this is the first principle, and this the cause of the subsistence of accident.
For whatever may be neither always, nor for 5. illustrations the most part, this we pronounce to be an acci- ddlnus^^^ontt dent;2 as, for instance, in the dog-days, that is, natur<j., * The accident has been already discussed in the fourth book; not,, however, Jn its present aspect. The description of it given in the oon text is ciCtious: <paiyfrai r6 trvfi$f$riKhi iyyin ri rod iiij ovros, ' Ft<2«book II. chap. ii.
when the sun is in Canis, if there should preyail storm and oold, we say that this is accidental; we should not, howerer, 9peak in this manner should stifling heat and warmth be generated, hecause the latter iuTariably, or at least for the most part, is prevalent at such a season of the year, whereae the former is not. An'd that a man is white is an accident; for neither is he always so, nor for the most part: but that man is an animal is not according to accident. And for « builder to have been instrumental in producing good health is an accident, because a builder is not fitted by nature to accomplish this, but a physician is; but it would be an aoci- •dent for the builder, his being a physician. And a cook, aiming at fumie^ing pleasure, would probably make some- thing calculated to promote health, but not in accordance with, or by virtue of, the art of cooking. Wherefore, we tBj that this would be accidental, and that in a certain respect the cook makes something that is salubrious, but, simply eom sidered, that he does not so.
6. Why the ac- ^^^ ^^ ^^^® things are there other poten- cident must tialities ^ that sometimes are productive, but of *"*** others there is no definite art or potentiality; for of those things that are, or are generated according to acci^ dent, the cause also is according to accident. Wherefore, since all things are not from necessity and always either are entities or are in generation, but since most things have a subsistence for the most part, it is necessary tliat there be in existence something which subsists according to accident, and that it should be such as is a white musician, who exists neither always, nor for the most part. Since sometimes, however, such is produced, there will be a subsistence according to acci* dent, and if not, all things will subsist from necessity. Where- fore, matter will be the contingent cause' of what is accidental, difierently from that which has a subsistence, for the most part.
7. The exist- We must, howcver, assume this as a begin- enceoftheac- ning of the inquiry, whether there is nothing 1 As to the dififerent sorts of potentialities, or capacities, and their modes of operation, the student is referred to the eighth book, whers the Bubj<Kit is elaborately handled.
' Thk is the germ of Aristotle's reasoning, to show from the natura of the T^ ffvfifitfiriKts the necessity of the existence of what is traa* •cendental, and of metaphysics as a sciei ce of it.
OB.in.] TO DiaffT AOCmElfT IS FATALISX. 148 lAAA subsists neither always, nor for the most ^{deot t tettM part, ot whether this is impossible 1 Accordingly, p»*nt. hi addition to these things is there something which in one way or other has a casual subsistence, and a subsistence according to accident. Shall we, however, admit that ^lat which has a subsistence for the most part, and that which has a perpetual subsistence, is not inherent in the natuire of anything, or are there certain entities that are eternal ) Con- eeanmtg these points, indeed, we will afterwards examine.
That, however, there is not a science of the ^ Thatth la aecidental is manifest; for, certainly, every science no icieiice of is a science either of that which subsists always, ftlfflj^ed"**** or of l^at which subsists as for the most part. For, otherwise, how should one learn anything or instruct another 1 for it is necessary that the object of the science be defined, either by that subsisting always, or that having a subsistence for the most part, as that mead is usdful, for the most part, for one that is sick of fever. What, however, is beyond this it will not be allowable to affirm; namely, as to the time when it may not be useful: as, for instance, during new-moon, for either always, or for the most part, is the mead serviceable during new-moon, also; and what is dif- ferent firom these is accidental What, in truth.
aecideirtal is. and from what cause it arises, and that thereig BO science of it in existence, has been declared.
CHAPTER III.
Now, that there are first principles, and causes, ^^ ^ ^^^ that are generable and corruptible, without any- accidentaUeads thing rising into existence and falling into decay, iecewSy ™ *' is evident. For if this were not the case all things would subsist from necessity, if of that which is being produced. and corrupted there must needs be a certain cause which does not submst according to accident. For whether will this particular thing take place or not? if, at least, this be produced it will, but if not, by no means will it take place; but this latter wiU take {^ace if something else is acooni' plished.
164' THE METAFHTfllOS OP ARI8T0TIJS. [BOOK V.
2. This argu- And SO It is manifest^ that when time is irSVbyex- Bubstracted from finite duration you will in* ampies. variably come to the present moment. Where- fore, this person will die either by disease or violence if he, at least, go forth out of the city, and this will take place if he should be thirsty, and this will happen if something else happens; and so wiU he come to that which now is, or to something of those things that have been: as, for instance, if he may have felt thirst; and this will happen if he eats things that are pimgent to the taste; and this, assuredly, is the case or is not: wherefore, he shall necessarily either die or shall not die. In like manner, also, if any one pass over in his inquiry to the things that have been done, the reasoning is the same; for already does this subsist in something: but I speak of that which has been done. Accoixiingly, all things that are likely to be in future will subsist from necessity: as, for instance, the death of one that is living; for already has something been accomplished which shows a tendency towards dissolu- tion; I mean, the existence of things that are contrary in the same body: but if the death of this person is to be brought about by disease or violence, not as yet has this taken place, but should this particular thing be effected.
3. Under what It is evident, then, that this reduction ad- ciass of cause yances towards a certain principle, and this must wc TaQic that of the TO principle no longer extends to anything else. ryM/3€/3»i«6.. Therefore, will this be the principle of what is casual, and there will be nothing as a cause of its generation. But into what sort of first principle, and what sort of cause such a reduction may be made, whether as into matter,^ or as into the final cause, or as into the power that imparts motion that is the efficient cause, is particularly worthy of consideration.
J CHAPTER IV.3 ^{T. The "ens" THEREFORE, indeed, respecting the entity viewed in reia- ^hi^h subsists according to accident, let the dis- ' 9ri\oy Sti. The Leipsic edition has ^tiXopSti, that i«, ** palpably." ' That is, the material cause.
' Aristotle here cautions his readers a^inst supposing that he viewfi Iht inbject-matter of metaphysics, the raSy, as a synonyme with truth, en. IV. J ENTITT IN BVLAHON TO TRUTff. 165 ousBion be dismissed, for the subject has been tion to trntb determined with sufficient accuracy. Now, that *°* fai«ehood. which subsists as true is entity, and that which subsists as &lse is nonentity, since they are employed about ^ composi- tion and division, and entirety about a portion of con- tradiction; for that which is true iuyolves an affirmation in the case of composition, and a negation in the case of division; but that which is false involves the contradiction of this division.
But how it is possible to understand what 2. solution of subsists at the same time, or has a separate * difficulty. subsistence, this is another question. Now, I mean, that things which subsist together, and that which subsists apart^ are disposed in such a way as not to subsist in a consequent order, but so as to become one certain thing; for not in things themselves are the false and the true, — as that which is good is true, but that which is bad is false, — but m the understatiding; and the truth and fidsehood concerning things that are simple, and concerning essence, are not in the understanding either. As many points, then, as it is requisite to examine into as regards entity subsisting in this way, and regarding nonentity, must be investigated on a subsequent ^ occasion.
Since, however, composition and division are 3. ^hy an in- in the intellect but not in the things themselves, <iu»fy about and that which is an entity after this manner is dif- l&^t is omit- fereut from those things that are properly termed ^^• entities, (for either the nature of a thing, or its being of a certain quality or quantity, or something else of the kind, doth the intellect conjoin or separate,) — ^that which, as an entity, subsists as an accident, and that which is as it were what is true — ^the consideration of these must be omitted.
or the rd fi^ty OS one with falsehood. This piece of Platonism is rejected by the Stagyrite, on the ground that it presupposes that to be a composite which he has sought to demonstrate an incomposite and pure nature. Vide book YIII. chap. x. The Leipsic edition has only three chapters in book V. It is the Paris edition, published by Didot, that adopts the arrangement I have followed.
I Aristotle has viewed this aspect of entity in his definition cf that term in book IV., and he glances at the same subject in book YIII chap. X. For the word vtpl some MSS. read vapd. « This is done in book VIII. chap x.
For the cause of the one, is indeBnite, but of the othev a oer? tain affection of the undei-stauding; and both are oonversant about ^ the remaining genua of entity, and do not render manifest any nature that is of an higher order than entity* Wherefore, let these points be omitted, to be sure; but w« pAust examine the causes and the first principles of entity itself 80 &r forth as it is entity. And it is evident, in what va have laid down concerning the multi&rioos predication cf everything, that entity is denominated in many ways.
BOOK VLt CHAPTER I.
:. Tbe first Entity is denominated in many ways, as division of the we havc previously made the division in the case the°To T "IJt.', of those statements relating to its multifiuious shown to be of predications:^ for one signification of entity is with substance, " the what a thmg 18, or quiddity, and this uiaia. certain particular thing; and another is quality or quantity, or each of the rest of the things that are so pre- dicated. Now, seeing that entity is spoken of in thus many ways, it is evident that the first entity amongst these is quiddity, or **the what a thing is," which signifies sub- stance. For when we say that this particular thing is of a certain quality, we term it either good or bad; but not as of three cubits, or that it is a man: when, however, we say what a thing is, we term it not white or warm, or of three cubits; but a man or a god. But the other entities are deno- 1 Other MSS. read irofxl ' Aristotle having put out of the way certain senses in which the expression **ens*' is received by certain philosophers, now proceeds to institute a mure direci examination into the subject-matter of meta* physics, by an aoaiysis of the r6 htf into its component significations.
' Vide book IV. chap. viL Taylor makes irtpl roO irohXdK'xs refer to the subject in creneral of multifiBrious predication. In this case Aris* iotle refers to the Categories, chaps, ii. iii iv.
OH. L] 8UBDIVISI0:rS OF ISXTITT. l^ minated so in regard of belouging to entity that, is really Bueh; some, to wit^ as being qiiantities, and some qualities, and some passions, and others, some other things 43f the sort. Wherefore, one might feel perplexed as to wbiBther walking,' and health, and editing, were each of them an entity or a nonentity. And, in like manner, alsp, is it the case with any whatsoever of the other things of this kind respecting which similar doubts are entert^ed; for none of them ia adapted by nature either to subsist essentially or is capable of being separated from substance, but rather (if I may express myself so) this is to be said of any amongst the entities which is walking, and sitting, and being in sound health. And these rather than those appear to be entities, because they have.some definite subject, and this is substance, and the singular which appears in the category of this kind; for that which is good, or the sitting posture, is not expressed without this^ also. It is evident, therefore, that each of those also subsists on account of this.' Wherefore, that which is primarily entity, and not any particular entity, but entity simply or absolutely, will constitute substance.
Tlierefore, that which is first is denominated i^i „ wh • - many ways; nevertheless, first of all is substance, stands foremost both in reason, and knowledge, and time, and Segoris.*** nature. For no one of the rest of the categories is capable of a separate subsistence, but this alone; and in definition is this first: for in the definition of everything there is a necessity that the definition of substance be inherent. And then we think we know each particular thing, especially, when we know what man is, or fire is, rather than when we know the quality, or the quantity, or the situation of a thing; since we then come to know each of these things ftrhen we know what the quantity of them is, or the quality.
And unquestionably, also, was that originally, s. oUia, as a and at the present time, and always,^ a subject of "^^^it" "*' * Aristotle shows that these are not substances, but mere qualities fbemselTes, presupposing certain ultimate subjects wherein they reside M such. Vide Mr. Maurice's *' Analysis of the Metaphysics."
* This observation may be verified in the case of ParmenideSy Anas igoras, Empedodes, the Platonists, and the Stoics.
16S THE METAPHYSICS OP ARISTOTLE. [bOOK VIi riaims shown investigation, and invariably of doubt; namely, fromusa«e. ^^^f. gj^tity is^ that is, what substance is: for some say that this is one, but others, that it is more than one; and some maintain that things which are finite are this entity, but others, things that are infinite. Wherefore, also, especially, and primarily, and exclusively, as I may say, we must investigate concerning that which subsists as entity after this manner, as to what it is.
CHAPTER II.1 I. Opinions Now, substance seems to subsist, no doubt, iu ??JII!l*-K *v bodies most palpably. Wherefore, we say that natural or ooth animals, and plants, and the parts ot tnem, Bupranaturai. ^^ substances; and we say the same of natural or physical bodies, as fire, and water, and earth, and every- thing of this sort; and as many as are either parts of these or are composed of these, either partly or entirely, as both the heaven and its {)art8, stars, and moon, and sun. Whether, however, these are the only substances, or whether there are others besides, or whether no one of these, but certain dif- ferent ones, are substances 1 this must be examined into. But to some^ the boundaries of bodies (as superficies, and line, and point, and monad) seem to be substances, and that, too, rather than body and solidity. Further, with the exception of things that are sensible, some are not of opinion that there is anything in existence of the kind, but others, that there are many such, and that especially those entities have a subsistence which are eternal; as Plato considered both forms and mathematical entities as two substances, and, as a third, the substance of sensible bodies. But Speusippus,^ starting * This chapter contains an examination into the primary one of the categories. Vide Categories, chaps. iL iii ^ Aristotle here gives us a condensed view concerning the theories •KtpX jilHrlOf which already had been discussed at large in book I. He glances at the systems of Plato, Pythagoras, Parmenides, Empedocles, and Speusippua.
' Speusippus was a pupil of Plato, and succeeded his master; he was the earliest adherent to what was called the first academy. The successor to Speusippus was Xeuocrates, who held similar opinions to those ascribed to Speusippus in the text. Tenneman, p. Ill, Bohn*t edition.
OB. III.] OPINIONS ABOUT SUBSTANCE. 169 from one, says that there are many substances and first prin- ciples of each substance; one of numbers, but another ol magnitudes, then another of soul; and in this way extends, therefore, the classes of substance. And some affirm that forms and numbers have the same nature, but that other things that are connected therewith, as lines and sur&ces, belong to a second class of substances as far as to the sub- stance of the heaven and to sensibles.
Accordingly, respecting these we must consider what it is that is said well or not well, and what lAqniries^re. substances exist, and whether there are certain 8j^8 »ub. ones besides sensibles,^ or are not, and how these subsist? also, whether there is any separable suostance, and why there is, and after what mode of sui)sistence; or whether there is no substance besides sensibles 1 This, I say, must form the subject of our investigation, having first delineated substance in a sketch of what it is.
CHAPTER III.
CHAPTER III.
Now, substance is denominated, if not multi-, Matter is fariously, yet, at least, in four ways particularly; subetancere-. for both the essence or the formal cause, and the prinfarysuiH universal, and the genus, seem to be substance in i«®** each thing; and fourth of these is the subject. But the subject is that of which other things are predicated, while itself is no longer predicated of any other tbang. Wherefore, concerning this point we must come to a determination in the first instance; for substance appears especially to be the primary subject. Now, in some such manner is matter deiio« minated substance, but in another way form, and in a third, that which results from, or is a compound of, these; now, I mean by matter, brass, for instance, but by form the figure of the idea, and by that which is composed of these the statue in its entirety. Wherefore, if form be prior to * Such philosophers as Hippo, sumamed the Atheist, and, in after- times, the followers of Epicurus, maintained the existence merely of what was cognisant by the seuMes. Plato, Speusippus, and Xenocrates, in their speculations, developed an element exclusively transcendentaiL Vide Tenneman, Ssdct. 128; Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosu* phers, Introduction, p. 1 0, sqq. jTAnslated in ''Bohn's daasical Library,* 170 THE i:etaphysics of aeistotia [book Yl Blatter, and rather than it is entity or being, also for the game reason will be prior that which is a compound of botbu Now therefore, by way of a rough delineation has it been declared what substance is at all; namely, that it is not that which is predicated of the subject, but is that of which other things are predicated. It must needs, however, be spokeu of not in this manner solely, for such is not sufficient; for this account of it is obscure.
2. ThiB proved -^^^ further, matter becomes substance: for firom the fact if matter is not sul)stance, what else is escapes that the rarioua i. t* u xi. xi-» qualities of our Comprehension; for when other things are '""'^'^ p^^P- removed away, nothing appears remaining. For ■tanee whernn Other things are the passive conditions ^ of bodies, they inhere. ^^^ ^^^ productions, and potentialities; but length, and breadth, And depth, are certain quantities, but not sub- stances: for quantity is not substance, but rather that wherein these very qualities are inherent primarily — that is substance. But, unquestionably, if we take away length, and depth, and breadth, we see nothing left except whatsoever is bounded by these. Wherefore, to persons conducting the inquiry in this way, matter must needs appear only as substance; and I caH matter that which essentially is termed neither quiddity, nor quantity, nor anything else of those things whereby entity is defined. For there is something of which each of these is pre* dicated from which " the being " is different, as well as from each of the categories; for the other things are predicated of substance, but this of matter. Wherefore, that which is ulti- mate essentially is neither quiddity, nor quantity, nor quality, nor any other such thing. Neither, therefore, are negations so; for these also will have a subsistence according to accident.
In consequence of these things, no doubt, therefore, it happens with speculators that matter is regarded as substance, s. others would This, howevcr, is impossible; for both s capa- thatVhich'u"'^ bility of Separation in its subsistence, and the eomposedof subsisting as this particular thing, seem to tonnftob?^8ub- inhere especially in substance. Wherefore, form, stance. and that which is composed of both, would appear to be substance rather than matter. Indeed, then, as regards the substance which is composed of both (I mean composed ' This argument has already been noticed by Ariatotle, in his Review of Qreek Philosophy in book. L COr IV.J 8UBBTAKGB AS THE FQBMAL CicVSB. IH of matter and form), the consideration of this must bo omitted, for it is posterior aid manifest; but somehow matter also is plain. But respecting the third substance must there be an inquiry made, for this is most perplexing. Now, certain substances of sensibles are acknowledged to exist; wherefore, in the case of these, let us» in the first place, insti- fcute an examination.
CHAPTER IV. 1 CHAPTER IV. 1 But since in the beginning of this book we i. Ariatotki' have made a division in how many ways we {SJuuyinto define substance, and of these a certain one ^«r«tdgRni- seems to be the essence or the very nature of stance, u the a thing, we must make an inquiry respecting this, '^'^^^ «^»'«*' for advantageous is the transition to what is more known.' For in this way is instruction imparted to all by means of advancing through those things that are less known to Nature to things that are more known; and this is something accomplished, as in practical things the having made from those tfdngs that are good to each, things that are good to each generally f so, from things that are more known to oneself, the having made things that are known to himself, to be known to Nature, as well as things that are known to individuals, and such as are first, and are often but little known, and often involve little or nothing of entity. Nevertheless, however, from things badly known, to be sure, yet known to oneself, must we en- deavour to attain a knowledge of things generally known, making a transition, as has been stated, by the way of these very things.