And, in the first place, let us speak thereof ». Logioai eon- some things logically, because the very nature of J^SSttle" everything is that which is denominated as ▼< hy eZvou, for subsisting essentially or absolutely. For your sl^^wi^h^* essence does not consist in being in one that is '^® ««** *»^** ^ These remarks on the r6 ri ^p thai are most important. In th^ Posterior Analytics, book II. chap, zi., this term occurs. Mr. Owen, m his translation, renders it by "essence," i,e. the formal cause. It is translated by Mr. Lewis, in his " History of Philosophy," " the very nature of a thing.** I have adopted both together.
' This is a favourite principle with Aristotle.
' Alexander illustrates this remark by the case of a legislator pro pounding such laws as would most contribute towards the public weai 172 THB MBTAPHT8I0S OF ARUXFOTLB. [bOOE VI musical, for not according to yourself are you musical; your essence, then, subsists according to yourself. For, truly, not eyerything that is essentially present to a thing is the very nature of that thing; for that is not the case with that which is so essentially present, as a white surface, since the being of a sur&ce is not the same thing with the being of what is white. But, doubtless, neither is that which is composed of both, namely, the being of a white surface, the same as the essence of superficies. Should the question be asked why it is not, our reply is, because superficies is contained in the definition of white surface. In whatever definition, then, expressive of this, this will not be found inherent, this will be the reason of the essence or very nature of each thing. Wherefore, if the being of a white surface is the being of a smooth sur&ce, the being white and smooth is one and the same thing.
3. Aristotle dis. But siucc, also, in accordaucc with the rest of queSioM** *^® Categories there are natures that are compo- touching the TO site, (for there is a certain subject to each as to nameiyr* ' quality and quantity, and the time when, and whether there the place where, and motion.) we must examine UUIV DO S&lCl CO ^ be a definition, if there is a definition of the very nature or the^^fo™!""' *"' essence of each of them,i and, also, whether the cause of each essonco of a thing is inherent in these 1 as, for lies, and example, if m man the essence of white man is ^**w'a»^* ^° inherent. Now, let his name be garment, what discoverable then is the being of a garment 1 but, doubtless, therein! neither does this belong to those things that are expressed absolutely; or, shall we say that a thing which is not essential is predicated in two ways, and that of this the one is from addition, but the other is not so 1 And in regard of this being added to another thing, it is denominated as that which is defined; for instance, if one defining the being white should assume the definition of white man, another thing is so denominated because something else is not added to it; for example, if a garment signifies a white man, but some one should define the garment as white, in this case a white man is, doubtless, soinething that is white, yet his essence or very nature does not consist in being white, but in being a garment. Is there, then, in short, in existence ^ Vide concluding paragraphs of shape, iv. and r.
OH. lY.] QUXSnoms about the E88BN0E. 173 such a thing as the essence or very nature of entities or not? for whatsoever is the very nature of a thing is the essence of that thing. But when one thing is predicated of another, it is not this certain particular thing; as, for instance, a white man is not this certain particular thing, if the being this particular thing belong to substances only. Wherefore, the very nature of a thing appertains to those things the dis- course respecting which is a definition. But not every discursus which signifies the same thing as the name is a definition, (for, in this case, all discourses would be definitions,) for the name will be the same with any discourse whatsoever. Wherefore, also, the term Iliad will be a definition; but if it may be one of some primary thing, a discourse is then a definition. And things of this kind are such as are spoken of not in respect of the predication of one thing of another.
The veiy nature of a thing will not, accord- 4^ something ingly, be found in any of those things that are decisive on this not the species of a genus, but in these only; for ^^^^' these seem to be predicated not according to participation and passion, nor as an accident: but, no doubt, there will be a discourse of each thing, and it will signify something of the other things, if it be a name; I mean, that this particular thing is inherent in this, or instead of the simple assertion is there one that is more accurate; but it will not be a definition, nor the essence or very nature of a thing.
Or also shall we say that definition, as well as 5 Another »o- the essence of a thing, is expressed in many lution pro- ways) for also the inquiry what the nature of ^°' ' a thing is, in one way signifies substance, and the being this particular thing, but in another each of the categories, quantity, quality, and whatever things else there are of this sort. For as the inquiry what a thing is also belongs to all things, though not after a similar manner, but to one thing primarily, and to others in a consequent order, so also the nature of a thing inheres in the substance simply, but ii^ other things in a sort of a way; for also as to the quality of a thing we could ask the question what it is: where- fore, likewise, quality belongs to those things to which the inquiry what they are appertains, but not simply considered; but just as in the case of nonentity certain speculatoi's say that it is nonentity, logically speaking, not simply, h\x% 174 THB IIETAPHTSIOB OF AEUSTCTLE. [BOOK Tt.
that is nonentity, so also is it with lespect to quality. It is necessary, therefore, to examine also how cue should speak lit everything not, certainly, at any rate, more than how tach thing subsists or is disposed. ^ _ Wherefore, now, also, since what is spoken is sion from this manifest, the very nature or essence of a thmg •toted'***" ^^^^ *^> ^^ ^^® manner, be inherent primarily and simply in substance, and afterwards in other things; as in the inquiry what a thing is, the essence or very nature of that thing will not be inherent simply, but with the addition of quality or quantity will the essence be inherent. For it is requisite to speak of the existence of these entities either equivocally or with addition and ablation, as, also, that which is not the object of scientific knowledge is a thing that may be scientifically known; since this is correct, at least, neither to speak of these equivocally, nor in like manner, but just in such a way as what is medicinal is pro- iicated in reference to one and the same thing, without, however, being one and the same thing, and yet, indeed, is not equivo(^y predicated either; for no medicinal body IS t^med a work and an apparatus either equivocally or according to one, but in relation to one thing. 7. This conciu- Therefore, in whatsoever way one chooses, tion vindicated, indeed, to express ^ these things makes no dif- ference. This, however, is evident, that definition, primarily and absolutely considered, and that the essence or very nature of a thing, belong to substances. Notwithstanding, they belong to other things, also, in a similar manner, except not primarily. For there is no necessity, even though we should admit that a name has the same signification with a certain discourse, that a discourse about that which the name signifies should be a definition of this; but this will take place if the name may have the same signification with a discourse, at least a certain discourse. And this takes place if it be of one thing not by continuity, as the Iliad, or whatever things else are one by connexion, but if it is as multifariously expressed as one thing is. Unity, however, is predicated in as many ways as entity; and entity signifies partly this particular thing, and partly quantity, and partly quality.
> The question as regards the r6 n ^v ^Ivau has been thus settled; snd here we have a summary view of Aristotle's decision thereupon.
OB. ▼.] CERTAIN BOUBTB VXFRESSBO. 175 Wherefore, also, of white man will therie be a certain discoorae and definition; and in another way will there be the same, both of that which is white and of substance.
CHAPTER V.i This statement, however, involves a doubt — in i. Thefongo. case any one denies definition to be a discourse {SIo'wmTwo* subsisting £rom addition — of what the definition nwtten of will be of those things that are not simple, but *®"^^' connected together; for from addition it is necessary Ix) make them manifest. Now, I say, for instance, there is nose and hol- lo wness, and flatness of nose — I mean, that which is called from both of these in respect of this being inherent in that; and neither the hollowness nor the flatness of nose is^ according to accident, at least, a passion of nose, but subsists essentially; nor do they subsist as the white in Callias^ or man, because Oallias is white, to whom it is an accident to be man: but they subsist as the male in animal, and the equal in quantity, and in the same way as all those things that are said to be essentially inherent. But these are those in whatsoever is inherent either the definition or the name of which this is an afiection^ and which it is not possible to manifest separately, as it is possible to make manifest the white without man, not 80, however, the female without animal. Wherefore, the very nature and definition of these are either of nothing, or, if there is a definition of these, it is in a manner otherwise from what we have declared.
And there is also another matter of doubt about 2. second sub- these. For if, in truth, a flat^nose and a hollow- Ject of doubt. nose are the same, the same thing will be the flat and the hollow; but if not, on account of its being impossible to use the word flat even without the thing of which it is an essen- tial afiection, and if flatness of nose will be a hollowness in the nose, the speaking of flat-nose either is a thing not possible, or the same thing will be said twice over; as thus, nose ia hoUow-noBe; for the nose, that is, the flat-nose^ will be a hollow- 1 AriBtoUe is viewing the rd 6v from a logical point of view, which will account for this book being ao much ocoupibd with the subjeci of definition.
176 THR METAPHTSICB OF ARISTOTLE. [BOOK VL nose. Wherefore, the inherence in things of this sort of what is the essence or formal principle would be absurd; and if it were not absurd there would be a progression ad infinitum; for in a nose, a flat-nose, will there further be inherent some- thing else that is essential. It i& evident, therefore, that of Bubetance only' is there definition; for if it were also of the rest of the categories, it must needs be from addition, as in the definition of quality and unevenness; for it is not framed without number, nor is the definition of female framed with- out animal Now, definitions formed from addition I call those in whatever the same things happen to be said twice, as in these.
8. Aristotie'a And, if this be true, neither will there be defi- ■*P^y* nition of those things that are conjoined together as of an odd number: it escapes their notice, however, that not accurately are the definitions of these things expressed by them. But if there are definitions of these things also, doubtless in a difierent way do they subsist; or, as has been affirmed, definition must be spoken of as subsisting in many ways, and so with the essence, or the very nature of a thing, likewise. Wherefore, in one way there wiU not be a definition of any of these, nor will essence be inherent in any one of these, save in substances; and in another way they will be inherent. That, therefore, indeed, definition is a discursus or description of the very nature or essence of a thing, and that the essence or formal principle belongs either to substances only, or especially both primarily and simply, is manifest CHAPTER VI.
CHAPTER VI.
I. The qiies- Let US uow condder whether the essence or IjS'ersen^e^ind v^iy nature of a thing, and each individual thmg, each thing are the same, or different 1 For this will be of JsseiTre isl'be advantage in reference to the inquiry concerning the same r substance; for both each particular thing does not seem to be different from its own substance, and the \ It is important to observe that Aristotle withholds definition from all the categories save substance, and makes this a ground for the existence of a certain ultimate subject-matter, ar that wherein the tcveral qualities in bodies might inhere. Videvp. 67,170.
easenoe, or very nature of each thing, is said to be the sub- Btanoe of that thing. Therefore in the case, no doubt, of tilings that are predicated according to accident, these would seem to be different, as that a white man is a thing different from the being of white man. For if they were the same, both the being of man, and the being of white man, would be the same; for man and white man, as they say, are the same thing. Wherefore, also, the being of a white man, and the being of man, would be the same. Or is there no necessity for whatever things that are according to accident to be the same, as those things that have an essential subsistence? for not, in ^e manner, do the extremes become the same. But, perhaps, at least, it would seem to happen that the extremes should become the same according to accident; as, for instance, the being of white, and the being of a musician; but this does not seem to be the case.
And as regards things that are predicated « xhatthe absolutely there always is a necessity that they are the same in be the same, as must take place if there are Jhfng8*predi- oertain substances belonging to which there are cated abto- not different substances, nor different antecedent ^^^^^' xiatures, such as some a^rm ideas to be. For if the actual good be a different thing from the being good, and animal from the being animal, and entity from the essence of entity, there will exist both different substances, and natures, and ideas, besides those mentioned; and those substances will be prior if there be in existence the essence of substance. And if they are, indeed, unconnected one with another, of such there will not be a scientific knowledge, and they will not be entities. Now, I mean by the phrase " un- connected," if neither in the actual good is inherent the being good, nor if the existence of good pertains to this; for the scientific knowledge of each thing subsists when we know the essence or very nature of each thing: and in the case of what is good, and of other things, the same takes place. Wherefore, if the being good be not good, neither will the being in entity constitute entity, nor that in unity be unity.
In like manner, also, all or not one of the essences will have an existence. Wherefore, if neither it be so with the being in entity, neither will it be so with anything else. Further, in whatever is not inherent the being good is not good.
iTjS T^M nmsAimsuxk of abisiohiB. [BooKn 4, Dedoeiioft Accordinglj, it is necessary that the good and ftom this. ^g being of good ^ be one, also the fid: and tht being fiiir; in &ct, whatsoever things are not predicated ol another, but have an absolute sul)si8tence, and are thiagi which are primary. For, also, this is sufficient if it takas place, even though forms may have no existence; but rather, perhaps, if forms do subsist. But, at the same time, it is evident that also if ideas are such things as some say they are^ the subject of them will not be substance; for it is neoeaeazy that these be substances, I admit: but it is not neoessaiy that they be predicated of a subject, for in this will they be inherent by participation. And, doubtless, from these argu- ments it is evident that each particular itself, and the essence, not according to accident are one and the same thing, and that to have a scientific knowledge, at any rate, of anything is to know scientifically the very nature or essence of that thing. Wherefore, according to this exposition, it is requisite that both be a certain one thing. 4. That they But that a thing predicated according to aooi- ^JL^iJ^i^ dent,2 as the musical or white, should be the same saine in tn6 ' saine in tn6 ' case of what is as the vcry nature of a thing itself on account of c^ding^toacoi. ^^^ twofold Signification of that in which it is an dent. accident and tiie accident itself, this is not a true assertion; so that in a certain respect a thing itself is the same^ and in a certain respect is not the same, with the very nature of that thing. For the being of man is not the same with that of a white man; but so fiar as the essence of man ii passive to whiteness it is the same. Now, it would appeae absurd, also, if any would impose the name on each thing of the essences; for there will be another essence besides also tliat: as besides the essence of horse there will be a dififerent essence of horse. Although what hinders certain essenees even from being now directly the same as the things of which they are the very natures, if the very nature of a thing be substance 1 But, truly, not only are they one, but also the definition of them is the same, as is also evident from the statements that have been made; for to be one and one are ' It is not quite obvious what difference Aristotle had in his mmi3( between the phrases rd tlyat dyaOu and r6 elmi dyaOSu, * I have adopted Tftylor's reading of the text, anf given his tniae» MoL of it til]' distinotions about oexebation; 179 Bot aocoiding to accident. Further, if they be different they will go on in a progression ad injiatiium; for the one will be the CBBence of being one, but the other the one itself. Wherefore, also, in the case of those will there be the same definition* ThaXf therefore, in the case of the first existences, and o. things predicated essentially, the being of each thing, and th«t very thing itself are one and the same thing ifc evident.
As regards, however, the refutations of the ^^ iof^sts in reference to this position, it is palpable fdutions oftk* that they are decided by the same solution; for JSJldth/rcbj. example, these sophists inquire whether Socrates and the being Socrates are the same? For there is no differ- ence in the things either from which one would ask the question, or firom which he should light upon an answer in bis attempted solution of it. How, then, the essence or very nature is the same, and how it is not the same, with each particular thing, has been declared.
CHAPTER VII.
CHAPTER VII.
Now, of things that are being produced,^ some i. certain dii- are produced by Nature, and others by Art, and *^^**®P* *° '•" others firom Chance. All things, however, that are Son exempli^ produced are produced by means of something, of^th?n*^*nSu- and from something, and become something. But »!, and aitifi- I mean that they become something according to *'***» *^'^*^"*i' each category; for they are generated either as quiddity, or quantity, or quality, or the place where. But generations — the physical or natural ones, I mean — are those, imquestionably, of which the generation is from Nature, and that from whidi they are generated is that which we denominate matter; but^ that by means of which they are generated belongs to some one. of those things which have a subsistence by Nature; and that which is some particular thing is man or plant, or some one of the things of that sort which we affirm to be especially sub- ' Ariitotle prooeads to discusB the sabject of generation, in order to ettabliBh afresh the point he has already laid down; and that is, that there subsists no form separate from any thing, but that there resides bi eaeh thing; essential to it, such a producing power as along with the 8xi| generates that thing. He now exemplifies this in the case of the three enumerated modes of generations.
n2 180 SHI MBTAFHT8IGB OV ABISTOTLB. [^OOktt Stances. Now, all things which are produced either by NatQM or Art involve matter, for it is possible for each of them both to be and not to be; this capability, however, ia ths matter in each. And, in general, Nature^ is even that £kt>m which a thing proceeds, and that according to which entitiet are generated is Nature likewise: for that which is being produced has a nature; as, for example, a plant or animal, and that by means of which a thing is generated is Nature herself, which is predicated according to the species, and is of the same species; but this is inherent in another, for man begets man. In this way, therefore, are produced the things that are generated through Nature: and the rest of the generations are denominated productions or operations. All operations, however, ai-e either from art, or from potentiality, or the understanding. But of these some are produced, also^ from chance and from fortime in a similar way, as in the case of those things that are produced by Nature; for th«re also are produced some things that are the same both from seed and without seed. Respecting, indeed, these,* then, we will subsequently institute an examination. From Art, however, are generated those things of whatsoever there is a form in the soul. But I mean by form the essence or very nature of each thing, and the first substance. For, also, of contraries in a certain manner is there the same form; for thus the substance of privation is the substance that is the one opposed, as health of disease; for by the absence of health is disease made apparent, and health constitutes the principle in the soul and in the science.
2. Exempiifica- Th© salubrious, howevcr, is produced when the *»2.n'.^oO'Ojthe physician reasons thus: since this is done for pie^in"ach of* the sake of health, it is necessary, if this will be these. salubrious, that this particular condition should exist; for example, evenness, and, if this take place, that the result be heat. And so he always reasons, until he conducts you to that which he himself can accomplish last. Accord- ingly, now the motion which begins from these is called the operation that tends towards becoming healthy. Wherefore, it happens that in a certain manner from health is generated * The term ^6(ns has ah-eady been explained in book IV»; and thi distinctions there laid down are well worthy of attention.
ko ' Vide chap. IX.
til] fre-existenoe involved in generation. 181 healthy and a house is constructed from a house; namely, tiiat which involves matter arises, or is generated, from that which does not involve a connexion with matter: for the medicinal and the house-huilding arts are the form, the one of health, and the other of a house. Now, I mean by substance not involving any connexion with matter, the essence or very nature or formal cause of a thing. Of gene- rations, however, and of motions one is termed thought and another operation; that is termed conception or thought which arises from the first principle and the form, but that is operation which takes its rise from the thought or conception of what is ultimate. In like manner, also, is produced each of the rest of those things that are media; now, I say, for instance, if health is to be restored there must needs be a reduction to equality secured. What, then, is this reduction into a state of equality? It is this par- ticular result. But this particular result will take place if heat shall have been promoted. And what is this f It is this particular effect Now, this effect is inherent iu capacity, but the former already lies in the power of the physician. Now, that which brings about the result, and whence the motion of restoring health derives its beginning, if it springs from art, such is the form that is in the soul; but if it arises from chance, it arises from that evidently which, for once, is the principle of bringing about the change to one that acts from art: as also, perhaps, in the case of restoring health, the first principle originates from the com- munication of heat; and this result it accomplishes by means of friction. Accordingly, heat is either a part of health, (I mean, such heat as inheres in the body,) or there follows it directly aome such thing as is a part of health, or this is accomplished indirectly, that is, by means of many media. This last, how' ever, is that which produces the result, and in this way is part of health, as stones are parts of a house, and something else a part of other things.