At this point, in case some one of them, cautious and watchful, now also more studious than pertinacious, had admonished me that the inquiry is not about vicious souls, but about vices themselves, which, seeing that they are not known by corporeal sense, and yet are known, can only be received as objects of intellectual apprehension, which if they excel all objects of sense, why can we not agree in attributing light to God as its author, but only a sacrilegious person would sav that God is the author of vices; I should have replied to the man, if either on the spur of the moment, as is customary to the worshippers of the good God, a solution of this question had darted like lightning from on high, or a solution had been previously prepared. If I had not deserved ur was unable to avail myself of either of these methods, I should have deferred the undertaking, and should have confessed that the thing propounded was difficult to discern and arduous. I should have withdrawn to myself, prostrated myself before God, groaned aloud asking Him not to suffer me to halt in mid space, when I should have moved forward with assured arguments, asking Him that I might not be compelled by a doubtful question either to subordinate intelligible things to sensible, and to yield, or to call Himself the author of vices; since either of these alternatives would have been absolutely full of falsehood and impiety. I can by no means suppose that He would have deserted me in such a frame of mind. Rather, in His own ineffable way, He would have admonished me to consider again and again whether vices of mind concerning which I was so troubled should be reckoned among intelligible things. But that I might find out, on account of the weakness of my inner eye, which rightly befell me on account of my sins, I should have devised some sort of stage for gazing upon spiritual things in visible things themselves, of which we have by no means a surer knowledge, but a more confident familiarity. Therefore I should straightway have inquired, what properly pertains to the sensation of the eyes. I should have found that it is the color, the dominion of which the light holds. For these are the things that no other sense touches, for the motions and magnitudes and intervals and figures of bodies, although they also can be perceived by the eyes, yet to perceive such is not their peculiar function, but belongs also to touch. Whence I should have gath. ered that by as much as yonder light excels other corporeal and sensible things, by so much is sight more noble than the other senses. The light therefore having been selected from all the things that are perceived by bodily sense, by this [light] I should have striven, and in this of necessity I should have placed that stage of my inquiry. I should have gone on to consider what might be done in this way, and thus I should have reasoned with myself: If yonder sun, conspicuous by its brightness and sufficing for day by its light, should little by little decline in our sight into the likeness of the moon, would we perceive anything else with our eyes than light however refulgent, yet seeking light by reason of not seeing what had been, and using it for seeing what was present? Therefore we should not see the decline, but the light that should survive the decline. But since we should not see, we should not perceive; for whatever we perceive by sight must necessarily be seen; wherefore if that decline were perceived neither by sight nor by any other sense, it cannot be reckoned among objects of sense. For nothing is an object of sense that cannot be perceived by sense. Let us apply now the consideration to virtue, by whose intellectual light we most fittingly say the mind shines. Again, a certain decline from this light of virtue, not destroying the soul, but obscuring it, is called vice. Therefore also vice can by no means be reckoned among objects of intellectual perception, as that decline of light is rightly excluded from the number of objects of sense perception. Yet what remains of soul, that is, that which lives and is soul, is just as much an object of intellectual perception as that is an object of sense perception which should shine in this visible luminary after any imaginable degree of decline. And so the soul, in so far as it is soul and partakes of life, without which it can in no way be soul, is most correctly to be preferred to all objects of sense perception. Wherefore it is most erroneous to say that any soul is not from God, from whom you boast that the sun and moon have their existence.
7. But if now it should be thought fit to designate as objects of sense perception not Chap. VII. j TWO SOULS, AGAINST THE MANICH^ANS.
only all those things that we perceive by the senses, but also all those things that though not perceiving by the senses we judge of by means of the body, as of darkness through the eyes, of silence through the ears, — for not f)y seeing darkness and not by hearing silence do we know of their existence, — and again, in the case of objects of intellectual perception, not those things only which we see illuminated by the mind, as is wisdom itself, but also those things which by the illumination itself we avoid, such as foolishness, which I might fittingly designate mental darkness; I should have made no controversy about a word, but should have dissolved the whole question by an easy division, and straightway I should have proved to those giving good attention, that by the divme law of truth intelligible subsistences are to be preferred to sensible subsistences, not the decline of these subsistences, even though we should choose to call these intelligible, those sensible. Wherefore, that those who acknowledge that these visible luminaries and those intelligible souls are subsistences, are in every way compelled to grant and to attribute the sublimer part to souls; but that defects of either kind cannot be preferred the one to the other, 1 for they are only privative and indicate non-; existence, and therefore have precisely the 1 same force as negations themselves. For when we say. It is not gold, and, It is not virtue, j although there is the greatest possible differlence between gold and virtue, yet there is no j difference between the negations that we adijoin to them. But that it is worse indeed;not to be virtue than not to be gold, no sane 'man doubts. Who does not know that the difference lies not in the negations themselves, jbut in the things to which they are adjoined?
Tor by as much as virtue is more excellent than gold, by so much is it more wretched to be in want of virtue than of gold. Where- fore, since intelligible things excel sensible (things, we rightly feel greater repugnance [towards defect in intelligible than in sensible things, esteeming not the defects, but the :hings that are deficient more or less precious. J jFrom which now it appears, that defect of ight, which is intelligible, is far more wretched;han defect of the sensible light, because, brsooth, life which is known is by far more precious than yonder light which is seen. 8. This being the case, who will dare, while 1 Attributing sun and moon, and whatever is efulgent in the stars, nay in this fire of ours ind in this visible earthly life, to God, to deline to grant that any souls whatsoever, which re not souls except by the fact of their being •erfectly alive, since in this fact alone life has the precedence of light, are from God. And since he speaks truth who says. In as far as a thing shines it is from God, would I speak falsely, mighty God, if I should say, In so far as a thing lives it is from God? Let not, I beseech thee, blindness of intellect and perv'ersions of mind be increased to such an extent that men may fail to know these things. But however great their error and pertinacity might have been, trusting in these arguments and armed therewith, I believe that when I should have laid the matter before them thus considered and canvassed, and should have calmly conferred with them, I should have feared lest any one of them should have seemed to me to be of any consequence, should he endeavor to subordinate or even to compare to bodily sense, or to those things that pertain to bodily sense as objects of knowledge, either intellect or those things that are perceived (not by w-ay of defect) by the intellect. Which point having been settled, how would he or any other have dared to deny that such souls as he would consider evil, yet since they are souls, are to be reckoned in the number of intelligible things, nor are objects of intellectual perception by way of defect? This is on the supposition that souls are souls only by being alive. For if they were intellectually perceived as vicious through defect, being vicious by lack of virtue, yet they are perceived as souls not through defect, for they are souls by reason of being alive. Nor can it be maintained that presence of life is a cause of defect, for by as much as anything is defective, by so much is it severed from life.
9. Since therefore it would have been every way evident that no souls can be separated from that Author from whom yonder light is not separated, whatever they might have now adduced I should not have accepted, and should rather have admonished them that they should choose with me to follow those who maintain that whatever is, since it is, and in whatever degree it is, has its existence from the one God.
CHAP. 7. — HOW EVIL MEN ARE OF GOD, AND NOT OF GOD.
They might have cited against me those words of the gospel: " Ye therefore do not hear, because ye are not of God;" "Ye are of your father the devil."" I also should have cij;ed: "All things were made by Him and without Him was not anything made," ' and this of the Apostle: " One God of. whom are all things, and one Lord Jesus Christ ' John viii. 47 and 44.
2 John i. 3.
i lOO [Chap. VIII.
I through whom are all things,"' and again from the same Apostle: "Of whom are all things, through whom are all things, in whom are all things, to Him be glory." ' I should have exhorted those men (if indeed I had found them men), that we should presume upon nothing as if we had found it out, but should rather inquire of the masters who would demonstrate the agreement and harmony of those passages that seem to be discordant. For when in one and the same Scriptural authority we read: "All things are of God," 3 and elsewhere: "Ye are not of God," since it is wrong rashly to condemn books of Scripture, who would not have seen that a skilled teacher should be found who would know a solution of this problem, from whom assuredly if endowed with good intellectual powers, and a " spiritual man," as is said by divine inspiration ■* (for he would necessarily have favored the true arguments concerning the intelligible and sensible nature, which, as far as I can, I have conducted and handled, nay he would have disclosed them far better and more convincingly); we should have heard nothing else concerning this problem, except, as might happen, that there is no class of souls but has its existence from God, and that it is yet rightly said to sinners and unbelievers: " Ye are not of God." For we also, perchance, Divine aid having been implored, should have been able easily to see, that it is one thing to live and another to sin, and (although life in sin may be called death in comparison with just life,^ and while in one man it may be found, that he is at the same time alive and a sinner) that so far as he is alive, he is of God, so far as he is a sinner he is not of God. In which division we use that alternative that suits our sentiment; so that when we wish to insist upon the omnipotence of God as Creator, we may say even to sinners that they are of God. For we are speaking to those who are contained in some class, we are speaking to those having animal life, we are speaking to rational beings, we are speaking lastly — and this applies especially to the matter in hand — to living beings, all which things are essentially divine functions. But when our purpose is to convict evil men, we rightly sa)^: "Ye are not of God." For we speak to them as averse to truth, unbelieving, criminal, infamous, and, to sum up all in one term — sinners, all of which things are undoubtedly not of God. Therefore what wonder is it, if Christ says to sinners, convicting them of this very thing that they were sinners and did not believe in 3 I Cor. xi. 12.
Him: "Ye are not of God;" and on the other hand, without prejudice to the former statement: "All things were made through Him," and "All things are of God?" For if not to believe Christ, to repudiate Christ's advent, not to accept Christ, was a sure maric | of souls that are not of God; and so it was ' said: " Ye therefore hear not, because ye are not of God;" how would that saying of the apostle be true that occurs in the memorable beginning of the gospel: " He came unto his own things, and his own people did not receive him?"^ Whence his own if they did not receive him; or whence therefore not his own because they did not receive him, unless that sinners by virtue of being men belong to God, but by virtue of being sinners belong to the devil? He who says: "His own people received him not" had reference to nature; but he who says: "Ye are not of God," had reference to will; for the evangelist was commending the works of God, Christ was censuring the sins of men CHAP. 8. THE MANICH^ANS INQUIRE WHENCE IS EVIL AND BY THIS QUESTION THINK THEY HAVE TRIUMPHED. LET THEM FIRST KNOW, WHICH IS MOST EASY TO DO, THAT NOTH- ING CAN LIVE WITHOUT GOD. CONSUM- MATE EVIL CANNOT BE KNOWN EXCEPT BY THE KNOWLEDGE OF CONSUMMATE GOOD, WHICH IS GOD.
Here perchance some one may say: Whence are sins themselves, and whence is evil in general? If from man, whence is man? if from an angel, whence is the angel? When it is said, however truly and rightly, that these are from God, it nevertheless seems to those unskillful and possessed of little power to look into recondite matters, that evils and sins are thereby connected, as by a sort of chain, to God. By this question they think themselves triumphant, as if forsooth to ask were to know; — would it were so, for in that case no one would be more knowing than myself. Yet very often in controversy the propounder of a great question, while impersonating the great teacher, is himself more ignorant in the matter concerning which he would frighten his opponent, than he whom he would frighten.
These therefore suppose that they are superior to tlie common run, because the former ask questions that the latter cannot answer.; If therefore when I most unfortunately was associated with them, not in the position in which I have now for some time been, they had raised these objections when I * John i. II.
Chap. X.]
TWO SOULS, AGAINST THE MANICH^EANS.
lOI had brought forward this argument, I should have said: I ask that you meanwhile agree with me, which is most easy, that if nothing can shine without God, much less can anything live without God. Let us not persist in such monstrous opinions as to maintain that any souls whatsoever have life apart from God. For perchance it may so happen that with me you are ignorant as to this thing, namely whence is evil, let us then learn either simultaneously or in any order, I care not what. For what if knowledge of the perfection of evil is impossible to man without knowledge of the perfection of good? For we should not know darkness if we were always in darkness. But the notion of light does not allow its opposite to be unknown. But the highest good is that than which there is nothing higher. But God is good and than Him nothing can be higher. God therefore is the highest good. Let us therefore together so recognize God, and thus what we seek too hastily will not be hidden from us. Do you suppose then that the knowledge of God is a matter of small account or desert. For what other reward is there for us than life eternal, which is to knovv' God? For God the ^Laster says: "But this is life eternal, that they might know Thee the only and true Ciod, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent." ' For the soul, although it is immortal, yet because aversion from the knowledge of God is rightly called its death, when it is converted to God, the reward of eternal life to be attained is that knowledge; so that this is, as has been said, eternal life. But no one can be converted to God, except he turn himself away from this world. This for myself I feel to be arduous and exceedingly difficult, whether it is easy to you, God Himself would have seen. I should have been inclined to think it easy to you, had I not been moved by the fact, that, since the world from which we are commanded to turn away is visible, and the apostle says: "The things that are seen are temporal, but the things that are unseen are eternal,"^ you ascribe more [importance to the judgment of these eyes liian to that of the mind, asserting and beilieving as you do that there is no shining •"^ather that does not shine from God, and it there are living souls that do not live Ifrom God. These and like things I should jeither have said to them or considered with imyself, for even then, supplicating God with all my bowels, so to speak, and examining as [attentively as possible the Scriptures, I should 'perchance have been able either to say such ihn xvii. 3.
- 2 Cor.
iv. i3.
things or to think them, so far as was necessary for my salvation.
CH.AP. 9. — AUGUSTIN DECEIVED BY FAMILIAR- ITY WITH THE MANICH/EANS, AND BY THE SUCCESSION OF VICTORIES OVER IGNORANT CHRISTIANS REPORTED BY THEM. THE MANl- CH^ANS ARE LIKEVl^ISE EASILY REFUTED FROM THE KNOWLEDGE OF SIN AND THE WILL.
But two things especially, which easily lay hold upon that unwary age, urged me through wonderful circuits. One of these was familiarity, suddenly, by a certain false semblance of goodness, wrapped many times around my neck as a certain sinuous chain. The other was, that I was almost always noxiously victorious in arguing with ignorant Christians who yet eagerly attempted, each as he could, to defend their faith. ^ By which frequent success the ardor of youth was kindled, and by its own impulse rashly verged upon the great evil of stubbornness. For this kind of wrangling, after I had become an auditor among them, whatever I was able to do either by my own genius, such as it was, or by reading the works of others, I most gladly devoted to them alone. Accordingly from their speeches ardor in disputations was daily increased, from success in disputations love for them [the Manichseans]. Whence it resulted that whatever they said, as if affected by certain strange disorders, I approved of as true, not because I knew it to be true, but because I wished it to be. So it came about that, however slowly and cautiously, yet for a long time I followed men that preferred a sleek straw to a living soul.
12. So be it, I was not able at that time to distinguish and discern sensible from intelligible things, carnal forsooth from spiritual. It did not belong to age, nor to discipline, nor even to any habit, nor, finally, to any deserts; for it is a matter of no small joy and felicitation: had I not thus been able at length even to grasp that which in the judgment of all men nature itself by the laws of the most High God has established?
CHAP. 10. — SIN IS ONLY FROM THE WILL. HIS OWN LIFE AND WILL BEST KNOWN TO EACH INDIVIDUAL. WHAT WILL IS.
For let any men whatever, if only no madness has broken them loose from the common 3 Nothing is more certain than that Christianity has suffered more at thu hands of injudicious and i.^norant defenders than from Its most astute and determined foes. Little attention would be paid to the blatant infidels of the present day were it not for the interest aroused and sustained by weak attempts to refute their arguments. And as the youthful, ardent Augustin was encouraged and confirmed in his errors by the inability of his opponents, so I02 [Chap. X.
sense of the human race, bring whatever zeal they like for judging, whatever ignorance, nay whatever slowness of mind, I should like to find out what they would have replied to me had I asked, whether a man would seem to them to have sinned by whose hand while he was asleep another should have written something disgraceful? Who doubts that they would have denied that it is a sin, and liave exclaimed against it so vehemently that they might perchance have been enraged that I should have thought them proper objects of such a question? Of whom reconciled and restored to equanimity, as best I could do it, I should have begged that they would not take it amiss if 1 asked them another thing just as manifest, just as completely withm the knowledge of all. Then I should have asked, if some stronger person had done some evil thing by the hand of one not sleeping but conscious, yet with the rest of his members bound and in constraint, whether because he knew it, though absolutely unwilling, he should be held guilty of any sin? And here all marvelling that I should ask such questions, would reply without hesitation, that he had absolutely not sinned at all. Why so? Because whoever has done anything evil by means of one unconscious or unable to resist, the latter can by no means be justly condemned. And precisely why this is so, if I should inquire of the human nature in these men, I should easily bring out the desired answer, by asking in this manner: Suppose that the sleeper already knew what the other would do with his hand, and of purpose aforethought, having drunk so much as would prevent his being awakened, should go to sleep, in order to deceive some one with an oath. Would any amount of sleep suffice to prove his innocence? What else than a guilty man would one pronounce him? But if he has also willingly been bound that he may deceive some one by this pretext, in what respect then would those chains profit as a means of relieving him of sin? Although bound by these he was really not able to resist, as in the other case the sleeper was absolutely ignorant of what he was then doing. Is there therefore any possibility of doubting that both should be judged to have sinned? Which things having been conceded, I should have argued, that sin is indeed nowhere but in the will,' since this consideration also are errors confirmed at the present day. The philosophical defence of Christianity is a matter of the utmost delicacy, and should be undertaken with fear and trembling.— A. H. N.
' The Pelagians used this statement with considerable effect in their polemics against its author. In his Retractations Augustin has this to say by way of explanation: " The Pelagians may think that this was said in their interest, or. account of young children whose sin which is remitted to them in baptism they deny on the would have helped me, that justice holds guilty' those sinning by evil will alone, although they may have been unable to accomplish what they willed.
13. For who could have said that, in adducing these considerations, I was dwelling upon obscure and recondite things, where on account of the fewness of those able to understand, either fraud or suspicion of ostentation is accustomed to arise? Let that distinction between intelligible and sensible things withdraw for a little: let me not be found fault with for following up slow minds with the stimuli of subtle disputations. Permit me to know that I live, permit me to know that I will to live. If in this the human race agrees, as our life is known to us, so also is our will. Nor when we become possessed of this knowledge, is there any occasion to fear lest any one should convince us that we may be deceived; for no one can be deceived as to whether he does not live, or wishes nothing. I do not think that I have adduced anything obscure, and my concern is rather lest some should find fault with me for dwelling on things that are too manifest. But let us ccnsider the bearing of these things.
14. Sinning therefore takes place only by exercise of will. ]kit our will is very well known to us; for neither should I know that I will, if I did not know what will itself is. Accordingly, it is thus defined: will is a movement of mind, no one compelling, either ground that they do not yet use the power of will. As if indeed the sin, which we say they derive originally from Adam, that is, that they are implicated in his guilt and on this account are held obnoxious to punishment, could ever be otherwise than in will, by which will it was committed when the transgression of the divine precept was accomplished. Our statement, that ' there is never sin but in will,' may be thought false for the reason that the apostle says: ' If what I will not this I do, it is no longer I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me." For this sin is to such an extent involuntary, that he says: ' What I will not this I do.' How, therefore, is there never sin but in the will? Hut this sin concerning which the apostle has spoken is called sin, because by sin it wasdone, and it is the penalty of sin; since this is said concerning carnal concupiscence, which he discloses in what follows saying: ' I know that in me, that is in my flesh, dwelleth no good; for to will is present to me, but to accomplish that which is good, is not." (Rom. vii. 16-18).
Since the perfection of good is, that not even the concupiscence of sin should be in man, to which indeed when one lives well the will does not consent; nevertheless man does not accomplish the good because as'yet concupiscence is in him, to which the will is antagonistic, the guilt of which concupiscence is loosed by baptism, but the infirmity remains, against which until it is healed every believer who advances well most earnestly struggles. But sin, which is never but in will, mu.st especially be knownas that which is followed by just condemnation. For this through one man entered into the world; although that sin also by which consent is yielded to concupiscence is not committed but by will. Wherefore also in another place I have said: ' Not therefore except by will is sm committed.' "—.\. H. N.
On this matter Augustin's still earlier treatise De Libera Arhitrii\ and his interesting Ketractatioiis on the s^me, should be compared. The reader of these earlier treatises in comparison with 1 the A nti- Pelagian treatises can hardly fail to recognize a marked change of base on Augustin's part. liis efforts to show the con-: sistency of his earlier with his later modes of thought are to be ' pronounced only partially successful. The fact is, that in the Anti-Manichaean time he went too far in maintaining the absolute freedom of the will and the impossibility of sin apart from personal will in the sinner; while in the Anti-Pelagian time fie \'entured too near to the fatalism that he so earnestly combated in the."ilanichaeans. — A. H. N.
Chap. XI.]
TWO SOULS, AGAINST THE MANICH.EANS.
for not losing or for obtaining something.' Why therefore could not I have so defined it then? Was it difficult to see that one unwilling is contrary to one willing, just as the left hand is contrary to the right, not as black to white? For the same thing cannot be at the same time black and white. But whoever is placed between two men is on the left hand with reference to one, on the right with reference to the other. One ma.i is both on the right hand and on the left hand at the same time, but by no means both to the one man. So indeed one mind may be at the same time unwilling and willing, but it cannot be at the same time unwilling and willing with reference to one and the same thing. For when any one unwillingly does anything; if you ask him whether he wished to do it, he says that he did not. Likewise