if you ask whether he wished not to do it, he replies that he did. So you will find him unwilling with reference to doing, willing with reference to not doing, that is to say, one mind at the same time having both attitudes, but each referring to different things. Why do I say this? Because if we should again ask wherefore though unwilling he does this, he will say that he is compelled. For every one also who does a thing unwillingly is compelled, and every one who is compelled, if he does a thing, does it only unwillingly. It follows that he that is willing is free from compulsion, even if any one thinks himself compelled. And in this manner every one who willingly does a thing is not compelled, and whoever is not compelled, either does it willingly or not at all. Since nature itself proclaim.s these things in all men whom we can interrogate without absurdity, from the boy even to the old man, from literary sport even to the throne of the wise, why then • This dictum also Augustin thought it needful to explain: "This was said that by this definition a willing person might be distinguished from ime not willing, and so the intention might be referred to those who tirst in Paradise were the origin of evil to the human race, by sinning no one compelling, that is by sinning with free will, because also knowingly they sinned against the iMiinand, and the tempters persuaded, did not compel, that this lould be done. For he who ignorantly sinned may not incongruously be said to have sinned unwillingly, although not knowing what he did, yet willingly he did it. So not even the sin of such a one could be without will, which will assuredly, as it has been defined, was a ' movement of the mind, no one compelling, either for not losing or for obtaining something.' For he was not compelled to do what if he had been unwilling he would not have done. Because he willed, therefore he did it, even if he did not sin because he willed, being ignorant that what he did is sin. So not evin such a sin could be without will, but by will of deed not by will ot sin, which deed was yet sin; for this deed is what ought not to have taken place. Hut whoever knowingly sins, if he can without sin resist the one compelling him to sin, yet resists not, assuredly sins willingly. For he who can resist is not compelled to yield.
lUit he who cannot by good will resist cogent covetousness, and therefore does what is contrary to the precepts of righteousness, this now is sin in the sen.se of being the penalty of sin. VVhere-!"re it is most true that sin cannot be apart from will."
It IS needless to say that such reasoning would not have answered Augustin"s purpose in writing against the Manichaeans. A. H. N, I should I not have seen that in the definition of will should be put, " no one compelling,'' : which now as if with greater experience most : cautiously I have done. But if this is everywhere manifest, and promptly occurs to all not by instruction but by nature, what is there left that seems obscure, unless perchance it be concealed from some one, that when we wish! for something, we will, and our mind is moved ' towards it, and we either have it or do not have it, and if we have it we will to retain it, if we have it not, to acquire it.'' Wherefore everyone who wills, wills either not to lose something or to obtain it. Hence if all these things are clearer than day, as they are, nor are they given to my conception alone, but by the liberality of truth itself to the whole human race, why could I not have said even at that time: Will is a movement of the mind, no one compelling, either for not losing or for obtainmg something?
CHAP. II. — WHAT SIN IS.
Some one will say: What assistance would I this have furnished you against the Manichaeans? Wait a moment; permit me first also to define sin, which, every mind reads divinely written in itself, cannot exist apart from will. Sin therefore is the will to retain and follow after what justice forbids, and from which it is free to abstain.'' Although if it be not free, it is not will. But I have preferred to define more roughly than precisely. Should I not also have carefully examined those obscure books, whence I might have learned that no one is worthy of blame or punishment who either wills what justice does not prohibit him from willing, or does not do what he is not able to do? Do not shepherds on mountains, poets in theatres, unlearned in social intercourse, learned in libraries, masters in schools, priests in consecrated places, and the human race throughout the whole world, sing out these things? But if no one is worthy of blame and condemnation, who either does not act against the prohibition of justice, or who does not do what he cannot do, yet every sin is blameworthy and condemnable, who doubts then that it is sin, when willing is unjust, and not willing is free. And hence that definition is both true and easy to understand, and not only now but then also could have been spoken by me: Sin is the will of retaining or of obtaining, what justice forbids, and whence it is free to abstain?
• _ 2 Here also Augustin guards himself in his Retractations: " The definition is true, in.ismuch as that is defined which is only sin, and not also that which is the penalty of sin." — A. H. N.
I04 [Chap. XII.
CHAP, 12. — FROM THE DEFINITIONS GIVEN OF SIN AND WILL, HE OVERTHROWS THE EN- TIRE HERESY OF THE MANICH.^ANS. LIKE- WISE FROM THE JUST CONDEMNATION OF EVIL SOULS IT FOLLOWS THAT THEY ARE EVIL NOT BY NATURE BUT BY WILL. THAT SOULS ARE GOOD BY NATURE, TO WHICH THE PARDON OF SINS IS GRANTED.
i6. Come now, let us see in what respect these things would have aided us. Much every way, so that I should have desired nothing more; for they end the whole cause; for wlioever consulting in the inner mind, where they are more pronounced and assured, the secrets of his own conscience, and the divine laws absolutely imposed upon nature, grants that these two definitions of will and sin are true, condemns without any hesitation by the fewest and the briefest, but plainly the most invincible reasons, the vvhole heresy of the Manichaeans. Which can be thus considered. They say that there are two kinds of souls, the one good, which is in such a way from God, that it is said not to have been made by Him out of any material or out of nothing, but to have proceeded as a certain part from the very substance itself of God; the other evil, which they believe and strive to get others to believe pertains to God in no way whatever; and so they maintain that the one is the perfection of good, but the other the perfection of evil, and that these two classes were at one time distinct but are now commingled. The character and the cause of this commingling I had not yet heard; but nevertheless I could have inquired whether that evil kind of souls, before it was mingled with the good, had any will. For if not, it was without sin and innocent, and so by no means evil.' But if evil in such a way, that though without will, as fire, yet if it should touch the good it would violate and corrupt it; how impious it is to believe that the nature of evil is powerful enough to change any part of God, and that the Highest Good is corruptible and violable! But if the will was present, assuredly there was present, no one compelling, a movement of the mind either towards not losing something or obtaining something. But this something was either good, or was thought to be good, for not otherwise could it be earnestly desired. But in supreme evil, before the commingling which they maintain, there never was any I In his Retractations, Augiistin replies to the Pelagian denial of the sinfulness of infants, in support of which thev had quoted the above sentence. " 'J'hey [infants] are held guilty not by propriety of will but by origin. For what is every earthly man in origin but Adam?" The will of the whole human race was m Adam, and when Adam sinned the whole race voluntarily sinned, seems to be his meaning. — A. H. N.
good. Whence then could there be in it either the knowledge or the thought of good? Did they wish for nothing that was in themselves, and earnestly desire that true good which was without? That will must truly be declared worthy of distinguished and great praise by which is earnestly desired the supreme and true good. Whence then in supreme evil was this movement of mind most worthy of so great praise? Did they seek it for the sake of injuring it? In the first place, the argument comes to the satne thing.
For he who wishes to injure, wishes to deprive another of some good for the sake of some good of his own. There was therefore in them either a knowledge of good or an opinion of good, which ought by no means to belong to supreme evil. In the'second place, whence had they known, that good placed outside of themselves, which they designed to injure, existed at all. If they had intellectually perceived it, what is more excellent than such a mind? Is there anything else for which the whole energy of good men is put forth except the knowledge of that supreme and sincere good? What therefore is now scarcely conceded to a few good and just men, was mere evil, no good assisting, then able to accomplish? But if those souls bore bodies and saw the supreme good with their eyes, what tongues, what hearts, what intellects suffice for lauding and proclaiming those eyes, with which the minds of just men can scarcely be compared? How great good things we find in supreme evil! For if to see God is evil, God is not a good; but God is a good; therefore to see God is good; and I know not what can be compared to this good. Since to see anything is good, whence can it be made out that to be able to see is evil? Therefore whatever in those eyes or in those minds brought it about, that the divine essence could be seen by them, brought about a great thing and a good thing most worthy of ineffable praise. But if it was not brought about, but it was such in itself and eternal, it is difficult to find anything better than this evil.
17. Lastly, that these souls may have nothing of these praiseworthy things which by the reasonings of the Manichaeans they are compelled to have, I should have asked, whether God condemns any or no souls. If none, there is no judgment of rewards and punishments, no providence, and the world is administered by chance rather than by reason, or rather is not administered at all. For the name administration must not be given to chances. But if it is impious for all those that are bound by any religion to believe, Chap. XIII.]
TWO SOULS, AGAINST THE MANICH^ANS.
this, it remains eitlier tliat there is condemnation of some souls, or that there are no sins. But if there are no sins, neither is there any evil. Which if the Manichaeans should say, they would slay their heresy with a single blow. Therefore they and I agree that some souls are condemned by divine law and judgment. But if these souls are good, what is that justice? If evil, are they so by nature, or by will? But by nature souls can in no way be evil. Whence do we teach this. From the above definitions of will and sin. For to speak of souls, and that they are evil, and that they do not sin, is full of madness; but to say that they sin without will, is great craziness, and to hold any one guilty of sin for not doing what he could not do, belongs to the height of iniquity and insanity. Wherefore whatever these souls do, if they do it by nature not by will, that is, if they are wanting in a movement of mind free both for doing and not doing, if finally no power of abstaining from their work is conceded to them; v/e cannot hold that the sin is theirs.' But all confess both that evil souls are justly, and souls that have not sinned are unjustly condemned; therefore they confess that those souls are evil that sin. But these, as reason teaches, do not sin. Therefore the extraneous class of evil souls of the Manichceans, whatever it may be, is a non-entity.
18. Let us now look at that good class of souls, which again they exalt to such a decree as to say that it is the very substance of '"lod. But how much better it is that each one should recognize his own rank and merit, nor be so puffed up with sacrilegious pride as to believe that as often as he experiences a change in himself it is the substance of that supreme good, which devout reason holds and teaches to be unchangeable! For behold! Mnce it is manifest that souls do not sin in not being such as they cannot be; it follows that these supposititious souls, whatever they may be, do not sin at all, and moreover that they are absolutely non-existent; it remains that since there are sins, they find none to whom to attribute them except the good class of souls and the substance of God. But especially are they pressed by Christian autliority; for never have they denied that forgiveness of sins is granted when any one has heen converted to God; never have they said (as they have said of many other passages) ' In his Reirariations, Augustin explains that by nature is to ■•<■ understood the state in which we were created without vice. He transfers the entire argument from the actual condition of man •" the primitive Adaniic condition. It is evident, however, that this.as not his ineanin>; when he combated the Manichaeans. The ijuestionof infant sinfulness arises here also, and is discussed in the usual Anti-Pelagian way. — A. H»N.
that some corrupter has interpolated this into the divine Scriptures. To whom then are sins attributed? If to those evil souls of the alien class, these also can become good, can possess the kingdom of God with Christ. Which denying, they [the Manichaeans] have no other class except those souls which they maintain are of the substance of God. It remains that they acknowledge that not only these latter also, but these alone sin. But I make no contention about their being alons in sinning; yet they sin. But are they compelled to sin by being commingled with evil? If so compelled that there was no power of resisting, they do not sin. If it is in their power to resist, and they voluntarily consent, we are compelled to find out through their [the Manichaean] teaching, why so great good things in supreme evil, why this evil in supreme good, unless it be that neither is that which they bring into suspicion evil, nor is that which they pervert by superstition supreme good?
CHAP. 13. FROM DELIBERATION ON THE EVIL AND ON THE GOOD PART IT RESULTS THAT TWO CLASSES OF SOULS ARE NOT TO BE HELD TO. A CLASS OF SOULS ENTICING TO SHAMEFUL DEEDS HAVING BEEN CONCEDED, IT DOES NOT FOLLOW THAT THESE ARE EVIL BY NATURE, THAT THE OTHERS ARE SUPREME GOOD.
19. But if I had taught, or at any rate had myself learned, that they rave and err regarding those two classes of souls, why should I have thenceforth thought them worthy of being heard or consulted about anything? That I might learn hence, that these two kinds of souls are pointed out, which in the course of deliberation assent puts now on the evil side, now on the good? Why is not this rather the sign of one soul which by free will can be borne here and there, swayed hither and thither? For it was my own experience to feel that I am one, considering evil and good and choosing one or the other, but for the most part the one pleases, the other is fitting, placed in the midst of which we fluctuate. Nor is it to be wondered at, for we are now so constituted that through the flesh we can be affected by sensual pleasure, and through the spirit by honorable considerations. Am I not therefore compelled to acknowledge two souls? Nay, we can better and with far less difficulty recognize two classes of good things, of which neither is alien from God as its autlior, one soul acted upon from diverse directions, the lower and the higher, or to speak more correctly, the external and the internal. These are the two io6 [Chap. XIV.
classes which a little while ago we considered under the names sensible and intelligible, which we now prefer to call more familiarly carnal and spiritual. But it has been made difificult for us to abstain from carnal things, since our truest bread is spiritual. For with great labor we now eat this bread. For neither without punishment for the sin of transgression have we been changed from immortal into mortal. So it happens, that when we strive after better things, habit formed by connection with the flesh and our sins in some way begin to militate against us and to put obstacles in our way, some foolish persons with most obtuse superstition suspect that there is another kind of souls which is not of God.
20. However even if it be conceded to them that we are enticed to shameful deeds by another inferior kind of souls, they do not thence make it evident that those enticing*are evil by nature, or those enticed, supremely good. For it may be, the former of their own will, by striving after what was not^lawful, that is, by sinning, from being good have become evil; and again they may be made good, but in such manner that for a long time they remain in sin, and by a certain occult suasion traduce to themselves other souls. Then, they may not be absolutely evil, but in their own kind, however inferior, tney may e.xercise their own functions without any sin. But those superior souls to whom justice, the directress of things, has assigned a far more excellent activity, if they should wish to follow and to imitate those inferior ones, become evil, not because they imitate evil souls, but because they imitate in an evil way. By the evil souls is done what is proper to them, by the good what is alien to them is striven after. Hence the former remain in their own grade, the latter are plunged into a lower. It is as when men copy after beasts. For the fourfooted horse walks beautifully, but if a man on all fours should imitate him, who would think him worthy even of chaff for food? Rightly therefore we generally disapprove of one who imitates, while we approve of him whom he imitates. But we disapprove not because he has not succeeded, but for wishing to succeed at all. For in the horse we approve of that to which by as much as we prefer man, by so much are we offended that he copies after inferior creatures. So among men, however well the crier may do in sending forth his voice, would not the senator be insane, if he should do it even more clearly and better than the crier? Take an illustration from the heavenly bodies: The moon when shining is praised, and by its course and its changes is quite pleasing to those that pay attention to such things. But if the sun should wish to imitate it (for we may feign that it has desires of this sort '), who would not be greatly and rightly displeased. From which illustrations I wish it to be understood, that even if there are souls (which meanwhile is left an open question-) devoted to bodily offices not by sin but by nature, and even if they are related to us, however inferior they may be, by some inner alifinity, they should not be esteemed evil simply because we are evil ourselves in following them and in loving corporeal things. For we sin by loving corporeal things, because by justice we are required and by nature we are able to love spiritual things, and when we do this we are, in our kind, the best and the happiest. 3 21. Wherefore what proof does deliberation, violently urged in both directions, now prone to sin, now borne on toward right conduct, furnish, that we are compelled to accept two kinds of souls, the nature of one of which is from God, of the other not; when we are free to conjecture so many other causes of alternating states of mind? But that these things are obscure and are to no purpose pried into by blear-eyed minds, whoever is a good judge of things sees. Wherefore those things rather which have been said regarding the will and sin, those things, I say, that supreme justice permits no man using his reason to be ignorant of, those things which if they were taken from us, there is nothing whence the discipline of virtue may begin, nothing whence it may rise from the death of vices, those things I say considered again and again with sufficient clearness and lucidity convince us that the heresy of the Manichaeans is false.
CHAP. 14. AGAIN IT IS SHOWN FROM THE UTILITY OF REPENTING THAT SOULS ARE NOT BY NATURE EVIL. SO SURE A DEMON- STRATION IS NOT CONTRADICTED EXCEPT FROM THE HABIT OF ERRING.
22. Like the foregoing considerations is what I shall now say about repenting. For as among all sane people it is agreed, and this the Manichaeans themselves not only confess but also teach, that to repent of sin is useful. Why shall I now, in this matter, collect the testimonies of the divine Scriptures, which I I ' Augustin's carefulness to explain that he is only indulging in personification is doubtless due to the fact that with the.Manicha;-ans the sun and the moon were objects of worship. — A. H. N.
2 In his Retractations, Augustin explains that he did not really regard this as an open question, but speaks of it as such only so far as this particular discussion is concerned. He simply declines to enter upon a consideration of it in this connection. — A. H. N.
3 Here also the use of the word " nature " gave Augustin trouble in his later years. He claims in the Ketractations that he uses the word in the sense of " nature that has been healed ' and that " cannot be vitiated," and seeks to show that he did not mean to exclude divine grace. — A. H. N.
Chap. XIV.]
TWO SOULS, AGAINST THE MANICH^ANS.
are scattered throughout their pages? It is also the voice of nature; notice of this thing has escaped no fool. We should be undone, if this were not deepl)^ imbedded in our nature. Some one may say that he does not sin; but no barbarity will dare to say, that if one sins he should not repent of it. This being the case, I ask to which of the two kinds of souls does repenting pertain? I know indeed that it can pertain neither to him who does ill nor to him who cannot do well. Wherefore, that I may use the words of the Manichseans, if a soul of darkness repent of sin, it is not of the substance of supreme evil, if a soul of light, it is not of the substance of supreme good; that disposition of repenting which is profitable testifies alike that the penitent has done ill, and that he could have done well. How, therefore, is there from me nothing of evil, if I have acted unadvisedly, or how can I rightly repent if I have not so done? Hear the other part. How is there from me nothing of good, if in me there is good will, or how do I rightly repent if there is not? Wherefore, either let them deny that there is great utility in repenting, so that they may be driven not only from the Christian name, but from every even imaginary argument for their views, or let them cease to say and to teach that there are two kinds of souls, one of which has nothing of evil, the other nothing of good; for that whole sect is propped up by this two-headed ' or rather headlong^ variety of souls.
23. And to me indeed it is sufficient thus to know that the Manichaeans err, that I know that sin must be repented of; and yet if now by right of friendship I should accost some one of my friends who still thinks that they are worthy of being listened to, and should say to him: Do you not know that it is useful, when anyone has sinned, to repent? Without hesitation he will swear that he knows. If then I shall have convinced you that Manichseism is false, will you not desire anything more? Let him reply what more he can desire in this matter. Very well, so far. But when I shall have begun to show the sure and I Bicipiti.
2 Prcecipiti.
necessary arguments which, bound to it with adamantine chains, as the saying is, follow that proposition, and shall have conducted to its conclusion the whole process by which that sect is overthrown, he will deny perhaps that he knows the utility of repenting, which no learned man, no unlearned, is ignorant of, and will rather contend, when we hesitate and deliberate, that two souls in us furnish each its own proper help to the solution of the different parts of the question. O habit of sin! O accompanying penalty of sin! Then you turned me away from the consideration of things so manifest, but you injured me when I did not discern. But now, among my most familiar acquaintances who do not discern, you wound and torment me discerning.
CHAP. 15. HE PRAYS FOR HIS FRIENDS WHOM HE HAS HAD AS ASSOCIATES IN ERROR.
24. Give heed to these things, I beseech you, dearly beloved. Your dispositions I have well known. If you now concede to me the mind and the reason of any sort of man, these things are far more certain than the thino^s that we seemed to learn or rather were compelled to believe. Great God, God omnipotent, God of supreme goodness, whose rio^ht it is to be believed and known to be inviolable and unchangeable. Trinal Unity, whom the Catholic Church worships, as one who have experienced in myself Thy mercy, I supplicate Thee, that Thou wilt not permit those with whom from boyhood I have lived most harmoniously in every relation to dissent from me in Thy worship. I see how it was especially to be expected in this place that I should either even then have defended the Catholic Scriptures attacked by the Manichaeans, if as I say, I had been cautious; or I should now show that they can be defended. But in other volumes God will aid my purpose, for the moderate length of this, as I suppose, already asks to be spared. ^ 3 This purpose Augustin accomplished in several works. See especially Contra Adiinuiituni, and Contra Paustum Alanichceum. On Augustin's defense of the Old Testament Scriptures, see Mozley's Ruling Ideas in Early Ages, last chapter. — A. H. N.
ACTS OR DISPUTATION AGAINST FORTUNATUS THE MANICH^AN [ACTA SEU DISPUTATIO CONTRA FORTUNATUM MANICH^UM].
A.D. 392.
PROFESSOR OF CHURCH HISTORY AND COMPARATIVE RELIGION, IN TORONTO BAPTIST (theological) COLLEGE, TORONTO, CANADA.
CONTENTS OF ACTS OR DISPUTATION AGAINST FOKTUNATUS THE MANICH.4^AN.
DISPUTATION OF THE FIRST DAY p. 113.
Augustin and Fortunatus are at variance with reference to the subject for discussion, the former having proposed to dispute about doctrine, the latter preferring to vindicate his party through the testimony of Augustin from the slanderous accusations that are current among the Catholics.
Fortunatus makes a confession of his faith, in which he confesses to believe" that God is incorruptible, lucid, unapproachable, intenible, impassible; and expresses his adherence to a doctrine of the Trinity somewhat like that held by Orthodox Christians. Augustin shows that the Manichaean God is subject to necessity, corruptible, violable, liable to suffering, etc., and presses upon Fortunatus the question. Why God sent a portion of his substance to combat the race of darkness, and so to become involved in corruption and misery?
Fortunatus attempts, without success, to show the consistency of his confession of faith with the Manichsean view of two eternally existing antagonistic principles, and the conflict between the two resulting in the mingling of good and evil in the present order of things by quoting freely from the Christian Scriptures. Knowing the deceitfulness of Fortunatus in his use of Scripture, Augustin insists that the discussion be conducted on rational grounds. The audience take sides with Augustin. and raise a clamor that results in the suspension of the discussion, and after they have expressed horror at Fortunatus' assertion that the Word of God is fettered in the race of darkness, the meeting is closed.
DISPUTATION OF THE SECOND DAY p. 119.
j Fortunatus reiterates his Dualism, and yet denies that he teaches the corruptibility of God. Augustin states the Catholic view of the relation of evil to God, insisting that sin is a matter of free will on the part of man.
Augustin continues to press the question. Why God when he can in no way suffer injury sent the soul hither? Fortunatus at last confesses that he is at a loss what to say, and expresses an intention to re-investigate the entire question, with the help of Augustin. Augustin expresses his thawks to God for so happy an ending of the discussion.
f ACTS OR DISPUTATION AGAINST FORTUNATUS, THE MANICH^AN, [ACTA SEU DISPUTATIO CONTRA FORTUNATUM MANICH.-EUM.] A.D. 392.'
DISPUTATION OF THE FIRST DAY.
ON THE FIFTH OF SEPTEMBER, THE MOST RENOWNED MEN ARCADIUS AUGUSTUS (THE SECOND time) and RUFINUS being CONSULS, A DISPUTATION AGAINST FORTUNATUS, AN ELDER OF THE MANICH^ANS, WAS HELD IN THE CITY OF HIPPO REGIUS, IN THE BATHS OF SOSSIUS, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE PEOPLE.
I. AuGUSTiN said: I now regard as error what formerly I regarded as truth. I desire to hear from you who are present whether my supposition is correct. First of all I regard it as the height of error to believe that Almighty God, in whom is our one hope, is in any part either violable, or contaminable, or corruptible. This I know your heresy affirms, not indeed in the words that I now use; for when you are questioned you confess that God is incorruptible, and absolutely inviolable, and incontaminable; but when you begin to expound the rest of your system, we are compelled to declare Him corruptible, penetrable, contaminable. For you say that ' This Disputatioti seems to have occurred shortly after the writing of the preceding treatise. It appears from the. Retractations that Fortunatus had Hved for a considerable time at Hippo, and had secured so large a number of followers that it was a delight to him to dwell there. The Disputation is supposed to be a verliatim report of what Augustin and Fortunatus said during a two days' discussion. The subject is the origm of evil. Augustin maintains that evil, so far as man is concerned, has arisen from a free e.xercise of the will on man's part; Fortunatus, on the other hand, maintams that the nature of evil is co-eternal with (Jod. Fortunatus shows considerable knowledge of the New Testament, but no remarkable dialectic powers. Heappearsat great disadvantage beside his great antagoni.st. In fact, he i.s far from saying the best that can be said in favor of dualism. We may say that he was fairly vanquished in the argument, and at the close confessed himself at a loss what to say, and expressed an intention of more carefully t.xamining the problems discu.ssed, in view of what Augustin had.said. Augustin is more guarded in this treatise than in tlie preceding in his statements about free will. He found Utile occasion here, therefore, to retract or explain. Fortunatus often expresses himself vaguely and obscurely. If some sentences are difficult to understand in the translation, they will be found equally so in the Latin.— A. H. N.