% A: all which you bring to one, and make one from all these; B: to which you bring all and make them into one.
It B:...One, Eternal, self-subsisting Being in which all is one and united, and outside which unity nothing can be imagined to be.
UNDERSTANDING, LOVE, REASON, &c. 35 (in so far as, or because, its ideas depend on it J) a cause; and on the other hand, since it consists of its ideas, a whole: so also God is both an Immanent Cause with reference to his works or creatures, and also a whole, considered from the second point of view.
I So in B. A: it depends on its ideas.
i SECOND DIALOGUE BETWEEN ERASMUS AND THEOPHILUS RELATING PARTLY TO THE PRECEDING, PARTLY TO THE FOLLOWING SECOND PART ERASMUS. I have heard you say, Theophilus, that God is a cause of all things, and, at the same time, that he can be no other than an Immanent cause. Now, if he is znimmanent cause of all things, how then can you call him a remote I 10 cause? For, that is impossible in the case of an Immanent cause.
THEOPHILUS. When I said that God is a remote t cause, I only said it with reference to the things [which God has produced mediately, and not with reference to those] which God (without any other conditions beyond his mere exist ence) has produced immediately; but on no account did I mean to call him a remote! cause absolutely: as you might also have clearly gathered from my remarks. For, I also said that in some respects we can call him a remote 20 cause.
ERASMUS. I understand now adequately what you want to say; but I note also that you have said, that the effect of the It immanent cause remains united with its cause in such a way that together they constitute a whole. Now, if this is so, then, methinks, God cannot be an immanent cause. For, if he and that which is produced by him together form a whole, then you ascribe to God at one time more essence than at another time. I pray you, remove these doubts for me.
ERASMUS AND THEOPHILUS 37 THEOPHILUS. If, Erasmus, you want to extricate yourself i from this confusion, then mark well what I am going to tell you now. The essence of a thing does not increase through its union with another thing with which it constitutes a whole; on the contrary, the first remains unchanged. I will give you an illustration, so that you may understand me the better. An image-carver has made from wood various forms after the likeness of the parts of the human body; he takes one of these, which has the form of a human breast, joins it to another, which has the form of a human head, and of 10 these two he makes a whole, which represents the upper part of a human body; would you therefore say that the essence of the head has increased because it has been joined to the breast? That would be erroneous, because it is the same that it was before. For the sake of greater clearness let me give you another illustration, namely, an idea that I have of a triangle, and another resulting from an extension of one of the angles, which extended or extending angle is neces sarily equal to the two interior opposite angles, and so forth. These, I say, have produced a new idea, namely, that the 20 three angles of the triangle are equal to two right angles.
This idea is so connected with the first, that it can neither be, nor be conceived without the same.t Mark well now that although the new idea is joined to the preceding one, the essence of the preceding idea does not undergo any change in consequence; on the contrary, it remains without the slightest change. The same you may also observe in every idea which produces love in itself: this love in no way adds to the essence of the idea. But why multiply illustra tions? since you can see it clearly in the subject which I 30 have been illustrating and which we are discussing now. I have distinctly stated that all attributes, which depend on no t A continues: And of all ideas which any one has we make a whole, or (which is the same) a thing of reason, which we call Understandingother cause, and whose definition requires no genus pertain to the essence of God; and since the created things are not competent to establish an attribute, they do not increase the essence of God, however intimately they become united to him. Add to this, that "whole" is but a thing of Reason, and does not differ from the general except in this alone that the general results from various Disconnected individuals, the Whole, from various United individuals; also in this, that the General only comprises parts of the same kind, but the 10 Whole, parts both the same and different in kind. I ERASMUS. So far as this is concerned you have satisfied me. But, in addition to this, you have also said, that the effect of the II inner cause cannot perish so long as its cause lasts; this, I well see, is certainly true, but III if this is so, then how can God be an inner cause of all things, seeing that many things perish? After your previous distinction you will say, that God is really a cause of the effects which he has produced immediately, without any other conditions except his attributes alone; and, that these cannot perish so long as 20 their cause endures; but that you do not call God an inner cause of the effects whose existence does not depend on him imme diately, but which have come into being through some other thing, except in so far as their causes do not operate, and can not operate, without God, nor also outside him^lll and that for this reason also, since they are not produced immediately by God, they can perish. But this does not satisfy me. For I see that you conclude, that the human understanding is immortal, because it is a product which God has pro duced in himself. Now it is impossible that more than the 30 I B:...the general results from various unconnected indi viduals of the same kind; but the whole from various connected individuals different as well as the same in kind.
HI B: this, I see, is not true, because if...llll B: without and outside him.
ERASMUS AND THEOPHILUS 39 attributes of God should have been necessary in order to i produce such an understanding; for, in order to be a being of such supreme perfection, it must have been created from eternity, just like all other things which depend imme diately on God. And I have heard you say so, if I am not mistaken. And this being so, how will you reconcile J this without leaving over any difficulties?
THEOPHILUS. It is true, Erasmus, that the things (for the existence of which no other thing is required, except the attributes of God) which have been created immediately by 10 him have been created from eternity. It is to be remarked, however, that although in order that a thing may exist there is required a special modification and tt a thing beside the attributes of God, for all that, God does not cease to be able to produce a thing immediately. For, of the necessary things which are required to bring things Jtt into existence, some are there in order that they should produce the thing, and others in order that the thing should be capable of being produced. For example, I want to have light in a certain room; I kindle a light, and this lights up the room through 20 itself; or I open a window [shutter], now this act of opening does not itself give light, but still it brings it about that the light can enter the room.Jttt Likewise in order to set a body in motion another body is required that shall have all the motion that is to pass from it to the other. But in order to produce in us an idea of God there is no need for another special thing that shall have what is to be produced in us, but only such a body in Nature whose idea is neces sary in order to represent God immediately. This you t B: explain. 30 II B: of. HI B: a thing.
tilt B: I kindle this [light], or I open a window, whereupon the room becomes light; now the act of kindling, or of opening the room does not produce the light, but prepares the way for the light to be able to light up the room, or to enter it.
4o GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING i could also have gathered from my remarks: for I said that God is only known through himself, and not through something else. However, I tell you this, that so long as we have not such a clear idea of God as shall unite us with him in such a way that it will not let us love any thing beside him, we cannot truly say that we are united with God, so as to depend immediately on him. If there is still anything that you may have to ask, leave it for another time; just now circumstances require me to attend to other 10 matters. Farewell.
ERASMUS. Nothing at present, but I shall ponder what you have just told me till the next opportunity. God be with you.
CHAPTER III i THAT GOD IS A CAUSE OF ALL THINGS WE shall now begin to consider those attributes [of God] which we called Propria.'f And, first of all, how God *'s a cause of all things.
Now, we have already said above that one substance can not produce another; and that God is a being of whom all attributes are predicated; whence it clearly follows that all other things can by no means be, or be understood, apart from or outside him. Wherefore we may say with all 10 reason that God is a cause of all things.
As it is usual to divide the efficient cause in eight divisions, let me, then, inquire how and in what sense God is a cause.
First, then, we say that he is an emanative or productive cause of his works; and, in so far as there is activity, an active or operating cause, which we regard as one and the same, because they involve each other.
Secondly, he is an immanent, and not a transeunt cause, since all that he produces is within himself, and not outside 20 him, because there is nothing outside him.
Thirdly, God is a free cause, and not a natural cause, as we shall make clear and manifest when we come to consider whether God can omit to do what he does, and then it will also be explained wherein true freedom consists.
t The [attributes] following are called Propria, because they are only Adjectives, which cannot be understood without their Substan tives. That is to say, without them God would indeed be no God, but still it is not they that constitute God; for they reveal nothing of the character of a Substance, through which alone God exists. 30 i Fourthly, God is a cause through himself, and not by accident; this will become more evident from the discussion on Predestination.
Fifthly, God is a principal cause of his works which he has created immediately, such as movement in matter, &c.; in which there is no place for a subsidiary [instrumental] cause, since this is confined to particular things; as when he dries the sea by means of a strong wind, and so forth in the case of all particular things t in Nature. 10 The subsidiary provoking cause is not [found] in God, because there is nothing outside him to incite him. The predisposing It cause, on the other hand, is his perfection itself; through it he is a cause of himself, and, consequently, of all other things.
Sixthly, God alone is the first or Initial cause, as is evident from our foregoing proof.
Seventhly, God is also a Universal cause, but only in so far as he produces various things; otherwise this can never be predicated of him, as he needs no one in order 20 to produce any results.
Eighthly, God is the proximate cause of the things that are infinite, and immutable, and which we assert to have been created immediately by him, but, in one sense, he is the remote cause of all particular things.
J B omits the semi-colon before " as," in the preceding line, and gives the words " as when...particular things " in a note, instead of in the text.
tt A and B: voorgaande.
CHAPTER IV i ON GOD'S NECESSARY ACTIVITY WE deny that God can omit to do what he does, and we shall also prove it when we treat of Predestination; when we will show that all things necessarily depend on their causes. But, in the second place, this conclusion also follows from the perfection of God; for it is true, beyond a doubt, that God can make everything just as perfect as it is conceived in his Idea; and just as things' that are conceived by him cannot be conceived by him more perfectly than he conceives them, 10 so all things can be made by him so perfect that they can not come from him in a more perfect condition. Again, t when we conclude that God could not have omitted to do what he has done, we deduce this from his perfection; because, in God, it would be an imperfection to be able to omit to do what he does; we do not, however, suppose that there is a subsidiary provoking cause in God that might have moved him to action, for then he were no God.
But now, again, there is the controversy whether, namely, of all that is in his Idea, and which he can realise so 20 perfectly, whether, I say, he could omit to realise anything, and whether such an omission would be a perfection in him. Now, we maintain that, since all that happens is done by God, it must therefore necessarily be predetermined by him, otherwise he would be mutable, which would be a great imperfection in him. And as this predetermination by him must be from eternity, in which eternity there is no before or after, it follows irresistibly that God could never have predetermined things in any other way than that in which 1 they are determined now, and have been from eternity, and that God could not have been either before or without these determinations. Further, if God should omit to do anything, then he must either have some cause for it, or not; if he has, then it is necessary that he should omit doing it; if he has not, then it is necessary that he should not omit to da it; this is self-evident. Moreover, in a created thing it is a perfection to exist and to have been produced by God, for, of all imperfection, non-existence is the greatest imper- 10 fection; and since God desires the welfare and perfection of all things, it would follow that if God desired that a certain thing should not exist, then the welfare and perfec tion of this thing must be supposed to consist in its nonexistence, which is self-contradictory. That is why we deny that God can omit to do what he does. Some regard this as blasphemy, and as a belittling of God; but such an assertion results from a misapprehension of what constitutes hue freedom; this is by no means what they think it is, namely, the ability to do or to omit to do something good or evil; 20 but true freedom is only, or no other than [the status of being] the first cause, which is in no way constrained or coerced by anything else, and which through its perfection alone is the cause of all perfection; t consequently, if God could omit to do this, he would not be perfect: for the ability to omit doing some good, or accomplishing some perfection in what he does, can have no place in him, except through defect, tt That God alone is the only free cause is, therefore, clear not only from what has just been said, but also from this, 30 namely, that there is no external cause outside him to force or constrain him; all this is not the case with created things. Against this it is argued thus: The good is only good J B: but true freedom consists in this, that the first cause, con strained or coerced by nothing else, through its perfection alone is the cause of all perfection. JJ B: because it implies defect.
ON GOD'S NECESSARY ACTIVITY 45 because God wills it, and this being so, he can always bring i it about that evil should be good. But such reasoning is about as conclusive as if I said: It is because God wills to be God that he is God; therefore it is in his power not to be God, which is absurdity itself. Furthermore, when people do anything, and they are asked why they do it, their answer is, because it is what justice demands. If the question is then put, why justice, or rather the first cause of all that is just, *makes such a demand,* then the answer must be, because justice wills it so. But, dear me, I think to myself, 10 could Justice really be other than just? By no means, for then it could not be Justice. Those, however, who say that God does all that he does because it is good in itself, these, I say, may possibly think that they do not differ from us.
But that is far from being the case, since they suppose that there is something before God I to which he has duties or obligations, namely, a cause [through] which [God] desires that this shall be good, and, again, that that shall be just.H Then comes the further controversy, namely, whether God, supposing all things had been created by him in some 20 other way from eternity, or had been ordered and pre determined to be otherwise than they now are, whether, I say, he would then be just as perfect *as he is now.* To this it may serve as an answer, that if Nature had, from all eternity, been made different from what it is now, then, from the standpoint of those who ascribe to God will and under standing, it would necessarily follow that God had a different will and a different understanding then, lit in consequence of which he would have made it different; and so we should be compelled to think that God tttt has a different character 30 I B: Goodness (Goed instead of God).
It B:...obligations, because of a desire that this shall be good, and that, again, just.
: " than now " (als nu) instead of " then " (als doen). B omits the eleven words which follow (" has...and ").
D i now from what he had then, and had a different character then from what he has now; so that, if we assume he is most perfect now, we are compelled to say that he would not have been so had he created all things differently. All these things, involving as they do palpable absurdities, can in no way be attributed to God, who now, in the past, and unto all eternity, is, has been, and will remain immutable. We prove this also from the definition that we have given of a free cause, which is not one that can do or omit to do 10 anything, but is only such as is not dependent on anything else, so that whatever God does is done and carried into effect by him as the freest I cause. If, therefore, he had formerly made things different from what they are now, it would needs follow that he was at one time imperfect, which is falsest For, since God is the first cause of all things, there must be something in him, through which he does what he does, and omits not to do it. Since we say that Freedom does not consist in [having the choice of] doing or not doing something, and since we have also shown that 20 that which makes him [God] do anything can be nothing else than his own perfection, we conclude that, had it not been that his perfection made him do all this, then the things would not exist, and could not come into existence, in order to be what they are now. This is just like saying: if God were imperfect then things would be different from what they are now.H So much as regards the first [attribute]; we shall now pass on to the second attribute, which we call a proprium of God, and see what we have to say about it, and so on to 3o the end.
J A: wisest (alderwijste instead of aldervrijste; corrected in B). JJ B omits this sentence.
CHAPTER V i ON DIVINE PROVIDENCE THE second attribute, which we call a proprium [of God] is his Providence, which to us is nothing else than the striving which we find in the whole of Nature and in individual things to maintain and preserve their own existence. For it is manifest that no thing could, through its own nature, seek its own annihilation, but, on the contrary, that every thing has in itself a striving to preserve its condition, and to improve itself. Following these definitions of ours we, 10 therefore, posit a general and a special providence. The general [providence] is that through which all things are produced and sustained in so far as they are parts of the whole of Nature. The special providence is the striving of each thing separately to preserve its existence [each thing, that is to say], considered not as a part of Nature, but as a whole [by itself]. This is explained by the following example: All the limbs of man are provided for, and cared for, in so far as they are parts of man, this is general providence; while special [providence] is the striving of each separate 20 limb (as a whole in itself, and not as a part of man) to preserve and maintain its own well-being.
, CHAPTER VI ON DIVINE PREDESTINATION THE third attribute, we say, is divine predestination.
1. We proved before that God cannot omit to do what he does; that he has, namely, made everything so perfect that it cannot be more perfect.
2. And, at the same time, that without him no thing can be, or be conceived.
It remains to be seen now whether there are in Nature 10 any accidental things, that is to say, whether there are any things which may happen and may also not happen.
Secondly, whether there is any thing concerning which we cannot ask why it is.
Now that there are no accidental things we prove thus: That which has no cause to exist cannot possibly exist; that which is accidental has no cause: therefore...The first is beyond all dispute; the second we prove thus: If any thing that is accidental has a definite and certain cause why it should exist, then it must necessarily 20 exist; but that it should be both accidental and necessary at the same time, is self-contradictory; Therefore...
Perhaps some one will say, that an accidental thing has indeed no definite and certain cause, but an accidental one. If this should be so, it must be so either in sensu diviso or in sensu composite, that is to say, either the existence of the cause is accidental, and not its being a cause; or it is accidental that a certain thing (which indeed must neces sarily exist in Nature) should be the cause of the occurrence of that accidental thing. However, both the one and the 30 other are false.
ON DIVINE PREDESTINATION 49 For, as regards the first, if the accidental something is i accidental because [the existence of] its cause is accidental, then that cause must also be accidental, because the cause which has produced it is also accidental, etsic in infinitum.
And since it has already been proved, that all things depend on one single cause, this cause would therefore also have to be accidental: which is manifestly false.
As regards the second: if the cause were no more com pelled to produce one thing than another, that is, [if the cause were no more compelled] to produce this something 10 than not to produce it, then it would be impossible at once both that it should produce it and that it should not produce it, which is quite contradictory.
Concerning the second [question raised] above, whether there is no thing in Nature about which one cannot ask why it is, this remark of ours shows that we have to inquire through what cause a thing is real; for if this [cause] did not exist it were impossible that the thing should exist. Now, we must look for this cause either in the thing or outside the thing. If, however, any one should ask for a rule whereby 20 to conduct this inquiry, we say that none whatever seems necessary. For if existence pertains to the nature of a thing, then it is certain that we must not look outside it for its cause; but if such is not the case, then we must always look outside the thing for its cause. Since, however, the first pertains to God alone, it is thereby proved (as we have already also proved before) that God alone is the first cause of all things. From this it is also evident that this or that will of man (since the existence of the will does not pertain to its essence) must also have an external cause, by which it is necessarily 3° caused; that this is so is also evident from all that we have said in this chapter; and it will be still more evident when, in the second part, we come to consider and discuss the freedom of man.
Against all this others object: how is it possible that i God, who is said to be supremely perfect, and the sole cause, disposer, and provider of all, nevertheless permits such confusion to be seen everywhere in Nature? Also, why has he not made man so as not to be able to sin?
Now, in the first place, it cannot be rightly said that there is confusion in Nature, since nobody knows all the causes of things so as to be able to judge accordingly. This objection, however, originates in this kind of ignorance, namely, that they have set up general Ideas, with which, 10 they think, particular things must agree if they are to be perfect. These Ideas, they state, are in the understanding of God, as many of Plato's followers have said, namely, that these general Ideas (such as Rational, Animal,! and the like) have been created by God; and although those who follow Aristotle say, indeed, that these things are not real things, only things of Reason, they nevertheless regard them frequently as [real] things, since they have clearly said that his providence does not extend to particular things, but only to kinds; for example, God has never exercised his 20 providence over Bucephalus, &c., but only over the whole genus Horse. They say also that God has no knowledge of particular and transient things, but only of the general, which, in their opinion, are imperishable. We have, how ever, rightly considered Jt this to be due to their ignorance. For it is precisely the particular things, and they alone, that have a cause, and not the general, because they are nothing.
God then is the cause of, and providence over, particular things only. If particular things had to conform to some 3o other Nature, then they could not conform to their own, and consequently could not be what they truly are. For example, if God had made all human beings like Adam before the fall, then indeed he would only have created Adam, and no Paul nor Peter; but no, it is just perfection \ B: Rational- Animal. tt B: to consider.
ON DIVINE PREDESTINATION 51 in God, that he gives to all things, from the greatest to the i least, their essence, or, to express it better, that he has all things perfectly in himself.
As regards the other [objection], why God has not made mankind so that they should not sin, to this it may serve [as an answer], that whatever is said about sin is only said with reference to us, that is, as when we compare two things with each other, or [consider one thing] from different points of view. For instance, if some one has made a clock precisely in order to strike and to show the hours, and the 10 mechanism quite fulfils the aims of its maker, then we say that it is good, but if it does not do so, then we say that it is bad, notwithstanding that even then it might still be good if only it had been his intention to make it irregular and to strike at wrong times.
We say then, in conclusion, that Peter must, as is necessary, conform to the Idea of Peter, and not to the Idea of Man; good and evil, or sin, these are only modes of thought, and by no means things, or any thing that has reality, as we shall very likely show yet more fully in what 20 follows. For all things and works which are in Nature are perfect.
CHAPTER VII ON THE ATTRIBUTES WHICH DO NOT PERTAIN TO GOD HERE we shall take up the consideration of those attributes f which are commonly attributed to God, but which, never theless, do not pertain to him; as also of those through which it is sought to prove the existence of God, though in vain; and also of the rules of accurate definition.
For this purpose, we shall not trouble ourselves very 10 much about the ideas that people commonly have of God, but we shall only inquire briefly into what the Philosophers can tell us about it. Now these have defined God as a being existing through or of himself, cause of all things. Omniscient, Almighty, eternal, simple, infinite, the highest good, of infinite compassion, &c. But before we approach this inquiry, let us just see what admissions they make to us.
f As regards the attributes of which God consists, they are only infinite substances, each of which must of itself be infinitely perfect.
20 That this must necessarily be so, we are convinced by clear and distinct reasons. It is true, however, that up to the present only two of all these infinites are known to us through their own essence; and these are thought and extension. All else that is commonly ascribed to God is not any attribute of his, but only certain modes which may be attributed to him either in consideration of all, that is, all his attributes, or in consideration of one attribute. In con sideration of all [it is said], for instance, that he is eternal, selfsubsisting, infinite, cause of all things, immutable. In consideration of one [it is said], for instance, that he is omniscient, wise, &c., 30 which pertains to thought, and, again, that he is omnipresent, fills all, &c., which pertains to extension.
ATTRIBUTES NOT PERTAINING TO GOD 53 In the first place, they say that it is impossible to give i a true or right definition of God, because, according to their opinion, there can be no definition except per genus et differentiam, and as God is not a species of any genus, he cannot be defined rightly, or according to the rules.
In the second place, they say that God cannot be defined, because the definition must describe the thing itself and also positively; while, according to their standpoint, our knowledge of God cannot be of a positive, but only of a 10 negative kind; therefore no proper definition can be given of God.
They also say, besides, that God can never be proved a priori, because he has no cause, but only by way of probability, or from his effects.
Since by these assertions of theirs they admit sufficiently that their knowledge of God is very little and slight, let us now proceed to examine their definition.
In the first place, we do not see that they give us in it any attribute or attributes through which it can be known what 20 the thing (God) is,t but only some propria or properties which do, indeed, belong to a thing, but never explain what the thing is. For although self-subsisting, being the cause of all things, highest good, eternal and immutable, &c., are peculiar to God alone, nevertheless, from those properties we cannot know what that being, to whom these properties pertain, is, and what attributes he has.