t Further, to say that this idea is a fiction, this also is false: for it is impossible to have this [idea] if it [the ideatum\ does not exist; this is shown on page 16, and we also add the following: It is quite true that when an idea has first come to us from a 30 particular thing, and we have generalised it in abstracto, then our understanding may fancy various things about it, and we can add to it many other attributes abstracted from other things. But it is impossible to do this without a prior knowledge of the things them selves from which these abstractions have been made. Once, how ever, it is assumed that this idea [of God] is a fiction, then all other i From all this the second point is proved, namely, that the cause of a man's ideas is not his imagination but some external cause, which compels him to apprehend one thing sooner than another, and it is no other than this, that the things whose essentia objectiva is in his understanding exist formaliter, and are nearer to him than other things. If, then, man has the idea of God, it is clear that God must exist formaliter, though not eminenter, as there is ideas that we have must be fictions no less. If this is so, whence 10 comes it that we find such a great difference among them? For as regards some we see that it is impossible they should exist; e.g., all monsters supposed to be composed of two natures, such as an animal that should be both a bird and a horse, and the like, for which it is impossible to have a place in Nature, which we find differently constituted; J other ideas may, but need not, exist; whether, however, they exist or do not exist, their essence is always necessary; such is the idea of a triangle, and that of the love in the soul apart from the body, &c.; so that even if I at first thought that I had imagined these, I am nevertheless compelled afterwards 20 to say that they are, and would be, the same no less even if neither I nor anybody had ever thought about them. They are, conse quently, not merely imagined by me, and must also have outside me a subjectum other than myself, without which subjectum they cannot be. In addition to these there is yet a third idea, and it is an only one; this one carries with it necessary existence, and not, like the foregoing, the mere possibility of existence: for, in the case of those, their essence was indeed necessary, but not their existence, while in its case, both its existence and its essence are necessary, and it is nothing without them. I therefore see now 3° that the truth, essence, or existence of anything never depends on me: for, as was shown with reference to the second kind of ideas, they are what they are independently of me, whether as regards their essence alone, or as regards both essence and existence. I find this to be true also, indeed much more so, of this third unique J In B the whole of this first part of the note is given in the body of the text, while the rest is given as a note on " other ideas," eight lines above.
THAT GOD EXISTS 19 nothing more real or more excellent beside or outside him. r Now, that man has the idea of God, this is clear, because he knows his attributes,! which attributes cannot be derived from [man] himself, because he is imperfect. And that he knows these attributes is evident from this, namely, that he knows that the infinite cannot be obtained by putting together divers finite parts; that there cannot be two t infinites, but idea; not only does it not depend on me, but, on the contrary, he alone tt must be the subjectum of that which I affirm of him. Con sequently, if he did not exist, I should not be able to assert anything 10 at all about him; although this can be done in the case of other things, even when they do not exist. He must also be, indeed, the subjectum of all other things.
From what has been said so far it is clearly manifest that the idea of infinite attributes in the perfect being is no fiction; we shall, however, still add the following: According to the foregoing consideration of Nature, we have so far not been able to discover more than two attributes only which belong to this all-perfect being. And these give us nothing adequate to satisfy us that this is all of which this perfect being consists, 20 quite the contrary, we find in us a something which openly tells us not only of more, but of infinite perfect attributes, which must belong to this perfect being before he can be said to be perfect. And whence comes this idea of perfection? This something cannot be the outcome of these two [attributes]: tor two can only yield two, and not an infinity. Whence then? From myself, never; else I must be able to give what I did not possess. Whence, then, but from the infinite attributes themselves which tell us that they are, without however telling us, at the same time, what they are: for only of two do we know what they are. 30 t His attributes; it is better [to say], because he knows what is proper to God; for these things [infinity, perfection, &c.] are no attributes of God. Without these, indeed, God could not be God, but it is not through them [that he is God], since they show nothing substantial, but are only like adjectives which require substantives or their explanation.
I B omits " two."
tt B omits "alone."
i only one; that it is perfect and immutable, for we know that nothing seeks, of itself, its own annihilation, and also that it cannot change into anything better,t because it is perfect, which it would not be in that case, or also that such a being cannot be subjected to anything outside it, since it is omnipotent, and so forth.
From all this, then, it follows clearly that we can prove both a priori and a posteriori that God exists. Better, in deed, a priori. For things which are proved in the latter 10 way [a posteriori] must be proved through their external causes, which is a manifest imperfection t in them, inas much as they cannot make themselves known H through themselves, but only through external causes. God, how ever, who is the first cause of all things, and also the cause of himself [causa sui~\, makes himself known through him self. Hence one need not attach much importance to the saying of Thomas Aquinas, namely, that God could not be proved a priori because he, forsooth, has no cause.
f The cause of this change would have to be either outside, or 20 in it. It cannot be outside, because no substance which, like this, exists through itself depends on anything outside it; therefore it is not subject to change through it. Nor can it be in it: because no thing, much less this, desires its own undoing • all undoing comes from outside. *Again, that there can be no finite substance is clear from this, because in that case it would necessarily have to have something which it had from nothing: which is impossible; for whence has it that wherein it differs from God? Certainly not from God; for he has nothing imperfect or finite, &c.: whence, therefore, but from nothing? * 30 J B: an extreme imperfection. Jt B omits " known."
CHAPTER II i Now that we have proved above that God is, it is time to show what he is. Namely, we say that he is a being of whom all or infinite attributes are predicated,^ of which attri butes every one is infinitely perfect in its kind. Now, in order to express our views clearly, we shall premise the four following propositions: i. That there is no finite substance, tt but that every substance must be infinitely perfect in its kind, that is to 10 say, that in the infinite understanding of God no substance can be more perfect than that which already exists in Nature.
t The reason is this, since Nothing can have no attributes, the All must have all attributes; and just as Nothing has no attribute because it is Nothing, so that which is Something has attributes because it is Something. Hence, the more it is Something, the more attributes it must have, and consequently God being the most perfect, and all that is Anything, he must also have infinite, perfect, and all attributes. ° ft Once we can prove that there can be no Finite Substance^ then zK substance must without limitation belong to the divine being. We do it thus: i. It must either have limited itself or J some other must have limited it. It could not have done so itself, because having been infinite it would have had to change its whole essence. Nor can it be limited by another: for this again must be either finite or infinite; the former is impossible, therefore the latter; therefore it [i.e., the other thing] is God. He must, then, have made it finite because he lacked either the power or the will [to make it infinite]: but the first [supposition] is contrary to his 30 J B inserts here 2.
i 2. That there are not two like substances.
3. That one substance cannot produce another.
4. That in the infinite understanding of God there is no other substance than that which is formaliter in Nature.
As regards the first, namely, that there is no finite sub stance, &c., should any one want to maintain the opposite, we would ask the following question, namely, whether this substance is finite through itself, whether it has made 10 itself thus finite and did not want to make itself less finite; or whether it is thus finite through its cause, which cause omnipotence, the second is contrary to his goodness. J 2. That there can be no finite substance is clear from this, namely, that, if so, it would necessarily have something which it would have from Nothing, which is impossible. For whence can it derive that wherein it differs from God? Certainly not from God, for he has nothing imperfect or finite, £c. So, whence then but from Nothing? Therefore there is no substance other than infinite. Whence it follows, that there cannot be two like infinite sub- 20 stances; for to posit such necessitates limitation. And from this, again, it follows that one substance cannot produce another; thus: The cause that we might suppose to produce this substance must have the same attribute J J as the one produced, and also either just as much perfection JJJ or more or less. The first supposition is not possible, because there would then be two like [substances]. The second also not, because in that case there would be a finite [substance]. Nor the third, because something cannot come from nothing. — Moreover, if the finite Hl~t came from the infinite, then the infinite JJttt would also be finite, &c.
30 Therefore one substance can not produce another. And from this, again, it follows that all substance must exist "formaliter" for if it did not exist, there would be no possibility for it to come into existence.
J B omits here the next five lines, which it has already given at the end of the last note in the first chapter. H B: attributes. Ill B omits the seven words — "and also...perfection."
Hill B: the cause.
either could not or would not give more? The first i [alternative] is not true, because it is impossible that a substance should have wanted to make itself finite, especially a substance which had come into existence through itself. Therefore, I say, it is made finite by its cause, which is necessarily God. Further, if it is finite through its cause, this must be so either because its cause could not give more, or because it would not give more. That he should not have been able to give more would contradict his omnipotence; f that he should not have been willing 10 to give more, when he could well do so, savours of illwill, which is nowise in God, who is all goodness and perfection.
As regards the second, that there are not two like substances, we prove this on the ground that each substance is perfect in its kind; for if there were two alike they would necesf To say to this that the nature of the thing required such [limitation] and that it could not therefore be otherwise, that is no reply: for the nature of a thing can require nothing while it does not exist. Should you say that one may, nevertheless, see what 20 belongs to the nature of a thing which does not exist: that is true as regards its existence, but by no means as regards its essence. And herein lies the difference between creating and generating. To create is to posit a thing quo ad essentiam et existentiam simul [i.e., to give a thing both essence and existence]; while in the case of generation a thing comes forth quo ad existentiam solam [i.e., it only receives existence]. And therefore there is now in Nature no creation but only generation. So that when God creates he creates at once the nature of the thing with the thing itself. He would therefore show ill-will if (from lack of 30 will, and not of power) he created the thing in such a way that it should not agree with its cause in essence and existence. However, what we here call creation can really not be said ever to have taken place, and it is only mentioned to indicate what we can say about it, if we distinguish between creating and generating.
i sarily limit one another, and would consequently not be infinite, as we t have already shown before.
As to the third, namely, that one substance cannot produce another: should any one again maintain the opposite, we ask whether the cause, which is supposed to produce this substance, has or has not the same attributes as the produced [substance]. The latter is impossible, because something cannot come from nothing; therefore the former. And then we ask whether in the attribute which 10 is presumed to be the cause of this produced [substance], there is just as much perfection as in the produced substance, or less, or more. Less, we say, there cannot be, for the reasons * given* above. More, also not, we say, because in that case this second one would be finite, which is opposed to what has already been proved by us. Just as much, then; they are therefore alike, and It are two like substances, which clearly conflicts with our previous demonstration. Further, that which is created is by no means produced from Nothing, but must necessarily 20 have been produced from something existing. But that something should have come forth from this, and that it should none the less have this something even after it has issued from it, that we cannot grasp with our under standing. Lastly, if we would seek the cause of the substance which is the origin of the things which issue from its attribute, then it behoves us to seek also the cause of that cause, and then again the cause of that cause, et sic in infmitum; so that if we must necessarily stop and halt somewhere, as indeed we must, it is necessary to stop 30 at this only substance.
As regards the fourth, that there is no substance or attribute in the infinite understanding of God other than what exists " formaliter" in Nature, this can be, and is, proved by us: (i) from the infinite power of God, since in him there can I B: I. tJ B has " or," and omits " are."
be no cause by which he might have been induced to i create one sooner or more than another; (2) from the simplicity of his will; (3) because he cannot omit to do what is good, as we shall show afterwards; (4) because it would be impossible for that which does not now exist to come into existence, since one substance cannot produce another. And, what is more, in that case there would be more infinite substances not in existence than there are in existence, which is absurd, t From all this it follows then: that of Nature all in all is predicated, and that consequently 10 Nature consists of infinite attributes, each of which is perfect in its kind. And this is just equivalent to the definition usually given of God.
Against what we have just said, namely, that there is no thing in the infinite understanding of God but what exists formaliter in Nature, some want to argue in this way: If God has created all, then he can create nothing more; but that he should be able to create nothing more conflicts with his omnipotence; therefore...
Concerning the first, we admit that God can create 20 nothing more. And with regard to the second, we say that we own, if God were not able to create all that could be created, then it would conflict with his omnipotence; but that is by no means the case if he cannot create what is self-contradictory; as it is, to say that he has created all, and also that he should be able to create still more. Assuredly it is a far greater perfection in God that he has created all that was in his infinite understanding than if he had not created it, or, as they say, if he had never been able to create it. But why say so much about it? Do they not 30 themselves argue thus, t or must they not argue thus t B omits this sentence.
f That is, whenever we make them argue from this admis sion, namely, that God is omniscient, then they cannot but argue thus.
i * from God's omniscience*: If God is omniscient then he can know nothing more; but that God can know nothing more is incompatible with his perfection; therefore...? But if God has all in his understanding, and, owing to his infinite perfection, can know nothing more, well then, why can we not say that he has also created all that he had in his understanding, and has made it so that it exists or should exist formatter in Nature?
Since, then, we know that all alike is in the infinite 10 understanding of God, and that there is no cause why he should have created this sooner and more than that, and that he could have produced all things in a moment, so let us see, for once, whether we cannot use against them the same weapons which they take up against us; namely, thus: If God can never create so much that he cannot create more, then he can never create what he can create; but that he cannot create what he can create is self-contra dictory. Therefore...20 Now the reasons why we said that all these attributes, which are in Nature, are but one single being, and by no means different things (although we can know them clearly and distinctly the one without the other, and the other without another), are these: 1. Because we have found already before that there must be an infinite and perfect being, by which nothing else can be meant than such a being of which all in all must be predicated. Why? [Because] to a being which has any essence attributes must be referred, and the more 30 essence one ascribes to it, the more attributes also must one ascribe to it, and consequently if a being is infinite then its attributes also must be infinite, and this is just what we call a perfect J being.
2. Because of the unity which we see everywhere in B: an infinite.
Nature. If there were different beings in it t then it would i be impossible for them to unite with one another.
3. Because although, as we have already seen, one substance cannot produce another, and if a substance does not exist it is impossible for it to begin to exist, we see, nevertheless, that in no substance (which we none the less know to exist in Nature), when considered separately, is there any necessity to be real, since existence does not pertain to its separate essence. ft So it must necessarily follow that Nature, which results from no causes, and 10 which we nevertheless know to exist, must necessarily be a perfect being to which existence belongs.
From all that we have so far said it is evident, then, that we posit extension as an attribute of God; and this seems not at all appropriate to a perfect being: for since exten sion is divisible, the perfect being would have to consist of parts, and this is altogether inapplicable to God, because f That is, if there were different substances which were not connected in one only being, then their union would be impossible, because we see clearly that they have nothing at all in common, it 20 is so with thought and extension of which we nevertheless consist.
ft That is, if no substance can be other than real, and yet existence does not follow from its essence, when it is considered by itself, it follows that it is not something independent, but must be something, that is, an attribute, of another thing, namely, the one, only, and universal being. Or thus: All substance is real, and when a substance is considered by itself its existence does not follow from its essence; therefore, no existing substance can be known through itself, but it must belong to something else. That is, when with our understanding we consider " substantial " Thought 30 and ["substantial"] Extension, then we consider them only in their essence and not as existing, that is [we do not consider] that their existence necessarily pertains to their essence. When, however, we prove [of each] that it is an attribute of God, we thereby prove a priori that it exists, and a posteriori (as regards extension alone) [we prove its existence] from the modes which must necessarily have it for their subjectum.
i he is a simple being. Moreover, when extension is divided it is passive, and with God (who is never passive, and cannot be affected by any other being, because he is the first efficient cause of all) this can by no means be the case. To this we reply: (i) that "part" and "whole" are not true or real entities, but only "things of reason," and consequently there are in Nature t neither whole nor parts. (2) A thing composed of different parts must be such that the parts thereof, taken separately, can be conceived and 10 understood one without another. Take, for instance, a clock which is composed of many different wheels, cords, and other things; in it, I say, each wheel, cord, &c., can be f In Nature, that is, in " substantial " Extension; for if this were divided its nature and being would be at once annihilated, as it exists only as infinite extension, or, which comes to the same, it exists only as a whole.
But should you say: is there, in extension, no part prior to all its modes? I say, certainly not. But you may say, since there is motion in matter, it must be in some part of matter, for it cannot 20 be in the whole, because this is infinite; and whither shall it be moved, when there is nothing outside it? Therefore it must be in a part.J My answer is: Motion alone does not exist, but only motion and rest together; and this is in the whole, and must be in it, because there is no part in extension. Should you, however, say that there is, then tell me: if you divide the whole of extension then, as regards any part which you cut off from it in thought, can you also separate it in nature from all [other] parts; and supposing this has been done, I ask, what is there between the part cut offtJ and the rest? You must say, a vacuum, or another body, or something 30 of extension itself; there is no fourth possibility. The first will not do, because there is no vacuum, something positive and yet no body; nor the second, because then there would exist a mode, which cannot be, since JJJ extension as extension is without and prior to all modes. Therefore the third; and then there is no part but only the whole of extension.
J B omits this sentence. H B: separated.
HI B: therefore. HI J B: but extension one and indivisible.
conceived and understood separately, without the com- i posite whole being necessary thereto. Similarly also in the case of water, which consists of straight oblong particles, each part thereof can be conceived and understood, and can exist without the whole; but extension, being a sub stance, one cannot say of it that it has parts, since it can neither diminish nor increase, and no parts thereof can be understood apart, because by its nature it must be infinite. And that it must be such, follows from this, namely, because if it were not such, but consisted of parts, then it would not icr be infinite by its nature, as it is said to be; and it is impossible to conceive parts in an infinite nature, since by their nature all parts are finite. t Add to this still: if it consisted of different parts then it should be intelligible that supposing some parts thereof to be annihilated, extention might remain all the same, and not be annihilated together with the annihilation of some of its parts; this is clearly contradictory in what is infinite by its own nature and can never be, or be conceived, as limited or finite. Further, as regards the parts in Nature, we maintain that 20 division, as has also been said already before, never takes place in substance, but always and only in the mode of substance. Thus, if I want to divide water, I only divide the mode of substance, and not substance itself. And whether this mode is that of water or something else it is always the same.tl Division, then, or passivity, always takes place in the mode; thus when we say that man passes away or is annihilated, then this is understood to apply to man only in so far as he is such a composite being, and a mode of sub stance, and not the substance on which he depends. 30 J B: because all the parts would have to be infinite by their nature.
tt B: when, therefore, I divide water I do not divide the sub stance, but only that mode of the substance, which substance, however variously modified, is always the same.
c * Moreover, we have already stated, and we shall repeat it Inter, that outside God there is nothing at all, and that he is an Immanent Cause. Now, passivity, whenever the agent and the patient are different entities, is a palpable imperfec tion, because the patient must necessarily be dependent on that which has caused the passivity from outside; it has, therefore, no place in God, who is perfect, Furthermore, of such an agent who acts in himself it can never be said that he has the imperfection of a patient, because he is not 10 affected by another; such, for instance, is the case with the understanding, which, as the philosophers also assert, is the cause of its ideas, since, however, it is an immanent cause, what right has one to say that it is imperfect, howsoever frequently it is affected by itself? t Lastly, since substance is [the cause] and the origin of all its modes, it may with far greater right be called an agent than a patient. And with these remarks we consider all adequately answered.
It is further objected, that there must necessarily be a first cause which sets body in motion, because when at rest 20 it is impossible for it to set itself in motion. And since it is clearly manifest that rest and motion exist in Nature, these must, they think, necessarily result from an external cause. But it is easy for us to reply to this; for we concede that, if body were a thing existing through itself, and had no other attributes than length, breadth, and depth, then, if it really rested there would be in it no cause whereby to begin to move itself; but we have already stated before that Nature is a being of which all attributes are predicated, and this being so, it can be lacking in nothing wherewith to 30 produce all that there is to be produced.
Having so far discussed what God is, we shall say but a word, as it were, about his attributes: that those which are known to us consist of two only, namely, Thought and I B: And although the understanding, as the philosophers say, is a cause of its ideas, yet, since it is an immanent cause, &c.
Extension; for here we speak only of attributes which i might be called the proper attributes of God,! through which we come to know him [as he is] in himself, and not [merely] as he acts [towards things] outside himself. All else, then, that men ascribe to God beyond these two attributes, all that (if it otherwise pertains to him) must be either an " extraneous denomination," such as that he exists through himself, is Eternal, One, Immutable, &c., or, I say, has reference to his activity, such as that he is a cause, predes tines, and rules all things: all which are properties of God, 10 but give us no information as to what he is. But how and in what manner these attributes can nevertheless have a place in God we shall explain in the following chapters. But, for the better understanding of this!! and in further exposition thereof,!!! we have thought it well * and have decided * to add the following arguments consisting of a [Dialogue.]
B: which may truly be called God's attributes.
B: of the foregoing.!!! B: of what we mean to say.
[FIRST] DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE UNDERSTANDING, LOVE, REASON, AND DESIRE LOVE. I see, Brother, that both my essence and perfection depend on your perfection; and since the perfection of the object which you have conceived is your perfection, while from yours again mine proceeds, so tell me now, I pray you, whether you have conceived such a being as is supremely perfect, not capable of being limited by any other, and in 10 which I also am comprehended.
UNDERSTANDING. I for my part consider Nature only in its totality as infinite, and supremely perfect, but you, if you have any doubts about it, ask Reason, she will tell you.
REASON. To me the truth of the matter is indubitable, for if we would limit Nature then we should, absurdly enough, have to limit it with a mere Nothing; I we avoid this absurdity by stating that it is OneEternal Unity, infinite, omnipotent, &c., that is, that Nature is infinite and that all is contained 20 therein; and the negative of this we call Nothing.
DESIRE. Ah indeed! it is wondrously congruous to sup pose that Unity is in keeping with the Difference which I observe everywhere in Nature. But how? I see that think ing substance has nothing in common with extended sub stance, and that the one limits [not] the other; and if, in addi tion to these substances, you want to posit yet a third one which is perfect in all respects, then look how you involve J A and B continue: moreover under the following attributes, namely, that it is One, Eternal, infinite through itself; we UNDERSTANDING, LOVE, REASON, &c. 33 yourself in manifest contradictions; for if this third one is i placed outside the first two, then it is wanting in all the attributes which belong to those two, but this can never be the case with a whole outside of which there is nothing. Moreover if this being is omnipotent and perfect, then it must be such because it has made itself, and not because another has made it; that, however, which could produce both itself and yet another besides would be even more omnipotent. And lastly, if you call it omniscient then it is necessary that it should know itself; and, at the same time, you must know 10 that the knowledge of oneself alone is less than the know ledge of oneself together with the knowledge of other sub stances. All these are manifest contradictions. I would, therefore, have advised Love to rest content with what I show her, and to look about for no other things.
LOVE. What now, O dishonourable one, have you shown me but what would result in my immediate ruin. For, if I had ever united myself with what you have shown me, then from that moment I should have been persecuted by the two archenemies of the human race, namely, Hatred and 20 Remorse, and sometimes also by Oblivion; and therefore I turn again to Reason only to proceed and stop the mouths of these foes.
REASON. What you say, O Desire, that there are different substances, that, I tell you, is false; for I see clearly that there is but One, which exists through itself, and is a support to all other attributes. And if you will refer to the material and the mental as substances, in relation to the modes which are dependent on them, why then, you must also call them modes in relation to the substance t on which they depend: 3° for they are not conceived by you as existing through them selves. And in the same way that willing, feeling, under standing, loving, &c., are different modes of that which you call a thinking substance, in which you bring together and t A: substances; B: substance.
i unite all these in one, t so I also conclude, from your own proofs, that Both Infinite Extension and Thought together with all other infinite attributes (or, according to your usage, other substances) are only modes of the One, Eternal, Infinite Being, who exists through himself; and from all these we posit, as stated, An Only One or a Unity outside which nothing can be imagined to be. J} DESIRE. Methinks I see a very great confusion in this argu ment of yours; for, it seems you will have it that the whole 10 must be something outside of or apart from its parts, which is truly absurd. For all philosophers are unanimous in saying that " whole " is a second notion, and that it is nothing in Nature apart from human thought. Moreover, as I gather from your example, you confuse whole with cause: for, as I say, the whole only consists of and [exists] through its parts, and so it comes that you represent the thinking power as a thing on which the Understanding, Love, &c., depend. But you cannot call it a Whole, only a Cause of the Effects just named by you.
20 REASON. I see decidedly how you muster all your friends against me, and that, after the method usually adopted by those who oppose the truth, you are designing to achieve by quibbling what you have not been able to accomplish with your fallacious reasoning. But you will not succeed in winning Love to your side by such means. Your assertion, then, is, that the cause (since it is the Originator of the effects) must therefore be outside these. But you say this because you only know of the transeunt and not of the immanent cause, which by no means produces anything outside itself, 30 as is exemplified by the Understanding, which is the cause of its ideas. And that is why I called the understanding