Spinoza here opposes the view of Descartes, who (De Pass. An. III. 194) considered gratitude "always virtuous as one of the chief bonds of human society." In the Ethics (IV. li.) Spinoza says that " Favour is not opposed to reason, but may agree with it, and arise from it"; and (IV. Ixxi.) that " only those who are free are most grateful to one another."
CHAPTER XIV 99. Ethics, III. Aff. Def. xxxii.: " Grief (Desiderium) is the desire or longing to possess something, which [desire] is fostered by the memory of the thing, and at the same time restrained by the memory of other things which exclude the existence of the thing longed for."
99, 15 ff. This was most probably meant to be a new chapter, dealing with the feelings generally from Spinoza's own peculiar point of view.
99, 16. Note the equivalence of "True Belief" and " Reason." Cf. p. 74, note.
99, i8/. Spinoza here repeats his protest against the Car tesian view that the passions are determined by the move ments of the " vital spirits." Cf. p. 69, line 26 /.
99, 20 ff. This is also in opposition to Descartes, who denied that the soul had any direct control over the passions (De Pass. An. I. 45). Cf. Ethics, V. xx. Schol.: " The power of the mind is determined solely by knowledge, while its impotence or passion is measured solely by the privation of knowledge "; and the knowledge of God (Spinoza adds) enables us to reduce the passions to a minimum, if not to destroy them.
100, 5/. According to Descartes (ibid. III. 211), "all pas sions are by nature good"; it is only their abuse that is bad.
100, ii ff. Cf. Tract, de Intel Emend, (p. 5): " All happiness or unhappiness depends on this alone, namely, on the kind of object to which we are attached by love. For on account of that which is not loved no strife will ever arise, there will be no sorrow if it perishes, no jealousy if it is possessed by another, no fear, no hatred, and, in a word, no mental com motion; all which arise, indeed, when we love what is perishable...But love for an object eternal and infinite feeds the mind with unmixed joy."
100, 29 ff. Cf. Ethics, V. xx. Schol.: " Love towards an object immutable and eternal " " can always become greater and greater, and occupy the greatest part of the mind, and affect it through and through."
CHAPTER XV 102, 6 ff. Truth and Falsity are similarly defined in Cog. Metaph. I. vi., and in Ethics, I. Ax. 6. In the Tract, de Intel. Emend, (p. 1 1 /.), however, a different view of Truth appears, in which no reference is made to "agreement " or " corre spondence " with things. To have a true idea is to have objective the essentia formalis of the thing thought about (the ideatum). This view is developed also in Ethics, II. xxxiv., &c., where "true" ideas are identified with "ade quate " ideas, " false " ideas with " inadequate " ones. Cf. Ethics, II. xliii.
102, 10 ff. Cf. Descartes, Med. III. (Veitch, p. 118): "With respect to ideas, if these are considered only in themselves, and are not referred to any object beyond them, they cannot, properly speaking, be false; for, whether I imagine a goat or a chimera, it is not less true that I imagine the one than the other."
102, 15. Descartes (Princ. Phil. I. Ix.-lxii.— Veitch, pp. 219 ff.) speaks of three kinds of Distinctions, namely, real, modal, and logical. A real distinction is that between two substances; a modal distinction is " that between the mode properly so called and the substance of which it is a mode, or that between two modes of the same substance"; while a logical distinction, or a distinction of reasonf "is that between a substance and some one of its attributes...or between two such attributes of a common substance, the one of which we essay to think without the other " — " for example, duration is distinct from substance only in thought (ratione), because a substance which ceases to endure ceases also to exist." Similarly Spinoza — see p. 237.
102, 20 /. This question, it may be noted at once, is not answered in this chapter, but in the next (p. no, lines 1-5). Most probably the passage containing the answer was intended to come at the end of this chapter.
102, 23 /. Cf. Ethics, II. xliii. Schol.: " Just as light reveals both itself and the darkness, so truth is the standard of itself and of the false " (sicut lux seipsam et tenebras manifestat, sic veritas norma sui et falsi est). Compare also Tr. de Intel. Em. (p. n): "To be sure of a truth no sign is necessary, only just the possession of the true idea: for, as we have shown, in order that I may know, it is not necessary for me to know that I know."
103, 12 ff. The same thought recurs in the Tr. de Intel. Em. (p. 15), where it is even more evident that Spinoza is thinking of Descartes, who (Med. III. — Veitch, p. 99) made the occurrence of dreams a ground for his preliminary scepticism.
103, 18-21. The falsity of an idea, according to Spinoza, is not due to any positive element, but to the " inadequacy " or fragmentariness of the idea; the true or "adequate" idea is therefore richer, or has more essence, than the false one.
103, 23. The word verstaan, or the verb intettigere, is active, not passive.
103, 24. The expression " passivity " must not be taken too literally here. The explanation which follows immediately seems to suggest that what Spinoza meant was simply that the sequence of our ideas is not due to any arbitrary volition on our part, but is necessary. It is true that the sentence beginning line 26 appears to suggest a kind of sensationalist view, namely, that the things outside us produce the ideas in us; and there are similar passages in chapters xvi. and xix. (see p. 109, lines 2 ff., and p. 123, lines 29 /.). On the other hand, the explanation of error in chapter xvi. (p. 1 10, lines i ff.) shows a very different view of human knowledge, a view more like that explained in the Ethics, where he insists on the spontaneity of ideation, in opposition to the view that ideas are " dumb pictures on a tablet " (II. xlix. Schol.). Possibly Spinoza may have been thinking of the immanent necessity in the sequence of our ideas or judgments. And in the case of immanent causality the usual distinction between activity and passivity disappears. See what he actually says on p. 30, lines 8-14. It is, of course, quite easy to suppose that Spinoza's theory of knowledge went through a com plete change — that he began by conceiving knowledge to be merely passive, and ended by regarding it as eminently active. But the easier interpretation is not always the more accurate one. What Spinoza really intended to oppose was, I think, the Cartesian conception of judgment as an arbi trary act of volition (Med. IV.). On p. 109, lines 6 ff., Spinoza seems to be dealing expressly with this view of Descartes. (For a discussion of this problem see Trendelenburg, Freudenthal's Spinozastudien, and Gebhardt.)
104, i ff. The sentence in brackets presents some difficulty. The Dutch is " (ah door weinige of minder toevoeginge in [B: toevoegingen van dien~\ 't zelve gewaar wordende)." The word "toevoeginge" seems hardly appropriate in any case. Sigwart translates it " Affectionen," Schaarschmidt " Anregungen." This is quite plausible, inasmuch as "toevoegen " is used for " addressing some one," and it may accordingly be rendered by "stimuli." This translation, however, makes the word in in A wrong, while the sentence in brackets is a mere repetition of what precedes. But as " toevoegen " literally means " to add," it seems quite pos sible that " toevoeginge " may have been a rather clumsy translation of attributa or accidentia in the wider sense of " qualities." If so, the passage can be rendered thus: "(as becoming aware of it only through a few or the less im portant of the attributes in it [or "of its attributes"])." Dr. W. Meyer has paraphrased this passage in the same way, taking toevoeging as = toeeigening, or attribute.
CHAPTER XVI CHAPTER XVI 105. According to Freudenthal this chapter is misplaced. The substance of one part of it — namely, p. 109, line 21, to p. 1 10, line 8 — should have been given at the end of chapter xv., ascontainingthe answer to thequestion raised on p. 102, lines 20 /. But the rest of the present chapter, and also chapters xvii. and xviii., should follow chapter xx. For chapter xix. deals with the question " wherein the well-being of a perfect man consists," and chapter xvi. (p. 105, line 4) assumes that the question has already been dealt with. Per contra, chapter xix. seems to assume an immediately preceding discussion on the advantages of " true belief," and such a discussion is found in chapter xv. As chapters xix. and xx. obviously go together, they should both follow chapter xv.; and be followed by chapters xvi.-xviii. So rearranged, the con nection of ideas would be as follows: the discussion of truth and falsity (or, briefly, of knowledge) serves as an introduction to chapters xix. and xx., where it is shown that knowledge is the cause of the passions, but that these may be mastered by a knowledge of God. This raises the ques tion discussed in chapters xvi. and xvii., namely, whether such a self-emancipation from the passions is the effect of volun tary effort, or the necessary result of inevitable causes. And chapter xviii. (which, according to Freudenthal, originally concluded the whole Treatise)rounds off the whole discussion with a consideration of the moral value of the highest knowledge.
105, 10. Desire: see p. 73, lines 4 ff. In Ethics, III. ix. Schol., Desire is defined as "appetitus cum ejusdem conscientia," and appetitus as " ipsa hominis essentia, e% cujus natura ea, qucz ipsius conservationi inserviunt, necessario sequuntur"; in short (III. Aff. Def. i.), Desire denotes "all the strivings, impulses, appetites, and volitions of man."
107, iff. Cf. Ethics, II. xlviii. and xlix.
108, i. "Idea" — that is, a general idea or abstraction derived from particular acts of volition.
108, 7. " This " = " that it is unnecessary to ask whether the will is free." The opening of this paragraph in A is somewhat obscure. B is much clearer (see lines 32 ff.).
108, i6ff. This was a common doctrine among medieval philosophers; it is found in the writings of Thomas Aquinas, Peter Lombard, and others. Scaliger, e.g., says: " Conservatio est qucedam veluti perpetua generatio" (Exerc. 31, quoted by Freudenthal in Sp. u. d. Schol.). The same thought is also found in Crescas. Cf. Descartes, Med. III.
109, 6 ff. Spinoza is probably referring here to the Cartesian view that to have an idea is one thing, to make an affirmation or denial about it is another and depends on our free will. Spinoza identifies volition with affirmation and denial, but denies that it is free. The ideas necessitate certain affirmations or denials. Thinking is thus identified with judging. Cf. Ethics, II. xlix. Schol.
CHAPTER XVII ^. Spinoza's reference to the Aristotelian distinc tion between /SoJArjo-/? (voluntas), and tTriOvjULia (voluptas) is most probably based on Scholastic accounts. In DC Anima, III. ix., Aristotle distinguishes within the conative faculty (TO 6/o£/cn/coV= Spinoza's cupiditas, line 12) rational desire ({3ov\r)cri$) from irrational desire (tTriOvjuLia), and this distinction recurs also in III. x. and in the Rhetoric, 112, 19 ff. Spinoza's attitude towards the Aristotelian view is not expressed clearly. Since Spinoza identifies volition with affirmation and negation and Aristotle with desire, they really mean different things, although they use the same term (will). This seems to be the meaning of the sentence in question.
CHAPTER XVIII 115, 10 ff. Cf. Ethics, II. xlix. Schol. Trendelenburg has pointed out that in Plato's Euthyphron man is similarly described as the slave of God. There is a vast difference, however. In Plato's dialogue it is only " the ministration called holiness " (that is, sacrificing and praying to the Gods, as distinguished from Justice, which is service to men) that is described as " of the same nature as that which slaves render to their master." Spinoza is not thinking at all of such restricted " divine service," but of the whole life and conduct of man.
116, 26 ff. Probably an allusion to i John, iv. 13: " Hereby know we that we dwell in Him, and He in us, because He hath given us of His spirit." This verse was subsequently put by Spinoza on the title-page of his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus.
117, i ff- Cf. Burgersdijck (Inst. Log. cap. xvii.): " Instrumentarum essentia posita est in aptitudine ad usum...Sic securis eatenus securis est, quatenus materice qualitate et forma apta est adsecandum."
117, 12 ff. Cf. Browning's Last Ride Together; or Tenny son's Wages: " Glory of Virtue, to fight, to struggle, to right the wrong-Nay, but she aimed not at glory, no lover of glory she: Give her the glory of going on, and still to be.
She desires no isles of the blest, no quiet seats of the just, To rest in a golden grove, or to bask in a summer sky: Give her the wages of going on, and not to die."
CHAPTER XIX 118. According to Freudenthal this chapter, and the next, should have been placed immediately after chapter xv. See the first note to chapter xvi. (p. 223).
118, 26 /. Allusion to Romans iii. 20^.: " By the works of the law shall no man be justified in His sight: for through the law cometh the knowledge of sin. But now apart from the law a righteousness of God hath been manifested...even the righteousness of God through faith in Jesus Christ unto all them that believe;...being justified freely by His grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus." See Intro duction, p. cxxvi.
118, 30 /. " Know and enjoy." Probably a reminiscence of Biblical language, as in Psalm xxxiv. 8: "0 taste and see that the Lord is good."
119, 18$. It was on account of Descartes' initial scep ticism that Spinoza felt it necessary to prove the existence of material bodies. " A body " = Extension, or Matter.
119, 27^. This paragraph appears, at first sight, to be directed against Occasionalism — the view, namely, that our perception of a body is produced in our mind by the direct action of God on the " occasion " of the presence of such a body. But there is no other evidence of Spinoza's acquaint ance with Occasionalism. It maybe that Spinoza was only thinking of the " omnipotent demon " who, as Descartes suggested (Med. I)., might be deluding us with fancies of apparently material bodies. The context, dealing as it does with Descartes' scepticism, seems to me to confirm this.
119, 34. The reference to the " first chapter " seems to be in accurate. The passage to which reference is made is supposed to show that there is nothing outside God (and that, therefore, no such demon can exist). This is done, not in the first chapter, but in the first Dialogue (also in chapter ii. Book I.).
120, i ff. In various parts of the Short Treatise, but espe cially in this chapter and the next, Spinoza deals with the relation between mind and body. Only indirectly, how ever, or incidentally — for his main inquiry is ethical, not psychological, in character. It is regrettable that he did not discuss the problem for its own sake, because in that case he would have expressed his views more clearly and consistently than he has done in these incidental discussions which originated on different occasions, and had different aims. As it is, we seem to have here several different views on the relation between mind and body. And as we have no independent knowledge of the chronological orders, or of the geological formation (so to say) of the parts of the Treatise, it is impossible to speak with absolute confidence of the actual order or sequence among these views. It seems reasonable, however, to suppose that their logical order is also more or less representative of their chrono logical sequence. His final view, we take it, was what has since become familiar as that of psycho-physical parallelism. This view is the one adopted in the Ethics, though with occasional lapses. The other views may be regarded as leading up to this one.
Now, in the first place, do body and mind interact? In some passages the view expressed or implied is that they do. Body acts on mind (p. 103, lines 26 ff.; 112, 26; 119, 7 ff.; 122, 26 ff.; 129, I5/., &c.); and mind acts on body, or, at all events, the soul can move its own body (129, 6 /.), and through it also other bodies (130, 12 ff.). In other passages, however, this view, apparently, of direct interaction is con siderably modified, if not denied. The mind, we are told, cannot affect even its own body, except through the media tion of the " vital spirits," whose movements it cannot ini tiate or terminate, but only control or direct (121, 2 ff., 28 ff.; 127, 10 ff.); nor can body act directly on mind without the intervention of " vital spirits" (122, 4 #.)• And this, of course, is the Cartesian view (see note to 95, 22 — p. 216).
Spinoza, however, was not satisfied with this solution. After all, the " vital spirits " were physical, and one might just as well suppose that mind can interact with body as with them. We find, accordingly, a new solution of the problem. Mind and body can affect each other, because they are mere modes of one and the same whole, or substance (127, 34^.; 121, 9 ff.). This answer may have suggested yet another point of view from which the problem itself disappeared.
So far the reality of interaction of some sort was assumed, the problem being to explain it. And Spinoza tried to do so, first by invoking " spirits," and then by his conception of a " whole," in which mind and body were most intimately united. The ultimate " whole," according to Spinoza, is Substance, of which Extension and Thought are co-attri butes. These stand in no causal relationship to each other; they are, so to say, collateral expressions of the same reality; the one does not cause the other, but simply is the other — that is, another or parallel aspect of the same reality. Similarly, mind and body are really one whole, merely a double-faced mode of substance; mind does not affect body, nor body mind; the one simply is the other — that is, a parallel aspect of the same reality. So there is really no interaction — and no problem. This view is expressed, though not adequately, in the passage now under con sideration (pp. 120, 121; cf. Ethics, II. vii. and III. ii.).
The theory of psycho-physical parallelism, first enunciated by Spinoza, did not receive the attention which it merited until some two centuries afterwards, but has held its ground since then as the favourite working-hypothesis among psychologists. (For a fuller account see Freudenthal, Ueber die Entwicklung der Lehre vom psychophysischen Parallelismus bei Spinoza.)
120, 12 ff. Cf. Ethics, II. xiii.
120, 21 ff. Cf. Ethics, II. Lemma iii., and III. ii.
120, 22. "Rest" (fipwia) was regarded by Aristotle (De Ccelo, II.), not as the mere absence of motion, but as its positive contrary; that is to say (in more modern language), not as the mere absence of energy of motion, but as the presence of energy of position. This positive conception of "rest" is also found in Descartes' Principia, II.; in Med.j III., however, Descartes speaks as though " rest " were the mere absence of motion, as darkness is of light. Note t (p. 120) may have been directed against this suggestion.
124,3. " Object " = object of thought. The sentence is awkwardly expressed, but the meaning is clear.
CHAPTER XX 126, 18. "Their form..." The Dutch is haar, which generally means " their," but is used by Spinoza also for the singular. If translated by " its," the reference would be to the body. But cf. p. 127, line 5.
127, 21 ff. Similarly Descartes, Princ. Phil. IV. cxc.
230 GOD; MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING 127, 34^. This long note, as Sigwart has shown, contains various suggestions which Spinoza subsequently elaborated in the Ethics (II. xi.-xxxii.).
128, 6-9. " We have also said..." Not in this Treatise as we now have it. The part referred to must have been lost.
128, 12-17. " PaSe — •" The numbers of the pages referred to are not given in the MS. Nor is it easy to find suitable passages for most of them. The third proposition is not proved in this Treatise at all. The references are probably either to lost parts, or to parts which Spinoza intended to write, but did not.
128, 25 /. "Has an idea" — that is, an adequate idea, as explained immediately afterwards.
129, 9 /. " Paul " and " Peter " should probably change places.
129, 20 ff. This sentence seems irrelevant. Perhaps the difference in our ideas of the same object was intended as a proof of their imperfection, of which the preceding sentence speaks.
129, 33. The words idea reflexiva seem to be quite irre levant here, and the version which they suggested to Monnikhoff is wrong. Sigwart has suggested that the error may be due to the fact that on p. 162, lines I3/., Spinoza passes at once from the explanation of " feeling " to the idea reflexiva (self-consciousness), and this transition may have been misunderstood by the copyist, or by a reader.
130, 3. "Soul" = the soul of Nature—*'.*., the infinite CHAPTER XXI 131, According to Freudenthal, this and the following five chapters are later additions to the Short Treatise, which originally concluded with what is now chapter xviii. See the first note to chapter xvi. (p. 223). The addition of these last six chaplers; Freudenthal thinks, was necessitated by Spinoza's (later) distinction between Reason and Under standing (or Intuition, which is the highest kind of knowledge).
The views found in the present chapter are developed much more fully in Ethics, IV. ix.-xvii.
131, 4^. In Ethics, IV.xvii. SchoL, Spinoza quotes Ovid's well-known utterance (Metam. vii. 20), Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor, and takes Ecclesiastes, i. 18 (" He that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow ") to refer to such cases.
131, 31. What does " for, &c.," refer to? Possibly to the next sentence in the text (p. 132, lines 2 ff.). So, at all events, Monnikhoff seems to have understood it, for instead of " See pages...," B has " See above." But the passages referred to by A are not irrelevant to the note as a whole, and were most probably not meant to refer only to the last sentence of the note.
CHAPTER XXII CHAPTER XXII 133. The " fourth kind of knowledge "—see pp. 67-69, and the notes on them. Sigvvart cites several passages from Heereboord's Logic which appear at first to express a view very like Spinoza's on knowledge as a bond of union between man and God. There is, however, a fundamental diffe rence between the two views. The knowledge to which Heereboord refers is discursive knowledge, or what Spinoza calls " Reason," while Spinoza refers to " intuitive " know ledge, which is almost mystical in character. The view of Heereboord, it may be remarked, is already found in Maimonides and other medieval Aristotelians.
134, 7/. "That same thing" = Nature (line 6) or God (see line 10), or possibly the " thinking thing " — i.e., the attribute Thought (see lines 157. and p. 64, lines 20 /.). The meaning is ultimately the same in any case. It may be that the sentence is imperfect, and (as suggested by Dr. W. Meyer) the following words should be inserted after " in " (line 7): " the thinking thing, which idea is..."
134, 18. The expression "cause" is not quite accurate here. What is meant (as the context shows) is that, corre sponding to that mode in the Attribute Extension called our body, there is a mode in the Attribute Thought called our soul; but it is not the body that " produces " the soul (the Attribute Thought does that), it is only in a certain sense the " occasion" of its existence. Note ft was obviously intended to correct the false suggestion of the word " cause." Possibly the note was made, not by Spinoza, but by some reader.
CHAPTER XXIII 136. Cf. p. 65, lines 31 ff.; also Ethics, V. xxi.-xxiii., xxxiii. /., xxxviii. /. (In the Cogitata Metaphysica, II. xii., the soul is said to be immortal because it is a substance, and a substance cannot destroy itself, nor be destroyed by any other created substance. But this reasoning was obviously not intended to represent Spinoza's own views.)
Joel has rightly drawn attention to a certain similarity in the views of Spinoza and Maimonides on Immortality. According to both Maimonides and Spinoza, Immortality (in the higher sense) is not something which is the com mon right of all, independently of the lives they actually live, but rather a gift that has to be acquired by leading a life not only of moral uprightness, but also of strenuous effort after the highest kind of knowledge. Very similar to their view on Immortality is also their view on Providence.
CHAPTER XXIV 138, 8. " What there is..." The Dutch is wot daar af is en te zeggen zoude zijn [ B: wat daar af is, en van het zelfde zou te zeggen zijn']. The construction seems to be con fused; but the meaning is clear.
138, 13 ff. Cf. Ethics, V. xvii. (Deus expers est passionum, nee ullo Lcetitice aut Tristitice affectu afficitur) and xix. (Qui Deum amat, conari non potest, ut Deus ipsum contra amet).
138, 27 ff. Cf. Ethics, V. xxxvi. and xl. Schol.: "...Our mind, in so far as it understands, is an eternal mode of Thought, which is determined by another mode of Thought, and this again by another, et sic in infmitum; so that all taken together constitute the eternal and infinite intellect of God."
139, 4ff. Cf. Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, chapters iv., xvi., and xix.
140, 21 ff. The following passage from Maimonides (Guide, III. liv. p. 395) throws some light on this paragraph (and also on parts of chapter xxiii.): "Even this [moral per fection] is only a preparation for another perfection, and is not sought for its own sake. For all moral principles con cern the relation of man to his neighbour...Imagine a person being all alone, and...all his good moral principles...are not required...These principles are only necessary and useful when man comes in contact with others. The fourth kind of perfection is the true perfection of man; the possession of the highest intellectual faculties; the possession of...true metaphysical notions concerning God. With this perfection man attains to his final end;...it gives him immortality; and makes him what is (properly) called Man."
141, 5^. Cf. Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, i. vi. xiii.
CHAPTER XXV 143. Cf. Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, ii.
As already stated in the Introduction, this chapter on Devils played an important role in the recovery of the Short Treatise. Kindness shown even to the devil is not wasted. Devils and spirits of all sorts and conditions were very real things in those days; Spinoza's quiet humour is much in advance of his time. In an earlier draft of the Treatise this chapter may have had a different place, for it is referred to as chapter xxi. by Hallmann.
143, 15 ff. In Ethics, II. xxx., Spinoza says, on the contrary, that " the duration of our body does not depend upon its essence...but...upon the common order of nature and the constitution of things."
CHAPTER XXVI 144,8. B omits the words " through reason..."probably because the copyist (Monnikhoff) noticed that it had not been shown how "our blessedness" is attained " through reason." See note to 128, 12-17 (p. 230).
144, 18 ff. Cf. Ethics, V. xlii.: " Blessedness is not virtue's reward, but virtue itself...The more a mind delights in the love of God...the more does it understand, that is, the greater power has it over its feelings, and the less does it suffer from evil passions."
144, 22 ff. Cf. Ethics, V. xli.: " Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal we should still hold Piety and Religion to be of first importance...The creed of the multitude appears to be different. For most people seem to believe that they are free only in so far as they are permitted to indulge in lustfulness...Piety and Religion...they believe to be burdens..." It is only the hope of reward and the fear pf punishment after death that induce them to submit to the divine law. If they believed that minds perish with the body they would follow their own sweet will, and obey chance desires rather than themselves. But "this seems to be no less absurd than the conduct of a man who, because he does not believe that he can feed his body with good food to all eternity, decides to stuff himself with poisonous and deadly drugs; or because he sees that the mind is not eternal or immortal, therefore prefers to be mad and live without reason."
145, 8 ff. The parable of the fish (as Joel has pointed out) was probably suggested to Spinoza by the following Talmudical legend (Babylonian Talmud, Berachot, 6ib — quoted by Joel). In the reign of Hadrian the Romans prohibited the Jews to study the Law. Rabbi Akiba, however, persisted in studying and teaching it. And when a certain Pappos warned him of the danger that threatened him, he replied with the following parable: A fox on the banks of a river saw many fishes hurrying away from a certain spot. Asking them why they fled, he was told that they were afraid of the nets which had just been spread for them. " Come, then," suggested the fox, " come out, and let us live together on land, even as our forefathers did." " What! " exclaimed the fishes, " if even in our own element we can only live in fear and dread, what shall we do on land, which to us spells death?" Even so, said Rabbi Akiba, is it with the Jews. The Law is our element, for it is written, "It is thy life and the length of thy days." If danger lurks in the study of the Law, a yet greater danger lurks in the neglect thereof.
145, 28 /. Cf. Hosea, xi. 4: "I drew them...with bands of love" In the Ethics, V. xxxvi. Schol., Spinoza says that human Salvation, or Blessedness or Freedom, consists in " a constant and eternal love towards God."
146, ii /. Cf. Ethics, V. xl.: " The more perfect a thing is the more reality it possesses, and consequently acts more and suffers less."
146, 16 ff. Cf. Ethics, I. xxviii. and III. iv.
147, 5/. "Whole," however, is only an ens rationis, and does not adequately express the actual relationship of God to finite beings.
147, 9 ff. Cf. Ethics, V. xxxviii. xl. Here it is maintained that the greater our union with God is, the greater is our activity; in the Ethics we see the converse of this, namely, the more active we are (or the more we understand) the more are we united with God.
147, 31 ff. Cf. Ethics, IV. xxxii.-xxxvii.
148, 3 /. The Dutch is not very clear: hoe 't zij, of niet zij, ik ben gehouwen of geslaagen, dit 's klaar.
148, 35 ff. This note is apparently just a marginal sum mary.
149, 12 ff. Cf. Letter XV., and the Introduction, pp. cxxiv. ff.
APPENDICES APPENDIX I 153. This gives a " geometric " version of the first half of chapter ii. Part I. It is remarkable that no Definitions are given, although they are really essential features of the "geometric method." Spinoza, however, made good the omission not only in the Ethics, but already in a brief essay (very similar to this Appendix) which he sent to Oldenburg, whose first letter to Spinoza and the latter's reply thereto have already been referred to in the Introduction (pp. Ixiv. /., cxxiii.). In the course of his reply Spinoza remarks that he thought it best to state his explanations also separately in the geometric form, and that he was enclosing it for Oldenburg's perusal and criticism. Unfortunately the enclosed essay has been lost. The correspondence (Letters 1 1. -IV.), however, leaves little doubt about the contents of that essay, which Sigwart has reconstructed as follows: I. DEFINITIONES 1. Deum definio esse Ens constans infmitis attributis quorum unumquodque est infmitum sive summe perjectum in suo genere.
2. Per attributum intelligo omne id quod concipitur per se et in se, adeo ut ipsius conceptus non involvat conceptum alterius rei. Ut ex, gr. extensio per se et in se concipitur; at motus non item. Nam concipitur in alio, et ipsius conceptus involvit extensionem.
3. Ea res dicitur in suo genere infmita, qua alia ejusdem natura non terminatur. Sic corpus non terminatur cogitationc, nee cogitatio cor pore.
4. Per substantiam intelligo id, quod per se et in se con cipitur, hoc est cujus conceptus non involvit conceptum alteriiis rei.
5. Per modificationem sive per accidens intelligo id, quod in alio est et per id, in quo est, concipitur.
II. AXIOM ATA 1. Substantia est prior natura. suis accidentibus.
2. Prater substantias el accidentia nil datur realiter, sive extra intellectum.
3. Res qua diversa habent attributa, nihil habent inter se commune.
4. Rerum qua nihil habent inter se commune, una alterius causa csse non pot est.
Q III. PROPOSITIONES 1. In rerum natura non possunt existere duce substantia ejusdem attributi.
2. Substantia non potest produci [neque ab alia quacumque substantia] t sed de ipsius essentia est existere.
3. Omnis substantia debet esse infinita sive summe perfecta in suo genere.
There was also a Scholium like Schol. 2 in Ethics, I. viii., but it is difficult to restore the text of it.
The first Appendix was probably a first draft of the above essay (1661), in which Definitions were added, while the rest was abridged.
153, 6/. In the Cogitata Metaphysica (II. v.) Spinoza enumerates three kinds of " distinctions." Rerum distinctio triplex, Realis, Modalis, Rationis. The explanations which he adds are the same as those given by Descartes. See note 153, 19 /. Axiom 7 looks suspicious. It is really only a repetition of Axiom i. Possibly it was only a reader's note on Axiom i, but was incorporated in the text by an uncritical copyist. The suspicion is confirmed by the fact that no use is made of it in what follows.
APPENDIX II 157, 3 ff. Cf. pp. 63 /., 127 ff. note. Observe the omission here of the argument that man is not a substance.
On p. 24 (lines 31 ff.) it was maintained that whatever is in the infinite understanding of God must actually exist; here (lines 18 ff.) we have the converse assertion, namely, that whatever is real must have its idea in the attribute Thought.