One is inclined to ask whether codex A may not be identical with the manuscript which Rieuwertsz is reported to have shown to Stolle and Hallmann in 1703. But the terms of the report make it uncertain whether that manu script purported to be in Spinoza's own handwriting or in that of the bookseller's father. And, in any case, the state ment, in the preface on the title-page, that the Short Treatise was originally written in Latin, could scarcely have escaped their eyes, and, since they undoubtedly report that the manuscript was in Dutch just as Spinoza had at first com posed it, the probability is that it was a different copy which they then saw. There is no doubt, however, that manu script copies of the Short Treatise were extant, among various friends and readers of Spinoza, at the end of the seventeenth century, and codex A is most likely one of these manuscripts.
Both A and B, however, purport to be only translations, or copies of a translation, from the Latin, and not copies of a Dutch original. This is also confirmed by an examination of the text of the manuscripts, which contains various mistakes that can only be explained on the supposition that they are mistranslations from the Latin. Some of these will be indicated in the notes.
cxviii INTRODUCTION cxviii INTRODUCTION Again, codex A cannot be the original copy even of a translation, because it contains several mistakes which can only be accounted for on the supposition that they are misreadings of Dutch words, writing (for example) alderwijste (wisest) where the context requires aldervrijste (freest). And codex B has far too much in common with A to be regarded, with any plausibility, as giving an independent translation of the Short Treatise. Prima facie the most plausible sup position is that A is itself a copy of an older manuscript, and that B is more or less a copy of A, and this suggestion is in large measure also confirmed by more internal evidence.
§3. THE TWO MANUSCRIPTS COMPARED In the main, both manuscripts give practically the same translation of the Short Treatise, although there are numerous minor differences, most of which are indicated in the present translation. In neatness of appearance and smooth ness of expression B is very much superior to A. In A notes and additions to the text are found sometimes all round the page — top and bottom, and to the left and right of the text. Sometimes it is difficult to know which is meant to be text and which is meant to be the note. In B, on the other hand, the arrangement is perfectly clear and neat. Similar differences show themselves in the compo sition of the two manuscripts. In A the punctuation is sometimes absolutely barbarous — there are whole strings of colons and semi-colons, bringing together ideas which have no real connection, while at other times full-stops dis connect what should have been connected. Occasionally also the trouble of translating technical expressions seems to be shirked, and they are simply given in their Latin form. All or nearly all such barbarisms are absent from HISTORY OF THE SHORT TREATISE cxix B — the punctuation is quite normal, and it generally trans lates into Dutch, and does not simply reproduce, such expressions as a priori, a posteriori, attributum, essentia, idea, &c. Again, in A the second part of the Short Treatise has numerous marginal summaries of the text, in addition to the explanatory notes; B omits nearly all these marginal summaries, and also some of the notes. Apart from these relatively external differences between the two codices, there are also more important differences between them. A often has a sentence or an expression which B omits; on the other hand, there are only a comparatively few cases in which B has any important sentence or expression which A has not. Again, A has numerous mistakes which are not found in B; on the other hand, there are extremely few instances in which a passage is given correctly in A and wrongly in B. Illustrations of all this will be found in the accompanying translation and notes, though the punctua tion had to be somewhat improved occasionally. But such, in general terms, is the relation between the two manu scripts of the Short Treatise.
What may reasonably be deduced from the above facts? Some (Schaarschmidt, for instance) are inclined to mini mise the differences between A and B, and suggest that the improvements on A in B were made more or less arbi trarily by Monnikhoff, who had no other manuscript before him except A, and that he was guided simply by his own common sense or fastidious taste, as the case may be, in making the numerous alterations in his own copy. A great many of the differences between A and B might certainly be accounted for in this way. Sigwart, however, maintains that it is scarcely possible to account for all the differences that way; and he inclines to the belief (rightly, we think) that Monnikhoff had some other manuscript,* besides A, which enabled him to make so many improve- * This hypothetical third MS. is generally called C.
cxx INTRODUCTION ments on A. It seems clear, however, that the suggested other manuscript (if Monnikhoff really had another to consult) could not have been the original Latin manuscript or a copy of it, because some of his mistakes would have been impossible in that case. Nor, in all probability, was it even an independent Dutch translation of the original, because in that case B would most likely not have had so very much in common with A as it actually has. That Monnikhoff might have consulted another Dutch manu script of the Short Treatise (besides A) seems likely from the fact that Rieuwertsz, for instance, had such another Dutch manuscript (as Hallmann reports), and there may have been also others in Amsterdam, where Monnikhoff lived. At the same time, it is just possible that Monnikhoff had only codex A before him, and that his own critical insight enabled him to make the various corrections and improvements.
§4. THE COMPONENT PARTS OF THE SHORT TREATISE Even a cursory examination of the Short Treatise shows that it is not a homogeneous whole, bat a complex of parts in which a closer scrutiny reveals different strata of thought representing different stages of development. Compara tively external differences suffice to enable us to distinguish four separate parts in the Short Treatise, namely: (i) the bulk of the text of the treatise (both parts); (ii) the so-called foot-notes or marginal additions; (Hi) the two dialogues at the end of Part I. chapter ii.; and (iv) the so-called Appendices at the end of the treatise.
It may be remarked at once that no one seriously doubts that the Short Treatise as a whole is the work of HISTORY OF THE SHORT TREATISE cxxi Spinoza. The only portions the authenticity of which may be doubted are some of the notes. Many of the notes to Part II. in A are evidently mere marginal summaries which were not made by Spinoza, and nearly all of them were omitted by Monnikhoff, no doubt for this very reason. They have also been omitted from all the published editions and translations of the Short Treatise. Some of the remaining notes (or additions) are also probably from some other hand than Spinoza's, and so is the preface on the title-page of A. Most of the long notes, however, are certainly Spinoza's own, and Monnikhoff says so expressly on the extra title-page which he wrote in codex A (which has already been cited above), while the "Outline" in Boehmer's Colerus states explicitly that Spinoza had added notes in further explanation and elaboration of his views. And the rest of the Short Treatise is Spinoza's beyond a doubt. The above-mentioned traditions about his Dutch Ethics with a chapter on the Devil, and passages in his letters, to which we shall refer when we try to determine the date of its composition, sufficiently confirm the authorship of Spinoza which is claimed on the title-page of both the manuscripts.
But, though Spinoza wrote the whole of the Short Treatise (excepting the suspicious notes) as we now have it, he evidently did not write it all at the same time. What we have before us is a first draft together with successive attempts to correct, or supplement, or reconcile various parts of it. The bulk of the text represents that first draft. The chapters are strung together more or less loosely; inconsistencies of thought or of expression are not yet removed. Some of the so-called notes or marginal additions are really new versions of the corresponding text, which Spinoza apparently meant to rewrite. They often represent a distinct advance in thought, bridging over the gulf be tween the text of the Treatise and the Ethics. The Dialogues cxxii INTRODUCTION elaborate special points, while assuming what has already been explained in other parts of the Treatise. Like the first Appendix, they also represent an experiment in the form of exposition. Spinoza evidently realised very quickly that his was not the art of writing Platonic dialogues. The second Appendix is concerned with the elaboration of a special point. The first, as already stated, is an experiment in the geometric form of exposition, and is intimately related to the Ethics. The Treatise shows us Spinoza in his workshop gradually shaping the material for his great edifice. It is, of course, all the more interesting for that. But it is prac tically impossible to determine precisely the chronological sequence of its parts. At one time it was supposed that the Dialogues were the oldest parts of the Treatise. Freudenthal, however, has shown that they must have been written after the main text of the Treatise because they assume a knowledge of various views already explained in other parts of the work. Thus all that may be asserted with confidence is that the notes, the Dialogues, and the Appendices are later than the rest of the Treatise. It is also possible to determine which parts of the work were the last additions.
Detailed information relating to these questions will be found in the Commentary. But it is important to note immediately that we are dealing with a book which was never properly prepared for publication, Spinoza having finally determined to recast the exposition of his philosophy in the geometric form, as we have it in the Ethics. The present arrangement of the Treatise is probably due in part to one of his disciples, whose insight was not sufficient to guard him against misplacing some parts, omitting others, and retaining passages which were meant to be discarded. Occasionally also readers' comments seem to have found their way into the text through the copyist's lack of dis crimination.
HISTORY OF THE SHORT TREATISE cxxiii §5. THE ORIGIN AND CHARACTER OF THE SHORT TREATISE It is difficult to determine with any precision when the Short Treatise was begun, but it is comparatively easy to determine when it was already completed. About the end of 1661 Spinoza wrote to Oldenburg, saying, "as regards your new question, namely, in what manner things began to exist, and what is the bond of dependence between them and the first cause, on this subject, and also on the improve ment of the understanding, I have written a complete little treatise, and am at present engaged in copying and improv ing it. Sometimes, however, I put the work aside, for I am not yet sure about publishing it. I fear lest the theologians of our day should take offence, and, with their usual rancour, attack me, who have an absolute horror of quarrels." It is clear from this that the Treatise on the Improvement of the Understanding was already sufficiently advanced for Spinoza to think of its early publication. But this cannot be the only treatise to which Spinoza here refers, because it contains nothing about the origin of things and their dependence on the first cause, with which this little treatise, to which Spinoza refers, is primarily concerned, nor does it contain anything to warrant Spinoza's evident apprehension that it would provoke the rancour of the theologians. Spinoza can only be referring, in this letter, to our Short Treatise, the style and contents of which prove it to be an earlier work than the Treatise on the Improvement of the Understanding. The Short Treatise must have been already finished when Spinoza wrote the above letter to Oldenburg, but owing to his recent occupation with Bacon and the question of philosophic method, which he had also discussed with Oldenburg, he seems to have begun the Treatise on the Improvement of the Understanding with the cxxiv INTRODUCTION intention of using it as a general introduction to his whole philosophy as contained for the most part in the Short Treatise. The opening passages of the former treatise, already quoted above,* are hardly appropriate as an introduction to a mere theory of knowledge, they refer rather to philosophy as a whole. Spinoza's growing pre ference for the geometric method, and his successful experiment in applying it to Descartes' Principia, also the gradual modification of some of his views, soon led him to begin a new exposition of his philosophy, such as he even tually gave in the Ethica. And the Short Treatise thus fell into neglect. But there can be no doubt that it was already completed in 1661, possibly already the year before, if we allow for the Treatise on the Improvement of the Understand ing, which, though a fragment now and probably even more fragmentary then, must nevertheless have taken him some time to write.
The main text of the Short Treatise, then, must have been written not later than 1661. It seems equally clear that it could not have been finished before 1660 — that is to say, before Spinoza's removal to Rijnsburg. The reason for this suggestion is to be found in the concluding paragraph of the Second Part of the Treatise^ It is really an epistle addressed to his friends, to whom he is sending the entire manuscript of the Short Treatise (before the Appendices were written). And its tone and contents strongly suggest that it was written to friends at a distance. Who these friends were it is not difficult to conjecture. They were Balling, Jelles, Meyer, and the other members of the philosophical coterie to whom Spinoza subsequently also sent the completed portions of the Ethica in manu script. His friends, then, were in Amsterdam. Had Spinoza still been living in or near Amsterdam, it would scarcely have been necessary for him to write that exhor- * See pp. liii. ff. f See pp. 149 /.
HISTORY OF THE SHORT TREATISE cxxv tation. It must, therefore, have been written when Spinoza had already left Amsterdam and its neighbour hood, and had gone to Rijnsburg. And this happened early in 1660.
We would maintain, accordingly, that the Short Treatise was not finished before 1660. But, as already suggested, it was probably commenced very much earlier than that. Many or most of its chapters very likely contain the sub stance of the notes which Spinoza dictated to his disciples while teaching at Amsterdam. This seems to be borne out, to some extent, by a marginal summary at the side of the above-mentioned concluding paragraph of the Treatise.* This note seems to have been put there by a disciple of Spinoza, and speaks of the Treatise as having been dictated, while the text says that it was written. Very likely a good portion of the Treatise had actually been dictated to his friends while Spinoza was at Amsterdam, but the com pleted Treatise must have been sent to them in manuscript from Rijnsburg.
Avenarius has suggested that the Short Treatise was quite a youthful work; that the Dialogues were written about 1651, and the main text in 1654 or 1655. The suggestion was largely based on the assumption that the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus was finished in 1661 or earlier. But it is known now that Spinoza did not complete it till 1669 or 1670. The comparative immaturity of the Short Treatise as compared with it does not therefore compel us to assume that the Treatise was written long before 1661. And the internal evidence is against such an early date as 1655. The tone of the concluding paragraph of Part II. shows that, when writing it, Spinoza had already acquired a certain authority in a circle of philosophical friends. He could not have written in that strain at the age of 22 or 23. Again, his reference to the " character of the age " seems to * See the first note on p. 149.
cxxvi INTRODUCTION point to his own excommunication as an event in the past. Moreover, the Treatise shows an interest in specific Christian doctrines and their reinterpretation (the son of God, Regeneration, Sin in relation to the Law, and Grace). Spinoza must have been moving for some time in a Christian environment to feel such an interest in problems of Christian theology. The characters he introduces as illustrations bear New Testament names, and he even devotes a chapter to Devils, in whom the Jews took very little interest. All this argues in favour of the supposition that the Short Treatise was not written till some years after Spinoza's severance from the Jewish community (1656). Freudenthal maintains, accordingly, that it must have been composed between 1658 and 1660. With this view we concur, allowing, however, that some of the additions may be later than 1660, while some parts of the Treatise or some of its views may date from before Spinoza's excom munication, because one of the charges already brought against him then was that he had asserted that extension was an attribute of God.
It is interesting to note, in conclusion, that when Spinoza made his literary debut he was already a pantheist. His pantheism was not in any sense a development of Cartesianism; he started from it, and at once criticised the Car tesian dualism from that point of view. He probably owed his introduction to pantheistic views partly to Jewish mysticism, with which he must have been made acquainted by Rabbis Morteira and Ben Israel, who were both of them strongly inclined towards mysticism, and partly to Bruno, to whose writings, as already suggested, Van den Enden may have directed his attention. The Short Treatise shows also considerable familiarity with, and indebtedness to, the writings of Descartes, as will be shown in the Commentary. But Spinoza is never merely a follower of the Jewish Mystics, or of Bruno, or of Descartes. From the first he HISTORY OF THE SHORT TREATISE cxxvii has his own peculiar outlook. From the first he is, so to say, his own architect, though he obtains his bricks from many different quarters.
§6. LITERATURE ON THE SHORT TREATISE A. EDITIONS AND TRANSLATIONS W. Meyer: Korte Verhandeling (a modern Dutch version > also a new edition of Boehmer's Lineamenta). Amster C. Schaarschmidt: Benedicti de Spinoza " Korte Verhandeling van God..." (Dutch text and Latin introduction). Amsterdam, 1869.
Spinoza' s Kurzgefasste Abhandung (German translation). Third edition, Leipzig, 1907.
C. Sigwart: Spinoza's Kurzer Tractat (German translation with Introduction and Notes). Freiburg, 1870.
]. Van Vloten: Ad Benedicti de Spinoza Opera...Supplementum (Dutch text with Latin translation). Amster Van Vloten and Land's edition of Spinoza's complete works gives the text in vol. ii. of the 1882 edition, and in vol. iii. of the 1895 edition.
B. OTHER WORKS R. Avenarius: Ueber die beiden erst en Phasen des Spinozischen Pantheismus. Leipzig, 1868.
A. Baltzer: Spinoza's Entwickelungsgang. Kiel, 1888. E. Boehmer: Benedicti de Spinoza Tractatus de Deo...Lineamenta. Halle, 1852. L. Busse: Beitriige zur Entwickelungsgeschichte Spinozas.
cxxviii INTRODUCTION J. Freudenthal: Spinoza und die Scholastik (in the " Philosophische Anfsatze" dedicated to Zeller). Leipzig, Spinozastudien ("Zeitschrift fiir Philosophic," vols.
Ueber die Entwicklung der Lehre vom psychophysischen Parallelismus bei Spinoza ("Archiv fiir gesamte Psychologic," ix.). 1907. C. Gebhardt: Spinozas Abhandlung ueber die Verbesserung des Verstandes. Heidelberg, 1905.
M. Joel: Zur Genesis der Lehre Spinozas. Breslau, 1871. C. Sigwart: Spinozas neuentdeckter Tractat. Gotha, 1866. A. Trendelenburg: Ueber die aufgefundenen Ergdnzungen zu Spinozas Werken (in " Historische Beitrage," vol. iii.).
Berlin, 1867.
Various references to the Short Treatise occur also in the following more general works on the life or the philosophy of Spinoza: R. A. Duff: Spinoza s Political and Ethical Philosophy.
Glasgow, 1903.
K. Fischer: Spinoza. 4th ed. Heidelberg, 1898. J. Freudenthal: Die Lebensgeschichte Spinozas. Leipzig, 1899. Das Leben Spinozas. Stuttgart, 1904. H. H. Joachim: A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza. Oxford, J. Martineau: A Study of Spinoza. 3rd ed. London, 1895. Sir F. Pollock: Spinoza. 2nd ed. London, 1899. E. E. Powell: Spinoza and Religion. Chicago, 1906. A. Rivaud: Les Notions d'Essence et d'E%istence dans la Philo sophie de Spinoza. Paris, 1906.
EXPLANATIONS OF SIGNS, &c.
A stands for the older manuscript of the Short Treatise.
B stands for the later manuscript of the Short Treatise.
Where nothing is stated to the contrary the Translation follows A.
*...* Words, &c., between asterisks are in B, but not in A.
[ ] Words in square brackets are those of the translator; but ]* When there are asterisks outside the brackets, then B has the words in such brackets.
f is used as a reference-mark to notes which are given in A.
I is used as a reference-mark to notes indicating different readings, &c.
"..." Occasionally words are put in inverted commas to draw attention to the fact that they are used in a peculiar sense.
Explanations of difficult words and passages will be found at the end of the volume (p. 165 ff) arranged according to chapter and page.
Beginners may omit, on a first reading, most ot the foot-notes in the Translation.
SPINOZA'S SHORT TREATISE ON [TITLE-PAGE IN A] SHORT TREATISE ON GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING Previously written in the Latin tongue by B.D.S. for the use of his disciples who wanted to devote themselves to the study of Ethics and true Philosophy. And now translated into the Dutch lan guage for the use of the Lovers of Truth and Virtue: so that they who spout so much about it, and put their dirt and filth into the hands of simpletons as though it were ambergris, may just have their mouths stopped, and cease to pro fane what they do not understand: God, themselves, and how to help people to have regard for each other's wellbeing^ and how to heal those whose mind is sick, in a spirit of tenderness and tolerance, after the example of the Lord Christ, our best Teacher ^ X [TITLE-PAGE IN B] ETHICA OR MORAL SCIENCE COMPOSED IN TWO PARTS WHICH TREAT I. OF GOD'S EXISTENCE, and Attributes II. OF MAN, with reference to the character and origin of his Passions, the use of his reason in this respect, and the means whereby he is edu cated to his Happiness and supreme freedom ALSO AN APPENDIX, containing a brief account of the nature of Substance — as well as that of the human Soul, and its union with the Body COMPOSED BY BENEDICTUS DE SPINOZA -- WULM-JV-tSfa y Z^L- TABLE OF CONTENTS; OF THE FOLLOWING Two BOOKS, NAMELY: THE FIRST BOOK TREATING OF GOD AND WHAT PERTAINS TO HIM, CONTAINS THE FOLLOWING CHAPTERS CHAP. PAGE I. THAT GOD EXISTS 15 II. WHAT GOD is 21 [FIRST DIALOGUE] 32 [SECOND DIALOGUE] 36 III. THAT GOD is A CAUSE OF ALL THINGS 41 IV. ON GOD'S NECESSARY ACTIVITY 43 V. ON DIVINE PROVIDENCE 47 VI. ON DIVINE PREDESTINATION 48 VII. ON THE ATTRIBUTES WHICH DO NOT PERTAIN TO GOD 52 VIII. ON " NATURA NATURANS" 56 IX. ON " NATURA NATURATA " 57 X. WHAT GOOD AND EVIL ARE 59 THE SECOND BOOK TREATING OF THE PERFECTION OF MAN SO THAT HE MAY BE IN A POSITION TO BECOME UNITED WITH GOD :HAP. PAGE [PREFACE] 63 I. ON OPINION, BELIEF, AND KNOWLEDGE 67 II. WHAT OPINION, BELIEF, AND CLEAR KNOWLEDGE ARE 69 B has no Table of Contents io TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAP. PAGE III. THE ORIGIN OF PASSION. PASSION ARISING FROM OPINION 70 IV. WHAT COMES FROM BELIEF, AND ON THE GOOD AND EVIL OF MAN 74 V. ON LOVE 78 VI. ON HATRED 82 VII. ON JOY AND SORROW 85 VIII. ESTEEM AND CONTEMPT 87 IX. HOPE AND FEAR go X. ON REMORSE AND REPENTANCE 94 XI. ON DERISION AND JESTING 95 XII. ON GLORY, SHAME, AND SHAMELESSNESS 96 XIII. ON FAVOUR, GRATITUDE, AND INGRATITUDE 93 XIV. ON GRIEF 99 XV. ON THE TRUE AND THE FALSE 102 XVI. ON THE WILL 105 XVII. ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN WILL AND DESIRE 112 XVIII. ON THE USES OF THE FOREGOING 115 XIX. ON OUR HAPPINESS 118 XX. CONFIRMATION OF THE FOREGOING 126 XXL ON REASON 131 XXII. ON TRUE KNOWLEDGE, REGENERATION, &c. 133 XXIII. ON THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL 136 XXIV. ON GOD'S LOVE OF MAN 138 XXV. ON DEVILS 143 XXVI. ON TRUE FREEDOM 144 [APPENDIX I.] ON GOD 153 [APPENDIX II.] ON THE HUMAN SOUL 157 c*Z/JtjCJZ~ i >stst [MONNIKHOFF'S VERSES FACING SPINOZA'S PORTRAIT IN A] EDICTUS DE Cm natujra,Deus,rerum ciu cog-mtus ordo Hoc Spinola ftalru coiifpicieiidus erat.
Expreflere viri faciein.ietl pm^ere mentetn Zettxidis artifices non valwere itianvis.
Ilia vi^ei Tcnplis: illic luDlimia tractat: Huiicquicun^uecupis nofcere.fci-ipta leg-e.
FIRST PART ON GOD [FIRST PAGE OF A] CHAPTER I i THAT GOD EXISTS As regards the first,! namely, whether there is a God, this, we say, can be proved.
*!.* In the first place, a priori thus: 1. Whatever we clearly and distinctly know to belong to the nature t of a thing, we can also truly affirm of that thing. Now we can know clearly and distinctly that existence belongs to the nature of God; 10 Therefore...Otherwise also thus: tt 2. The essence of things are from all eternity, and unto all eternity shall remain im mutable; The existence of God is essence; Therefore...t Understand the definite nature through which a thing is what it is, and which can by no means be removed from it without at the same time destroying that thing: thus, for instance, it 20 belongs to the essence of a mountain that it should have a valley, or the essence of a mountain is that it has a valley; JJ| this is truly eternal and immutable, and must always be included in the concept of a mountain, even if it never existed, or did not exist now.
t B: this.
It B omits these three words.
JJt B simply: to the essence of a mountain belongs a valley.
If man has an idea of God, then God f must exist formaliter; Now, man has an idea of God; Therefore...The first we prove thus: If there is an idea of God, then the cause thereof must exist formaliter, and contain in itself all that the idea has objective; 10 Now there is an idea of God; Therefore...In order to prove the first part of this argument we state the following principles, namely: 1. That the number of knowable things is in finite; 2. That a finite understanding cannot apprehend the infinite; 3. That a finite understanding, unless it is deter mined by something external, cannot through 20 itself know anything; because, just as it has no power to know all things equally, so little f From the definition which follows in chapter 2, namely, that God has infinite attributes, we can prove his existence thus: Whatever we clearly and distinctly see to belong to the nature of a thing, that we can also with truth affirm of that thing; now to the nature of a being that has infinite attributes belongs existence, which is an attribute; therefore...To assert that this may well be affirmed of the idea, but not of the thing itself, is false: for the Idea does not really consist of the attribute which belongs to this 30 being, so that that which is affirmed is [affirmed] neither of the thing, nor of that which is affirmed of the thing; so that there is a great difference between the Idea and the Ideatum: therefore what is affirmed of the thing is not affirmed of the Idea, and vice versa. [Text corrupt. See Commentary.]
THAT GOD EXISTS 17 also has it the power to begin or to commence i to know this, for instance,! sooner than that, or that sooner than this. Since, then, it can do neither the one nor the other it can know nothing. The first (or the major premiss) is proved thus: If the imagination of man were the sole cause of his ideas, then it would be impossible that he should be able to apprehend anything, but he can apprehend something; 10 Therefore...The first Jt is proved by the first principle, namely, that the knowable things are infinitely numerous. Also, following the second principle, man cannot know all, because the human understanding is finite, and if not determined by external things to know this sooner than that, and that sooner than this, then according to the third principle it should be impossible for it to know anything.!
J B omits " for instance."
Jt Instead of this paragraph B has the following: Again, since 20 according to the first principle the knowable things are infinite, and according to the second principle the finite understanding cannot comprehend everything, and according to the third principle it has not the power to know this sooner than that, and that sooner than this, it would be impossible for it to know anything, if it were not determined thereto by external things.