lam maestae lacrimis madent.
Non Ixionium caput 35 Velox praecipitat rota Et longa site perditus Spernit flumina Tantalus. Vultur dum satur est modis, Non traxit Tityi iecur.
Vmbrarum miserans ait, ' Donamus comitem uiro Emptam carmine coniugem. Sed lex dona coerceat, 45 Ne, dum Tartara liquerit, Fas sit lumina flectere.' Quis legem det amantibus? Maior lex amor est sibi. Heu, noctis prope tenninos 60 Orpheus Eurydicen suam Vidit, perdidit, occidit. Vos haec fabula respicit Quicumque in superum diem Mentem ducere quaeritis. Nam qui Tartareum in specus Victus lumina flexerit, Quidquid praecipuum trahit Perdit, dum uidet inferos."
The guilty souls with pains opprest, Moved with his song began to weep.
Ixioii's wheel now standing still Turns not his head with motions steep.
Though Tantalus might drink at will, To quench his thirst he would forbear.
The vulture full with music shrill Doth not poor Tityus' liver tear.
' We by his verses conquered are/ Saith the great King whom spirits fear.
1 Let us not then from him debar His wife whom he with songs doth gain.
Yet lest our gift should stretch too far, We will it with this law restrain, That when from hell he takes his flight, He shall from looking back refrain.'
Who can for lovers laws indite?
Love hath no law but her own will.
Orpheus, seeing on the verge of night Eurydice, doth lose and kill Her and himself with foolish love.
But you this feigned tale fulfil, Who think unto the day above To bring with speed your darksome mind.
For if, your eye conquered, you move Backward to Pluto left behind, All the rich prey which thence you took, You lose while back to hell you look."
PHILOSOPHIAE CON- SOLATIONIS LIBER TERTIVS EXPLICIT INCIPIT LIBER IV I.
HAEC cum Philosophia dignitate uultus et oris grauitate seruata leniter suauiterque cecinisset, turn ego nondum penitus insiti inaeroris oblitus intentionem dicere adhuc aliquid parantis abrupi. Et: 6 " O," inquam, " ueri praeuia luminis quae usque adhuc tua fudit oratio, cum sui speculatione diuina turn tuis rationibus inuicta patuerunt, eaqtie mihi etsi ob iniuriae dolorem nuper oblita non tamen antehac prorsus ignorata dixisti. Sed ea ipsa est uel maxima 10 nostri causa maeroris, quod, cum rerum bonus rector exsistat, uel esse omnino mala possint uel impunita praetereant; quod solum quanta dignum sit admiratione profecto consideras. At huic aliud maius THE FOURTH BOOK OF I.
WHEN Philosophy had sung these verses with a soft and sweet voice, observing due dignity and gravity in her countenance and gesture, I, not having altogether forgotten my inward grief, interrupted her speech which she was about to continue, and said: " O thou who bringest us to see true light, those things which hitherto thou hast treated of have manifestly appeared both to be divine when contemplated apart, and invincible when supported by thy reasons, and what thou hast uttered, though the force of grief had made me forget it of late, yet heretofore I was not altogether ignorant of it. But this is the chiefest cause of my sorrow, that since the governor of all things is so good, there can either be any evil at all, or that it pass unpunished. Which alone I beseech thee consider, how much admiration it deserveth. J?ut there is another greater than adiungitur. Nam imperante florenteque nequitia 15 uirtus non solum praemiis caret, uerum etiam sceleratorum pedibus subiecta calcatur et in locum facinorum supplicia luit. Quae fieri in regno scientis omnia, potentis omnia sed bona tantummodo uolentis dei nemo satis potest nee admirari nee conqueri."
20 Turn ilia: " Et esset," inquit, " infiniti stuporis onmibusque horribilius monstris, si, uti tu aestimas, in tanti uelut patrisfamilias dispositissima domo uilia uasa colerentur, pretiosa sordescerent. Sed non ita est. Nam si ea quae paulo ante conclusa sunt incon- 25 uulsa seruantur, ipso de cuius nunc regno loquimur auctore cognosces semper quidem potentes esse bonos, malos uero abiectos semper atque inbecillos nee sine poena umquam esse uitia nee sine praemio uirtutes, bonis felicia, malis semper infortunata con- 30 tingere multaque id genus quae sopitis querelis firma te soliditate corroborent. Et quoniam uerae formam beatitudinis me dudum monstrante uidisti, quo etiam sita sit agnouisti, decursis omnibus quae praemittere necessarium puto, uiam tibi quae te domum reuehat 35 ostendam. Pennas etiam tuae menti quibus se in altum tollere possit adfigam, ut perturbatione depulsa sospes in patriam meo ductu, mea semita, meis etiam uehiculis reuertaris.
this; for wickedness bearing rule and sway, virtue is not only without reward, but lieth also trodden under the wicked's feet, and is punished instead of vice. That which things should be done in the kingdom of God, who knoweth all things, can do all things, but will do only that which is good, no man can sufficiently admire nor complain."
To which she answered: "It were indeed infinitely strange, and surpassing all monsters, if, as thou conceivest, in the best-ordered house of so great an householder the vilest vessels were made account of and the precious neglected; but it is not so. For if those things which were a little before concluded be kept unviolated, thou shalt by His help, of whose kingdom we speak, know that the good are always powerful, and the evil always abject and weak_, and that vices are never without punishment, nor virtue without reward, and that the good are always prosperous, and the evil unfortunate, and many things of that sort, which will take away all cause of complaint, and give thee firm and solid strength. And since by my means thou hast already seen the form of true blessedness, and known where it is placed, running over all those things which I think necessary to rehearse, I will show thee the way which will carry thee home. And I will also fasten wings upon thy mind, with which she may rouse herself, that, all perturbation being driven away, thou mayest return safely into thy country by my direction, by my path, and with my wings.
I.
Sunt etenim pennae uolucres mihi Quae celsa conscendant poli. Quas sibi cum uelox mens induit, Terras perosa despicit, 6 Aeris inmensi superat globum, Nubesque postergum uidet, Quique agili motu calet aetheris, Transcendit ignis uerticem, Donee in astriferas surgat domos 10 Phoeboque coniungat uias Aut comitetur iter gelidi senis Miles corusci sideris, Vel quocumque micans nox pingitur, Recurrat astri circulum 15 Atque ubi iam exhausti fuerit satis, Polum relinquat extimum Dorsaque uelocis premat aetheris Compos uerendi luminis. Hie regum sceptrum dominus tenet 20 Orbisque habenas temperat Et uolucrem currum stabilis regit Rerum coruscus arbiter. Hue te si reducem referat uia, Quam nunc requiris immemor: 25 * Haec,' dices, ' memini, patria est mihi, Hinc ortus, hie sistam gradum.' Quod si terrarum placeat tibi Noctem relictam uisere, Quos miseri toruos populi timent 30 Cernes tyrannos exules."
a Cf. " frigida Saturni sese quo stella receptet," Virg. Georg. i. 336.
I.
For I have swift and nimble wings which will ascend the lofty skies, With which when thy quick mind is clad, it will the loathed earth despise, And go beyond the airy globe, and watery clouds behind thee leave, Passing the fire which scorching heat doth from the heavens' swift course receive, Until it reach the starry house, and get to tread bright Phoebus' ways, Following the chilly sire's path,a companion of his flashing rays, And trace the circle of the stars which in the night to us appear, And having stayed there long enough go on beyond the farthest sphere, Sitting upon the highest orb partaker of the glorious light, Where the great King his sceptre holds, and the world's reins doth guide aright, And, firm in his swift chariot, doth everything in order set. Unto this seat when thou ai*t brought, thy country, which thou didst forget, Thou then wilt challenge to thyself, saving: ' This is the glorious land Where I was born, and in this soil my feet for ever more shall stand. Whence if thou pleasest to behold the earthly night which thou hast left, Those tyrants which the people fear will seem of their true home bereft.' " II.
Turn ego: " Papae," inquam, " ut magna promittis! Nee dubito quin possis efficere; tu modo quern excitaueris ne moreris." " Primum igitur/' inquit, "bonis semper adesse potentiam, malos cunctis uiribus esse 6 desertos agnoscas licebit, quorum quidem alterum demonstratur ex altero. Nam cum bonum malumque contraria sint, si bonum potens esse constiterit, liquet inbecillitas mail; at si fragilitas clarescat mail, boni firmitas nota est. Sed uti nostrae sententiae fides 10 abundantior sit, alterutro calle procedam nunc hinc nunc inde proposita confirmans.
Duo sunt quibus omnis hum(anorum actuum constat effectus, uoluntas scilicet ac potestas, quorum si alterutrum desit, nihil est quod explicari queat. Deficiente 16 etenim uoluntate ne aggreditur quidem quisque quod non uult; at si potestas absit, uoluntas frustra sit. Quo fit ut si quern uideas adipisci uelle quod minime adipiscatur, huic obtinendi quod uoluerit defuisse ualentiam dubitare non possis." " Perspicuum est," 20 inquam, "nee ullo modo negari potest." "Quern uero effecisse quod uoluerit uideas, num etiam potuisse dubitabis? " "Minime." "Quod uero quisque potest, in eo ualidus, quod uero non potest, in hoc imbecillis esse censendus est." " Fateor," inquam.
25 " Meministine igitur," inquit, " superioribus rationibus esse collectum intentionem ornnem uoluntatis humanae quae diuersis studiis agitur ad beatitudinem a The whole of this and of the following chapter is a paraphrase of Plato's Goryias.
II."
" Oh! " quoth I. " How great thing's dost thou promise! And I doubt not but thou canst perform them, wherefore stay me not now that thou hast stirred up my desires." "First then," quotli she, "that good men are always powerful, and evil men of no strength, thou mayest easily know, the one is proved by the other. For sinee that good and evil are contraries, if it be convinced that goodness is potent, the weakness of evil will be also manifest; and contrariwise if we discern the frailty of evil, we must needs acknowledge the firmness of goodness. But that our opinions may be more certainly em braced, I will take both ways, confirming my pro positions, sometime from one part, sometime from another.
There be two things by which all human actions are effected, mlLand, power, of which if either be wanting, there can nothing be performed. For if there want will, no man taketli anything in hand against his will, and if there be not power, the will is in vain. So that, if thou seest any willing to obtain that which he doth not obtain, thou canst Hot doubt but that he wanted power to obtain what he would." " It is manifest," quoth I, "and can by no means be denied." "And wilt thou doubt that he could, whom thou seest bring to pass what he desired?" "No." "But every man is mighty in that which he can do, and weak in that which he cannot do." " I confess it," quoth I. " Dost thou remember then," quoth she, "that it was inferred by our former discourses that all the intentions of man's will doth hasten to happiness, though their L 305 festinare? " " Memini," inquam, " illud quoque esse demonstratum." " Num recordaris beatitudinem 30 ipsum esse bonum eoque modo, cum beatitude petitur, ab omnibus desiderari bonum? " " Minime," inquam, "recorder, quoniam id memoriae fixum teneo." " Omnes igitur homines boni pariter ac mali indiscreta intentione ad bonum peruenire nituntur?"
35 " Ita," inquam, " consequens est." " Sed certum est adeptione boni bonos fieri." " Certum." "Adipiscuntur igitur boni quod appetunt? " " Sic uidetur." <f Mali uero si adipiscerentur quod appetunt bonum, mali esse non possent." (< Ita est." " Cum igitur 40 utrique bonum petant, sed hi quidem adipiscantur, illi uero minime, num dubium est bonos quidem potentes esse, qui uero mali sunt imbecillos? " " Quisquis," inquam, "dubitat, nee rerum naturani nee consequentiam potest considerare rationum."
45 " Rursus," inquit, "si duo sint quibus idem secundum naturam propositum sit eorumque unus natural! officio id ipsum agat atque perficiat, alter uero naturale illud officium minime administrare queat, alio uero modo quam naturae conuenit non quidem impleat 50 propositum suum sed imitetur implentem, quenmam horum ualentiorem esse decerm's? " " Etsi coniecto," inquam, "quid uelis, planius tamen audire desidero." " Ambulandi," inquit, " motum secundum naturam esse hominibus num negabis? " " Minime," inquam.
55 " Eiusque rei pedum officium esse naturale num dubitas? " " Ne hoc quidem," inquam. " Si quis igitur pedibus incedere ualens ambulet aliusque cui courses be divers? " " I remember," quoth I, " that that also was proved." "Dost thou also call to mind that blessedness is goodness itself, and con sequently when blessedness is sought after, goodness must of course be desired? " " I call it not 'to mind, for I have it already fixed in my memory." " Where fore all men both good and bad without difference of intentions endeavour to obtain goodness." " It followeth," quoth I. "But it is certain that men are made good by the obtaining of goodness." " It is so." "Wherefore good men obtain what they desire." "So it scemeth." "And if evil men did obtain the goodness they desire, they could not be evil." "It is true." "Wherefore since they both desire goodness, but the one obtaineth it and the other not, there is no doubt but that good men are powerful, and the evil weak." " Whosoever doubteth of this," quoth I, " he neither considereth the nature of things, nor the consequence of thy reasons."
"Again," quoth she, "if there be two to whom the same thing is proposed according to nature, and the one of them bringeth it perfectly to pass with his natural function, but the other cannot exercise that natural function but after another manner than is agreeable to nature, and doth not perform that which he had proposed, but imitateth the other who performeth it: which of these two wilt thou judge to be more powerful?" "Though I conjecture," quoth I, " at thy meaning, yet I desire to hear it more plainly." "Wilt thou deny," quoth she, " that the motion of walking is agreeable to the nature of men? " " No," quoth I. " And makest thou any doubt that the function of it doth naturally belong to the feet? " "There is no doubt of this neither," quoth I. " Wherefore if one that can go upon his feet doth hoc naturale pedum desit officium, manibus nitena ambulare conetur, quis horum iure ualentior existimari 60 potest? " " Contexe/' inquarn, " cetera; nam quin naturalis officii potens eo qui idem nequeat ualentior sit, nullus ambigat." " Sed summum bonuin, quod aeque malis bonisque propositum, boni quidein naturali officio uirtutum petunt, mali uero uariam 65 per cupiditatem, quod adipiscendi boni naturale officium non est, idem ipsum conantur adipisci. An tu aliter existimas? " "Minima/' inquam, "nam etiam quod est consequens patet. Ex his enim quae concesserim, bonos quidem potentes, malos uero esse 70 necesse est imbecillos."
" Recte/' inquit, " praecurris idque, uti medici sperare solent, indicium est erectae iam resistentisque naturae. Sed quoniam te ad intellegendum promptissimum esse conspicio, crebras coaceruabo 75 rationes. Vide enim quanta uitiosorum hominum pateat infirmitas qui ne ad hoc quidem peruenire queunt ad quod eos naturalis ducit ac paene compellit intentio. Et quid si hoc tarn magno ac paene inuicto praeeuntis naturae desererentur auxilio? 80 Considera uero quanta sceleratos homines habeat impotentia. Neque enim leuia aut ludicra praemia petunt, quae consequi atque obtinere non possunt, sed circa ipsam rerum summam uerticemque deficiunt nee in eo miseris contingit effectus quod solum 85 dies noctesque moliuntur; in qua re bonorum uires eminent. Sicut enim eum qui pedibus incedens ad eum locum usque peruenire potuisset, quo nihil ulterius peruium iaceret incessui, ambulandi poten- « Cf. Virgil, Aen. xii. 764.
walk, and another who hath not this natural function of his feet endeavoureth to walk by creeping upon his hands, which of these two is deservedly to be esteemed the stronger?" "Infer the rest/' quoth I, " for no man doubteth but that he which can use that natural function is stronger than he which cannot." "But/' quoth she, "the good seek to obtain the chiefest good, which is equally proposed to bad and good, by the natural function of virtues, but the evil endeavour to obtain the same by divers concupiscences, which are not the natural function of obtaining goodness. Thinkest thou otherwise? " ;"No," quoth I, "for it is manifest what followeth. , For by the force of that which I have already granted, it is necessary that good men are powerful and evil men weak."
"Thou runnest before rightly," quoth she, "and it is (as physicians are wont to hope) a token of an erected and resisting nature. Wherefore, since I see thee most apt and willing to comprehend, I will therefore heap up many reasons together. For consider the great weakness of vicious men, who cannot come so far as their natural intention leadeth and almost compelleth them. And what if they were destitute of this so great and almost invincible help of the direction of nature? Ponder likewise the immense impotency of wicked men. For they are no light or trifling rewards a which they desire, and cannot obtain: but they fail in the very sum and top of things: neither can the poor wretches compass that which they only labour for nights and days: in which thing the forces of the good eminently appear. For as thou wouldst judge him to be most able to walk who going on foot could come as far as there were any place to go in: so must thou of tissimum esse censeres, ita eum qui expetendorurn 90 finem quo nihil ultra est apprehendit, potentissimum necesse est iudices. Ex quo fit quod huic obiacet, ut idem scelesti, idem uiribus omnibus uideantur esse deserti. Cur enim relicta uirtute uitia sectantur? Inscitiane bonorum? Sed quid eneruatius ignorantiae 95 caecitate? An sectanda nouerunt? Sed transuersos eos libido praecipitat. Sic quoque intemperantia fragiles qui obluctari uitio nequeunt. An scientes uolentesque bonum deserunt, ad uitia deflectunt? Sed hoc modo non solum potentes esse sed omnino 100 esse desinunt. Nam qui communem omnium quae sunt finem relinquunt, pariter quoque esse desistunt. Quod quidem cuipiam mirum forte uideatur, ut malos, qui plures hominum sunt, eosdem non esse dicamus; sed ita sese res habet. Nam qui mail sunt eos malos 105 esse non abnuo; sed eosdem esse pure atque simpliciter nego.
Nam uti cadauer hominem mortuum dixeris, simpliciter uero hominem appellate non pcvssis, ita uitiosos malos quidem esse concesserim, sed esse 110 absolute nequeam confiteri. Est enim quod ordinem retinet seruatque naturam; quod uero ab hac deficit, esse etiam quod in sua natura situm est derelinquit. 'Sed possunt,' inquies, cmali.' Ne ego quidem negauerim, sed haec eorum potentia non a uiribus 115 sed ab imbecillitate descendit. Possunt enim mala quae minime ualerent, si in bonorum efficientia manere potuissent. Qua« possibilitas eos euidentius nihil posse demonstrat. Nam si, uti paulo ante collegimus, malum nihil est, cum mala tantummodo force judge him most powerful who obtaineth the end of all that can be desired, beyond which there is nothing. Hence that which " is opposite also followeth, that the same men are wicked and destitute of all forces. For why do they follow vices, forsaking virtues? By ignorance of that which is good? But what is more' devoid of strength than blind ignorance? Or do they know what they should embrace, but passion driveth them headlong the contrary way? So also intemperance makes them frail, since they cannot strive against vice. Or do they wittingly and willingly forsake goodness, and decline to vices? But in this sort they leave not only to be powerful, but even to be at al'l. For they which leave the common end of all things which are, leave also being. Which may perhaps seem strange to some, that we should say that evil men are not at all, who are the greatest part of men: but yet it is so. For I deny not that evil men are evil, but withal I say that purely and simply they are not.
For as tliou mayest call a carcase a dead man, but not simply a man, so 1 confess that the vicious are evil, but T cannot grant that they are absolutely. For that is which retaineth order, and keepeth nature, but that which faileth from this leaveth also to be that which is in his own nature. But them wilt say that evil men can do many things, neither will I deny it, but this their power proceedeth not from forces but from weakness. For they can do evil, which they could not do if they could have remained in the performance of that which is good. Which possibility declareth more evidently that they can do nothing. For if, as we concluded a little before, eyiljsjjothingj since they can only do evil, i( 120 possint, nihil posse improbos liquet." " Perspicuum est." " Atque ut intellegas quaenam sit huius potentiae uis, summo bono nihil potentius esse paulo ante definiuimus." " Ita est," inquam. " Sed idem/' inquit, " facere malum nequit." " Minime." " Est 125 igitur/' inquit, " aliquis qui omnia posse homines putet?" " Nisi quis insaniat, nemo." " Atqui idem possunt mala." " Vtinam quidem," inquam, "non possent." " Cum igitur bonorum tantnmmodo potens possit omnia, non uero queant omnia potentes etiam 130 malorum, eosdem qui mala possunt minus posse manifestum est. Hue accedit quod omnem potentiam inter expetenda numerandam omniaque expetenda referri ad bonum uelut ad quoddam naturae suae cacumen ostendimus. Sed patrandi sceleris possi- 135 bilitas referri ad bonurn non potest; expetenda igitur non est. Atqui omnis potentia expetenda est; liquet igitur malorum possibilitatem non esse potentiam. Ex quibus omnibus bonorum quidem potentia, malorum uero minime dubitabilis apparet 140 infirmitas ueramque illam Platonis esse sententiam liquet solos quod desiderent facere posse sapientes, improbos uero exercere quidem quod libeat, quod uero desiderent explere non posse. Faciunt enirn quaelibet, dum per ea quibus delectantur id bonum 145 quod desiderant se adepturos putant; sed minime adipiscuntur, quoniam ad beatitudinem probra non ueniunt, is manifest that the wicked can do nothing." "It is most manifest." "And that thou mayest under stand what the force of this power is; we determined a little before that there is nothing more powerful than the Sovereign Goodness." "It is true," quoth I. "But He cannot, do evil.' "No." "Is there any then/' quoth she, " that think that men can do all things? " " No man, except he be mad, thinketh so." " Hut yet men can do evil." " I would to God they could not," quoth I. "Since therefore he that can only do good, can do all things, and they who can do evil, cannot do all things, it is manifest that they which can do evil are less potent. Moreover, we have proved that all power is to be accounted among those things which are to be wished for, and that all such things have reference to goodness, as to the very height of their nature. Hut the possibility of committing wickedness cannot have reference to goodness. Wherefore it is not to be wished for. Yet all power is to be wished for; and consequently it is manifest, possibility of evil is no power. By all which the power of the good and the undoubted infirmity of evil appeareth. And it is manifest that the sentence of Plato is true: that only wise men can do that which they desire, and that the wicked men practise indeed what they list, but cannot perform what they would. For they do what they list, thinking to obtain the good which they desire by those things which cause them delight; but they obtain it not, because shameful action cannot arrive to happiness."
L2 II.
Quos uides sedere celsos solii culmine reges Purpura claros nitente saeptos tristibus armis Ore toruo comminantes rabie cordis anhelos, Detrahat si quis superbis uani tegmina cultus, 6 lam uidebit intus artas dominos ferre catenas. Hinc enim libido uersat auidis corda uenenis, Hinc flagellat ira mentem fluctus turbida tollens Maeror aut captos fatigat aut spes lubrica torquet Ergo cum caput tot unum cernas ferre tyrannos, 10 Non facit quod optat ipse dominis pressus iniquis.
III.
Videsne igitur quanto in caeno probra uoluantur, qua probitas luce resplendeat? In quo perspicuum est numquam bonis praemia numquam sua sceleribus deesse supplicia. Rerum etenim quae geruntur illud 5 propter quod unaquaeque res geritur, eiusdem rei praemium esse non iniuria uideri potest, uti currendi in stadio propter quam curritur iacet praemium corona. Sed beatitudinem esse idem ipsum bonum II.
The kings whom \ve behold In highest glory placed, And with rich purple graced, Compassed with soldiers bold; Whose countenance shows fierce threats, Who with rash fury chide, If any strip the pride From their vainglorious feats; He'll see them close oppressed Within by galling chains.
For filthy lust there reigns And poisoneth their breast, Wrath often them perplexeth Raising their minds like waves, Sorrow their power enslaves And sliding hope them vexeth.
So many tyrants still Dwelling in one poor heart, Except they first depart She cannot have her will.
III.
Seest thou then in what mire wickedness wallows, and how clearly honesty shineth? By which it is manifest that the good are never without rewards, nor the evil without punishments. For in all things that are done that for which anything is done may deservedly seem the reward of that action, as to him that runneth a race, the crown for which he runneth is proposed as a reward. But we have showed that blessedness is the selfsame goodness for which all propter quod omnia geruntur ostendimus. Est igitur 10 humanis actibus ipsum bonum ueluti praemium commune propositum. Atqui hoc a bonis non potest separari neque enim bonus ultra iure uocabitur qui careat bono; quare probos mores sua praemia non relinquunt. Quantumlibet igitur saeuiant mali, 15 sapienti tamen corona non decidet, non arescet. Neque enim probis animis proprium decus aliena decerpit improbitas. Quod si extrinsecus accepto laetaretur, poterat hoc uel alius quispiam uel ipse etiam qui contulisset auferre; sed quoniam id sua 20 cuique probitas confert, turn suo praemio carebit, cum probus esse desierit. Postremo cum omne praemium idcirco appetatur quoniam bonum esse creditur, quis boni compotem praemii iudicet expertem? At cuius praemii? Omnium pulcherrimi 25 maximique. Memento etenim corollarii illius quod paulo ante praecipuum dedi ac sic collige: cum ipsum bonum beatitude sit, bonos omnes eo ipso quod boni sint fieri beatos liquet. Sed qui beati sint deos esse coimenit. Est igitur praemium bonorum quod nullus 30 deterat dies, nullius minuat potestas, nullius fuscet improbitas, deos fieri. Quae cum ita sint, de malorum quoque inseparabili poena dubitare sapiens nequeat. Nam cum bonum malumque item poenae atque prae mium aduersa fronte dissideant, quae in boni praemio 35 uidemus accedere eadem necesse est in mali poena contraria parte respondeant. Sicut igitur probis probitas ipsa fit praemium, ita improbis nequitia ipsa CONSOLAT. PHJI.OROPH. IV.
things are done. Wherefore this goodness is pro posed as a common reward for all human actions, and this cannot be separated from those who are good. For he shall not rightly be any longer called good, who wanteth goodness; wherefore virtuous manners are not left without their due rewards. And how much so ever the evil do rage, yet the wise man's crown will not fade nor wither. For others' wickedness depriveth not virtuous minds of their proper glory. But if he should rejoice at any thing which he hath from others, either lie who gave it, or any other might take it away. But because every man's virtue is the cause of it, then only he shall want his reward when he leaveth to be virtuous. Lastly, since every reward is therefore desired because it is thought to be good, who can judge him to be devoid of reward, which hath goodness for his possession? But what reward hath he? The most beautiful and the greatest that can be.
For remember that corollarium a which I presented thee with a little before, as with a rare and precious jewel, and infer thus: Since that goodness itself is happiness, it is manifest that all good men even by being good are made happy- But we agreed that happy men are gods. Wherefore the reward I of good men, which no time can waste, no man's power diminish, no man's wickedness obscure, is to become gods. Which things being so, no wise man can any way doubt of the inseparable punish ment of the evil. For since goodness and evil, punishment and reward, are opposite the one to the other, those things which we see fall out in the reward of goodness must needs be answerable in a contrary manner in the punishment of evil. Where fore as to honest men honesty itself is a reward, so supplicium est. lam uero quisquis afficitur poena, malo se affectum esse non dubitat. Si igitur sese 40 ipsi aestimare uelint, possuntne sibi supplicii expertes uideri quos omnium malorum extrema nequitia non affecit modo uerum etiam uehementer infecit? Vide autem ex aduersa parte bonorum, quae improbos poena comitetur. Omne namque quod sit unum 45 esse ipsumque unum bonum esse paulo ante didicisti, cui consequens est ut omne quod sit id etiam bonum esse uideatur. Hoc igitur modo quidquid a bono deficit esse desistit; quo fit ut mali desinant esse quod fuerant, sed fuisse homines adhuc ipsa humani 50 corporis reliqua species ostentat. Quare uersi in malitiam humanam quoque amisere naturam. Sed cum ultra homines quemque prouehere sola probitas possit, necesse est ut quos ab humana condicione deiecit, infra hominis meritum detrudat improbitas.
55 Etienit igitur, ut quern transformatum uitiis uideas hominem aestimare non possis. Auai'itia feruet alienarum opum uiolentus ereptor? Lupi similem dixeris. Ferox atque inquies linguam litigiis exercet? Cani comparabis. Insidiator occultus subripuisse 60 fraudibus gaudet? Vulpeculis exaequetur. Irae intemperans fremit? Leonis animum gestare credatur. Pauidus ac fugax non metuenda formidat? Ceruis similis habeatur. Segnis ac stupidus torpit? Asinum uiuit. Leuis atque inconstans studia permutat?