to the wicked their very wickedness is a punishment. And he that is punished doubteth not but that he is afflicted with the evil. Wherefore if they would truly consider their own estate, can they think themselves free from punishment, whom wickedness, the worst of all evils, doth not only touch but strongly infect? But weigh the punishment which accompanieth the wicked, by comparing it to the reward of the virtuous. For them learnedst not long before that whatsoever is at all is one, and that unity is goodness, by which it followeth that whatsoever is must also be good. And in this manner, whatsoever falleth from goodness ceaseth to be, by which it followeth that evil men leave to be that which they were, but the shape of men, which they still retain, showeth them to have been men: wherefore by embracing wickedness they have lost the nature of men. But since virtue alone can exalt us above men, wickedness must needs cast those under the desert of men, which it hath bereaved of that condition. Wherefore thou canst not account him a man whom thou seest transformed by vices. Is the violent extorter of other men's goods carried away with his covetous desire? Thou mayest liken him to a wolf. Is the angry and unquiet man always contending and brawling? Thou mayest compare him to a dog. Doth the treacherous fellow rejoice that he hath deceived others with his hidden frauds?
Let him be accounted no better than a fox. Doth the outrageous fret and fume? Let him be thought to have a lion's mind. Is the fearful and timorous afraid without cause? Let him be esteemed like to* hares and deer. Is the slow and stupid always idle? He liveth an ass's life. Doth the light and unconstant change his courses? He is nothing 65 Nihil auibus differt. Foedis inmundisque libidinibus immergitur? Sordidae suis uoluptate detinetur. Ita fit ut qui probitate deserta homo esse desierit, cum in diuinam condicionem transire non possit, uertatur in beluam.
III.
Vela Neritii ducis Et uagas pelago rates Eurus appulit insulae, Pulchra qua residens dea 5 Solis edita semine Miscet hospitibus nouis Tacta carmine pocula.
Quos ut in uarios modos Vertit herbipotens manus, 10 Hunc apri facies tegit, Ille Marmaricus leo Dente crescit et unguibus.
Hie lupis nuper additus, Flere dum parat, ululat. 15 Ille tigris ut Indica Tecta mitis obambulat.
Sed licet uariis malis Numen Arcadis alitis Obsitum miserans ducem 20 Peste soluerit hospitis, lam tamen mala remiges Ore pocula traxerant, lam sues Cerealia a Literally " Marniaric,"i.«. properly, the region between Egypt and the great Syrtis; generally, African, cf. Lucan iii. 293.
6 Literally, " rove tame round the house."
c i.e. Mercury who was born in Arcadia; cf. Virg.
Aen. viii. 129-138.
different from the birds. Is he drowned in filthy and unclean lusts? He is entangled in the pleasure of a stinking sow. So that he who, leaving virtue, I ceaseth to be a man, since he cannot be partaker of '. the divine condition, is turned into a beast.
III.
The sails which wise Ulysses bore, And ships which in the seas long time did stray The eastern wind drave to that shore Where the fair Goddess Lady Circe lay, Daughter by birth to Phoebus bright, Who with enchanted cups and charms did stay Her guests, deceived with their delight And into sundry figures them did change, Being most skilful in the might And secret force of herbs and simples strange; Some like to savage boars, and some Like lions fierce, which daily use to range Through Libya,*1 in tooth and claw become.
Others are changed to the shape and guise Of ravenous wolves, and waxing dumb Use howling in the stead of manly cries.
Others like to the tiger rove 6 Which in the scorched Indian desert lies.
And though the winged son of Jove c From these bewitched cups' delightful taste To keep the famous captain strove, Yet them the greedy mariners embraced With much desire, till turned to swine Glande pabula uerterant 25 Et nihil manet integrum Voce corpore perditis. Sola mens stabilis super Monstra quae patitur gemit. O leuem nimium manum 80 Nee potentia gramma, Membra quae ualeant licet, Corda uertere non ualent! Intus est hominum uigor Arce conditus abdita. 85 Haec uenena potentius Detrahunt hominem sibi Dira quae penitus meant Nee nocentia corpori Mentis uulnere saeuiunt."
IV.
Turn ego: " Fateor," inquam, "nee iniuria dici uideo uitiosos, tametsi human! corporis speciem seruent, in beluas tamen animorum qualitate mutari; sed quorum atrox scelerataque mens bonorum pernicie 5 saeuit, id ipsum eis licere noluissem." " Nee licet," inquit, " uti conuenienti monstrabitur loco. Sed tamen si id ipsum quod eis licere creditur auferatur, magna ex parte sceleratorum hominum poena releuetur. Etenim quod incredibile cuiquam forte 10 uideatur, infeliciores esse necesse est malos, cum cupita perfecerint, quam si ea quae cupiunt implere non possint. Nam si miserum est uoluisse praua, potuisse miserius est, sine quo uoluntatis miserae Instead of bread they fed on oaken mast.
Ruined in voice and form., no sign Remains to them of any human grace; Only their minds unchanged repine To see their bodies in such ugly case.
O feeble hand and idle art Which, though it could the outward limbs deface, Yet had no force to change the heart.
For all the force of men given by God's arm Lies hidden in their inmost part.
The poisons therefore which within them swarm More deeply pierce, and with more might, For to the body though they do no harm, Yet on the soul they work their spite."
IV.
Then said I, " I confess and perceive that thou affirmest not without cause that the vicious, though they keep the outward shape of men, are in their inward state of mind changed into brute beasts. But I would have had them whose cruel and wicked heart rageth to the harm of the good, restrained from executing their malice." " They are restrained," quoth she, " as shall be proved in convenient place. But yet if this liberty which they seem to have be taken away, their punishment also is in great part released. For (which perhaps to some may seem incredible) evil men must necessarily be more unhappy when they have brought to pass their purposes than if they could not obtain what they desire. For if it be a miserable thing to desire that which is evil, it is more miserable to be able to perform it, without which the miserable will could langueret effectus. Itaque cum sua singulis miseria 15 sit, triplici infortunio necesse est urgeantur quos uideas scelus uelle, posse, perficere." " Accedo," inquam, " sed uti hoc infortunio cito careant patrandi sceleris possibilitate deserti uehementer exopto." "Carebunt," inquit, "ocius quam uel tu forsitari uelis 20 uel illi sese aestiment esse carituros. Neque enim est aliquid in tarn breuibus uitae metis ita serum quod exspectare longum immortalis praesertim animus putet: quorum magna spes et excelsa facinorum machina repentino atque insperato saepe fine de- 25 struitur, quod quidem illis miseriae modum statuit.
Nam si nequitia miseros facit, miserior sit necesse est diuturnior nequam; quos infelicissimos esse iudicarem, si non eorum malitiam saltern mors extrema finiret. Etenim si de prauitatis infortunio 30 uera conclusimus, infinitam liquet esse miseriam quam esse constat aeternam." Turn ego: " Mira quidem/' inquam, " et concessu difficilis inlatio, sed his earn quae prius concessa sunt nimium conuenire cognosce." " Recte," inquit, "aestimas. Sed qui conclusion] 35 accedere durum putat, aequum est uel falsum aliquid praecessisse demonstret uel collocationem propositionum non esse efficacem necessariae conclusionis ostendat; alioquin concessis praecedentibus nihil prorsus est quod de inlatione causetur. Nam hoc 40 quoque quod dicam non minus mirum uideatur, sed ex his quae sumpta sunt aeque est necessarium."
not have any effect. Wherefore since everyone of these hath their peculiar misery, they must of force be oppressed with a threefold wretchedness, whom thou seest desire, be able, and perform wickedness." "I grant it," quoth I, "but earnestly wish that they may soon be delivered from this misery, having lost the power to perform their malice." " They will lose it," quoth she, "sooner than perhaps either thou wouldst, or they themselves suppose. For in the short compass of this life there is nothing so late that any one, least of all an immortal soul, should think it long in coming; so that the great hope and highest attempts of the wicked are many times made frustrate with a sudden and unexpected end, which in truth setteth some end to their misery.
For if wickedness make men miserable, the longer one is wicked, the more miserable he must needs be; and 1 should judge them the most unhappy men that may be, if death at least did not end their malice. For if we have concluded truly of the misery of wickedness, it is manifest that the wretchedness which is everlasting must of force be infinite." " A strange illation," quoth I, "and hard to be granted; but I see that those things which were granted before agree very well with these." "Thou thinkest aright," quoth she, " but he that findeth difficulty to yield to the conclusion must either show that something which is presupposed is false, or that the combination of the propositions makes not a necessary conclusion; otherwise, granting that which went before, he hath no reason to doubt of the inference. For this also which I will conclude now will seem no less strange, and yet followeth as necessarily out of those things which are already assumed." " What? " quoth I.
"Quidnam?" inquam. " Feliciores," inquit, "esse improbos supplicia luentes quam si eos nulla iustitiae poena coerceat. Neque id nunc tnolior quod cuiuis 45 ueniat in mentem, corrigi ultione prauos mores et ad rectum supplicii terrore deduci, ceteris quoque exemplum esse culpanda fugiendi, sed alio quodam modo infeliciores esse improbos arbitror impunitos, tametsi nulla ratio correctionis, nullus respectus 50 habeatur exempli." " Et quis erit," inquam, " praeter hos alius modus?" Et ilia: "Bonos/' inquit, "esse Felices, malos uero miseros nonne concessimus? " " Ita est," inquam. " Si igitur," inquit, " miseriae cuiuspiam bonum aliquid addatur, nonne felicior est 55 eo cuius pura ac solitaria sine cuiusquam boni admixtione miseria est?" "Sic/' inquam, "uidetur." " Quid si eidem misero qui cunctis careat bonis, praeter ea quibus miser est malum.aliud fuerit adnexum, nonne multo infelicior eo censendus est 60 cuius infortunium boni participatione releuatur?" " Quidni? " inquam. " Sed puniri improbos iustum, impum'tos uero elabi iniquum esse manifestum est." "Quis id neget? " "Sed ne illud quidem," ait, " quisquam negabit bonum esse omne quod iustum 65 est contraque quod iniustum est malum." Liquere, respondi.1 " Habent igitur improbi, cum puniuntur, quidem boni aliquid adnexum poenam ipsam scilicet quae ratione iustitiae bona est, idemque cum supplicio carent, inest eis aliquid ulterius mali ipsa impunitas 70 quam iniquitatis merito malum esse confessus es."
1 Sed puniri...respondi quae infra (in pay. 328 /. 73) post ultioni puniti in codiclbus habentur hue transponenda esse censuit P. Langenus, demonstrauit A. Enqelbrecht.
" That wicked men," quoth she, " are more happy being punished than if they escaped the hands of justice. Neither do I now go about to show that which may come into every man's mind, that evil customs are corrected by chastisement, and are reduced to virtue by the terror of punishment, and that others may take example to avoid evil, but in another manner also I think vicious men that go unpunished to be more miserable, although we take no account of correction and pay no regard to example.'' " And what other manner shall this be," quoth I, " besides these? " " Have we not granted," quoth she, " that the good are happy, and the evil miserable?" "'We have," quoth I. "If then," quoth she, " something that is good be added to one's misery, is he not happier than another whose misery is desolate and solitary, without any participa tion of goodness?" "So it seemeth," quoth I. " What if there be some other evil annexed to this miserable man who is deprived of all goodness, besides those which make him miserable, is he not to be accounted much more unhappy than he whose misery is lightened by partaking of goodness?" "Why not?" quoth I. " But it is manifest that it is just that the wicked be punished, and unjust that they should go unpunished." " Who can deny that?"
" But neither will any man deny this," quoth she, " that whatsoever is ijlgti_is_SQo.d, and contrariwise, that whatsoever is unjust, is_.evil/' "Certainly," I answered. "Then the wicked have some good annexed when they are punished, to wit, the punish ment itself, which by reason of justice is good, and when they are not punished, they have a further evil, the very impunity which thou hast deservedly granted to be an evil because of its injustice." "I " Negare non possum." " Multo igitur infeliciores improbi sunt iniusta impunitate donati quam iusta ultione puniti." Turn ego: " Ista quidem consequentia sunt eis quae paulo ante conclusa sunt.
75 Sed quaeso," inquam, "te, nullane animarum supplicia post defunctuin morte corpus relinquis? " " Et magna quidem/' inquit, "quorum alia poenali acerbitate, alia uero purgatoria dementia exerceri puto. Sed nunc de his disserere consilium non est.
80 Id uero hactenus egimus, ut quae indignissima tibi uidebatur malorum potestas earn nullam esse cognosceres quosque impunitos querebare, uideres numquam improbitatis suae carere suppliciis, licentiam quam cito finiri precabaris nee longam esse disceres 85 intelicioremque fore, si diuturnior, infelicissimam uero, si esset aeterna; post haec miseriores esse improbos iniusta impunitate dimissos quam iusta ultione punitos. Cui seriteiitiae consequens est ut turn demum grauioribus suppliciis urgeantur, cum 90 impuniti esse creduntur."
Turn ego: "Cum tuas," inquam, "rationes considero, nihil dici uerius puto. At si ad hominum iudicia reuertar, quis ille est cui haec non oredenda modo sed saltern audienda uideantur? " " Ita est," 96 inquit ilia. " Nequeunt enim oculos tenebris assuetos ad lucem perspicuae ueritatis attollere, similesque auibus sunt quarum intuitum nox inluminat dies caecat. Dum enim non rerum ordinem, sed suos " See discussion of this passage in Boethi-ux, An Essay, H. F. Stewart (1891), pp. 98 ff.
cannot deny it." " Wherefore the vicious are far more unhappy by escaping punishment unjustly, than by being justly punished." "This followeth," quoth I, "out of that which hath been concluded before.
But I pray thee, leavest thou no punishments for the_souls after the death of the body.?" "And those great too," quoth she. " Some of which I think to be executed as sharp punishments, and others as merciful purgations." But I purpose not now to treat of those. But we have hitherto laboured that thou shouldest perceive the power of the wicked, which to thee seemed intolerable, to be none at all, and that thou shouldest see, that those whom thou complainedst went unpunished, do never escape without punishment for their wickedness. And that thou shouldest learn that the licence which thou wishedst might soon end, is not long, and yet the longer the more miserable, and most unhappy if it were everlasting. Besides, that the wicked are more wretched being permitted to escape with unjust impunity, than being punished with just severity. Out of which it followeth that they are then more grievously punished, when they are thought to go scot-free."
"When 1 consider thy reasons," quoth J, ' think nothing can be said more truly. But if I return to the judgments of men, who is there that will think them worthy to be believed or so much as heard?" "It is true," quoth she, "for they cannot lift up their eyes accustomed to darkness, to behold the light of manifest truth, and they are like those birds whose sight is quickened by the night, and dimmed by the day. For while they look upon, not the order of things, but their own intuentur affectus, uel licentiam uel impunitatem J0 scelerum putant esse felicem. Vide autem quid aeterna lex sanciat. Melioribus animuin conformaueris,, nihil opus est iudice praemium deferente tu te ipse excellentioribus addidisti. Studium ad peiora deflexeris, extra ne quaesieris ultorem. Tu te 1"° ipse in deteriora trusisti, ueluti si uicibus sordidara humum caelumque respicias, cunctis extra cessantibus ipsa cernendi ratione nunc caeno nunc sideribus interesse uidearis. At uulgus ista non respicit Quid igitur? Hisne accedamus quos beluis similes HO esse monstrauimus? Quid si quis amisso penitus uisu ipsum etiam se habuisse obliuiseeretur iiituitum nihilque sibi ad humanam perfectionein deesse arbitraretur, num uidentes eadem caecos putaremus? Nam ne illud quidem adquiescent quod aeque ualidis H5 rationum nititur firmamentis: infeliciores eos esse qui faciant quam qui patiantur iniuriam." " Vellem," inquam, " has ipsas audire rationes." " Omnem," inquit, " improbum num supplicio dignum negas? " " Minime." " Infeliees uero esse qui sint improbi 120 multipliciter liquet." " Ita/' inquam. "Qui igituir supplicio digni sunt miseros esse non dubitas? " " Conuenit," inquam. " Si igitur cognitor," ait, " resideres^ cui supplicium inferendum putares^ eine qui fecisset an qui pertulisset iniuriam?" "Nee 125 ambigo," inquam, " quin perpesso satisfacerem dolore facientis." " Miserior igitur tibi iniuriae inlator quam acceptor esse uideretur." " Consequitur," affections, they think that licence and impunity to sin is happy. But see what the eternal law establisheth. If thou apply thy mind to the better, thou needest no judge to reward thee: thou hast joined thyself to the more excellent things. If thou declinest to that which is worse, never expect any other to punish thee: thou hast put thyself in a miserable estate; as if by turns thou lookest down to the miry ground, and up to heaven, setting aside all outward causes, by the very law of sight thou seemest sometime to be in the dirt, and sometime present to the stars. But the common sort considereth not these things. What then? Shall we join ourselves to them whom we have proved to be like beasts? What if one having altogether lost his sight should likewise forget that he ever had any, and should think that he wanted nothing which belongeth to human perfection: should we likewise think them blind, that see as well as they saw before? For they will not grant that neither, which may be proved by as forcible reasons, that they are more unhappy that do injury than they which suffer it." " I would," quoth I, "' hear these reasons." " Deniest thou," quoth she, " that every wicked man deserveth punishment? " " No." " And it is many ways clear that the vicious are miserable?" "Yes," quoth I. " Then you do not doubt that those who deserve punishment are wretched?" "It is true," quoth I.
"If then," quoth she, "thou wert to examine this cause, whom wouldest thou appoint to be punished, him that did or that suffered wrong?" "1 doubt not," quoth I, " but that 1 would satisfy him that suffered with the sorrow of him that did it." "The offerer of the injury then would seem to thee more miserable than the receiver?" "It followeth, " inquam. " Hinc igitur aliis de causis ea radice nitentibus, quod turpitude suapte natura miseros 130 faciat, apparet inlatam cuilibet iniuriam noil accipientis sed inferentis esse miseriam." " Atqui mine," ait, " contra faciunt oratores. Pro his enim qui graue quid acerbumque perpessi sunt miserationem iudicum excitare conantur, cum magis admittentibus 135 iustior miseratio debeatur; quos non ab iratis sed a propitiis potius miserantibusque accusatoribus ad iudicium ueluti aegros ad medicum duci oportebat, ut culpae morbos supplicio resecarent. Quo pacto defensorum opera uel tota frigeret, uel si prodesse 140 hominibus mallet, in accusationis habitum uerteretur. Ipsi quoque improbi, si eis aliqua rimula uirtutem relictam fas esset aspicere uitiorumque sordes poenarum cruciatibus se deposituros uiderent compensatioiie adipiscendae probitatis, nee hos cruciatus 145 esse ducerent defensorumque operam repudiarent ac se totos accusatoribus iudicibusque permitterent. Quo fit ut apud sapientes nullus prorsus odio locus relinquatur. Nam bonos quis nisi stultissimus oderit? Malos uero odisse ration e caret. Nam si, 150 uti corporum languor, ita uitiositas quidam est quasi morbus animorum, cum aegros corpore minime dignos odio sed potius miseratione iudicemus, multo magis non insequendi sed miserandi sunt quorum mentes omni lariguore atrocior urget improbitas.
CONSOLAT. PHILOSOFH. IV.
quoth I. " Hence therefore, and for other causes "•rounded upon that principle that dishonesty of itself maketh men miserable, it appeareth that the injury which is offered any man is not the receiver's but the doer's misery." " But now-a-days,' quoth she, " orators take the contrary course. For they endeavour to draw the judges to commiseration of them who have suffered any grievous afflictions; whereas pity is more justly due to the causers thereof, who should be brought, not by angry, but rather by favourable and compassionate accusers to judgment, as it were sick men to a physician, that their diseases and faults might be taken away by punishments; by which means the defenders' labour would either wholly cease, or if they had rather do their clients some good, they would change their defence into accusations. And the wicked themselves, if they could behold virtue abandoned by them, through some little rift, and perceive that they might be delivered from the filth of sin by the affliction of punishments, obtaining virtue in exchange, they would not esteem of torments, and would refuse the assistance of their defenders, and wholly resign themselves to their accusers and judges. By which means it eorneth to pass, that in wise men there is no place for hatred. For who but a very fool would hate the good? And to hate the wicked were against reason. For as faintness is a disease of the body, so is vice a sickness of the mind.
Wherefore, since we judge those that have corporal infirmities to be rather worthy of compassion than f of hatred, much more are they to be pitied, and not 1 abhorred, whose minds are oppressed with wicked-; ness, the greatest malady that may be.
BOETHil IV.
Quod tantos iuuat excitare motus Et propria fatum sollicitare manu? Si mortem petitis, propinquat ipsa Sponte sua uolucres nee remoratur equos. 5 Quos serpens leo tigris ursus aper Dente petunt, idem se tamen ense petunt. An distant quia dissidentque mores, Iniustas acies et fera bella mouent Alternisque uolunt perire telis? 10 Non est iusta satis saeuitiae ratio.
Vis aptam mentis uicem referre?
Dilige iure bonos et miseresce malis."
V.
Hie ego: " Video/' inquam, " quae sit uel felicitas uel miseria in ipsis proborum atque improborum meritis constituta. Sed in hac ipsa fortuna populari non nihil boni maliue inesse perpendo. Neque enim 5 sapientum quisquam exul inops ignominiosusque esse malit, potius quam pollens opibus, honore reuerendus, potentia ualidus, in sua permanens urbe florere.
Sic enim clarius testatiusque sapientiae tractatur officium, cum in contingentes populos regentium 10 quodam modo beatitude transfunditur, cum praesertim career, nex l ceteraque legalium tormenta poenarum perniciosis potius ciuibus propter quos etiam constituta sunt debeantur. Cur haec igitur uersa uice mutentur scelerumque supplicia bonos premant, praemia uir- 1 lex plerique codd.
a Literally, " Men whom serpent, lion, tiger, bear, and boar attack with tooth, yet attack each other with the sword. " CONSOLAT/VHILOSOPH. iv.
IV.
Why should we strive to die so many ways, And slay ourselves with our own hands? If we seek death, she ready stands, She willing comes, her chariot never stays.
Those against whom the wild beasts armed be, Against themselves with weapons rage.* Do they such wars unjustly wage, Because their lives and manners disagree, And so themselves with mutual weapons kill? Alas, but this revenge is small. Wouldst thou give due desert to all?
Love then the good, and pity thou the ill."
V.
" I see," quoth I, " what felicity or misery is placed in the deserts of honest and dishonest men. But I consider that there is somewhat good or evil even in this popular fortune. For no wise man had rather live in banishment, poverty, and ignominy, than prosper in his own country, being rich, re spected, and powerful. For in this manner is the office of wisdom performed with more credit and renown, when the governors' happiness is participated by the people about them; so chiefly because prisons, death, and other torments of legal punishments are rather due to pernicious subjects, for whom they were also ordained. Wherefore I much marvel why these things are thus turned upside down, and the punishments of wickedness oppress the good, while BOETrm BOETrm 15 tutum mail rapiant, ueheinenter admiror, quaeque tarn iniustae confusionis ratio uideatur ex te scire desidero. Minus etenim mirarer, si misceri omnia fortuitis casibus crederem. Nunc stuporem meum deus rector exaggerat, Qui cum saepe bonis iucunda, 20 malis aspera contraque bonis dura tribuat, malis optata concedat, nisi causa deprehenditur, quid est quod a fortuitis casibus differre uideatur? " " Nee mirum," inquit, "si quid ordinis ignorata ratione teinerarium confusumque credatur. Sed tu quamuis 25 causain tantae dispositionis ignores, tamen quoniam bonus mundum rector temperat, recte fieri cuncta ne dubites.
V.
Si quis Arcturi sidera nescit Propinqua summo cardine labi, Cur legat tardus plaustra Bootes Mergatque seras aequore flammus, 5 Cum nimis celeres explicet ortus, Legem stupebit aetheris alti. Palleant plenae cornua lunae Infecta metis noctis opacae Quaeque fulgenti texerat ore 10 Confusa Phoebe detegat astra, Commouet gentes publicus error Lassantque crebris pulsibus aera. Nemo miratur flamina Cori Litus frementi tundere fiuctu 15 Nee niuis duram frigore molem Feruente Phoebi soluier aestu.
a See Tylor's Primitive Culture, pp. 296 ff. Cf. " carniina uel caelo possunt deducere lunara," Virg. Eel. viii. 69, and Juvenal, Sat. vi. 440 sq.
evil men obtain the rewards of the good. And 1 desire to know of thee what may seem to be the reason of so unjust confusion. For I would marvel less if I thought that all things were disordered by casual events. Now God being the Governor, my astonishment is increased. For since that He distributeth oftentimes that which is pleasant to the good, and that which is distasteful to the bad, and contrariwise adversity to the good, and prosperity to the evil, unless we find out the cause hereof, what difference may there seem to be betwixt this and accidental chances?" " It is no marvel," quoth she, " if anything be thought temerarious and confused, when we know not the order it hath. But although thou beest ignorant of the causes why things be so disposed, yet because the world hath a governor, doubt not but all things are well done.
V.
Who knows not how the stars near to the poles do slide, And how Bootes his slow wain doth guide, And whv he sets so late, and doth so early rise, May wonder at the courses of the skies. If when the moon is full her horns seem pale to sight, Infested with the darkness of the night, And stars from which all grace she with her bright ness took, Now show themselves, while she doth dimly look, A public error straight through vulgar minds doth pass, And they with many strokes beat upon brass.0 None wonders why the winds upon the waters blow. Nor why hot Phoebus' beams dissolve the snow. M 337 Hie enim causas cernere promptum est, Illic latentes pectora turbant.
Cuncta quae rara prouehit aetas 20 Stupetque subitis mobile uulgus, Cedat inscitiae nubilus error, Cessent profecto mira uideri."
VI " Ita est," inquam; " sed cum tui muneris sit latentium rerum causas euoluere uelatasque caligine explicare rationes, quaeso uti quae hinc decernas, quoniam hoc me miraculum maxime perturbat, 5 edisseras." Turn ilia paulisper arridens: "Ad rem me," inquit, " omnium quaesitu maximam uocas, cui uix exhaust! quicquam satis sit. Talis namque materia est ut una dubitatione succisa innumerabiles aliae uelut hydrae capita succrescant, nee ullus fuerit 10 modus, nisi quis eas uiuacissimo mentis igne coerceat. In hac enim de prouidentiae simplicitate, de fati serie, de repentinis casibus, de cognitione ac praedestinatione diuina, de arbitrii libertate quaeri solet, quae quant! oneris sint ipse perpendis. Sed quoniam 15 haec quoque te nosse quaedam medicinae tuae portio est, quamquam angusto limite temporis saepti tamen aliquid delibare l conabimur. Quod si te musici carminis oblectamenta delectant, hanc oportet paulisper differas uoluptatem, dum nexas sibi ordine 20 contexo rationes." " Vt libet," inquam.
1 deliberare codd.; delibare coni. Pulmannus.
These easy are to know, the other hidden lie, And therefore more our hearts they terrify.
All strange events which time to light more seldom brings, And the vain people count as sudden things, If we our clouded minds from ignorance could free, No longer would by us admired be."
VI.
"It is true," quoth I, " but since it is thy pro fession to explicate the causes of hidden things, and to unfold the reasons which are covered with dark ness, I beseech thee vouchsafe to declare what conclusion thou drawest from these things, for this miracle troubleth me above all others." Then she smiling a little said: "Thou invitest me to a matter which is most hardly found out, and can scarcely be sufficiently declared; for it is such that, one doubt being taken away, innumerable others, like the heads of Hydra, succeed, neither will they have any end unless a man repress them with the most lively fire of his mind. For in this matter are wont to be handled these questions: of the simjThcity_of Provi dence; of the course of Fate; of sudden chances; of G.odjj_ knowledge- and predestination^ and of free will_;_ which how weighty they are, thou thyself discerneth. But because it is part of thy cure to know these things also, though the time be short, yet we will endeavour to touch them briefly. But if the sweetness of verse delight thee, thou must forbear this pleasure for a while, until I propose unto thee some few arguments." "As it pleaseth thee," quoth I.
Tune uelut ab alio orsa principio ita disseruit: " Omnium generatio rerum cunctusque mutabilium naturarum progressus et quidquid aliquo mouetur modo, causas, ordinem, formas ex diuinae mentis 25 stabilitate sortitur. Haec in suae simplicitatis arce compositamultiplicem rebus regendis modum statuit. Qui modus cum in ipsa diuinae intellegentiae puritate conspicitur, prouidentia nominatur; cum uero ad ea quae mouet atque disponit refertur, fatum 30 a ueteribus appellatum est. Quae diuersa esse facile liquebit, si quis utriusque uim mente conspexerit. Nam prouidentia est ipsa ilia diuina ratio in summo omnium principe constituta quae cuncta disponit; fatum uero inhaerens rebus mobilibus dispositio per 35 quam prouidentia suis quaeque nectit ordinibus. Prouidentia namque cuncta pariter quamuis diuersa quamuis infinita complectitur; fatum uero singula digerit in motum locis formis ac temporibus distributa, ut haec temporalis ordinis explicatio in 40 diuinae mentis adunata prospectum prouidentia sit, eadem uei'o adunatio digesta atque explicata tem poribus fatum uocetur. Quae licet diuersa sint, alterum tamen pendet ex altero. Ordo namque fatalis ex prouidentiae simplicitate procedit. Sicut 45 enim artifex faciendae rei formam mente praecipiens mouet operis effectum, et quod simpliciter praesentarieque prospexerat, per temporales ordines ducit, ita deus prouidentia quidem singulariter stabiliterque facienda disponit, fato uero haec ipsa