'25 mine uocauerunt, nos uero per inopiam significantium uocum translaticiam retinuimus nuncupationem, earn quarn illi VTTOO-TOCTIV dicunt personam uocantes; sed peritior Graecia sermonum vTrmrracriv uocat indiuiduam subsistentiam. Atque, uti Graeca utar oratione in 30 rebus quae a Graecis agitata Latina interpretatione translata sunt: at owriat ev /xty rots KaBoXov clvat SvvavTat, ' fv 8e rots drdyuois KCU Kara yue/aos /AOVOIS v(f)UTTavTa.L, id est: essentiae in uniuersalibus quidem esse possunt, in solis uero indiuiduis et particularibus 35 substant. Intellectus enim uniuersaliuin rerum ex particularibus sumptus est. Quocirca cum ipsae subsistentiae in uniuersalibus quidem sint,in particularibus uero capiant substantiam, iure subsistentias particu lar! ter substantes I'Troo-racrets appellauerunt. Neque " Implying a short penultimate.
different subjects of representation. Now persona " mask " is derived from personare, with a circumflex on the penultimate. But if the accent is put on the antepenultimate a the word will clearly be seen to come from sonm " sound/' and for this reason, that the hollow mask necessarily produces a larger sound.
The Greeks, too, call these masks Trpoo-wTra from the fact that they are placed over the face and conceal the countenance from the spectator: -n-apa TOV TT/OOS TOWS (uTras Ti()e<rdai. But since, as we have said, it was by the masks they put on that actors played the different characters represented in a tragedy or comedy — Hecuba or Medea or Simon or Chremes, — so also all other men who could be recognized by their several characteristics were designated by the Latins with the term persona and by the Greeks with Trpoo-wTra. But the Greeks far more clearly gave to the individual subsistence of a rational nature the name iiTroo-racrts, while we through want of appropriate words have kept a borrowed term, calling that persona which they call vTroo-racm; but Greece with its richer vocabulary gives the name iVoo-racrts to the individual subsistence. And, if I may use Greek in dealing with matters which were first mooted by Greeks before they came to be interpreted in Latin: al ova-cat (V [M£v rots KadoXov etvou Suvavrcu • «r 6e rots aro/zois Kal Kara (j.epos fioyots v^Ldravro.!^ that is: essences indeed can have potential existence in universals, but they have particular substantial existence in particulars alone. For it is from particulars that all our comprehension of universals is taken. Where fore since subsistences are present in universals but acquire substance in particulars they rightly gave the name I'Troa-rao-ts to subsistences which acquired substance through the medium of particulars. For 40 enim pensius subtiliusque intuenti idem uidebit.ui esse subsistentia quod substantia.
Nam quod Graeci owrtoxrw uel ovo-Lwa-Oai dicunt, id nos subsistentiam uel subsistere ap})ellamus; quod uero illi viroo-raa-iv uel V(/>urracr$ai, id nos substantiam 45 uel substare interpretamur. Subsistit enim quod ipsum accidentibus, ut possit esse, non indiget. Substat autem id quod aliis accidentibus subiectum quoddam, ut esse ualeant, subministrat; sub illis enim stat, dum subiectum est accidentibus. Itaque genera uel species 50 subsistunt tantum; neque enim accidentia generibus speciebusue contingunt. Indiuidua uero non modo subsistunt uerum etiam substant, nam neque ipsa indigent accidentibus ut sint; informata enim sunt iam propriis et specificis differentiis et accidentibus 55 ut esse possint ministrant, dum sunt scilicet subiecta. Quocirca civai atque ovcnwa-dai esse atque subsistere, v<£i'o-Tacr0ai uero substare intellegitur. Neque enim uerborum inops Graecia est, ut Marcus Tullius alludit, sed essentiam, subsistentiam, substantiam, personam 60 totidem nominibus reddit, essentiam quidem ovviav, subsistentiam uero oucrtwcrtv, substantiam UTrooracrti/, personam TT/OOO-WTTOV appellans. Ideo autem t>7roo"rucms Graeci indiuiduas substaritias uocauerunt, quoniam ceteris subsunt et quibusdam quasi accidentibus sub- 65 positae subiectaeque sunt; atque idcirco nos quoque eas substantias nuncupamus quasi subpositas, quas illi 1 vTrocrTao-ets, cumque etiam irpoa-MTra nuncupent easdem substantias, possumus nos quoque nuncupare personas. Idem est igitur ova-iav esse quod essentiam, idem 70 ovcrtoxrtv quod subsistentiam, idem vTroo-rao-iv quod substantiam, idem TrpocrwTrov quod personam. Quare autem de inrationabilibus animalibus Graecus VTTO-(TTavLv non dicat, sicut nos de eisdem nomen sub- 1 quas illi Vallinus; quasi uel quas codd. meliores.
to no one using his eyes with any care or penetra tion will subsistence and substance appear identical. For our equivalents of the Greek terms owriWis ovcriMo-Oai are respectively subsisienlia and subsistere, while their I'TrocrTacris uc/Hcrracr^ai are represented by our substantia and substare. For a thing has subsist ence when it does not require accidents in order to be, but that thing has substance which supplies to other things, accidents to wit, a substrate enabling them to be; for it "substands " those things so longas it is subjected to accidents. Thus genera and species have only subsistence, for accidents do not attach to genera and species. But particulars have not only subsistence but substance, for they, no more than generals, depend on accidents for their Being; for they are already provided with their proper and specific differences and they enable accidents to be by supplying them with a substrate. Wherefore esse and subsistere represent eivai and ora-LwrOat, while substare represents v^ia-raa-Oat.. For Greece is not, as Marcus Tullius a playfully says, short of words, but provides exact equivalents for esscntia, subsistentia, substantia and persona — ovtria for essentia, ovo-tWts for subsistentia, uTroo-rao-ts for substantia, ny>6creo7rov for per sona. But the Greeks called individual substances viTrocrracrets because they underlie the rest and offer support and substrate to what are called accidents; and we in our term call them substances as being substrate — wocrTCMms, and since they also term the same substances -n-poa-Mrra, we too may call them persons. So ovcria is identical with essence, ovtrtwris with subsistence, uTrooracris with substance, Trpoo-wTrov with person. But the reason why the Greek does not use wTToo-rao-ts of irrational animals while we apply " Tusc. ii. 15. 3o.
D2 89 stantiae praedicamus, haec ratio est, quoniam nomen 75 hoc melioribus applicatum est, ut aliqua id quod est excellentius, tametsi non descriptione naturae secundum id quod i><£to-Tacr0cu atque substare est, at certe uTTocrrao-ews uel substantiae uocabulis discerneretur.
Est igitur et hominis quidem essentia, id est ova-La., 80 et subsistentia, id est OTJO-UOCTIS, et viroa-rcuris, id est substantia, et irpocnaTrov, id est persona; owria quidem atque essentia quoniam est, oiVtWts uero atque subsistentia quoniam in nullo subiecto est, uVoo-rao-is uero atque substantia, quoniam subest 85 ceteris quae subsistentiae non sunt, id est oixriwcreis; est Trpoo-wTTov atque persona, quoniam est rationabile indiuiduum. Deus quoque et ova-ia est et essentia, est enim et maxima ipse est a quo omnium esse proficiscitur. Est ovtrt&xrtSj id est subsistentia (subsistit 90 enim nullo indigens), et v(f>Lo-Tao-6ai.; substat enim. Vnde etiam dicimus unam esse oucrtav uel oixriaxriv, id est essentiam uel subsistentiam deitatis, sed tres vTroorao-ets, id est tres substantias. Et quidem secundum hunc modum dixere unam trinitatis essentiam, 95 tres substantias tresque personas. Nisi enim tres in deo substantias ecclesiasticus loquendi usus excluderet, uideretur idcirco de deo dici substantia, non quod ipse ceteris rebus quasi subiectum supponeretur, sed quod idem omnibus uti praeesset ita etiam quasi 100 principium subesset rebus, dum eis omnibus oixriwcr$ou uel subsistere subministrat.
IV.
Sed haec omnia idcirco sint dicta, ut differentiam 0 For a similar submission of his own opinion to the usage of the Church cf. the end of 2V. i. and of Tr. ii.
the term substance to them is this: This term was applied to things of higher value, in order that what is more excellent might be distinguished, if not by a definition of nature answering to the literal meaning of v<j>i(rra(rdaL = substare, at any rate by the words uTrocrrao-t? = substantia.
To begin with, then, man is essence, i.e. oiWu, subsistence, i.e. ovcriVrts, wroerracris, i.e. substance, Trpoo-wTTov, i.e. person: ova- to. or essentia because he is, oixrtWis or subsistence because he is not accidental to any subject, vTroo-rao-is or substance because he is subject to all the things which are not subsistences or oi'crtdjcrets, while he is TrpocruTrov or person because he is a rational individual. Next, God is oiVi'u or essence, for He is and is especially that from which proceeds the Being of all things. To Him belong ovaidxrts, i.e. subsistence, for He subsists in absolute independence, and v^urraa-Oai, for He is substantial Being. Whence we go on to say that there is one ovcria or oiVtwo-ts, i.e. one essence or subsistence of the Godhead, but three vTroo-racreis or substances. And indeed, following this use, men have spoken of One essence, three substances and three persons of the Godhead. For did not the language of the Church forbid us to say three substances in speaking of God," substance might seem a right term to apply to Him, not because He underlies all other things like a substrate, but because, just as He excels above all things, so He is the foundation and support of things, supplying them all witli oiVrtdxrtfui or sub sistence.
IV.
You must consider that all I have said so far has been for the purpose of marking the difference naturae atque personae id est ouo-ias atque {iT monstraremus. Quo uero nomine unumquodque oporteat appellari, ecclesiasticae sit locutionis arbi-5 trium. Hoc interim constet quod inter naturam pei'sonamque differre praediximus, quoniam natura est cuiuslibet substantiae specificata proprietas, persona uero rationabilis naturae indiuidua substantia. Hanc in Christo Nestorius duplicem esse 10 constituit eo scilicet traductus errore, quod putauerit in omnibus naturis dici posse personam. Hoc enim praesumpto, quoniam in Christo duplicem naturam esse censebat, duplicem quoque personam esse confessus est. Qua in re eum falsum esse cum definitio 16 superius dicta conuincat, turn haec argumentatio euidenter eius declarabit errorem. Si enim non est Christi una persona duasque naturas esse manifestum est, hominis scilicet atque dei (nee tarn erit insipiens quisquam, utqui utramque earum a ratione seiungat), 20 sequitur ut duae uideantur esse personae; est enim persona ut dictum est naturae rationabilis indiuidua substantia.
Quae est igitur facta hominis deique coniunctio? Num ita quasi cum duo corpora sibimet apponuntur, 25 ut tantum locis iuncta sint et nihil in alterum ex alterius qualitate perueniat? Quern coniunctionis Graeci modum Ka.ro. -Tra.pa.Qta-Lv uocant. Sed si ita humanitas diuinitati coniuncta est, nihil horum ex utrisque confectum est ac per hoc nihil est Christus.
30 Nomen quippe ipsum unum quiddam significat singularitate uocabuli. At si duabus personis manentibus ea coniunctio qualem superius diximus facta est naturarum, unum ex duobus effici nihil potuit; between Nature and Person, that is, owna and vTruo-Tao-is. The exact terms which should be applied in each case must be left to the decision of ecclesi astical usage. For the time being let that distinction between Nature and Person hold which I have affirmed,, viz. that Nature is the specific property of any substance, and Person the individual substance of a rational nature. Nestorius affirmed that in Christ Person was twofold, being led astray by the false notion that Person may be applied to every nature. For on this assumption, understanding that there were in Christ two natures, he declared that there were likewise two persons. And although the defini tion which we have already given is enough to prove Nestorius wrong, his error shall be further declared by the following argument. If the Person of Christ is not single, and if it is clear that there are in Him two natures, to wit, divine and human (and no one will be so foolish as to fail to include either in the definition), it follows that there must apparently be two persons; for Person, as has been said, is the in dividual substance of a rational nature.
What kind of union., then, between God and man has been effected? Is it as when two bodies are laid the one against the other, so that they are only joined locally, and no touch of the quality of the one reaches the other — the kind of union which the Greeks term Kara TrapdOfa-iv " by juxtaposition "? But if humanity has been united to divinity in this way no one thing has been formed out of the two, and hence Christ is nothing. The very name of Christ, indeed, denotes by its singular number a unity. But if the two persons continued and such a union of natures as we have above described took place, there could be no unity formed from two things, for nothing could ever omnino enim ex duabus personis nihil umquam fieri 35 potest. Nihil igitur unum secundum Nestorium Christus est ac per hoc omnino nihil. Quod enim non est unum, nee esse omnino potest; esse enim atque unum conuertitur et quodcumque unum est est. Etiam ea quae ex pluribus coniunguntur 40 ut aceruus, chorus, unum tamen sunt. Sed esse Christum manifeste ac ueraciter confitemur; unum igitur esse dicimus Christum. Quod si ita est, unam quoque Christi sine dubitatione personam esse necesse est. Nam si duae personae essent, unus 45 esse non posset; duos uero esse dicere Christos nihil est aliud nisi praecipitatae mentis insania. Cur enim omnino duos audeat Christos uocare, unum hominem alium deum? Vel cur eum qui deus est Christum uocat, si eum quoque qui homo est Christum est 50 appellaturuSj cum nihil simile, nihil habeant ex copulatione coniunctum? Cur simili nomine diuersissimis abutatur naturis, cum, si Christum definire cogitur, utrisque ut ipse dicit Christis non possit unam definitionis adhibere substantiam? Si enim 55 dei atque hominis diuersa substantia est unumque in utrisque Christi riomen nee diuersarum coniunctio substantiarum unam creditur fecisse personam, aequiuocum riomen est Christi et nulla potest definitione concludi. Quibus autem umquam scripturis nomen 60 Christi geminatur? Quid uero noui per aduentum saluatoris efFectum est? Nam catholicis et fidei ueritas et raritas miraculi constat. Quarn enim magnum est quamque noutim, quam quod semel nee ullo alio saeculo possit euenire, ut eius qui solus 65 est deus natura cum humana quae ab eo erat diuer- <* Cf. the discussion of aequiuoca = 6/j.(i)vvfji.os in Isag. Porph. Vide Brandt's Index.
9* possibly be formed out of two persons. Therefore Christ is, according to Nestorius, in no respect one, and therefore He is absolutely nothing. For what is not one cannot exist either; because Being and unity are convertible terms, and whatever is one is. Even things which are made up of many items, such as a heap or chorus, are nevertheless a unity. Now we openly and honestly confess that Christ is; therefore we say that Christ is a Unity. And if this is so, then without controversy the Person of Christ is one also. For if the Persons were two He could not be one; but to say that there are two Christs is nothing else than the madness of a distraught brain. Could Nestorius, I ask, dare to call the one man and the one God in Christ two Christs? Or why does he call Him Christ who is God, if he is also going to call Him Christ who is man, when his combination gives the two no common factor, no coherence? Why does he wrongly use the same name for two utterly different natures, when, if he is compelled to define Christ, he cannot, as he himself admits, apply the substance of one definition to both his Christs? For if the substance of God is different from that of man, and the one name of Christ applies to both, and the combination of different substances is not believed to have formed one Person, the name of Christ is equivocal a and cannot be comprised in one definition. But in what Scriptures is the name of Christ ever made double?
Or what new thing has been wrought by the coming of the Saviour? For the truth of the faith and the unwontedness of the miracle alike remain, for Catholics, unshaken. For how great and unprece dented a thing it is — unique and incapable of repeti tion in any other age — that the nature of Him who is God alone should come together with human nature sissima conueniret atque ita ex distantibus naturis una fieret copulatione persona! Secundum Nestorii uero sententiam quid contingit noui? "Seruant," inquit, "proprias humanitas diuinitasque personas."
70 Quando enim non fuit diuinitatis propria humanitatisque persona? Quando uero non erit? Vel quid amplius in lesu generatione contingit quam in cuiuslibet alterius, si discretis utrisque personis discretae etiam fuere naturae? Ita enim personis manentibus 75 illic nulla naturarum potuit esse coniunctio, ut in quolibet homine, cuius cum propria persona subsistat, nulla est ei excellentissimae substantiae coniuncta diuinitas. Sed fortasse lesum, id est personam hominis, idcirco Christum uocet, quoiiiam per earn 80 mira quaedam sit operata diuinitas. Esto. Deum uero ipsum Christ! appellatione cur uocet? Cur uero non elementa quoque ipsa simili audeat appellare uocabulo per quae deus mira quaedam cotidianis motibus operatur? An quia inrationabiles sub- 85 stantiae non possunt habere personam qua l Christ! uocabulum excipere possint 2? Nonne in sanctis hominibus ac pietate conspicuis apertus diuinitatis actus agnoscitur? Nihil enim intererit, cur non sanctos quoque uiros eadem appellatione dignetur, 90 si in adsumptione humanitatis non est una ex coniunctione persona. Sed dicat forsitan, " Illos quoque Christos uocari fateor, sed ad imaginem ueri Christ!." Quod si nulla ex homine atque deo una persona coniuncta est, omnes ita ueros Christos arbitrabimur 95 ut hunc qui ex uirgine genitus creditur. Nulla quippe in hoc adunata persona est ex dei atque hominis copulatione sicut nee in eis, qui dei spiritu 1 quae codd. 8 possit Vallinus.
which was entirely different from God to form from different natures by conjunction a single Person! But now, if we follow Nestorius, what happens that is new? "Humanity and divinity/' quoth he, "keep their proper Persons." Well, when had not divinity and humanity each its proper Person? And when, we answer, will this not be so? Or wherein is the birth of Jesus more significant than that of any other child, if, the two Persons remaining distinct, the natures also were distinct? For while the Persons remained so there could no more be a union of natures in Christ than there could be in any other man with whose substance, be it never so perfect, no divinity was ever united because of the subsistence of his proper person. But for the sake of argument let him call Jesus, i.e. the human person, Christ, because through that person God wrought certain wonders. Agreed. But why should he call God Himself by the name of Christ? Why should he not go on to call the very elements by that name? For through them in their daily movements God works certain wonders. Is it because irrational substances cannot possess a Person enabling them to receive the name of Christ?
Is not the operation of God seen plainly in men of holy life and notable piety? There will surely be no reason not to call the saints also by that name, if Christ taking humanity on Him is not one Person through conjunction. But perhaps he will say, " I allow that such men are called Christs, but it is because they are in the image of the true Christ." But if no one Person has been formed of the union of God and man, we shall consider all of them just as true Christs as Him who, we believe, was born of a Virgin. For no Person has been made one by the union of God and man either in Him or in them who by the.
de uenturo Christo praedicebant, propter quod etiam ipsi quoque appellati sunt Christi. lam uero sequitur, 100 ut personis manentibus nullo modo a diuinitate humanitas credatur adsumpta. Omnino enim disiuncta sunt quae aeque personis naturisque separantur, prorsus inquam disiuncta sunt nee magis inter se homines bouesque disiuncti quam diuinitas in 105 Christo humanitasque discreta est, si mansere personae. Homines quippe ac boues una animalis communitate iunguntur; est enim illis secundum genus communis substantia eademque in uniuersalitatis collectione natura. Deo uero atque homini quid 110 non erit diuersa ratione disiunctum, si sub diuersitate naturae personarum quoque credatur mansisse discretio? Non est igitur saluatum genus humanum, nulla in nos salus Christi generatione processit, tot prophetarum scripturae populum inlusere credentem, 115 omnis ueteris testamenti spernatur auctoritas per quam salus mundo Christi generatione promittitur. Non autem prouenisse manifestum est, si eadem in persona est quae in natura diuersitas. Eundem quippe saluum fecit quern creditur adsumpsisse; 120 nulla uero intellegi adsumptio potest, si manet aeque naturae personaeque discretio. Igitur qui adsumi manente persona non potuit, iure non uidebitur per Christi generationem potuisse saluari. Non est igitur per generationem Christi hominum saluata 125 natura, — quod credi nefas est.
Sed quamquam permulta sint quae hunc sensum inpugnare ualeant atque perfringere, de argumentorum copia tamen haec interim libasse sufficiat.
b For a similar reductio ad absurdum ending in quod nefas est see Tr. iii. (supra, p. 44) and Cons. v. 3 (infra, p. 374).
Spirit of God foretold the coming Christ, for which cause they too were called Christs. So now it follows that so long as the Persons remain, we cannot in any wise believe that humanity has been assumed by divinity. For things which differ alike in persons and natures are certainly separate, nay absolutely separate; man and oxen are not further separate than are divinity and humanity in Christ, if the Persons have remained. Men indeed and oxen are united in one animal nature, for by genus they have a common substance and the same nature in the collection which forms the universal." But God and man will be at all points fundamentally different if we are to believe that distinction of Persons continues under difference of nature. Then the human race has not been saved, the birth of Christ has brought us no salvation, the writings of all the prophets have but beguiled the people that believed in them, contempt is poured upon the authority of the whole Old Testament which promised to the world salvation by the birth of Christ. It is plain that salvation has not been brought us, if there is the same difference in Person that there is in Nature. No doubt He saved that humanity which we believe He assumed; but no assumption can be conceived, if the separation abides alike of Nature and of Person. Hence that human nature which could not be assumed as long as the Person continued, will certainly and rightly appear incapable of salvation by the birth of Christ.
Wherefore man's nature has not been saved by the birth of Christ — an impious conclusion.6 But although there are many weapons strong enough to wound and demolish the Nestorian view, let us for the moment be content with this small selection from the store of arguments available.
V.
Transeundum quippe est ad Eutychen qui cum a ueterum orbitis esset euagatus, in contra rium cucurrit errorem asserens tantum abesse, ut in Christo geinina persona credatur, ut ne naturam 5 quidem in eo duplicem oporteat confiteri; ita quippe esse adsumptum hominem, ut ea sit adunatio facta cum deo, ut natura humana non manserit. Huius error ex eodem quo Nestorii fonte prolabitur. Nam sicut Nestorius arbitratur non posse esse naturam 10 duplicem quin persona fieret duplex, atque ideo, cum in Christo naturam duplicem confiteretur, duplicem credidit esse personam, ita quoque Eutyches non putauit naturam duplicem esse sine duplicatione personae et cum non confiteretur duplicem esse per- 15 sonano, arbitratus est consequens, ut una uideretur esse natura. Itaque Nestorius recte tenens duplicem in Christo esse naturam sacrilege confitetur duas esse personas; Eutyches uero recte credens unam esse personam impie credit unam quoque esse 20 naturam. Qui conuictus euidentia rerum, quandoquidem manifestum est aliam naturam esse hominis aliam dei, ait duas se confiteri in Christo naturas ante adunationem, unam uero post adunationem. Quae sententia non aperte quod uult eloquitur. Vt 25 tamen eius dementiam perscrutemur, adunatio haec aut tempore generationis facta est aut tempore resurrectionis. Sed si tempore generationis facta est, uidetur putare et ante generationem fuisse humanam carnem non a Maria sumptam sed aliquo a The ecclesiastical uia media, with the relegation of opposing theories to the extremes, which meet in a common fount of falsity, owes something to Aristotle and to our author. Vide infra, p. 118.
V.
I must now pass to Eutyches who, wandering from the path of primitive doctrine,, lias rushed into the opposite error a and asserts that so far from our having to believe in a twofold Person in Christ, we must not even confess a double Nature; humanity, he maintains, was so assumed that the union with Godhead involved the disappearance of the human nature. His error springs from the same source as that of Nestorius. For just as Nestorius deems there could not be a double Nature unless the Person were doubled, and therefore, confessing the double Nature in Christ, has perforce believed the Person to be double, so also Kutyches deemed that the Nature was not double unless the Person was double, and since he did not confess a double Person, he thought it a necessary consequence that the Nature should be regarded as single. Thus Nestorius, rightly holding Christ's Nature to be double, sacrilegiously professes the Persons to be two; whereas Eutyches, rightly believing the Person to be single, impiously believes that the Nature also is single. And being confuted by the plain evidence of facts, since it is clear that the Nature of God is different from that of man, he declares his belief to be: two Natures in Christ before the union and only one after the union. Now this statement does not express clearly what he means. However, let us scrutini/e his extravagance. It is plain that this union took place either at the moment of conception or at the moment of resurrection.
But if it happened at the moment of conception, Eutyches seems to think that even before conception He had human' flesh, not taken from Mary but