30 modo alio praeparatam, Mariam uevo uirginem appositam ex qua caro nasceretur quae ab ea sumpta non esset, illam uero carnem quae antea fuerit esse et diuisam atque a diuinitatis substantia separatam; cum ex uirgine natus est, adunatum esse deo, ut una 35 uideretur facta esse natura. Vel si haec eius sententia non est, ilia esse poterit dicentis duas ante adunationem, unam post adunationem, si adunatio generatione perfecta est, ut corpus quidem a Maria sumpserit, sed, antequam sumeret, diuersam deitatis 40 humanitatisque fuisse naturam; sumptam uero unam factam atque in diuinitatis cessisse substantiam. Quod si hanc adunationem non putat generatione sed resurrectione factam, rursus id duobus fieri arbitrabitur modis; aut enim genito Christo et non 45 adsumente de Maria corpus aut adsumente ab eadem carnem, usque dum resurgeret quidem, duas fuisse naturas, post resurrectionem unam factam. De quibus illud disiunctum nascitur, quod interrogabimus hoc modo: natus ex Maria Christus aut 50 ab ea carnem humanam traxit aut minime. Si non confitetur ex ea traxisse, dicat quo homine indutus aduenerit, utrumne eo qui deciderat praeuaricatione peccati an alio? Si eo de cuius semine ductus est homo, quern uestita diuinitas est? Nam si ex 55 semine Abrahae atque Dauid et postremo Mariae non fuit caro ilia qua natus est, ostendat ex cuius hominis sit carne deriuatus, quoniam post primum hominem caro omnis humana ex humana carne deducitur. Sed si quern dixerit.hominem a quo prepared in some other way, while the Virgin Mary was brought in to give birth to flesh that was not taken from her; that this flesh, which already existed, was apart and separate from the substance of divinity, but that when He was born of the Virgin it was united to God, so that the Nature seemed to be made one. Or if this be not his opinion, since he says that there were two Natures before the union and one after, supposing the union to be established by conception, an alternative view may be that Christ indeed took a body from Mary but that before He took it the Natures of Godhead and manhood were different: but the Nature assumed became one with that of Godhead into which it passed. But if lie thinks that this union was effected not by conception but by resurrection, we shall have to assume that this too happened in one of two ways; either Christ was conceived and did not assume a body from Mary or He did assume flesh from her, and there were (until indeed He rose) two Natures which became one after the Resurrection.
From these alternatives a dilemma arises which we will examine as follows: Christ who was born of Mary either did or did not take human flesh from her. If Eutyches does not admit that He took it from her, then let him say what manhood He put on to come among us — that which had fallen through sinful disobedience or another? If it was the man hood of that man from whom all men descend, what manhood did divinity invest? For if that flesh in which He was born came not of the seed of Abraham and of David and finally of Mary, let Eutyches show from what man's flesh he descended, since, after the first man, all human flesh is derived from human flesh. But if he shall name any child of man beside 60 generatio sumpta sit saluatoris praeter Mariam uirginem, et ipse errore confundetur et adscribere mendacii notam summae diuinitati inlusus ipse uidebitur, quando quod Abrahae atque Dauid promittitur in sanctis diuinationibus, ut ex eorum semine toti 65 mundo salus oriatur, aliis distribuit, cum praesertim, si humana caro sumpta est, non ab alio sumi potuerit nisi unde etiam procreabatur. Si igitur a Maria non est sumptum corpus humanum sed a quolibet alio, per Mariam tamen est procreatuin quod fuerat prae- 70 uai-icatione corruptum, superius dicto repellitur argumento. Quod si non eo homine Christus indutus est qui pro peccati poena sustinuerat mortem, illud eueniet ex nullius hominis semine taleni potuisse nasci qui fuerit sine originalis poena peccati. Ex 75 nullo igitur talis sumpta est caro; unde fit ut nouiter uideatur esse formata. Sed haec aut ita hominum uisa est oculis, ut humanum putaretur corpus quod reuera non esset humanum, quippe quod nulli originali subiaceret poenae, aut noua quaedam uera 80 nee poenae peccati subiacens originalis ad tempus hominis natura formata est? Si uerum hominis corpus non fuit, aperte arguitur mentita diuinitas, quae ostenderet hominibus corpus, quod cum uerum non esset, turn fallerentur ii l qui uerum esse arbitra- 85 rentur. At si noua ueraque non ex homine sumpta caro formata est, quo tanta tragoedia generationis?
Vbi ambitus passionis? Ego quippe ne in homine quidem non stulte fieri puto quod inutiliter factum 1 hii uel hi codd.
a The use of this kind of argument by Boethius allays any suspicion as to the genuineness of Tr. iv. which might be caused by the use of allegorical interpretation therein, Mary the Virgin as the cause of the conception of the Saviour, he will both be confounded by his own error., and, himself a dupe, will stand accused of stamping with falsehood the very Godhead for thus transferring to others the promise of the sacred oracles made to Abraham and David a that of their seed salvation should arise for all the world, especially since if human flesh was taken it could not be taken from any other but Him of whom it was begotten.
If, therefore, His human body was not taken from Mary but from any other, yet that was engendered through Mary which had been corrupted by dis obedience, Eutyches is confuted by the argument already stated. But if Christ did not put on that manhood which had endured death in punishment for sin, it will result that of no man's seed could ever one have been born who should be, like Him, without punishment for original sin. Therefore flesh like His was taken from no man, whence it would appear to have been new-formed for the purpose. But did this flesh then either so appear to human eyes that the body was deemed human which was not really human, because it was not subject to any primal penalty, or was some new true human flesh formed as a makeshift, not subject to the penalty for original sin? If it was not a truly human body, the Godhead is plainly convicted of falsehood for displaying to men a body which was not real and thus deceived those who thought it real. But if flesh had been formed new and real and not taken from man, to what purpose was the tremendous tragedy of the conception? Where the value of His long Passion? I cannot but consider foolish even a human action Note also that in the Gonsolatio the framework is allegory, which is also freely applied in the details.
est. Ad quam uero utilitatem facta probabitur tanta 90 humilitas diuinitatis, si homo qui periit generatione ac passione Christ! saluatus non est, quoniam negatur adsumptus? Rursus igitur sicut ab eodem Nestorii fonte Eutychis error principium sumpsit, ita ad eundem finem relabitur, ut secundum Eutychen 95 quoque non sit saluatum genus humanum, quoniam non is qui aeger esset et saluatione curaque egeret, adsumptus est. Traxisse autem hanc sententiam uidetur, si tamen huius erroris fuit ut crederet non fuisse corpus Christi uere ex homine sed extra atque 100 adeo in caelo formatum, quoniam cum eo in caelum creditur ascendisse. Quod exemplum continet tale: "non ascendit in caelum, nisi qui de caelo descendit."
VI.
Sed satis de ea parte dictum uidetur, si corpus quod Christus excepit ex Maria non credatur adsumptum. Si uero adsumptum est ex Maria neque perrnansit perfecta humana diuinaque natura, id tribus effici potuit 5 modis: aut enim diuinitas in humanitatem translata est aut humanitas in diuinitatem aut utraeque in se ita temperatae sunt atque commixtae, ut neutra substantia' propriam formam teneret. Sed si diuinitas in humanitatem translata est, factum est, quod credi 10 nefas est, ut humanitate inmutabili substantia permanente diuinitas uerteretur et quod passibile atque mutabile naturaliter exsisteret, id inmutabile permaneret, quod uero inmutabile atque inpassibile 0 Another reductio ad absurdum or ad impietatem, cf, supra, p. 98, note 6.
that is useless. And to what useful end shall we say this great humiliation of Divinity was wrought if ruined man has not been saved by the conception and the Passion of Christ — for they denied that he was taken into Godhead? Once more then, just as the error of Eutyches took its rise from the same source as that of Nestorius3 so it hastens to the same goal inasmuch as according to Eutyches also the human race has not been saved," since man who was sick and needed health and salvation was not taken into Godhead. Yet this is the conclusion he seems to have drawn, if he erred so deeply as to believe that Christ's body was not taken really from man but from a source outside him and prepared for the purpose in heaven, for He is believed to have ascended with it up into heaven. Which is the meaning of the text: none hath ascended into heaven save Him who came down from heaven.
VI.
VI.
F think enough has been said on the supposition that we should believe that the body which Christ received was not taken from Mary. But if it was taken from Mary and the human and divine natures did not continue, each in its perfection, this may have happened in one of three ways. Either Godhead was translated into manhood, or manhood into God head, or both were so modified and mingled that neither substance kept its proper form. But if God head was translated into manhood, that has happened which piety forbids us to believe, viz. while the man hood continued in unchangeable substance Godhead was changed, and that which was by nature passible and mutable remained immutable, while that which we believe to be by nature immutable and impassible naturaliter creditur, id in rem rnutabilem uerteretur.
15 Hoc igitur fieri nulla ratione contingit. Sed humana forsitan natura in deitatem uideatur esse conuersa. Hoc uero qui fieri potest, si diuinitas in generatione Christi et humanam animam suscepit et corpus? Non enim omnis res in rem omnem uerti ac transmutari 20 potest. Nam cum substantiarum aliae sint corporeae, aliae incorporeae, neque corporea in incorpoream neque incorporea in earn quae corpus est mutari potest, nee uero incorporea in se inuicem formas proprias mutant; sola enim mutari transformarique 25 in se possunt quae habent unius materiae commune subiectum, nee haec omnia, sed ea quae in se et facere et pati possunt. Id uero probatur hoc modo: neque enim potest aes in lapidem permutari nee uero idem aes in herbam nee quodlibet aliud corpus in quodlibet 30 aliud transfigurari potest, nisi et eadem sit materia rerum in se transeuntium et a se et facere et pati possint, ut, cum uinum atque aqua miscentur, utraque suiit talia quae actum sibi passionemque communicent. Potest enim aquae qualitas a uini qualitate aliquid 35 pati; potest item uini ab aquae qualitate aliquid pati. Atque idcirco si multum quidem fuerit aquae, uini uero paululum, non dicuntur inmixta, sed alterum alterius qualitate corrumpitur. Si quis enim uinum fundat in mare, non mixtum est mari uinum sed in mare 40 corruptum, idcirco quoniam qualitas aquae multitudine sui corporis nihil passa est a qualitate uini, sed potius in se ipsam uini qualitatem propria multitudine commutauit. Si uero sint mediocres sibique aequales uel paulo inaequales naturae quae a se was changed into a mutable thing. This cannot happen on any show of reasoning. But perchance the human nature may seem to be changed into God head. Yet how can this be if Godhead in the con ception of Christ received both human soul and body? Things cannot be promiscuously changed and inter changed. For since some substances are corporeal and others incorporeal, neither can a corporeal sub stance be changed into an incorporeal, nor can an incorporeal be changed into that which is body, nor yet incorporeals interchange their proper forms; for only those things can be interchanged and transformed which possess the common substrate of the same matter, nor can all of these so behave, but only those which can act upon and be acted on by each other. Now this is proved as follows: bronze can no more be converted into stone than it can be into grass, and generally no body can be transformed into any other body unless the things which pass into each other have a common matter and can act upon and be acted on by each other, as when wine and water are mingled both are of such a nature as to allow reciprocal action and influence. For the quality of water can be influenced in some degree by that of wine, similarly the quality of wine can be influenced by that of water.
And therefore if there be a great deal of water but very little wine, they are not said to be mingled, but the one is ruined by the quality of the other. For ii you pour wine into the sea the wine is not mingled with the sea but is lost in the sea, simply because the quality of the water owing to its bulk has been in no way affected by the quality of the wine, but rather by its own bulk has changed the quality of the wine into water. But if the natures which are cap able of reciprocal action and influence are in moderate 45 facere et pati possunt, illae miscentur et mediocribus inter se qualitatibus temperantur. Atque haec quidem in corporibus neque his omnibus, sed tantum quae a se, ut dictum est, et facere et pati possunt communi atque eadem materia subiecta. Omne enim 50 corpus quod in generatione et corruptioiie subsistit communem uidetur habere materiam, sed non omne ab omni uel in omni uel facere aliquid uel pati potest. Corpora uero in incorporea nulla ratione poterunt permutari, quoniam nulla communi materia subiecta 55 participant quae susceptis qualitatibus in alterutram permutetur. Omnis enim natura incorporeae substantiae nullo materiae nititur fundamento; nullum uero corpus est cui non sit materia subiecta. Quod cum ita sit cumque ne ea quidem quae communem 60 materiam naturaliter habent in se transeant, nisi illis adsit potestas in se et a se faciendi ac patiendi, multo magis in se non permutabuntur quibus non modo commuiiis materia non est, sed cum alia res materiae fundamento nititur ut corpus, alia omnino materiae 65 subiecto non egeat ut incorporeum.
Non igitur fieri potest, ut corpus in incorporalem speciem permutetur, nee uero fieri potest, ut incorporalia in sese commixtione aliqua permutentur. Quorum enim communis nulla materia est, nee in 70 se uerti ac permutari queunt. Nulla autem est incorporalibus materia rebus; non poterunt igitur in se inuicem permutari. Sed anima et deus incorporeae substantiae recte creduntur; non est igitur humana anima in diuinitatem a qua adsumpta est permutata.
proportion and equal or only slightly unequal, they are really mingled and tempered by the qualities which are in moderate relation to each other. This indeed takes place in bodies but not in all bodies, but only in those, as has been said, which are capable of reciprocal action and influence and have the same matter subject to their qualities. For all bodies which subsist in conditions of birth and decay seem to possess a common matter, but all bodies are not capable of reciprocal action and influence. But corporeals cannot in any way be changed into incorporeal s because they do not share in any common underlying matter which can be changed into this or that thing by taking on its qualities. For the nature of no in corporeal substance rests upon a material basis; but there is no body that has not matter as a substrate. Since this is so, and since not even those things which naturally have a common matter can pass over into each other unless they have the power of acting on each other and being acted upon by each other, far more will those things not suffer interchange which not only have no common matter but are different in substance, since one of them, being body, rests on a basis of matter, while the other, being incorporeal, cannot possibly stand in need of a material substrate!
It is therefore impossible for a body to be changed into an incorporeal species, nor will it ever be possible for incorporeals to be changed into each other by any process of mingling. For things which have no common matter cannot be changed and converted one into another. But incorporeal things have no matter; they can never, therefore, be changed about among themselves. But the soul and God are rightly believed to be incorporeal substances; therefore the human soul has not been converted into the Godhead 75 Quod si neque corpus neque anima in diuinitatem potuit uerti, nullo modo fieri potuit, ut humanitas conuerterettir in deum. Multo minus uero credi potest, ut utraque in sese confunderentur, quoniam neque incorporalitas transire ad corpus potest neque gO rui'sus e conuerso corpus ad incorporalitatem, quando quidem nulla his materia subiecta communis est quae alterutris substantiarum qualitatibus permutetur.
At hi ita aiunt ex duabus quidem naturis Christum consistere, in duabus uero minime, hoc scilicet in- 85 tendentes, quoniam quod ex duabus consistit ita unum fieri potest, ut ilia ex quibus dicitur constare iion maneant; ueluti cum mel aquae confunditur iieutrum manet, sed alterum alterius copulatione corruptura quiddam tertium fecit, ita illud quidem quod 90 ex melle atque aqua tertium fit constare ex utrisque dicitur, in utrisque uero negatur. Non enim poterit in utrisque constare, quando utrorumque natura non permanet. Ex utrisque enim constare potest, licet ea ex quibus coniungitur alterutra qualitate corrupta 95 sint; in utrisque uero huiusmodi constare non poterit, quoniam ea quae in se transfusa sunt non manent ac non sunt utraque in quibus constare uideatur, cum ex utrisque constet in se inuicem qualitatum mutatione transfusis.
100 Catholic! uero utrumque rationabiliter confitentur, nam et ex utrisque naturis Christum et in utrisque consistere. Sed id qua ratione dicatur, paulo poster! us explicabo. Nunc illud est manifestum conuictam esse Eutychis sententiam eo nomine, quod cum tribus by which it was assumed. But if neither body nor soul can be turned into Godhead, it could not possibly happen that manhood should be transformed into God. But it is much less credible that the two should be confounded together since neither can incorporality pass over to body, nor again, contrari wise, can body pass over into incorporality when these have no common matter underlying them which can be converted by the qualities of one of two substances.
But the Eutychians say that Christ consists indeed of two natures^ but not in two natures, meaning, no doubt, thereby, that a thing which consists of two elements can so far become one, that the elements of which it is said to be made up disappear; just as, for example, when honey is mixed with water neither remains, but the one thing being spoilt by conjunc tion with the other produces a certain third thing, so that third thing which is produced by the combina tion of honey and water is said to consist of both, but not in both. For it can never consist in both so longas the nature of both does not continue. For it can consist of both even though each element of which it is compounded has been spoiled by the quality of the other; but it can never consist in both natures of this kind since the elements which have been transmuted into each other do not continue, and both the elements in which it seems to consist cease to be, since it consists of two things translated into each other by change of qualities.
But Catholics in accordance with reason confess both, for they say that Christ consists both of and in two natures. How this can be affirmed I will explain a little later. One thing is now clear; the opinion of Eutyches has been confuted on the ground that, E 113 105 modis fieri possit, ut ex duabus naturis una subsistat, ut aut diuinitas in humanitatem translata sit aut humanitas in diuinitatem aut utraque permixta sint, nullum horum modum fieri potuisse superius dicta argumentatione declaratur.
VII.
Restat ut, quemadmoduni catholica fides dicat, et in utrisque naturis Christum et ex utrisque consistere doceamus.
Ex utrisque naturis aliquid consistere duo signi-5 ficat: unum quidem, cum ita dicimus aliquid ex duabus naturis iungi sicut ex melle atque aqua, id autem est ut ex quolibet modo confusis, uel si una uertatur in alteram uel si utraeque in se inuicem misceantur, nullo modo tamen utraeque permaneant; 10 secundum hunc modum Eutyches ait ex utrisque naturis Christum consistere.
Alter uero modus est ex utrisque consistendi quod ita ex duabus iunctum est, ut ilia tamen ex quibus iunctum esse dicitur maneant nee in alterutra 15 uertantur, ut cum dicimus coronam ex auro gemmisque compositam. Hie neque aurum in gemmas translatum est neque in aurum gemma conuersa, sed utraque permanent nee formam propriam derelinquunt. Talia ergo ex aliquibus constantia et in his constare dicimus 20 ex quibus consistere praedicantur. Tune enim possumus dicere coronam gemmis auroque consistere; sunt enim gemmae atque aurum in quibus corona although there are three ways by which the one nature can subsist of the two, vi/. either the transla tion of divinity into humanity or of humanity into divinity or the compounding of both together, the foregoing train of reasoning proves that no one of the three ways is a possibility.
VII.
It remains for us to show how in accordance witli the affirmation of Catholic belief Christ consists at once in and of both natures.
The statement that a thing consists of two natures bears two meanings; one, when we say that anything is a union of two natures, as e.g. honey and water, where the union is such that in the combination, however the elements be confounded, whether by one nature changing into the other, or by both mingling with each other, the two entirely disappear. This is the way in which according to Eutyches Christ consists of two natures.
The other way in which a thing can consist of two natures is when it is so combined of two that the elements of which it is said to be combined continue without changing into each other, as when we say that a crown is composed of gold and gems. Here neither is the gold converted into gems nor is the gem turned into gold, but both continue without surrendering their proper form.
Things then like this, composed of various elements, we say consist also in the elements of which they are composed. For in this case we can say that a crown is composed of gems and gold, for gems and gold are that in which the crown consists. For in the former consistat. Nam in priore modo non est mel atque aqua in quibus illud quod ex utrisque iungitur constet 25 Cum igitur utrasque maiiere naturas in Christo fides catholica confiteatur perfectasque easdem persistere nee alteram in alteram transmutai'i, iure dicit et in utrisque naturis Christum et ex utrisque consistere: in utrisque quidem, quia manent utraeque, ex utris- 30 que uero, quia utrarumque adunatione manentium una persona fit Christi. Non autem secundum earn siguificationem ex utrisque naturis Christum iunctum esse fides catholica tenet, secundum quam Eutyches pronuntiat. Nam ille talem significationem coniunc- 35 tioiiis ex utraque natura sumit, ut non confiteatur in utrisque consistere, neque enim utrasque manere; catholicus uero earn significationem ex utrisque consistendi sumit quae illi sit proxima eamque conseruet quae in utrisque consistere confitetur.
40 Aequiuocum igitur est "ex utrisque consistere" ac potius amphibolum et gemina significatione diuersa designans: una quidem significatione non manere substantias ex quibus illud quod copulatum est dicatur esse coniunctum, alio modo significans ita ex utrisque 45 coniunctum, ut utraque permaneant.
Hoc igitur expedite aequiuocationis atque ambiguitatis nodo nihil est ultra quod possit opponi, quin id sit quod firma ueraque fides catholica continet; eundem Christum hominem esse perfectum, euiidem deum 50 eundemque qui homo sit perfectus atque deus unum esse deum ac dei filium, nee quaternitatem trinitati adstrui, dum homo additur supra perfectum deum, sed unam eandemque personam numerum trinitatis mode of composition honey and water is not that in which the resulting union of both consists.
Since then the Catholic Faith confesses that both natures continue in Christ and that they both remain perfect, neither being transformed into the other, it says with right that Christ consists both in and of the two natures; in the two because both continue, of the two because the One Person of Christ is formed by the union of the two continuing natures.
But the Catholic Faith does not hold the union of Christ out of two natures according to that sense which Eutyches puts upon it. For the interpretation of the conjunction out of two natures which he adopts forbids him to confess consistence in two or the continuance of the two either; but the Catholic adopts an interpretation of the consistence out of two Avhich comes near to that of Eutyches, yet keeps the interpretation which confesses consistence in two.
" To consist of two natures " is therefore an equivocal or rather a doubtful term of double mean ing denoting different things; according to one of its interpretations the substances out of which the union is said to have been composed do not continue, according to another the union effected of the two is such that both natures continue.
When once this knot of doubt or ambiguity has been untied, nothing further can be advanced to shake the true and solid content of the Catholic-Faith, which is that the same Christ is perfect, man and God, and that He who is perfect man and God is One God and Son of Man, that, however, quaternity is not added to the Trinity by the addition of human nature to perfect Godhead, but that one and the same Person completes the number of the Trinity, explere, ut cum humanitas passa sit, deus tamen ,5 passus esse dicatur, non quo ipsa deitas humanitas facta sit, sed quod a deitate fuerit adsumpta. Item qui homo est, dei filius appellatur non substantia diuinitatis sed humanitatis, quae tamen diuinitati naturali unitate coniuncta est. Et cum haec ita 10 intellegentia discernantur permisceanturque, tamen unus idemque et homo sit perfectus et deus: deus quidem, quod ipse sit ex patris substantia genitus, homo uero, quod ex Maria sit uirgine procreatus. Itemque qui homo, deus eo quod a deo fuerit ad- 15 sumptus, et qui deus, homo, quoiiiam uestitus homine sit. Cumque in eadem persona aliud sit diuinitas quae suscepit, aliud quam suscepit humanitas, idem tamen deus atque homo est. Nam si hominem intellegas, idem homo est atque deus, quoniam homo '0 ex natura, deus adsumptione. Si uero deum intellegas, idem deus est atque homo, quoniam natura deus est, homo adsumptione. Fitque in eo gemina natura geminaque substantia, quoniam homo -deus unaque persona, quoniam idem homo atque deus. Mediaque '5 est haec inter duas haereses uia sicut uirtutes quoque medium tenent. Omnis enim uirtus in medio rerum decore locata consistit. Siquid enim uel ultra uel infra quam oportuerit fiat, a uirtute disceditur. Medietatem igitur uirtus tenet.
$0 Quocirca si quattuor haec neque ultra neque infra esse possunt, ut in Christo aut duae naturae sint duaeque personae ut Nestorius ait, aut una persona unaque natura ut Eutyches ait, aut duae naturae sed • Vide supra, p. 100 note.
so that, although it was the manhood which suffered, yet God can be said to have suffered, not by manhood becoming Godhead but by manhood being assumed by Godhead. Further, He who is man is called Son of God not in virtue of divine but of human substance, which latter none the less was conjoined to Godhead in a unity of natures. And although thought is able to distinguish and combine the manhood and the Godhead, yet one and the same is perfect man and God, God because He was begotten of the substance of the Father, but man because He was engendered of the Virgin Mary. And further He who is man is God in that manhood was assumed by God, and He who is God is man in that God was clothed with manhood. And although in the same Person the Godhead which took man hood is different from the manhood which It took, yet the same is God and man. For if you think of man, the same is man and God, being man by nature, God by assumption. But if you think of God, the same is God arid man, being God by nature, man by assumption. And in Him nature becomes double and substance double because He is God-man, and One Person since the same is man and God. This is the middle way between two heresies, just as virtues also hold a middle place." For every virtue has a place of honour midway between extremes. For if it stands beyond or below where it should it ceases to be virtue. And so virtue holds a middle place.
Wherefore if the following four assertions can be said to be neither beyond or below reason, viz. that in Christ are either two Natures and two Persons AS Nestorius says, or one Person and one Nature as Eutyches says, or two Natures but one Person as una persona ut catholica fides credit, aut una natura 85 duaeque personae,1 cuinque duas quidem naturas duasque personas in ea quae contra Nestorium dicta est responsione conuicerimus (unam uero personam unamque naturam esse non posse Eutyche proponente monstrauimus neque tamen tarn amens quisquam hue 90 usque exstitit, ut unam in eo naturam credere t sed geminas esse personas), restat ut ea sit uera quam fides catholica pronuntiat geminam substantiam sed unam esse personam. Quia uero paulo ante diximus Eutychen confiteri duas quidem in Christo 'ante 95 adunationem naturas, unam uero post adunationem, cumque hunc errorem duplicem interpretaremur celare sententiam, ut haec adunatio aut generatione fieret, cum ex Maria corpus hominis minime sumeretur aut ad sumptum 2 quidem ex Maria per resurrectionem 100 fieret adunatio, de utrisque quidem partibus idonee ut arbitror disputatum est. Nunc quaerendum est quomodo fieri potuerit ut dune naturae in unam substantiam miscerentur.